Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 1 that the third round of US-Russian discussions to address “irritants” will “definitely take place before the end of autumn [2025]” but that Russia and the United States have not yet agreed on a specific date.[1] Ryabkov claimed that Russia is waiting for US President Donald Trump's response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent proposal to extend Russia's adherence to the New START Treaty, a bilateral nuclear arms limitations treaty that entered into force in 2011, for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[2] Ryabkov further claimed that the United States must either “pursue stabilization” with Russia or engage in “a new arms race, which [Russia] opposes, even though [Russia is] guaranteed to ensure [its] own security.”[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 1 that Russia cannot plan high-level contacts between Russia and Ukraine because Ukraine has stopped the negotiation process.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to normalizing bilateral relations with the United States for economic and political gain while protracting its war in Ukraine to make additional gains on the battlefield as the Kremlin obstructs peace efforts.[5] Russia is also attempting to discredit Ukraine by baselessly accusing the Ukrainian government of halting the negotiation process to distract from Russia's uncompromising demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation.[6]
Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace. Norwegian public broadcaster NRK reported on October 1 that Norwegian authorities spotted an unidentified drone on September 30 near an airport in Bronnesund, prompting authorities to divert one scheduled flight and cancel remaining flights.[7] NRK also reported that Norwegian police detained eight People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens following reports of an unidentified drone flight near the Svolvaer Airport, arrested one of the tourists, and seized drone equipment. The Norwegian police stated that there is no current apparent connection between a state actor and the Svolvaer Airport or other drone incidents. [8] French authorities stopped the Russian Borocay shadow-fleet-linked tanker off the coast of the Saint-Nazaire port in western France on September 30 and seized the tanker and detained the captain and first mate on October 1.[9] French President Emanuel Macron stated that the Borocay’s crew committed ”very serious offenses.”[10] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.[11] The Maritime Executive reported that European authorities are investigating three Russia-linked vessels that were sailing near the Copenhagen Airport when unidentified drone flights recently forced the airport to close.[12] Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet reported that the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Alexander Shabalin had been off the Danish coast for days during heavy drone flights at Danish airports and that Danish authorities are investigating the ship's role in the drone operations.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk similarly reported on September 28 and 29 that intelligence indicates that Russia is likely launching drones into NATO airspace from Russian shadow fleet tankers and is leveraging such vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters.[14]
The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction. The commander of Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kherson direction reported on October 1 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from near Chasiv Yar to the Kherson direction to replace elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) that redeployed from the Kherson direction to Donetsk Oblast at an unspecified date.[15] Geolocated footage from a Russian source shows Russian forces, purportedly elements of the 98th VDV Division, striking a house in Prydniprovske, Kherson Oblast.[16] These are the first reports that ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating outside of the Chasiv Yar direction, where the division has operated nearly exclusively since April 2023.[17] ISW has observed reports that some elements of the 98th VDV Division remain active near Chasiv Yar as recently as October 1, 2025, indicating that this reported Russian redeployment is likely occurring slowly and that the division may be splitting its elements across various sectors of the front.[18] It is currently unclear whether the Russian military command would redeploy some or all of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar area to the Kherson direction or other areas of the frontline.
The reason for the redeployment of the 98th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command may be redeploying the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction to allow it to rest and reconstitute away from active frontline ground operations. ISW has observed Russian redeployments from the Kherson and Sumy directions to the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast, including elements of its relatively elite VDV and naval infantry units, indicating that the primary Russian effort in Fall 2025 is more likely in Donetsk Oblast than in Kherson Oblast.[19] The 98th VDV Division has been in active combat since April 2023, when it participated in the final seizure of Bakhmut and the Russian efforts to advance from Bakhmut toward and through Chasiv Yar, and this redeployment may indicate that elements of the 98th VDV Division are degraded or have limited combat capability after sustaining two and a half years of offensive operations. The redeployment of elements of the 98th VDV Division may alternatively indicate that the Russian military command intends to reprioritize offensive operations in the Kherson direction, however. This would be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces would have to ford and cross the Dnipro River into unoccupied Kherson Oblast under intense Ukrainian fires — an operation Russian forces have not attempted since Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022. Forces that have been in combat with as little rest as the 98th VDV Division would be ill-equipped for such an undertaking without significant rest. It is possible that the Russian military command intends to redeploy elements of the division slowly to prepare for a future offensive in the Kherson direction after the division has rested and reconstituted, allowing other Russian forces to fight in Russia's current priority efforts in Donetsk Oblast. ISW will continue to monitor for indications that the Russian command is redeploying elements of the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction or any other areas of the front.
Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian energy-focused outlet Seala told Russian state outlet RBK on September 30 that Russian oil refineries are temporarily facing a 38 percent decrease (roughly 338,000 tons per day) in their primary oil refining capacity as of September 28 due to Ukrainian drone strikes, which have struck more than two dozen major oil refineries in Russia since early August 2025.[20] Seala estimated that Russia's total available capacity for gasoline and diesel fuel production fell by 6 percent in August 2025 and by another 18 percent in September 2025, reaching historic lows. Seala estimated that Ukrainian drone strikes caused approximately 70 percent of downtime in gasoline production as the strikes disabled approximately a quarter of Russia's oil refining capacity (roughly 236,000 tons per day) by the end of September 2025, and that four more Russian refineries, including two of the top five largest Russian oil refineries, halted production after drone strikes. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the fuel crisis has impacted the Far East and occupied Crimea the hardest, where Russian authorities have banned sales of more than 30 liters of gasoline per customer since the beginning of the week (roughly September 28).[21] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on October 1 a limit of 20 liters of gasoline per customer in an effort to mitigate the gasoline shortage.[22] Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev noted that Russian oil companies have to wait months for repairs to damaged refineries, as Western sanctions have blocked the sale of equipment and replacement parts on which Russia relies and cannot easily replace with Chinese equivalents. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak outlined to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on September 24 several possible means of alleviating Russia's desperation for gas, including a zero-rate five percent import customs duty on gasoline imported from the People's Republic of China (PRC), South Korea, and Singapore through certain checkpoints in the Far East.[23] Novak also reportedly proposed a rule that Russia will only authorize certain companies to supply fuel, which would allow Russia to export approximately 150,000 tons of gasoline from Siberian refineries westward per month to maintain supply balances in central Russia. Novak also reportedly proposed increasing gasoline imports from Belarus from 45,000 tons to 300,000 tons per month. RBK reported that Belarus began exporting gasoline to Russia in September 2025 after a pause that began in Fall 2024.[24]
Russia's problems with oil refinery capabilities will likely persist amidst more damage to Russian oil refineries. Russian authorities and sources reported on October 1 that there was a large fire at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, located 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[25] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed on October 1 that the incident is unrelated to a drone attack, and neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources have attributed responsibility for the fire.[26] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike overnight caused a fire at an industrial facility in Verkhnedonsky Raion, Rostov Oblast, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there was a fire at the Sukhodolnaya Oil Pumping Station in Rostov Oblast.[27]
The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid. Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported on September 30 that the ZNPP has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid since September 23 and is relying on backup diesel generators to maintain its reactor cooling systems.[28] The Ukrainian officials stated that Russian shelling damaged the final operational Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP, and the IAEA stated that the damage occurred about 1.5 kilometers from the ZNPP itself. Damage to the ZNPP’s power lines has disconnected the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid nine other times since the full-scale invasion prior to September 23, and the current power outage is the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor in exile Dmytro Orlov stated that one of the diesel generators supporting the ZNPP has failed, as the diesel generators are not designed to operate for such a long period of time.[30] Orlov stated that continued Russian shelling of the area prevents Ukrainian authorities from repairing the power line.[31] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there is no immediate danger to the ZNPP, but that running on the diesel generators is not sustainable.[32] Grossi stated that Ukraine has been ready to repair another power line to the ZNPP that has been disconnected since May 2025, but that the “military situation” has not allowed Ukraine to repair this power line. Russian officials denied the reports of Russian shelling and accused Ukrainian strikes of damaging the power line to the ZNPP.[33] Greenpeace Ukraine analyzed satellite imagery of damage to the power line since September 23 and assessed that there was no shelling of the power line, suggesting that Russian forces conducted sabotage operations against the power line.[34]
