Posted on 10/13/2022 6:45:57 PM PDT by Widget Jr
Disclaimer: This was written before Russian mobilization was announced. The situation in Ukraine is ongoing and we aim to produce the most up-to-date content.
A real David vs Goliath story is unfolding as Ukraine has fought back one of the biggest military juggernauts in the world, the Russian army, but does Ukraine really stand a chance at winning this war? Don't miss today's epic new military video to take a look inside the battle for Ukraine!
[ Full Transcript, LONG: ]
On February 24th of 2022 Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine under the guise of a 'special military operation'. In reality this was all-out war against its neighbor, whom it wished to bring back into the soviet-era fold. Ukraine however had no desire to be Putin's puppet, and the war for Ukraine was on.
Yet from the very start it seems as if Russia did everything it could to not win this war. Does this mean that Ukraine is actually winning though?
The initial Russian offensive played out much as western observers had expected it would- at least for the first few hours. Large missile and stand-off weapon attacks against Ukrainian military facilities, troop formations, radar, and communications nodes. A missile and aerial blitzkrieg descended upon Ukraine, which fielded a military a fraction the size of Russia.
And yet keen-eyed observers could tell even through the fog of war that something was not quite right with the Russian offensive. When the United States and allies launched Desert Storm in 1991, they were facing one of the world's largest armies protected by one of the world's most sophisticated air defense networks. In order to eliminate Iraq's ability to fight, the very first thing that the US and allies did was destroy Iraq's air defense and command and control networks with an aerial blitzkrieg of cruise missiles and air attacks. Within 48 hours Iraq's formidable, Soviet-built air defense network was in tatters, and friendly aircraft ruled the skies, allowing them to devastate Iraqi ground forces.
Yet in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was expected to follow a similar doctrine, this did not appear to be happening.
While Russia did strike against Ukrainian radar and air defense sites, these strikes were very limited in scope compared to the actual capabilities of the Russian air and missile forces. In fact, it seemed as if either Russia wasn't taking the war very seriously, wasn't taking Ukraine's defenses and will to fight very seriously, or was displaying a staggering amount of strategic ineptitude or perhaps lack of tactical capabilities.
It seems as if the truth lies with a mix of all of the above.It’s unfair to compare modern Russian capabilities to even those of the United States in 1991. For starters, the US had the help of many allies, and American equipment, training, and doctrine are simply superior. US investment in smart weapons far outstrips that of Russia, as does its investment in targeting pods for aircraft, special mission airframes, and tracking and surveillance capabilities.
Yet despite the disparity in capabilities, Russia- at least on paper- should have been able to launch an overwhelming and effective counterforce strike against Ukraine that would've been crippling to its ability to defend itself. It became very apparent very quickly that Russia was not devoting a large amount of its combat air power to the mission. It also seemed to be launching only a limited number of strikes with its stockpile of smart munitions- a stockpile that has always been significantly limited in size.
When two planes fell out of the sky during the first two days of the invasion due to maintenance issues, the west started to get an idea of why large amounts of Russia's combat air power may not have been dedicated to the fight. While unconfirmed, there's a possibility that Russia's maintenance and logistics simply couldn't afford to support a large percentage of its combat air power at the same time.
This, as we've come to find out, would be in line with Russia's doctrine of bluffing the west with the size and capabilities of its military. However, the truth likely also involves a significant amount of complacency on Russia's behalf, and understimating Ukraine's ability and will to fight. The first three days of the war saw a lightning assault by Russia's elite paratroopers on air fields around Kyiv- within 48 hours the assaults had been defeated by Ukrainian forces and Russia's most elite troops were killed or captured.
The assault was immediately puzzling to western observers, who noted that there seemed to be a goal of establishing an air bridge to reinforce these assaults.
Ground forces attacking south from Belarus may have been meant to reinforce these air assaults, but they were quickly mired down by determined Ukrainian defenders. Reinforcements were critical for the Russian air assaults, because by their nature airborne or air assault forces are light infantry, with no heavy vehicle support. At best, these forces can count on light infantry fighting vehicles, and in some militaries on light tanks.
