Posted on 02/24/2024 5:59:01 AM PST by SpeedyInTexas
This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.
(Excerpt) Read more at oryxspioenkop.com ...
The Kremlin continues the parallel use of nuclear threats and economic incentives to pressure the United States into normalizing US-Russian relations while explicitly rejecting Russian-Ukrainian negotiations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on October 1 that the third round of US-Russian discussions to address “irritants” will “definitely take place before the end of autumn [2025]” but that Russia and the United States have not yet agreed on a specific date.[1] Ryabkov claimed that Russia is waiting for US President Donald Trump's response to Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent proposal to extend Russia's adherence to the New START Treaty, a bilateral nuclear arms limitations treaty that entered into force in 2011, for one year after it expires on February 5, 2026.[2] Ryabkov further claimed that the United States must either “pursue stabilization” with Russia or engage in “a new arms race, which [Russia] opposes, even though [Russia is] guaranteed to ensure [its] own security.”[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on October 1 that Russia cannot plan high-level contacts between Russia and Ukraine because Ukraine has stopped the negotiation process.[4] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains committed to normalizing bilateral relations with the United States for economic and political gain while protracting its war in Ukraine to make additional gains on the battlefield as the Kremlin obstructs peace efforts.[5] Russia is also attempting to discredit Ukraine by baselessly accusing the Ukrainian government of halting the negotiation process to distract from Russia's uncompromising demands that amount to Ukraine's full capitulation.[6]
Russian shadow fleet oil tankers may be connected to the recent incursions of unidentified drones operating in NATO airspace. Norwegian public broadcaster NRK reported on October 1 that Norwegian authorities spotted an unidentified drone on September 30 near an airport in Bronnesund, prompting authorities to divert one scheduled flight and cancel remaining flights.[7] NRK also reported that Norwegian police detained eight People's Republic of China (PRC) citizens following reports of an unidentified drone flight near the Svolvaer Airport, arrested one of the tourists, and seized drone equipment. The Norwegian police stated that there is no current apparent connection between a state actor and the Svolvaer Airport or other drone incidents. [8] French authorities stopped the Russian Borocay shadow-fleet-linked tanker off the coast of the Saint-Nazaire port in western France on September 30 and seized the tanker and detained the captain and first mate on October 1.[9] French President Emanuel Macron stated that the Borocay’s crew committed ”very serious offenses.”[10] Maritime-focused news outlet Maritime Executive reported on September 23 that the Boracay was one of three Russian-linked vessels near the coordinated drone incursion that shut down the Copenhagen Airport on September 22.[11] The Maritime Executive reported that European authorities are investigating three Russia-linked vessels that were sailing near the Copenhagen Airport when unidentified drone flights recently forced the airport to close.[12] Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet reported that the Russian Ropucha-class landing ship Alexander Shabalin had been off the Danish coast for days during heavy drone flights at Danish airports and that Danish authorities are investigating the ship's role in the drone operations.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk similarly reported on September 28 and 29 that intelligence indicates that Russia is likely launching drones into NATO airspace from Russian shadow fleet tankers and is leveraging such vessels to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage missions in international waters.[14]
The Russian command may be redeploying elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Kramatorsk direction to the Kherson direction. The commander of Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kherson direction reported on October 1 that the Russian command redeployed elements of the 98th VDV Division from near Chasiv Yar to the Kherson direction to replace elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) that redeployed from the Kherson direction to Donetsk Oblast at an unspecified date.[15] Geolocated footage from a Russian source shows Russian forces, purportedly elements of the 98th VDV Division, striking a house in Prydniprovske, Kherson Oblast.[16] These are the first reports that ISW has observed elements of the 98th VDV Division operating outside of the Chasiv Yar direction, where the division has operated nearly exclusively since April 2023.[17] ISW has observed reports that some elements of the 98th VDV Division remain active near Chasiv Yar as recently as October 1, 2025, indicating that this reported Russian redeployment is likely occurring slowly and that the division may be splitting its elements across various sectors of the front.[18] It is currently unclear whether the Russian military command would redeploy some or all of the 98th VDV Division from the Chasiv Yar area to the Kherson direction or other areas of the frontline.
