Posted on 10/08/2022 1:05:38 PM PDT by nuconvert
S.J.Res.106 - A joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Islamic Republic of Iran for threatening the national security of the United States through the development of nuclear weapons
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/106
Iran Update, August 3, 2024
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) issued a statement on August 3 claiming that Israel killed Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran using a short-range projectile equipped with an explosive warhead.[1] The statement claimed that the projectile was fired from outside the guesthouse where Haniyeh was staying in northern Tehran. The IRGC also claimed that the projectile was equipped with a “seven-kilogram warhead.” The IRGC vowed to retaliate severely against Israel at the “appropriate time and place” for the killing of Haniyeh.
The statement follows an August 1 New York Times report that stated, citing seven anonymous Middle Eastern officials, that Israel killed Haniyeh by remotely detonating an explosive device covertly smuggled into the Tehran guesthouse months in advance.[2] The report stated that Haniyeh had stayed at that guesthouse multiple times previously. United Kingdom-based outlet the Telegraph similarly reported on August 2 that the Israeli Mossad hired Iranian security agents from the IRGC Ansar ol Mehdi Protection Corps to plant explosives in three separate rooms in the guesthouse.[3] The Telegraph also reported that Israel originally planned to detonate the explosives targeting Haniyeh during former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s funeral in May 2024. The report stated that this original plan did not go ahead due to large crowds inside the building. The report stated that the agents then fled Iran and detonated the explosive devices from abroad. The IRGC is responsible for securing and maintaining the guesthouse.[4] The IRGC may have claimed that a projectile killed Haniyeh to deflect blame for allowing Mossad to infiltrate its security forces.
The New York Times reported on August 3 that Iran has arrested over twenty-four individuals, including senior intelligence officers, military officers, and staff at the guesthouse, in connection to the security failure that led to the killing of Haniyeh.[5] Israel has not claimed responsibility for killing Haniyeh at the time of this writing.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-3-2024
Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel in response to Israel killing Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. CTP-ISW previously outlined this scenario as one of the most dangerous courses of action that Iran could pursue.[1] Iranian state media reported on August 4 that Iran and the Axis of Resistance will conduct a “quadrilateral operation” against Israel.[2] The operation would reportedly involve Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducting coordinated strikes on Israel at the same time as Iranian forces. Iranian state media added that Hezbollah seeks to attack Israel to retaliate for Israel killing a senior Hezbollah officer in Beirut on July 30, while the Houthis seek to retaliate against Israel for the IDF airstrike on July 20 that hit Houthi military targets in al Hudaydah, Yemen.[3] The leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Akram al Kaabi, published an image on August 4 signaling his intent to participate in an attack on Israel.[4] Three anonymous US and Israeli officials told Axios on August 4 that Iran and the Axis of Resistance could conduct their coordinate attack as soon as August 5.[5]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance will probably conduct an attack that is more escalatory than the drone and missile attack that Iran conducted against Israel in April 2024. Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 120 ballistic missiles, and 30 cruise missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack. Iran designed this strike package of over 300 projectiles to inflict serious damage on Israel and sought to thereby establish deterrence. But the United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted the vast majority of projectiles, so that the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[6]
Iran could modify the April 2024 attack model in at least four ways to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.
1. Iran could increase the volume of projectiles fired at Israel. Iran could fire more drones and missiles from Iranian territory or instruct its proxy and partner militias across the Middle East to fire more. Drones and missiles fired from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria would be much harder to intercept than those launched from Iran given the shorter distances and flight times to Israel. US and Israeli forces would have significantly less time than they did in April 2024 to intercept those projectiles.
2. Iran could change the number of locations in Israel that it targets. Iran targeted two remote locations in Israel in the April 2024 attack.[7] Iran could exploit the short flight times from Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria to concentrate fire on a single target rather than against two. Shorter flight times for drones from Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria could make it easier to coordinate them with ballistic missiles fired from Iran. Tehran could alternatively attack a greater number of targets across Israel.
3. Iran could order simultaneous attacks on US forces, especially in eastern Syria. Iran only targeted Israeli targets in the April 2024 attack. Iranian-backed militia attacks attacking US positions could, in some circumstances, pull American attention and resources away from identifying and intercepting projectiles bound for Israel.[8] Iranian leaders may calculate that their projectiles have a higher likelihood of penetrating Israeli air defenses if the United States has to focus on defending its own forces.