While air assaults are great for surprising the enemy and seizing territory behind the front lines, they are incredibly vulnerable to rapid reaction forces which can easily overwhelm them- just like the allies found out in Operation Market Garden during World War II. Now it seems as if Russia stumbled straight into its own Market Garden, with equally disastrous results.
Russia had completely overstimated its ability to move forces from Belarus to the outskirts of Kyiv in time to reinforce the air assaults. Even without any significant enemy resistance- and it would have been foolish to expect anything but heavy and determined resistance- Russian logistics are incredibly poorly suited for supporting operations far from railroads, through which Russia ships most of its supplies. With approximately half the logistics support for each unit that a comparable American unit would enjoy, Russia simply couldn't have advanced fast enough to support the air assaults.
Next, Russia failed to neutralize Ukrainian air defenses around the Kyiv area, putting support air craft in serious risk. Multiple transport aircraft meant to quickly reinforce the assaults were downed by Ukrainian air defenses, at tragic loss of life for the Russians.
The greatest failure however, which echoed across the entire conflict, was the massive intelligence failure on Russia's behalf on Ukrainian capabilities and will to fight. Before the conflict President Vladimir Putin had granted his intelligence apparatus millions of dollars meant to conduct operations inside Ukraine to determine the feasibility of an invasion. This money included funds to bribe local and military officials for either information or to facilitate an invasion.
There's evidence that this happened to an extent- the roads to Kherson for example had been heavily mined as the Russian invasion was launched, and yet when Russian troops got there the roads had been cleared of all mines. The discovery prompted Ukrainian President Zelensky to fire multiple high level officials.
It has become clear as the conflict has evolved that Putin's intelligence apparatus didn't just fail in its mission, but might have pocketed large amounts of the money given to them to carry it out, while feeding him false assurances that the Ukrainian people wouldn't put up much resistance.
This is in line with what we know about the state of corruption in the Russian military and government, but evidence for this also comes from the fact that multiple high ranking intelligence officials were jailed shortly after the invasion when it became clear Ukraine wasn't capitulating.
It's perhaps this intelligence failure that could explain why Russia seemed to launch such a sloppy invasion with such low investment of long-range precision striking power. It’s also likely why Russia made the incredibly poor decision of launching an air assault operation against Kyiv without having ground forces ready for immediate reinforcement.
As the war devolved into a grind, Putin maintained pressure on the Ukrainian capital, with the hope of seizing Kyiv, killing Zelensky, and ending the war by installing a puppet government. However, this is where Russia was foiled both from within and without.
Russia's advance into Kyiv soon became a massive traffic jam reaching a whopping 40 miles long. But vehicles weren't simply stalled out due to traffic, many had in fact suffered numerous maintenance or supply issues and weren't operable anymore.
The infamous Kyiv convoy would show the world how thoroughly corrupt and inept the Russian military was, with evidence of cheap tires being used on multi-million dollar vehicles, the money for proper tires having been naturally skimmed off the top by unit commanders. These tires, mainly sourced from China and not rated for the size of the vehicles they were being installed on, soon went flat on muddy Ukrainian roads, or simply wore out, stranding dozens of vehicles and creating massive bottlenecks.
Simple logistics however were also to blame, with Russia proving it could not support a major advance deep into enemy territory. Once away from railheads, Russian logistics depended solely on trucks, and as we mentioned before Russia has approximately half the number of trucks per unit that a comparable American unit would have. The further towards Kyiv that Russian forces moved, the longer the round-trip between supply depots and deployed forces grew, inevitably slowing the advance to a crawl and then finally bringing it to a standstill.
The Ukrainians quickly identified this glaring vulnerability in Russian doctrine and made them suffer dearly for it. Ukrainian air and ground forces no longer attacked tanks or infantry fighting vehicles, but instead ignored them and focused on destroying Russian trucks. This put even more pressure on an already weak logistics network which would inevitably collapse. As a general withdrawal was announced, many Russian vehicles were simply abandoned, perfectly operational but without any gas.
Russian troops too suffered from a lack of supplies, with many resorting to shooting dogs or cats, or simply looting, as they had no food. The retreat from Kyiv was Ukraine's first major victory, though truthfully it was more of a self-inflicted defeat than a Ukrainian win.