Russia has been setting conditions to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid for months. Russia has been constructing power lines into occupied southern Ukraine that could connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid, and Russian officials have announced their intention to bring the ZNPP to its full operational capacity under Russian control.[35] Transferring the ZNPP to the Russian power grid requires that the ZNPP remain disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid. The ZNPP’s six nuclear reactors have remained in a cold shutdown mode since April 2024 to mitigate the risk of nuclear disaster in wartime conditions, and restarting the ZNPP under conditions of occupation and war would very likely introduce significant risks.[36] Russia's occupation of the ZNPP has significantly degraded the security of the plant, and Russia's integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will exacerbate security risks, degrade Ukraine's future power generation capacity, and serve as a tool that Russia can use to legitimize its occupation of Ukraine.[37]
The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets. The EC announced on October 1 that its Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan program issued Ukraine its ninth tranche of funds worth four billion euros (roughly $4.7 billion) secured by proceeds from frozen Russian revenues.[38] The EC noted that its overall support to Ukraine is now approaching 178 billion euros (roughly $209 billion). EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 30 that two billion euros (roughly $2.3 billion) of the earmarked funds are for drone production.[39]
Products in Russia will rise in price by 27-35%.
The government says that this is good news, and the State Duma plans to introduce cards for those who will not be able to afford food. According to him, two factors will affect the rise in price - a further increase in fuel prices and an increase in VAT.
“The rise in food prices is expected to be gradual, there will not be such a thing that everything immediately rises in price by a third. Everything is gradual, something this year, something later. We have consulted with the Central Bank and predict a maximum increase in food prices at the level of 27-35%. And this is good news. After all, according to one of the scenarios, the price increase could be over 60%. But it seems that bad forecasts are not confirmed. Therefore, everything will be within reason,” the channel's interlocutor said.
At the same time, he refused to answer the question of whether food cards will be introduced for Russians who will not be able to buy food for themselves after the rise in price (we wrote about such a government proposal). “This issue will be resolved by Vladimir Vladimirovich. I do not rule out that there will be a positive decision, but so far no comments,” the source said. At the same time, the introduction of food cards in Russia has become closer, our insider information is confirmed. The State Duma plans to introduce a project on the issuance of certificates for products (the same cards, named more mildly) for low-income citizens. The nominal value of such a certificate should be 30% of the subsistence minimum. Such plans simultaneously confirm the fact that food pric, unfortunately, will rise inevitably and quite seriously.
After threats from individual NATO countries to send troops to Ukraine, the military and the elites in general developed two approaches to how to respond to this. Both options have already been proposed to Vladimir Putin.
The first is quite tough and radical, it is adhered to by Sergei Shoigu and the generals close to him. “Sergei Kuzhugetovich wants to act seriously. In his opinion, in NATO countries (I say this without hiding, so that they are afraid) it is necessary to carry out several special operations with the participation of our military specialists.
“I won’t tell you which ones, but they are very effective. And the SVO must continue until the bitter end, taking away as much territory as possible from the enemy. Of course, under such conditions, hostilities will not end this year, but we’ll see what happens next year,” a source in the Ministry of Defense told us.
According to him, ••important conditions for a future victory in the Northern Military District are the disruption of American assistance to the Kyiv regime•• and mobilization in Ukraine. And if on the first issue the expectations are rather pessimistic, then on the issue of disrupting mobilization in an enemy state, “we have already achieved serious success.”
{which is} a different opinion ( and this is the second option proposed to Putin Valery Gerasimov has ). He believes that for Russia any military clash with NATO is now fatal; we must first prepare for it.
Therefore, the Chief of the General Staff advocates for the speedy completion of the Northern Military District, even through “not very serious territorial concessions.”
“We need time to gain strength. Shoigu, by the way, understands this, but he is dizzy with success: now he can even lie to the President with impunity. But the right decision is to end the fighting, gain strength, and then resolve the Ukrainian issue, and show NATO its place,” a general close to Gerasimov told us.
