Attack On Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine (2 year anniversary)

This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is significantly higher than recorded here. Loitering munitions, drones used as unmanned bait, civilian vehicles and derelict equipment are not included in this list. All possible effort has gone into avoiding duplicate entries and discerning the status of equipment between captured or abandoned. Many of the entries listed as 'abandoned' will likely end up captured or destroyed. Similarly, some of the captured equipment might be destroyed if it can't be recovered. When a vehicle is captured and then lost in service with its new owners, it is only added as a loss of the original operator to avoid double listings. When the origin of a piece of equipment can't be established, it's not included in the list. The Soviet flag is used when the equipment in question was produced prior to 1991. This list is constantly updated as additional footage becomes available.

Russia unleashes new underwater weapon; Russian annalists tremble.
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Reporting From Ukraine:
https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/videos

The complete transcript.
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[ Crimean Bridge Was a Decoy! Russians Brace for The Real Strike! ]

Today [ June 8 ], there are a lot of interesting updates from the Sea of Japan. Here, after Ukraine’s audacious underwater drone strike on the Kerch Bridge, Russian analysts have begun sounding the alarm over the possibility of an even more devastating follow-up. To them, the Kerch operation wasn’t just a spectacular success - it looked like a rehearsal for something far more dangerous, aimed at Russia’s most sensitive naval bases in the far east.

In light of the massively successful Operation Spiderweb, showing Ukraine’s ability to strike deep in the heart of Russian territory by both conventional and unconventional means, the Ukrainian Security Service carried out another stunning strike.

In their own, so-called, special operation, Ukrainians hit the underwater support structure of the Kerch bridge. The estimated 1,100 kg explosion detonated around 10 meters deep, making the damage more difficult to assess and repair. Notably, Ukraine announced the strike by releasing footage taken from a Russian security camera, showing how deeply infiltrated Ukrainian intelligence services are in Russian networks.

To conduct the strike, Ukrainians used a new variant of underwater naval drone, the Toloka 1,000 or the Toloka 400. These new underwater drones, upgrades of the Toloka 150, can deliver between half a ton and 5 tons of explosives at a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers, respectively. The drones can operate at a depth of up to 40 meters. Their compact design and quiet propulsion systems make them ideal for covert sabotage missions against high-value Russian naval and logistics infrastructure.

However, Russian analysts note that Ukraine could have used multiple Toloka drones in sequence to breach defenses and collapse the bridge. They suggest that this was therefore not the main strike, but rather a field test of upgraded underwater drone capabilities.

Operation Spiderweb demonstrated that Ukraine can strike deep into Russia using unconventional platforms, hitting unexpected targets beyond traditional frontlines. Now, with new and upgraded underwater drones in play, Russian analysts started raising the alarm that the Pacific naval assets are under imminent threat.

Russian analysis are worried that to hit Russia’s far east, Ukrainians could realistically use container ships laden with concealed naval drones. The Ukrainians operate a large fleet of merchant vessels, including container ships. These are more difficult to regulate and inspect, making it easier to smuggle the underwater drones in them.

Furthermore, careful coordination of shipping towards international ports of Ukrainian allies, such as Australia, the United States, Japan, and South Korea, could reduce the risk of such an operation being intercepted, especially with the cooperation of allied intelligence services.

Once the container ships enter the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, or even dock in Russian ports, they would already be within range of releasing underwater drones, with the Toloka 1,000 having a range of 2,000 kilometers at the least. Ukraine could launch these drones from the deck, or through an underwater configuration comparable to a torpedo launch. The targets would be the Russian naval bases in Vladivostok and on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

The Vladivostok base houses the Russian Pacific surface fleet, with several destroyers, corvettes, and the flagship of the Russian Pacific fleet, the Cruiser Varyag. The base in Kamchatka houses Russia’s nuclear submarines, which are carriers of both nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles, and is known as one of Russia’s most secure facilities. With the Toloka 1,000 having a maximum payload of up to 5 tons, 10 times higher than conventional torpedoes shown on screen now, Ukrainians could hit and sink several ships with only 1 drone.

Such strikes would not have a direct military impact for Ukraine, but it would bring the war to the Russian home front in a way never seen before. Additionally, it would undermine Russia’s ability to defend itself in a broader sense, eroding the Russian nuclear triad even further, after already having lost over a third of its strategic bomber fleet.