However, the war in the east raged on, and here Russia was making slow but incremental gains. Yet here too Russian doctrine ensured that its military was not as successful as it should be against an inferior force. By the time of the Russian invasion, Ukraine's military had been completely transformed. In 2014 Ukraine fielded an unwieldly military still stuck in its Soviet roots. However, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, the United States sent hundreds of personnel to train Ukrainian forces to fight and operate like a western military. The result would be a Ukrainian military so transformed that it caught Russian completely by surprise.
By comparison, Russia's military is very top-down oriented. Orders come from above and junior personnel have little to no room for interpretation- even in the midst of an evolving combat environment. Russia's lack of a strong non-commissioned officer corps also means that Russian units lack discipline and the professional control provided by NCOs, making them large but very unwieldly. The two factors combined make for a military that is akin to a very clumsy juggernaut.
By comparison, Ukraine's forces encourage decision making by junior officers, and enjoy a disciplined NCO corps. While not as well developed as a western military, the difference is staggering, with Ukrainian units showing an incredible degree of initiative and flexibility compared to Russian forces.
The rigid inflexibility of Russian doctrine led directly to many defeats in its campaign for Ukraine, but none quite as high profile as the utter disaster Russian forces experienced attempting a river crossing at Bilohorivka. When the first crossing was shelled by Ukrainian forces, the Russians simply attempted it again- at the exact same place. Predictably, they were once more decimated by Ukrainian artillery. That didn't stop them from attempting the crossing at the exact same place multiple more times, all meeting with the exact same disaster.
The crossings were an exercise in madness, yielding the exact same results each time, but Russian troops had no choice but to proceed with the same plan drawn up by some senior military leader far from the front. It's estimated that Russia lost as much as an entire Battalion Tactical Group's worth of equipment during the attempts. But this river crossing disaster has played out across eastern Ukraine over and over again, with Russian forces showing a crippling deficiency in both command and doctrine.
Despite this and similar disasters, the sheer weight of Russian forces continued to push the Ukrainian defenders westwards, with small, incremental gains- until the stunning Ukrainian counteroffensive on September 6th. Planned in cooperation with US senior military leaders, Ukraine has now recaptured enough territory to send Russian forces in the north into a general retreat.
It’s the first major counteroffensive of the Ukraine war, and through a combination of brilliant deception, real time intelligence courtesy of the US, and sheer guts and determination, Ukrainian forces have delivered a stunning defeat to Russia that nobody saw coming on February 24th.
But the question remains: is Ukraine winning the war?
Tracking Russian and Ukrainian losses is difficult because both sides have a vested interest in keeping these figures secret. However open source reporting has led to some estimates that are likely within the ballpark of the true figure. Russia is estimated to have lost right around 2,000 tanks, with many of them captured and put into use by Ukrainian forces. Estimates of captured tanks after the latest offensive alone is somewhere around two dozen- enough for Ukraine to equip two tank companies. If true, this would be about 66% of Russia's modern tank forces- not counting the 20,000 hunks of junk that Russia keeps in storage as leftovers from the Cold War.
Although we have confirmation of T-62s being sent into combat in Ukraine, hinting that Russia's tank problems are reaching critical levels. It's estimated that Russia has also lost around 4500 infantry fighting vehicles, or around 34% of its total force. 1300 artillery of self-propelled and traditional type have also been captured, abandoned, or destroyed, or around 23% of Russia's total. 250 of Russia's most modern aircraft have also been downed, though this is only around 18% of Russia's total. Most important of all though, after tank losses, are Russia's estimated 217,000 casualties- 54,000 of which are estimated as KIA. This is a quarter of the entire Russian armed forces, but that figure is deceiving because it is counting all military personnel. With an estimated 300,000 ground combat forces, this means that a significant number of its combat personnel are either dead or wounded.