4. Iran and its allies could conduct a series of drone and missile attacks over several days. The April 2024 attack consisted of only one large volley of drones and missiles fired from Iran. But Iran and its allies could fire multiple volleys over an extended period in the next attack. Stretching attacks over this period could enable Iran and the Axis of Resistance to learn and adjust their attacks as they observe how successful each volley is.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance have a shrinking window of opportunity to attack Israel as the United States moves additional military assets to the Middle East. The United States has decided to send a carrier strike group, naval cruisers and destroyers, and a squadron of fighter jets to the Middle East in preparation for an Iranian-led attack on Israel.[9] The arrival of these assets to the region would improve the ability of the United States to respond to an Iranian attack, which Iranian leaders almost certainly recognize. Tehran may conclude that it needs to launch an attack before the United States can position and ready its assets in the region in order to maximize how much damage Iran inflicts on Israel.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-4-2024
Iran Update, August 5, 2024
Iran’s identification of targets in Israel does not independently verify CTP-ISW’s assessment of a likely Iranian strike because it is more likely intended to achieve informational effects rather than to specify the precise targets to be struck. Iran’s messaging does align with CTP-ISW’s assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel, however.[6] The operation could involve Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias conducting coordinated strikes on Israel at the same time as Iranian forces. Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias have all expressed an intent to attack Israel.[7] CTP-ISW has observed unconfirmed reports that additional groups, such as Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Palestinian fighters in the West Bank may participate in an Iranian-led attack.[8]
More: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-5-2024
The full inside story of how Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – minute by minute
Hamas boss Haniyeh’s assassination, which was decided on after October 7, necessitated a complicated set of arrangements from a network of Mossad spies
Reports have suggested that the device was placed in Haniyeh’s room weeks or months before the explosion. This is wrong. Security cameras show it was placed on the day of the explosion, at 4:23 pm - some nine hours before it was activated when Haniyeh entered his room. The explosion, which was set off remotely by a robot, took place after midnight, at exactly 01:37am local time.
To prevent possible detection, the Mossad planted a flat brick explosive, 3 inches wide by 6 inches long, that was fastened to the bottom of the bed. To minimise harming innocent civilians, they used a bomb known for its precision which targeted only Haniyeh’s room. As a result, only one specific area of the building was damaged (see the image on this page).
A2734/24 NOTAMN
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AUG 08 /0430-0730
E) GUN FIRING WILL TAKE PLACE WI AREA :
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CREATED: 06 Aug 2024 08:03:00
SOURCE: OIIIYNYX
https://www.notams.faa.gov/dinsQueryWeb/queryRetrievalMapAction.do?reportType=Raw&retrieveLocId=oiix&actionType=notamRetrievalbyICAOs
Iran Update, August 6, 2024
Unspecified US officials told Axios on August 5 that the US intelligence community expects Iran and its Axis of Resistance to conduct two waves of attacks in its retaliation against Israel for the death of Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.[1] US intelligence officials reportedly briefed a potential scenario to US President Joe Biden and US Vice President Kamala Harris in which Hezbollah would conduct an attack on Israel in a wave separate from another Iranian and Axis attack. Intelligence officials noted that it is not clear whether Iran and the Axis or Hezbollah would launch the first attack. One unspecified US official cited by Axios said that intelligence reports suggest Iranian and Hezbollah planning is a “work in progress.”
Iran and its Axis of Resistance would likely use the first wave of the attack on Israel to assess Israeli air defenses in preparation for the second wave of the attack. The April 2024 attack consisted of only one large volley of drones and missiles fired from Iran.[2] CTP-ISW noted on August 4 that Iran and its allies could use multiple attacks targeting Israel to learn and adjust their attacks as they observe how successful they are.[3] Iran and the Axis could adjust the volume or type of projectiles fired at Israel, targets, and launch locations.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024
Russian officials are continuing coordination with Iran ahead of the Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel out of concern for Russian interests in the region. Reuters reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a message via Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu that Iran should act with restraint and avoiding targeting civilians when retaliating against Israel.[28] An unspecified Iranian diplomat claimed to IranWire that Russia is opposed to Iranian strikes that could lead to the death of civilians due to the large number of Russian citizens who live in Israel. The report did not make clear how an Iranian official would understand the calculus behind the Russian decision making.[29]
Russia is also reportedly assisting Iranian efforts to improve its air defenses against Israeli attacks, according to the New York Times.[30] The New York Times, citing two unspecified Iranian officials including an IRGC member, stated that Russia began delivering advanced radars and air-defense systems to Iran.[31] Iranian media has previously reported that Iran sought to acquire Russian air defense systems to improve Iran's air defense network and defend against Israeli attack, according to the New York Times.