Such an operation would exponentially magnify the pressure on Russia to seek a realistic negotiated peace settlement, as the Ukrainian Istanbul delegation already noted how, after the launch of Operation Spiderweb, their Russian counterparts were much less hostile than before.

Overall, Ukraine’s strike on the Kerch Bridge fits into a broader, coordinated campaign, seemingly without range limitations. It marks the start of a new phase in long-range underwater warfare, with upgraded Toloka drones now capable of reaching over 2,000 kilometers.

Russian analysts openly worry this was only a trial run and that Ukraine’s real targets lie in the Pacific where Russian nuclear submarines and warships sit vulnerable in a false sense of security. As the pressure mounts and the reach of Ukraine’s unconventional operations expands Ukraine is actively undermining Russia’s domestic and international projection of strength and invincibility.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12PpA75MJf8

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 8, 2025

Russian officials have repeatedly signaled that the Kremlin has wider territorial ambitions in Ukraine, including in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Artem Zhoga, the former commander of the 80th ”Sparta” Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) and current presidential representative to the Ural Federal Okrug, claimed on June 8 that the 90th Tank Division is “closing the strategic gates to the Dnipro [River].”[8] Zhoga’s reference to the Dnipro River is consistent with other Russian officials’ calls for Russia to seize territory near the river in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Russian officials have called for Russia to control the areas of the Dnipro River that pass through Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and routinely invoke the Kremlin's concept of “Novorossiya,” which Russian officials have defined as all of eastern and southern Ukraine.[9] ISW observed reported in May 2025 that Russia was setting conditions to establish permanent control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), suggesting that Russia may plan to occupy and annex Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa also stated on June 5 Russia intends to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River, including eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, by the end of 2026.[11]

Russia continued to baselessly accuse Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 8 — part of the Kremlin's efforts to undermine mutually agreed upon confidence-building measures with Ukraine. Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff's Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Alexander Zorin claimed on June 8 that Russia delivered the bodies of 1,212 KIA Ukrainians to an exchange point in accordance with purported agreements made during the June 2 Ukrainian-Russian talks in Istanbul.[12] Zorin baselessly claimed that no exchange took place on June 7 because Ukraine did not respond to Russia's messages about the exchange, that Russia continues to wait for confirmation from Ukrainian officials, and that Ukraine is postponing the exchange.[13] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated on June 8 that authorities in Ukraine and Russia received notice on June 3 — the day following the most recent bilateral talks in Istanbul — that the prisoner of war (POW) and KIA exchanges that Ukraine and Russia agreed upon in Istanbul would occur during at a future date during the week of June 9 to 16.[14] GUR Spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on June 7 that Ukraine and Russia have not yet established the exact date of the KIA exchange and that Ukraine is still preparing for the repatriation exchange.[15] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's unwillingness to engage in good faith in lower-level confidence-building measures designed to facilitate larger peace negotiations further demonstrates Russia's disinterest in peace negotiations.[16]

The Kremlin appears to have orchestrated a concerted media campaign that aimed to use the purportedly agreed-upon KIA exchange in order to discredit Ukraine and promote Russia's justifications for its war to both domestic and international audiences. Zorin made his claims during a press conference for domestic Russian and foreign journalists in front of refrigerated transport trucks reportedly holding the bodies of Ukrainian KIA servicemembers.[17] Yusov stated that Russian officials filmed the videos of the refrigerated trucks and held the press conference for journalists on Russian territory far from the agreed upon exchange location, however.[18] Journalists from Russian and international media outlets, including Russian Ministry of Defense-run TV network Zvezda, Russian state media TV channel Channel One (Perviy Kanal), Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestia, Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen TV outlet, and Qatari-owned Al Araby al Jadeed TV outlet, attended the press conference.[19] Kremlin newswire TASS amplified footage of an Al Mayadeen journalist claiming that Ukraine's alleged refusal to accept the KIA bodies shows the “Nazi nature” of the Ukrainian authorities and footage of an Al Araby journalist claiming that Russia continues to fulfill the commitments it made in Istanbul.[20] Russian officials likely invited foreign and domestic news outlets to the press conference in order to promote to both foreign and domestic audiences the Russian narratives that Ukraine is spoiling confidence-building measures and peace negotiations and to posture the international community, particularly the Middle East, as supporting Russia's justifications for its full-scale invasion and demands of regime change in Kyiv.[21]