It is difficult to say now which approach Vladimir Vladimirovich will choose. The Kremlin refuses to comment on this matter.
The decision of the court in The Hague to issue arrest warrants for two of our military leaders is bad news for the entire Russian army. It may involve resignations, including those of Valery Gerasimov.
“Valery Vasilyevich is thinking about resigning and will talk about it with the President in the coming days.
“There is a threat that the next in line for these bastards from The Hague are Gerasimov and Shoigu, and then almost all the generals who took part in the Northern Military District. Valery Vasilyevich does not want such a fate for himself,” a general from the close circle of the head of the General Staff told us.
There are no other comments yet. We will find out more details and will tell you as soon as there is news on this matter.
“There is a dastardly plan.” The Kremlin spoke out about Gerasimov’s resignation, and we learned the names of three generals who will be “arrested” next
The arrest warrants of the International Criminal Court in The Hague for Sergei Kobylash and Viktor Sokolov are part of the West’s vile plan, which is aimed at demoralizing our army. Sources in the Kremlin with whom we spoke think so.
“Arrest warrants for the commanders of our long-range aviation and the Black Sea Fleet (the Kremlin prefers not to mention the problems and removal of Sokolov, which we wrote about - ed.) are part of a vile plan to intimidate our military leaders.
“I am sure that there will be further warrants for Gerasimov and Shoigu, and after that for all the generals who are in one way or another connected with the Northern Military District. Especially those under whose command we crushed the Ukrainian troops,” says one of the interlocutors.
Another agreed with this point of view, but expressed confidence “that our generals cannot be intimidated by any orders.”
It should be noted that the military reacted differently to this news. Valery Gerasimov, as we wrote, wants to resign and intends to talk about this with Vladimir Putin in the coming days. True, almost all of our sources - both in the Kremlin and among the military - are confident that the President will not allow any resignation.
Sergei Shoigu believes that no one will issue a warrant for his arrest. He is not going to resign and believes that “Vladimir Vladimirovich will protect him.”
At the same time, sources among diplomats believe that the next ones among those whom the court in The Hague will put on the wanted list will not be Gerasimov and Shoigu.
“According to my information, arrest warrants are now being prepared in The Hague for Sergei Surovikin, Andrei Mordvichev and Mikhail Teplinsky,” said a high-ranking source at the Foreign Ministry.
What did Avdiivka cost us? Truly scary numbers have become known
The capture of Avdiivka and further advance on this section of the front is the largest victory of the Russian army over the past year.
The military command was in a hurry to drive the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of there before the March Presidential elections. It was expected that Vladimir Vladimirovich would even record a video with Avdiivka in the background (but later this idea was abandoned).
A secret report on the results of the battles for Avdiivka came into our hands. It is worth noting that the city, like a bone in the throat, prevented the alignment of the front, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces had the opportunity to shoot at Donetsk from there, including using cannon artillery.
From November 1, 2023 to March 1, 2024, in Avdiivka and on the approaches to it, our army lost:
➖ 14,453 dead
➖ 1,267 are listed as missing
➖ 42,312 were injured and/or amputated
[ Total casualties lost in the taking of Avdiivka: 58,032. A 3:1 ratio would give >19,000 dead. ]
The scale of losses in technology is also known. In the battles for Avdiivka our troops lost:
➖ 242 tanks
➖ 384 armored vehicles
➖ 312 artillery systems
Sergei Shoigu has these figures. He also reported to Vladimir Putin about the capture of the city, but then there was no definitive data. Obviously, Shoigu is in no hurry to report such colossal losses in technology.
The President previously took the loss of equipment in the Northern Military District very hard.
Why are we publishing this information? There are several questions regarding Avdiivka.
The main one is that another destroyed city will not bring anything to the budget in the coming years, and we have already spent huge amounts of money on its capture (and still have to invest in restoration).
Also, in the battles for the city, almost 60,000 military personnel were killed or injured.
••And these are only those who could be counted.••
Perhaps our command’s tactics need to be adjusted? We really hope that there will be people around Vladimir Vladimirovich who will talk about the real scale of the tragedy in Avdiivka.
