[ransomnote]

another two paragraph at the link

A win for a court case that favors the definition of "freedom of the presses" in the first amendment to mean the presses, not just for speshul snowflakes (people who are members of the press).

[freerepublicchat]

The average person should have more protection from libel than a professional, IMO.

This ruling helps a little, but it's still odd that those whose job it is to state the facts get a pass when they're in error, while the average person is at risk.

[FredZarguna]

It's quite hard to see how they could sensibly rule any other way. At the time the Bill of Rights was verified, journalists were not credentialed in any serious way. A lot of the political speech during that time and in the run-up to the Revolution was done by pamphleteers, and by nailing essays in public places. "The press" meant literally anyone with access to a printing press. Pretty much what the Internet and other media are now.

Such a slam dunk even the Ninth Circus could not phuq't'up.

[TChad]

Thank you, Eugene Volokh! A big win, and in the Ninth Circus!

[ransomnote]

From the comments section:

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Fred Bernstein
• 3 hours ago

Congratulations, Eugene, on the win. The court decided the case correctly. But I find the “matter of public concern” reasoning weak. Doesn’t there have to be at least some truth to a statement before it qualifies? Otherwise, I could accuse a important person of criminal behavior, entirely falsely, and then claim the “matter of public concern” defense.

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EugeneVolokh Conspirator Fred Bernstein
• 2 hours ago

Thanks! But as to the public concern point: Indeed, if you accuse an important person of criminal behavior, entirely falsely, you are protected by New York Times v. Sullivan (if he’s a public official or a public figure) or Gertz v. Robert Welch (if he’s a private figure). You’re not absolutely protected; he can still win if he can show negligence (under Gertz as to proven compensatory damages) or recklessness/knowledge of falsehood (under Gertz as to other damages, or under Sullivan if that applies). But he can’t avoid the need to show this mens rea by just showing that the statement was false (whether partly or entirely) — the whole logic of Gertz, Sullivan, and similar cases is that some false statements will be protected so that true statements won’t be unduly deterred.

That a statement is on a subject that’s of public concern is the threshold for having Gertz and Sullivan apply. But once the subject matter is of public concern, those cases do apply, and do indeed shield even some false statements. Thus, for instance, the Dun & Bradstreet lead opinion begins by saying,

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., we held that the First Amendment restricted the damages that a private individual could obtain from a publisher for a libel that involved a matter of public concern. More specifically, we held that in these circumstances the First Amendment prohibited awards of presumed and punitive damages for false and defamatory statements unless the plaintiff shows “actual malice,” that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.

Thus, even if a statement is proven to be “false and defamatory,” Gertz applies “for a libel that involved a matter of public concern.” That analysis wouldn’t be consistent with the view that falsehood strips the statement of “public concern” status.

[Alberta's Child]

On principle this is a good ruling, but when you look at the facts of the case it may not be so good.

The person in this case admittedly posted an inflammatory and defamatory statement in an online blog, and was sued by the target of the attack. The plaintiff was awarded substantial damages, and the blogger then tried (successfully) to hide behind his or her First Amendment rights as a "journalist" in appealing the award.