Different elements of the Iranian regime have advocated for varying responses to Israel's killing of Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31. The different messages across the regime are very likely emblematic of differences in opinion between different camps in the regime. The messages may also reflect changes in position within these camps. Senior Iranian military and security officials, as well as Iranian armed forces- and IRGC-affiliated media, have suggested that Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel.[1] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani, for example, claimed on August 10 that Israel “only understands [the] language of force.”[2] Iranian armed forces-run outlet Defa Press separately published an article on August 10 speculating that Iran could attack Tel Aviv and Haifa.[3] The publication of this article does not necessarily mean that Iran will target Tel Aviv and Haifa, and more likely reflects the Iranian armed forces’ general desire to strike Israel directly. Other elements of the regime, including moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian, have advocated for attacking “secret Israeli bases” in Iraqi Kurdistan or Azerbaijan to avoid a direct conflict with Israel.[4] It is not possible to conclusively determine from individual statements exactly how and when Iran will respond to Israel given that these statements intentionally and unintentionally obfuscate regime discussions and Iran's intent behind a potential attack.
The general trends reflected in Iranian rhetoric, however, support CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale attack on Israel. The number of Iranian official statements vowing a “harsh” and “forceful” response to Israel far outweigh the number of statements calling for a more limited response. CTP-ISW’s assessment is also not only based on Iranian rhetorical statements, but also on CTP-ISW’s prior assessments about Iranian objectives and perceived strategic requirements. CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran likely seeks to restore deterrence after its unsuccessful April 2024 attack while simultaneously trying to avoid a large-scale war with Israel.[5] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in the April 2024 attack.[6] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[7] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran could modify its April 2024 attack model in several ways, including by increasing the volume of projectiles it fires at Israel or changing the number of locations in Israel that it targets, to increase the likelihood of inflicting serious damage on Israel.[8] CTP-ISW will continue to track and report the general trends in Iranian rhetoric across different elements of the regime while highlighting which elements of the regime likely have the most influence.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-10-2024
Iran Update, August 11, 2024
Iran has not retaliated quickly against Israel because Iran very likely seeks to ensure that its next attack restores deterrence with Israel while simultaneously avoiding a large-scale war. Iran previously attacked Israel on April 13, 12 days after Israel killed one of Iran’s senior-most military commanders in Syria on April 1.[1] Iran and its allies fired around 170 one-way attack drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles at Israel in its April 2024 attack.[2] The United States, Israel, and their allies intercepted most of the projectiles, and the Iranian attack did significantly less damage than Tehran intended.[3] Iranian leaders are therefore incentivized to carefully and slowly calculate their next attack to ensure that the attack inflicts serious damage on Israel, thereby restoring Iranian deterrence with Israel. Iran will likely also ensure that the attack will not trigger a major war. Western intelligence sources previously assessed that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13, although Iran might wait longer to conduct its next attack to ensure that the attack achieves its strategic goals.[4]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2024
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is conducting a military exercise in Kermanshah Province in western Iran between August 9 and 13 to “enhance combat readiness and vigilance.”[9] The Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base, which covers Kermanshah, Hamedan, and Ilam provinces, is overseeing the exercise.[10] The 29th IRGC Nabi Akram Division operates under the Najaf-e Ashraf Operational Base.[11] Iran separately issued a notice to airmen (NOTAM) on August 10 warning pilots not to fly near the Nojeh Airbase in Hamedan Province between August 11 and 14.[12] This NOTAM is similar to previous Iranian NOTAMs issued over the last week.[13]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2024