Russia and China are deepening their strategic space cooperation, including cooperation on satellite surveillance and space exploration. Russian space agency Roscosmos Head Yuri Borisov stated on March 5 that Russia and China are considering delivering and constructing a nuclear power plant on the moon in 2032-2035.
Though Borisov’s proposal to create a nuclear power plant on the moon is odd, Borisov’s statement is indicative of warming relations and Chinese willingness to foster a long-term strategic partnership with Russia to posture against and possibly threaten the West.
The Russian government approved a Russian-Chinese cooperation agreement on space cooperation through 2027 in November 2023 that Roscosmos and the Chinese National Space Administration (CNSA) initially signed in November 2022.
The agreement outlines three phases to develop and build the International Scientific Lunar Station and jointly explore the moon’s surface. Roscosmos and CNSA also signed an agreement in September 2022 on the joint placement of Russian GLONASS and Chinese BeiDou satellite navigation system stations in six Russian and Chinese cities.
Russia is reportedly developing a space-based anti-satellite weapon, and a strategic space partnership with China suggests that Russia would be unlikely to use this or similar technology against China and that both states would mutually benefit from Russia’s posturing against the West through space and satellite technology.
—
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu continued to highlight that ongoing Russian military restructuring efforts are meant to prepare for a potential future large-scale conventional war with NATO.
Shoigu stated on March 5 that the Russian military is strengthening its forces in the northwestern and western direction, including by creating the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Moscow Military District (MMD), in response to Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO.
ISW continues to assess that Russia would likely use an increased military
President Vladimir Putin signed an order allowing for fast-track sales of state-owned assets under a special procedure to speed up the sale of various companies.
The decree limits pre-sale valuations to 10 days and speeds up state registration of ownership, and is intended as a response to sanctions against Russia.
Many panties in a bunch over this story:
US to provide Ukraine with intelligence for long-range strikes in Russia, WSJ reports
https://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/4343814/posts
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized at least 4,714 square kilometers across the theater between January 1 and September 25, 2025: 205 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 3,308 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 261 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 175 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 542 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 223 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast.[1] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized 205 settlements in Ukraine during this time period. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 3,434 square kilometers since January 1: 151 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 2,481 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 248 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 96 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 255 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 210 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian MoD is inflating its claimed advances by 36 percent in Luhansk Oblast; 33 percent in Donetsk Oblast; five percent in Zaporizhia Oblast; 83 percent in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 112 percent in Kharkiv Oblast; and six percent in Sumy Oblast.
The Russian MoD often inflates its territorial claims in order to shape Western thinking about Russia's military capabilities and prospects for victory. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces had seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025, whereas ISW assessed at the time that Russian forces had gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers since March 1.[2] The Russian MoD’s September 25 claims are a continuation of these wider efforts to use large amounts of false quantitative data to create the impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield, even though Russian forces continue to advance at a slow foot pace. ISW also assesses that the Russian MoD has been leveraging footage showing Russian soldiers holding flags within specific settlements to claim that Russian forces had seized entire settlements.[3] The Russian footage only shows small group infiltration missions into areas where Russian forces are unable to secure enduring positions, however.[4] The Kremlin is attempting to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its original war goals on the battlefield in order to force Ukraine and its partners into conceding to Russian demands.
Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 24 that the Russian military command is rearranging forces in order to conduct several operational-level efforts across the frontline, including offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Zaporizhia directions, as part of Russia's wider strategic-level plan for 2025.[5] Many of these Russian efforts are not mutually supportive in that forces assigned to one sector of the front are not conducting offensive operations in a way that supports the offensive operations of another sector. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command began in August 2025 to redeploy some forces from deprioritized sectors of the front, including Sumy and Kherson oblasts, to higher priority sectors in eastern Ukraine — some of which Mashovets characterized as “odd.”[6] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from Sumy Oblast to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction.[7] Russian VDV are among Russia's relatively more combat capable forces, and Russia tends to redeploy these forces to their most prioritized areas of the front, including the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya areas.[8] Mashovets reported that unspecified sources expected Russia to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division to western Zaporizhia Oblast to participate in offensive operations south of Zaporizhzhia City.[9] Mashovets reported that Russia is establishing operational reserves in the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the deprioritized Kherson direction from the 25th CAA (Central Miliary District [CMD]) that is currently operating in the Lyman direction, rather than from units and formations of the 58th CAA itself.[10] Mashovets reported that the Russian command is similarly establishing operational reserves in the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps, SMD), which is currently operating in the Lyman direction, from elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) in the Kherson direction.