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) highlighted a “notable increase” in Iranian statements on Iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon, corroborating previous CTP-ISW reporting. ODNI published the 2024 annual report in compliance with the “Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022” on July 23.[32] The ODNI assessed that ”Iran probably will consider installing more centrifuges” and increasing its enriched uranium stockpile ”up to 90 percent in response to additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program.”[33] The ODNI also emphasized a ”notable increase” of Iranian officials’ statements on Iran's nuclear activities, including their ability to produce a nuclear weapon. This corroborates previous CTP-ISW reporting since May, which has noted that senior Iranian officials have normalized public discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[34]
The death of a Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the July 30 US strike in Iraq indicates a possible Iranian-backed effort to improve the targeting capabilities of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against both US forces and Israel.[21] The United States conducted a self-defense strike that killed a senior Houthi commander and drone expert at Kataib Hezbollah's Jurf al Sakhr facility in Iraq on July 30.[22] The Houthis confirmed that the strike killed the commander, who had traveled to Iraq to train other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in drone tactics.[23] An Iraqi journalist also reported that four other Houthi fighters died in the strike and that all five Houthis were buried in Wadi al Salam in Najaf, Iraq.[24] The Houthis have years of experience conducting successful drone attacks targeting facilities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that are protected by US air defense systems, such as the Patriot and THAAD.[25] The Houthis more recently have proven that their drones can evade Israeli air defense systems, at least in isolated incidents.[26] This is notable given the relative lack of success Iraqi-backed militias have had in targeting US positions in the region. Houthi instruction may therefore be aimed at improving the success of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against both the United States and Israel.
The Houthi decision to deploy this commander to Iraq to train Iraqi militias suggests that Iran and the Houthis seek to rapidly accelerate the training of these militias. Iran and the Houthis could have presumably decided to send small numbers of Iraqi militia members to Yemen for training as part of a “train-the-trainer”-style program. The drone expert's presence in Iraq, however, would have enabled him to train much larger numbers of Iraqi militia members much more rapidly, allowing the knowledge to be disseminated directly without an intermediary trainer. The Iraqi journalist also reported that the Houthis were coordinating with Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Ansarallah al Awfiya, and other Iranian-backed militias, which would be consistent with an effort to train larger numbers of fighters and Iraqi militias more efficiently.[27]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024
I [Jonathan Conricus] explain who Sinwar is and why he’s still alive after being nominated the “political” leader of Hamas on NewsNation, and try to assess why the Iranians haven’t attacked Israel yet.
https://x.com/jconricus/status/1821426875790405870
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D) AUG 13 / 0630-0830 AND AUG 15 / 1330-1530
Iran Update, August 8, 2024
CTP-ISW continues to assess that a coordinated large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel by Iran and its Axis of Resistance is the most likely Iranian response to Israel’s killing of senior axis leaders.[1] CTP-ISW assessed on July 31 that a coordinated large-scale drone attack resembling the Iranian April 2024 attack on Israel was one of the most dangerous but not most likely courses of action.[2] The Iranian regime’s public descriptions of a direct attack on Israel, including statements from senior Iranian officials and armed forces-affiliated outlets, caused CTP-ISW to judge that the most dangerous course of action was more likely to occur. (The most dangerous course of action Iran and its partners could pursue would actually be a full-scale attack on Israel and on US forces, but CTP-ISWs assesses that neither Iran nor Lebanese Hezbollah is at all likely to pursue such a course of action.) CTP-ISW is providing a forecast of the likelihood of a given Iranian action based on available data in an open-source environment. CTP-ISW is not offering a definitive prediction that Iran and its proxies and partners will undertake any specific action.