The reason for the redeployment of the 98th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command may be redeploying the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction to allow it to rest and reconstitute away from active frontline ground operations. ISW has observed Russian redeployments from the Kherson and Sumy directions to the Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk directions in Donetsk Oblast, including elements of its relatively elite VDV and naval infantry units, indicating that the primary Russian effort in Fall 2025 is more likely in Donetsk Oblast than in Kherson Oblast.[19] The 98th VDV Division has been in active combat since April 2023, when it participated in the final seizure of Bakhmut and the Russian efforts to advance from Bakhmut toward and through Chasiv Yar, and this redeployment may indicate that elements of the 98th VDV Division are degraded or have limited combat capability after sustaining two and a half years of offensive operations. The redeployment of elements of the 98th VDV Division may alternatively indicate that the Russian military command intends to reprioritize offensive operations in the Kherson direction, however. This would be a significant undertaking, as Russian forces would have to ford and cross the Dnipro River into unoccupied Kherson Oblast under intense Ukrainian fires — an operation Russian forces have not attempted since Ukraine's liberation of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022. Forces that have been in combat with as little rest as the 98th VDV Division would be ill-equipped for such an undertaking without significant rest. It is possible that the Russian military command intends to redeploy elements of the division slowly to prepare for a future offensive in the Kherson direction after the division has rested and reconstituted, allowing other Russian forces to fight in Russia's current priority efforts in Donetsk Oblast. ISW will continue to monitor for indications that the Russian command is redeploying elements of the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction or any other areas of the front.
Gasoline shortages continue in Russia and occupied Ukraine due to repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries. Russian energy-focused outlet Seala told Russian state outlet RBK on September 30 that Russian oil refineries are temporarily facing a 38 percent decrease (roughly 338,000 tons per day) in their primary oil refining capacity as of September 28 due to Ukrainian drone strikes, which have struck more than two dozen major oil refineries in Russia since early August 2025.[20] Seala estimated that Russia's total available capacity for gasoline and diesel fuel production fell by 6 percent in August 2025 and by another 18 percent in September 2025, reaching historic lows. Seala estimated that Ukrainian drone strikes caused approximately 70 percent of downtime in gasoline production as the strikes disabled approximately a quarter of Russia's oil refining capacity (roughly 236,000 tons per day) by the end of September 2025, and that four more Russian refineries, including two of the top five largest Russian oil refineries, halted production after drone strikes. Independent Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the fuel crisis has impacted the Far East and occupied Crimea the hardest, where Russian authorities have banned sales of more than 30 liters of gasoline per customer since the beginning of the week (roughly September 28).[21] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov announced on October 1 a limit of 20 liters of gasoline per customer in an effort to mitigate the gasoline shortage.[22] Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev noted that Russian oil companies have to wait months for repairs to damaged refineries, as Western sanctions have blocked the sale of equipment and replacement parts on which Russia relies and cannot easily replace with Chinese equivalents. Russian business outlet Kommersant reported that Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak outlined to Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin on September 24 several possible means of alleviating Russia's desperation for gas, including a zero-rate five percent import customs duty on gasoline imported from the People's Republic of China (PRC), South Korea, and Singapore through certain checkpoints in the Far East.[23] Novak also reportedly proposed a rule that Russia will only authorize certain companies to supply fuel, which would allow Russia to export approximately 150,000 tons of gasoline from Siberian refineries westward per month to maintain supply balances in central Russia. Novak also reportedly proposed increasing gasoline imports from Belarus from 45,000 tons to 300,000 tons per month. RBK reported that Belarus began exporting gasoline to Russia in September 2025 after a pause that began in Fall 2024.[24]
Russia's problems with oil refinery capabilities will likely persist amidst more damage to Russian oil refineries. Russian authorities and sources reported on October 1 that there was a large fire at the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery, located 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.[25] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev claimed on October 1 that the incident is unrelated to a drone attack, and neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources have attributed responsibility for the fire.[26] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuriy Slyusar claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike overnight caused a fire at an industrial facility in Verkhnedonsky Raion, Rostov Oblast, and NASA FIRMS data indicates that there was a fire at the Sukhodolnaya Oil Pumping Station in Rostov Oblast.[27]
The Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid for over a week as Russia sets conditions to imminently transfer the plant to the Russian power grid. Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported on September 30 that the ZNPP has been disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid since September 23 and is relying on backup diesel generators to maintain its reactor cooling systems.[28] The Ukrainian officials stated that Russian shelling damaged the final operational Ukrainian power line to the ZNPP, and the IAEA stated that the damage occurred about 1.5 kilometers from the ZNPP itself. Damage to the ZNPP’s power lines has disconnected the ZNPP from the Ukrainian power grid nine other times since the full-scale invasion prior to September 23, and the current power outage is the longest the ZNPP has ever endured.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Enerhodar Mayor in exile Dmytro Orlov stated that one of the diesel generators supporting the ZNPP has failed, as the diesel generators are not designed to operate for such a long period of time.[30] Orlov stated that continued Russian shelling of the area prevents Ukrainian authorities from repairing the power line.[31] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that there is no immediate danger to the ZNPP, but that running on the diesel generators is not sustainable.[32] Grossi stated that Ukraine has been ready to repair another power line to the ZNPP that has been disconnected since May 2025, but that the “military situation” has not allowed Ukraine to repair this power line. Russian officials denied the reports of Russian shelling and accused Ukrainian strikes of damaging the power line to the ZNPP.[33] Greenpeace Ukraine analyzed satellite imagery of damage to the power line since September 23 and assessed that there was no shelling of the power line, suggesting that Russian forces conducted sabotage operations against the power line.[34]
Russia has been setting conditions to connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid for months. Russia has been constructing power lines into occupied southern Ukraine that could connect the ZNPP to the Russian power grid, and Russian officials have announced their intention to bring the ZNPP to its full operational capacity under Russian control.[35] Transferring the ZNPP to the Russian power grid requires that the ZNPP remain disconnected from the Ukrainian power grid. The ZNPP’s six nuclear reactors have remained in a cold shutdown mode since April 2024 to mitigate the risk of nuclear disaster in wartime conditions, and restarting the ZNPP under conditions of occupation and war would very likely introduce significant risks.[36] Russia's occupation of the ZNPP has significantly degraded the security of the plant, and Russia's integration of the ZNPP into the Russian power grid will exacerbate security risks, degrade Ukraine's future power generation capacity, and serve as a tool that Russia can use to legitimize its occupation of Ukraine.[37]
The European Commission (EC) announced a $4.7 billion aid package for Ukraine using funds from frozen Russian assets. The EC announced on October 1 that its Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) loan program issued Ukraine its ninth tranche of funds worth four billion euros (roughly $4.7 billion) secured by proceeds from frozen Russian revenues.[38] The EC noted that its overall support to Ukraine is now approaching 178 billion euros (roughly $209 billion). EC President Ursula von der Leyen announced on September 30 that two billion euros (roughly $2.3 billion) of the earmarked funds are for drone production.[39]
Products in Russia will rise in price by 27-35%.
The government says that this is good news, and the State Duma plans to introduce cards for those who will not be able to afford food. According to him, two factors will affect the rise in price - a further increase in fuel prices and an increase in VAT.
“The rise in food prices is expected to be gradual, there will not be such a thing that everything immediately rises in price by a third. Everything is gradual, something this year, something later. We have consulted with the Central Bank and predict a maximum increase in food prices at the level of 27-35%. And this is good news. After all, according to one of the scenarios, the price increase could be over 60%. But it seems that bad forecasts are not confirmed. Therefore, everything will be within reason,” the channel's interlocutor said.
At the same time, he refused to answer the question of whether food cards will be introduced for Russians who will not be able to buy food for themselves after the rise in price (we wrote about such a government proposal). “This issue will be resolved by Vladimir Vladimirovich. I do not rule out that there will be a positive decision, but so far no comments,” the source said. At the same time, the introduction of food cards in Russia has become closer, our insider information is confirmed. The State Duma plans to introduce a project on the issuance of certificates for products (the same cards, named more mildly) for low-income citizens. The nominal value of such a certificate should be 30% of the subsistence minimum. Such plans simultaneously confirm the fact that food pric, unfortunately, will rise inevitably and quite seriously.
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