Ft, Sumpter was in South Carolina, a southern state. Lincoln ignored the request to remove Union troops from the fort, hoping to provoke the Confederacy into reacting so he would have an excuse to invade.Besides Gettysburg where else did the Confederacy invade the North? IIRC, 95% of the battles were fought in the South.
The Confederate forces invaded Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland, all states of the Union.
Why should the President of the United States remove U.S. Troops from a U.S. Fort, based solely on a request by the state government.
I suppose you think it fitting that we should give up Guantanamo Bay because the current Cuban Government does not want us there.
It was the property of the federal government. Why should they leave?
...hoping to provoke the Confederacy into reacting so he would have an excuse to invade
So your excuse was that you fell right into Lincoln's trap? Not very smart of you.
Besides Gettysburg where else did the Confederacy invade the North?
Maryland in 1862. Ohio in 1863. Kansas in 1863 and 1864.
IIRC, 95% of the battles were fought in the South.
If you start a war then you can't blame anyone but yourself if it comes home to haunt you.
No Lincoln was resupplying a FEDERAL fortification not opening hostilities. Yeah, most of the battles were fought in the South. Because THEY STARTED THE WAR!
General Lee invaded the North twice !
“Robert E. Lee firmly believed that for the Confederacy to survive he needed to win a major victory on Northern soil. He was to get two chances to put this theory to the test, and each case he was to loose his battle.”
“All in all, Lee took 50,000 men into Maryland on 4 September, crossing the Potomac about thirty miles west of Washington.
On 7 September Lee’s army stopped at Frederick, north of its crossing point. There Lee hoped to recruit secessionist Marylanders, but the secessionist areas of the state were further east and south. The first part of Lee’s plan to fail was his hope for reinforcements from Maryland.
The same day saw McClellan lead an 85,000 Union army out of the Washington defences to face Lee. Another 72,000 men were left behind to defend Washington. This was a serious mistake, not because McClellan’s army was too small, but because he had convinced himself that Lee had 100,000 men, and so he was outnumbered!
Lee’s original plan had been to march north through Maryland into Pennsylvania, but he now allowed his entire campaign to be derailed by the small Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry, to his west on the Potomac. On 10 September Lee’s army left Frederick, and headed west. Lee now took a massive gamble, splitting his army into five segments. Three were to concentrate against Harper’s Ferry, while two guarded the routes east and north. Lee was confident that he could capture Harpers Ferry and reunite the army before McClellan got anywhere near, or possibly even before he realised that Lee had split his forces.
This was improbable to say the least. McClellan was receiving a great deal of accurate intelligence about Lee’s movements now he was in Maryland, but on 13 September he received a stroke of luck that should have allowed him to role up Lee’s entire army. A copy of Lee’s Special Order 191, detailing his plan for the attack on Harpers Ferry, was found by two Union solders. Worse, the copy was written in handwriting that was recognised as belonging to Lee’s assistant adjutant-general. The order was genuine, and McClellan accepted it as such.
Even with this information, McClellan still proved incapable of moving quickly. On 14 September he managed to force his way through the mountain passes north of Harpers Ferry, but then halted again. Harpers Ferry did not fall to the Confederates until the following day, 15 September. On that same day, Lee decided to move his part of the army, some 15,000 men, south to Sharpsburg, with Antietam Creek running south to north just to his east. The first Federal units reached the east bank of the creek at noon on the same day.
This was McClellan’s great chance. The bulk of his army was no more than half a days march away. On 15 September he could have attacked Lee’s 15,000-20,000 men with most of his 80,000. The following day part of the Harpers Ferry force reached Lee, but even at the end of the day he only had 25,000 men. Still McClellan did not attack.
Finally, on 17 September McClellan attacked. The resulting Battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg saw a series of determined but uncoordinated Union attacks that came close to breaking Lee’s line on several occasions. On each occasion, McClellan failed to support the attack, and convinced that he was still outnumbered never used his reserves. Antietam saw the highest casualty figures of any single days fighting in the entire war. Lee lost 2,700 dead, 9,024 wounded and 2,000 missing out of a total force of 40,000. Union losses were 2,108 killed, 9,549 wound and 753 missing out, similar total numbers out of a much larger army.
McClellan was given yet another chance on 18 September. Lee remained in his lines all day, with his forces down to at most 30,000 men. McClellan had nearly that many fresh soldiers who had taken no part in the fighting on the previous day, but was still convinced that Lee had massive reserves, and did not attack. Finally, during the evening of 18 September Lee withdrew across the Potomac back into Virginia.
Antietam was McClellan’s last great chance to defeat Lee. On 7 November he was finally replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. He persisted in claiming Antietam as a military masterpiece. Although it was far from that, it did have long reaching effects. For some time Lincoln had been waiting for a victory before issuing the Emancipation Proclamation. Antietem was enough of a victory. The Proclamation helped change the nature of the war, giving the Union cause a great moral advantage. Antietam also discouraged any thoughts the British government might have had about recognising the Confederacy. Lee’s gamble had failed.”
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_american_civil_war05_invading_north.html