Senior Iranian security officials and an Iranian armed forces-affiliated outlet have discussed a possible Iranian and Hezbollah drone and missile strike in notable detail, including discussions about the Iranian partners involved, lists of possible targets, and descriptions of methods to increase the likelihood of a successful strike.[3] Defa Press, an outlet run by an Iranian institution that reports directly to the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), published a list of potential targets and methods to increase the success of the attack, which increased CTP-ISW’s confidence that Iran was considering a large-scale attack.[4] The AFGS would be responsible for planning and conducting a retaliatory strike against Israel. Statements from Iranian decisionmakers have also increased CTP-ISW’s confidence that Iran will choose this dangerous course of action. Iranian AFGS Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri stated on August 1 that both Iran and the Axis of Resistance will be involved in the retaliation, indicating that Iran will directly strike Israel.[5] Supreme National Security Council secretary and acting Iranian foreign affairs minister both suggested that Iran would directly participate in the retaliation in statements on August 1 and August 7 respectively.[6]
Divergent goals and priorities between Iran and Hezbollah could create friction between the two and disagreement on the timing and coordination of an attack. Unspecified US officials told Axios on August 5 that the US intelligence community expects Iran and its Axis of Resistance to conduct two waves of attacks against Israel.[14] Unspecified sources ”familiar with the intelligence” speaking to CNN have similarly claimed that Hezbollah is prepared to strike Israel independent of Iran.[15] These divisions may be appearing because Hezbollah and Iran have different constraints and goals for a retaliatory attack on Israel. Both groups want to establish deterrence with Israel but may have differing urgency. Hezbollah may feel increasing pressure to retaliate given Israeli operations targeting Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon and Syria since the targeted killing of Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30.[16] Hezbollah is also constrained by the Lebanese political scene. Hezbollah leaders are likely additionally considering how a Hezbollah retaliatory strike on Israel will affect if and when the IDF launches a major military operation into Lebanon. A Hezbollah retaliation that triggers an Israeli ground operation could be perceived as dragging all of Lebanon into Hezbollah’s war. Iranian decisionmakers are not under the same temporal pressure as Hezbollah given that Israel has not continued to conduct attacks in Iran or against Iranian targets since killing Haniyeh on July 31. Iranian leaders are likely incentivized to carefully and slowly assemble a strike package that both hurts Israel and avoids escalation into a wider war.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-8-2024
Two Iranian Nationals and One Pakistani National Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists
A superseding indictment was returned yesterday charging two Iranian citizens, brothers Shahab Mir’kazei (Shahab) and Yunus Mir’kazei (Yunis), and one Pakistani citizen, Muhammad Pahlawan, for conspiring to provide and providing material support to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program resulting in death and conspiring to commit violence against maritime navigation and maritime transport involving weapons of mass destruction resulting in death. Pahlawan is currently awaiting trial, while Shahab and Yunus remain at large.
According to the court documents, Shahab and Yunus work for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Pahlawan, is a Pakistani citizen who allegedly worked for the Mir’kazei brothers as the captain of a smuggling vessel known as a dhow, named the “Yunus,” which is owned by Shahab.
The type of weaponry found aboard the dhow is allegedly consistent with the weaponry used by the Houthi rebel forces in recent attacks on merchant ships and U.S. military ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will likely conduct a coordinated strike targeting Israel in retaliation for the death of former Hamas Political Bureau head Ismail Haniyeh on July 31. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has continued to communicate that Iran will retaliate “forcefully” against Israel to restore deterrence. Three anonymous Iranian officials told The New York Times that Khamenei ordered a direct strike on Israel during the SNSC meeting on August 7.[1] Khamenei later published a statement that blamed Israel directly and vowed retaliation, and his personal website published an article on August 8 arguing that it is Iran's duty to seek retribution for the death of Haniyeh.[2] The article stated that Iran is prepared to respond with “authority.”[3] Other top Iranian officials who would be involved in the planning and execution of the strike have also threatened Israel in response to Haniyeh’s death. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi stated that Khamenei has ordered Iranian forces to “harshly punish” Israel for the death of Haniyeh.[4] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani similarly restated Khamenei’s orders to “avenge” Haniyeh’s death in a letter to Hamas’ new Political Bureau head Yahya Sinwar on August 9.[5] Ghaani reassured Sinwar that Iran will inflict a harsh punishment on Israel for Haniyeh’s death. Khamenei holds ultimate decision-making power in Iran and would have to approve any retaliatory strike on Israel, making his statements on the strike particularly noteworthy.