Losses aren't Russia's only problem, as it's widely reported that Russian morale is at all-time lows. Almost from the start of combat operations, Russian troops were exhibiting low morale, with one tank unit going so far as to run their commander's legs over as retaliation for the high casualties they took. Now, Russian morale appears to be reaching critical lows- especially in the north where the total number of POWs taken is unknown, but some estimate at around 3,000.
Perhaps the greatest sign of Russia's weakness however is the fact that according to reports, Russia has ceased sending new units into Ukraine. After the defeat in the Kharkiv Oblast, Russia has begun a major nation-wide recruitment effort to replenish its combat losses. While not yet announcing mobilization, a national recruitment campaign is a sign that Russia recognizes it cannot generate the manpower needed to secure its objectives in Ukraine.
On the home front though the Russian economy is starting to show signs of serious weakening due to sanctions. Western sanctions have been criticized even amongst the west as ineffective, yet this was only because Russia has used significant currency reserves to artificially prop up its economy. Those reserves are slowly running out, and the reduction in energy that Russia supplies to Europe- both by self-bans of Russian energy and by Russia deliberately trying to pressure Europe by cutting off gas flow- means that Russia's biggest moneymaker is now drying up. With energy sales propping up the entire Russian economy, the sharp decrease in sales to Europe has sent Russia seeking alternative buyers- and those buyers are now setting prices themselves. China and India are both buying up cheap Russian energy at prices they dictate, and then selling it for a profit internationally.
By comparison, Ukraine is slowly but surely gaining the western support it needed from the start. Western countries are now mulling over the decision to supply Ukraine with heavy equipment such as tanks and aircraft, The US has approved the training of Ukrainian pilots on the F-16 and F-15, and within six to eight months it's all but assured that Ukraine will be flying western fighters. Germany is mulling over a decision to equip Ukraine with leopard battle tanks, and increasing calls from within the US may lead to an approval of equipping Ukraine with the mighty Abrams.
So is Ukraine really winning the war?
The answer is both yes and no. Wars aren't won until they're won, and any number of things could dramatically change the situation for Ukraine. As some in the west experience 'Ukrainian fatigue' the amount of support for the nation could being to dwindle. Europe is already set to experience a harsh winter due to energy crunches after being cut off from Russian supplies, and this could dramatically swing European opinion against continued support for Ukraine.Yet the United States remains steadfast in its commitment to Ukraine, and seems set to supply the nation with even more advanced equipment.
While Europe may, and has been faltering in its own backyard, the support of the US alone may be enough to shift the tide of war in Ukraine's favor. Russia however remains a significantly large, if clumsy and inept, military power, and has not announced a general mobilization. Even a general mobilization is at this point unlikely to win the war for Russia, as it would take nearly a year to mobilize, train, and equip fresh forces- time that Russia does not currently have.
At every turn Ukraine has been understimated, yet there's a very real fear of overestimating Ukraine's ability to succeed. Its offensive in the east continues to be successful even as this video is being made, but that offensive succeeded in large part due to surprise. It's unlikely such operational surprise can be achieved again, and this means the war is inevitably going to come to a slugfest, in which Russia is the heavyweight. Only continued and vastly increased support from the West can see Ukraine push Russia back to its borders, and as of now Ukraine isn't necessarily winning, but it's a long way from losing.
TLDR, the answer to the question "is Ukraine winning"? is that Ukraine has not won, while it is farther away from Losing than Russia is, for reasons that have been revealed over the last eight months.
Like I said on April 24, “Its pretty bad when a bunch of YouTube animators understand warfare better than a real army.”
Cmments, criticisms, questions, or angry gnashing of teeth?
I’d bring it down to a street fight level.
The purpose of a kinetic fight is to
deprive your opponent of the ability to fight or
the desire to continue the fight.
Neither Russia or Ukraine are there yet.
Resource wise Russia has the advantage
over a period of time.
Pure “blood and guts desire” Ukraine has the advantage.
it is their home they are protecting.
Can you spell Holodomor? I think they can.
Russian OWNS the air space has conclusively proven Ukraine's air defense is non-existent this week. You can't win a war or take back lost territory if the other side can bomb you to kingdom come.
Donald Trump knows that and that is why he wants to spare more Ukrainian lives and keep it from losing more territory by negotiating an end to the war.
