Green Party's Jill Stein to Seek Hand 'Recounts', Forensic Tabulator Audits in WI, MI, PA

The Green Party's 2016 Presidential candidate Jill Stein is announcing her intention to seek a "recount of votes in the battleground states of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania." The campaign's press release, posted in full below, cites "a multi-partisan effort to check the accuracy of the machine-counted vote tallies in these states in order to ensure the integrity of our elections."

The announcement follows on word that leaked out yesterday at New York magazine that top electronic voting experts and election integrity advocates have been encouraging the Hillary Clinton campaign to file for similar hand-counts and forensic analyses of electronic voting and tabulation systems in the same states. The BRAD BLOG has independently confirmed that those efforts have been under way and are still being considered at the top level of the Clinton campaign.

We discussed just some of those efforts, and a number of reasons for them, on yesterday's BradCast program. University of Michigan computer science professor Alex Halderman, who has cracked many electronic voting systems in recent years, offers additional reasons to check the results and the systems in WI, MI and PA now right here.

Dr. Jill Stein, the 2016 Green Party Presidential candidate, on her announcement earlier today that her campaign plans to file for hand-counted paper ballot "recounts" and forensic audits of the Presidential election results in Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania. [Audio link to show and full interview posted below.]

"We have to move really fast in order to basically verify the vote and be confident our votes were actually counted," she tells me, citing the many concerns brought to her by computer scientists and voting systems and election integrity experts, all questioning whether paper ballots were counted accurately by error-prone and easily-hacked computer tabulators in WI and MI, and whether touch-screen systems were manipulated in some fashion in PA.

Across those three states alone, as we have been reporting, just 50,000 votes flipped from Trump to Clinton --- out of more than 13 million ballots cast in those states, where a number of anomalous results have been found --- could change who becomes the next President of the United States.

There is plenty of reason to question whether the results as reported are accurate. And not only because of the surprising results. As I note again on today's show, University of Michigan computer science and voting systems expert J. Alex Halderman, one of those urging the candidates to call for a hand-count, has cracked many electronic voting systems in recent years. He offered still more reasons to examine both the reported results and the systems used in WI, MI and PA earlier today.

Stein, explaining that some $2 million must be raised to meet the deadline to file in WI by Friday (and another $4 million or so for the other two states next week), tells me that it's an "outrage we have to go to extraordinary lengths to verify the vote," adding she is doing so, due to her "interests as a citizen, as a person in America, that the vote be valid." (The campaign has set up a fund raising page for the effort right here.)

"Why would anyone be against counting the votes?," she asks. "Itâ€™s long been demonstrated that our system of voting, relying on these machines, has virtually no security. Theyâ€™re hack friendly [and] tamper friendly."

"People have felt such anguish during this election," Stein notes. "This is a joint effort, and there are many election advocates who are involved. A lot of the grassroots election integrity experts. If ever there was a time to stand up and demand an accountable and secure vote, this is the time to do it. If we don't do it now, when exactly, what would be the cause to do it?" She also details the attempt by the scientists and advocates to encourage the Clinton campaign to take up the effort as well. (I can confirm that effort happened and that the campaign was still considering doing so as of earlier today.) She says she welcomes other campaigns, such as the Libertarian Party and independent candidates with standing, to join the effort as well.

"It feels really good to be standing up right now," she tells me. "Itâ€™s time for us to take control of our democracy to start with. To give ourselves a gift on this Thanksgiving." We discuss all of that and the many concerns about the reported results, take a few calls afterward, and actually find a bit more to be thankful for on today's program Download MP3

