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I thought so, too, but I believe I have it right.

The British really wanted to be sure we were as involved as possible in the Atlantic.

The British were also quite concerned with Singapore.

I always wondered what the Japanese Navy did after Pearl Harbor?

They sailed into the Indian Ocean and scared Churchill something fierce.

Pretty sure you’re wrong. The closest thing to it was the Arcadia Conference of December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942. The upshot of that with regards to what we’re discussing is that we agreed to base US bombers in England for multiple uses including maritime patrol and the British agreed to strengthen/reinforce their forces in the Pacific. It also agreed that Germany would be the priority and set a limit on forces of all nations that would be committed to the Pacific. That last kind of went out the window as the U-Boat threat diminished with the closure of the air gap, the Kriegsmarine was steadily converted into an interesting series of artificial reefs for sealife conservation, and the naval forces committed to Europe ran out of things to do.

The British were also quite concerned with Singapore.

I always wondered what the Japanese Navy did after Pearl Harbor?

They sailed into the Indian Ocean and scared Churchill something fierce.

But that scare as you put it, ultimately turned to their detriment. The British had a deep concern about Ceylon too since it was a strongpoint gateway to the Indian Ocean - whomever controlled Ceylon controlled the lines of communication through the Indian Ocean. The Japs initially wanted a force to invade and hold Ceylon but could not get those resources built up for such an operation, so they scaled back to making a raid instead to see if they could damage British assets if not wipe out the British Eastern Fleet. They did do damage, but could not exploit it so they withdrew, leaving the area still in British hands with a largely intact fleet. The detriment to the Japs was how the RAF chewed up their aircraft during that action. So much so that three of the carriers had to return to Japan for new planes and train new pilots. That helped us out a lot since there were only two of the five carriers available for the battle of the Coral Sea about a month later, and when we faced them at Midway in June they had a bunch of green, second-string pilots to contest us. Admiral Nagumo would have done well to have skipped engaging in that action. If he had retired and rested his group after Pearl there would have been forces sufficient enough to have made a difference against us at Coral Sea and even Midway.