If you have a problem with Trump, lay down on the tracks so the Trump Train can run you and your fellow neocons over.
Noted Russian military expert Vladislav [“Vlad”] Shurygin to Izvestia newspaper: ‘The Russian Armed Forces have begun to conduct combat operations for real, this is how it should have been done from the very beginning.
Now we are striking at the infrastructure. First of all, targeting energy facilities, communications and railways. All these targets are vulnerable, and we have every opportunity to impact them.
Leaving the enemy without electricity, we will leave him without light and communications, as well as without properly functioning railways. This fighting must be continued. This is feared in the West, which is why they’ve raised such a cry.
Problems with electricity will disrupt entire logistics of the Ukrainian military — system for transporting personnel, military equipment, ammunition, related cargo, as well as the functioning of military and repair plants. It will become easier for our units at the front.
So far, there is shock in Ukraine, but they will be able to restore the destroyed facilities. In order to comprehensively destroy [Ukraine’s] military logistics, you need to work in this vein for a week and a half or two.’
We will see how this new strategy works under a new general. It worked for us against Serbia.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/belgrade052599.htm
BELGRADE, May 24 – NATO airstrikes on Yugoslavia’s power grid left millions of people without electricity or water service today, bringing the war over Kosovo more directly into the lives of civilians across the country.
Three consecutive nights of air attacks caused extensive blackouts in Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Nis, the three largest cities in Serbia, Yugoslavia’s dominant republic. In contrast with previous attacks on the power supply – in which allied warplanes triggered temporary outages by dropping carbon-fiber filaments that shorted out electrical lines – NATO forces this time struck at Serbia’s five major power-transmission stations with high-explosive munitions, causing damage that could take weeks to repair.
Officials at the Pentagon and at NATO headquarters in Belgium said allied jets deliberately attacked the power grid, aiming to shut it down more completely and for longer periods than at any time previously in the two-month-old air campaign. U.S. officials estimated the attacks had shut off power to about 80 percent of Serbia.
Allied officials said the attacks were intended to disrupt operations by the Serb-led Yugoslav military in Kosovo, the focus of the conflict, and not target civilians. But by increasing the hardship of ordinary citizens, alliance leaders also appeared to be seeking to encourage public disaffection with the government of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
Here in Belgrade, where rage against NATO during the initial days of the three-month-old bombing campaign has lapsed into weariness for many residents, the prospect of sustained blackouts brought renewed anger toward the alliance. Some cited the power outages as evidence that the genuine aim of NATO is not to expel Yugoslav troops and Serbian special police units from Kosovo, but to punish civilians and wreck the country.
The attacks also slashed water reserves by damaging pumps and cutting electricity to the few pumps that were still operative. Belgrade’s water utility said that reserves of drinking water had been reduced to 8 percent, according to the Beta news agency, and that 60 percent of the city was without water service. The agency said authorities were trying to restore water to most city residents by midnight.
A NATO spokesman, Peter Daniel, insisted that allied warplanes were not targeting the Yugoslav water system or main power plants. Instead, he said, the attacks were aimed at “the transformers and the edges, so to speak, of the electricity-generating system.”
Still, military officials confirmed that the objective of using conventional explosives against parts of the power grid was to cause longer-lasting disruptions of electrical service. “It’s fair to say we made the decision that we’re going to attack some elements of it in a way that’s going to take it down for longer than it would have been,” said a senior officer at the Pentagon.
By focusing the attacks more on distribution lines than on main production components, the officer said, the damage should take weeks, not years to repair. He said Yugoslav authorities have access to “auxiliary power supplies for many of these facilities,” but he added that the latest attacks should prove more challenging for the Yugoslav military than the brief outages caused by the filament drops.
That weapon is a highly classified munition that throws out clusters of bomblets packed with chemically treated strands that act like lightning when they touch an electrical structure, causing widespread outages but no permanent damage.
The strikes have been limited thus far to electrical facilities in Serbia proper, the Pentagon officer said, but NATO commanders are understood to be planning to extend the attacks to Kosovo – a Serbian province from which Belgrade government forces have driven hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in a drive to crush an independence movement there.