This coordinated strike will likely include two waves of attacks from Iran and its Axis of Resistance. Western intelligence officials continue to assess that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will conduct two waves of attacks targeting Israel. Two Israeli officials and a senior Western intelligence official cited by the Wall Street Journal on August 9 said that the latest intelligence suggests that Hezbollah and members of Iran's Axis of Resistance will likely conduct the first wave of attacks targeting Israel.[6] The sources said that Iran is expected to conduct a second independent wave of attacks on Israel. This is consistent with an Axios report on August 5, which highlighted a similar scenario two-wave scenario.[7] The Axios report did not, however, make clear whether Iran or Hezbollah would launch the first attack. Unspecified sources “familiar with intelligence [about the attacks]” told CNN that Hezbollah is prepared to strike Israel independently of Iran.[8]
Iran and Hezbollah leaders may choose to conduct separate waves of attacks—as described by The New York Times on August 9—to satisfy divergent goals and priorities.[9] CTP-ISW noted that Iran and Hezbollah have partially divergent imperatives that could create friction between the two parties and disagreement on the timing and coordination of an attack.[10] Both groups want to establish deterrence with Israel but may have different feelings of urgency. Hezbollah leaders may feel increasing pressure to retaliate given repeated Israeli operations that have killed Hezbollah commanders in southern Lebanon and Syria since the targeted killing of Fuad Shukr in Beirut on July 30.[11] Iranian decision-makers are likely not under the same temporal pressure as Hezbollah given that Israel has not continued to conduct attacks in Iran or against Iranian targets since killing Haniyeh on July 31. Iranian leaders are likely incentivized to carefully and slowly assemble a strike package that both hurts Israel and avoids escalation into a wider war.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-9-2024
Different elements of the Iranian regime have advocated for varying responses to Israel's killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. The different messages across the regime are very likely emblematic of differences in opinion between different camps in the regime. The messages may also reflect changes in position within these camps. Senior Iranian military and security officials, as well as Iranian armed forces- and IRGC-affiliated media, have suggested that Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, for example, claimed on August 10 that Israel “only understands [the] language of force.”[2] Iranian armed forces-run outlet Defa Press separately published an article on August 10 speculating that Iran could attack Tel Aviv and Haifa.[3] The publication of this article does not necessarily mean that Iran will target Tel Aviv and Haifa, and more likely reflects the Iranian armed forces’ general desire to strike Israel directly. Other elements of the regime, including moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan or Azerbaijan to avoid a direct conflict with Israel.[4] It is not possible to conclusively determine from individual statements exactly how and when Iran will respond to Israel given that these statements intentionally and unintentionally obfuscate regime discussions and Iran's intent behind a potential attack.
The general trends reflected in Iranian rhetoric, however, support CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. The number of Iranian official statements vowing a “harsh” and “forceful” response to Israel far outweigh the number of statements calling for a more limited response. CTP-ISW’s assessment is also not only based on Iranian rhetorical statements, but also on CTP-ISW’s prior assessments about Iranian objectives and perceived strategic requirements. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to restore deterrence after its unsuccessful April 2024 attack while simultaneously trying to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.[5] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack.[6] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[7] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[8] CTP-ISW will continue to track and report the general trends in Iranian rhetoric across different elements of the regime while highlighting which elements of the regime likely have the most influence.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-10-2024
Iran Update, August 11, 2024
Iran has not retaliated quickly against Israel because Iran very likely seeks to ensure that its next attack restores deterrence with Israel while simultaneously avoiding a large-scale war. Iran previously attacked Israel on April 13, 12 days after Israel killed one of Iran’s senior-most military commanders in Syria on April 1.[1] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in its April 2024 attack.[2] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[3] Iranian leaders are therefore incentivized to carefully and slowly calculate their next attack to ensure that the attack inflicts serious damage on Israel, thereby restoring Iranian deterrence with Israel. Iran will likely also ensure that the attack will not trigger a major war. Western intelligence sources previously assessed that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13, although Iran might wait longer to conduct its next attack to ensure that the attack achieves its strategic goals.[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2024
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is conducting a military exercise in Kermanshah Province in western Iran between August 9 and 13 to “enhance combat readiness and vigilance.”[9] The Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which covers Kermanshah, Hamedan, and Ilam provinces, is overseeing the exercise.[10] The 29th IRGC Nabi Akram Division operates under the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base.[11] Iran separately issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) on August 10 warning pilots not to fly near the Nojeh Airbase in Hamedan Province between August 11 and 14.[12] This NOTAM is similar to previous Iranian NOTAMs issued over the last week.[13]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2024
Iran Update, August 12, 2024
US and Israeli officials have warned that Iran will likely conduct a large-scale, coordinated attack targeting Israel in the days ahead.[1] White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby expressed concern on August 12 about the “increasing probability that Iran and its proxies will attack in the coming days.”[2] Israel similarly assesses that Iran will likely attack Israel directly “within days,” according to unspecified sources speaking to Axios.[3] These warnings are consistent with Western intelligence sources previously assessing that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13.[4]
The unspecified sources separately told Axios that Israel expects Lebanese Hezbollah to attack first followed by a direct Iranian attack.[5] Axios similarly reported on August 5 that the United States expects Iran and its Axis of Resistance to conduct “two waves” of attacks on Israel, citing unspecified US officials.[6] The officials added that the Iran-Hezbollah attack will likely be “bigger” than the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024 and that Iran and Hezbollah might target military sites near civilian areas.[7] These statements are all consistent with CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel in response to Israel killing senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.[8]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2024
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