Russia initiated aggression against Ukraine in 2014. On February 24, 2022, it started a full-scale military invasion to the Ukrainian territory. This brutal war and military crimes of Russian troops caused a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine with thousands civilians killed and millions becoming refuges. As a reaction to this act of aggression, many international companies decided to leave the Russian market, while some others continue doing business there as usual.
We track such decisions of companies and urge them to stop funding the war.
In addition to Russia importing artillery shells, missiles, drones, artillery, motorcycles, golf buggies, cars, trucks, and food we can now add gasoline🤔
Miss the Russian “great GDP” reports😎
French special forces intercepted a Russian oil tanker off the coast of France, en route to India's Vadinar port. The vessel, allegedly part of Russia's shadow fleet, is suspected of sanctions evasion and drone-based espionage. French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed the operation, citing “serious wrongdoings.”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F_q78f8XxaI
4 min video
Кремлевская табакерка
The Kremlin refused to answer the question about the protection of our tankers. And the philosopher Dugin announced a “terrible mobilization” in October-November
We asked several sources the question about protection after the French special forces detained a tanker, which some refer to as our so-called “shadow fleet”. Almost everyone in the Presidential Administration refused to talk about this topic. Only one interlocutor noted that “the protection of tankers is not the level of the Kremlin.” And he refused to explain these words.
The military with whom we spoke also did not comment on this situation. Their general opinion is “it is hardly worth fighting NATO over a tanker or several.” At the same time, philosopher Alexandr Dugin believes that a “terrible mobilization” will definitely be announced in Russia. “The military is now needed not only to go to Kyiv, but also to protect tankers, prepare for the defense of borders with NATO countries. I am sure that the mobilization will be in October or November. To some, it will seem scary in its scale. And my heart rejoices,” Alexander Gelevich told us.
In response to these words, the Kremlin recalled that Vladimir Putin has not yet made any decisions on mobilization. Perhaps they will be in October. It is still difficult to say what the president will decide.
I thought the word was already out that the Russian fall mobilization would be a bit larger than previous fall mobilizations, but not exceptionally large compared to previous falls.
“I thought the word was already out that the Russian fall mobilization would be a bit larger than previous fall mobilizations, but not exceptionally large compared to previous falls.”
Two separate processes.
Twice per year, there is a routine conscription cycle, where some young men of a certain age are drafted for one year of Military Service. They receive initial and specialty training, and then are listed as inactive Reservists, in case of future mass mobilization. They cannot be sent outside of the country for combat. That is the Fall call up that was recently announced (135 K).
In rare times of major emergency however, a separate process of mass mobilization can be conducted, drawing on all adult men (and women with required skills, like doctors), especially those who were trained earlier in life. That could be a lot (potentially millions) of people, from all walks of life, and different stages of their careers, many of them raising families. Under Russian law, they could be immediately sent into combat, outside of Russia. That kind of mass mobilization is the kind of disruptive event that some Russian warmongers (like Dugin) keep calling for.
Funny, as Trump's position on Russia changes, a lot of poster's position on Trump is changing. As I predicted years ago, many pro Russia posters support Putin over Trump.
I don't see Tomahawks being an option in Ukraine. No way do we deploy the Typhon system there. But there are other options, mostly air launched, and potentially some ground launched. JASSM is a possibility, and could be launched from Ukraine's F-16s. We could also do what we did with the GLSDB and now the Extended Range Attack Munition (ERAM) - introduce a brand new weapon into Ukraine, even before the US military. IMHO, the top candidate for that is Anduril's Barracuda series of cruise missiles, which the company says it is ready to mass produce. German company Rheinmetall is a partner in the Barracuda project and could start a second production line in Europe. Increased production of precision strike weapons is something Europe desperately needs.
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