The total casualties for Russia seem very high. Event the author mentions casualties are hard to be sure of. I have doubts they are that high.
The author is pretty clear in the overall picture.
Ukraine has not won, but it has not lost, which is a very big thing.
On the other hand, Russia has not won, but it has not lost, either.
The issue is still undecided.
If the West continues to support Ukraine, they have the edge for the moment.
Russia today is not the Russia of the Czars or Stalin. The information control is much less certain.
Russia may be able to conquer Ukraine and take Kiev, but I think it would cripple Russia to do so for the foreseable future.
The war in Ukraine has already done much to cripple the Russian "brand".
Okay if you are such an expert answer 2 questions:
1) Why have Russians in six months failed to take Kramatorsk in Donetsk
2) Do you expect Russia to take this town in 2022?
Russia has determinedly NOT owned the airspace.
They failed in the first few days and now have lost the airspace.
Your country is too corrupt to ein wars, even against Ukraine
“Ukraine has determinedly NOT owned the airspace.
They failed in the first few days and now have lost the airspace.
Your country is too corrupt to win wars, even against Russia.”
Fixed/Corrected.
The Democrats must have been doing some really awful stuff in Ukraine.
This is a pure fight between good and evil,Christians vs nazis and, naturally enough, the (stolen) US government and the criminals who operate it, have plopped themselves down four square on the side of the Nazis.
On October 8, Putin appointed General Sergei Surovikin as the overall commander of the Ukraine invasion. After eight months, Putin finally realizes he needs a overall commander of the operation.
Two days later, Russia launches over 100 cruise missiles and drones on civilian targets in Ukraine. According to Forbes, the October 10 attack had 84 cruise missiles and 24 drones, for a total cost of $400 to $700 million to knock out the power for a few days. According to Ukraine, 43 cruise missiles and 13 drones were shot down. Reportedly, one cruise missile was shot down by a man portable SAM (video). That can happen if the missile flies right over an alert AA crew. During the 1990 Persian Gulf War a few Tomahawks cruise missiles were shot down by Iraq this way. Then two days later, Ukraine shoot down 4 KA-52; attack helicopters, and is getting the photographic evidence to back up those claims. Maybe 2 more helicopters were damaged or shot down and a Mig-29 crashed due to mechanical malfunction.
Even on the low end of total cost and minimal missiles and drones shot down, that is a lot of munitions expended and aircraft lost for no military gain.That is with the existing Russian weapons and Ukraine air defenses. If you want to call air dominance go ahead. Ukraine is going to get improved air defenses, and like everything else they have received so far, figure out how to make it work.
The greatest outcome of the strike is to convince the US and Europe the only acceptable outcome is driving Russia out of Ukraine. This strike just killed any chance of a negotiated settlement. When Russia offered Germany to sell natural gas through the functioning Nord lines, Germany said no thanks. This winter is going to hurt, all nations are going to get through it. Then when spring and summer comes the economic impacts are going to really start coming home to Russia.
Enjoy Russia's "success" over this while you can.
As I hope you and others continue to enjoy Ukrainian “success”.......
Remains to be seen, does it not.
I certainly approve of the 4 regions, if not more later on, being added to the Russia Federation.
I approve of the continued denazification of Ukraine.
I approve of the continued demilitarization of Ukraine.
The Ukies are slowly grinding the Ruskies down, with much Western help. People in Russia don’t want to fight or die in Ukraine. Things will only get worse for Pootie and his army the longer he makes war on Ukraine. Belarus is transferring T-72 tanks to Russia, which only weakens Lukashenko in Belarus. Lukashenko’s regime in teetering, and when he falls so does Putin’s chief ally, and Polish and Western influence will wax in Belarus.
Cranko.
You Russians attacked a supposedly weaker neighbour.
Your airforce not only didn’t own the airspace in the first few days (and doesn’t niw), but have comprehensively lost the airspace now.
Russia is being pushed back because of it’s own failures in logistics, maintenance, training, diplomacy and intelligence.
blah blah. I am 100% sure that idiot Zelensky will ask us for more billions. That’s his only strategy.
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