Russian officials appear to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a potential future war with NATO. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on June 7 that Russia's “unilateral moratorium” on the deployment of land-based missiles prohibited under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is nearing its “logical conclusion,” suggesting that Russia may openly deploy such missiles in the future.[22] Ryabkov also claimed that the United States and its Western allies did not appreciate or reciprocate Russia's “restraint” following the United States’ withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019. Ryabkov's claim that Russia has continued to abide by the INF Treaty since the US withdrawal are false. The United States suspended its participation in the INF Treaty on February 1, 2019 and withdrew from the treaty in August 2019 due to Russia's development, testing, and deployment of intermediate-range 9M729 (SSC-8) missiles in violation of the treaty.[23] Russia suspended its participation in the INF Treaty in response to the US suspension on February 2, 2019. Ryabkov's allegations of Russia's continued adherence to the treaty are likely part of the Kremlin's ongoing efforts to falsely portray itself as a genuine participant in de-escalation efforts and to portray the West and NATO as threats to Russia's security. The Kremlin may leverage the war in Ukraine to renounce its participation in other international arms control treaties as it prepares for a larger confrontation with the West.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-8-2025

Кремлевская табакерка
Many have asked: where did Patrushev disappear to?

Aide to the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Russian Maritime Collegium Nikolai Patrushev announced that Vladimir Putin approved the Strategy for the Development of the Russian Navy until 2050. This is actually one of the tasks that Nikolai Platonovich has been working on over the past year. Sources familiar with the document say that it is comprehensive and includes all the key trends in the situation at sea, as well as information on geopolitical changes in general. Much attention is paid to the Arctic , the struggle for which is happening before our eyes.

It also separately talks about the need to find new solutions to regain influence in the Black Sea. Including by returning some of the ships from Novorossiysk to Sevastopol. But to do this, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of the Crimean Peninsula, including from naval drones. The best defense would be to take control of the Odessa region and restrict Ukraine's access to the sea. In addition, the document talks about finding mechanisms to influence Turkey in this region. Which not only has its own fleet, but also controls the passage through the Bosphorus. And at the same time, it is increasing its influence in the region.

In general, the preparation of the document lays the foundation for changes in the fleet caused by the development of new technologies and changes in the doctrine of using both the unmanned component and the frigates, large landing ships and boats that we are accustomed to. By the way, we recommend reading the interview with Nikolai Patrushev, which will be published on the website and in the latest issue of the weekly Arguments and Facts . [see below] There is a lot of interesting stuff there.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/5776

Strategic Depth. Patrushev Names New Targets for Russian Fleet

Patrushev: The decision to prepare the Strategy was made back in July last year at a meeting in the Kremlin. On the instructions of the President, the Ministry of Defense prepared its draft, which was then revised by the Russian Naval Board taking into account proposals from federal departments and organizations. The final version of the Strategy was submitted to the head of state for consideration, and he approved it on May 30.

P: Without going into details, I will say that such a strategic planning document has been adopted for the first time in modern history. This once again emphasizes that the development of a powerful and modern fleet is a priority for our country. And Russia's position as one of the greatest maritime powers in the world is gradually being restored.

Q: Along with the Navy, the Coast Guard, which is part of the FSB Border Service, also participates in protecting Russian interests at sea. Will it also be strengthened?
P: Of course. The decree of the head of state approved the Strategy for the development of the ship composition of the Federal Security Service for the period up to 2050.

Q:I can't help but ask you about the “price of the issue”. The construction of warships will obviously require considerable budget expenditures? To what extent are such investments justified?

P: In the coming decade, serious allocations are indeed provided for the construction of new ships and vessels of the Navy, which must be taken into account when forming the state armament program. And the state will seek unconditional fulfillment of contractual obligations from factories, shipyards and state customers.

https://aif.ru/politics/russia/strategicheskaya-glubina-patrushev-nazval-novye-celi-dlya-rossiyskogo-flota

An unrealistic project, there is no money.

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