AFFIDAVIT OF J. ALEX HALDERMAN
J. ALEX HALDERMAN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following under penalty of perjury:
1. My name is J. Alex Halderman. I am a Professor of Computer Science and Engineering and the Director of the Center for Computer Security and Society at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
2. I have a Ph.D., a Master's Degree, and a Bachelor's Degree in Computer Science, all from Princeton University.
3. My research focuses on computer security and privacy, with an emphasis on problems that broadly impact society and public policy. Among my areas of research are software security, data privacy, and electronic voting.
4. l have published peer-reviewed research analyzing the security of electronic voting systems used in Wisconsin, other U.S. states, and other countries. 1 was part of a team of experts commissioned by the California Secretary of State to conduct a "Top-to-Bottom" review of the state's electronic voting systems. I have also investigated methods for improving the security of electronic voting, such as efficient techniques for testing whether electronic vote totals match paper vote records.
5. I have published numerous other peer-reviewed papers in these areas of research. My full curriculum vitae, including a list of honors and awards, research projects, and publications, is attached as Exhibit A.
Context: Cyberattacks and the 2016 Presidential Election
6. The 2016 presidential election was subject to unprecedented cyberattacks apparently intended to interfere with the election. This summer, attackers broke into the email system of the Democratic National Committee and, separately, into the email account of John Podesta, the chairman of Secretary Clinton's campaign. Exhibits B and C. The attackers leaked private messages from both hacks. Attackers also infiltrated the voter registration systems of two states, Illinois and Arizona, and stole voter data. Exhibit D. The Department of Homeland Security has stated that senior officials in the Russian government commissioned these attacks. Exhibit E. Attackers attempted to breach election offices in more than 20 other states. Exhibit F.
7. Russia bas sophisticated cyber-offensive capabilities, and it has shown a willingness to use them to hack elections elsewhere. For instance, according to published reports, during the 2014 presidential election in Ukraine, attackers linked to Russia sabotaged Ukraine's vote-counting infrastructure, and Ukrainian officials succeeded only at the 1ast minute in defusing vote-stealing malware that could have caused the wrong winner to be announced. Exhibit G. Countries other than Russia also have similarly sophisticated cyberwarfare capabilities.
8. If a foreign government were to attempt to hack American voting machines to influence the outcome of a presidential election, one might expect the attackers to proceed as follows. First, the attackers might probe election offices well in advance to find ways to break into the computers. Next, closer to the election, when it was clear from polling data which states would have close electoral margins, the attackers might spread malware into voting machines into some of these states, manipulating the machines to shift a few percent of the vote to favor their desired candidate. This malware would likely be designed to remain inactive during pre-election tests, perform its function during the election, and then erase itself after the polls closed. One would expect a skilled attacker's work to leave no visible signs, other than a surprising electoral outcome in which results in several close states differed from pre-election polling.
The Vulnerability of American Voting Machines to Cyberattack
9. As I and other experts have repeatedly documented in peer-reviewed and state sponsored research, American voting machines have serious cybersecurity problems. Voting machines are computers with reprogrammable software. An attacker who can modify that software by infecting the machines with malware can cause the machines to provide any result of the attacker's choosing. As I have demonstrated in laboratory tests, in just a few seconds, anyone can install vote-stealing malware on a voting machine that silently alters the electronic records of every vote. 1
l0. Whether voting machines are connected to the Internet is irrelevant. Shortly before each election, poll workers copy the ballot design from a regular desktop computer in a government office and use removable media (akin to the memory card in a digital camera) to load the ballot design onto each machine. That initial computer is almost certainly not well enough secured to guard against attacks by foreign governments. If technically sophisticated attackers A video documenting this result is publicly available at https://youtu.be/aZws98jw67g. infect that computer, they can spread vote-stealing malware to every voting machine in the area. Technically sophisticated attackers can accomplish this with ease. 11. While the vulnerabilities of American voting machines have been known for some time, states' responses to these vulnerabilities have been patchy and inconsistent at best. Many states, including Wisconsin, continue to use out-of-date machines that are known to be insecure.
Examining the Paper Record Is the Only Way to Ensure the Integrity of the Result
12. Paper ballots are the best and most secure technology available for casting votes. Optical scan voting allows the voter to fill out a paper ballot that is scanned and counted by a computer. Electronic voting machines with voter-verified paper audit trails allow the voter to review a printed record of the vote he bas just cast on a computer. Only a paper record documents the vote in a manner that cannot later be modified by malware or other forms of cyberattacks.
13. One explanation for the results of the 2016 presidential election is that cyberattacks influenced the result. This explanation is plausible, in light of other known cyberattacks intended to affect the outcome of the election; the profound vulnerability of American voting machines to cyberattack; and the fact that a skilled attacker would leave no outwardly visible evidence of an attack other than an unexpected result.
14. The only way to determine whether a cyberattack affected the outcome of the 2016 presidential election is to examine the available physical evidence-that is, to count the paper ballots and paper audit trail records, and review the voting equipment, to ensure that the votes cast by actual voters match the results determined by the computers. For ballots cast through optical scanners, a manual recount of the paper ba1Iots, without relying on the electronic equipment, must occur. Using the electronic equipment to conduct the recount, even after first evaluating the machine through a test deck, is insufficient. Attackers intending to commit a successful cyberattack could, and likely would, create a method to undermine any pre-tests. For votes cast on electronic voting machines, the paper audit trail records must be counted, since the electronic records stored in the machines could have been manipulated in an attack. Voting equipment that might yield forensic evidence of an attack includes the voting machines, removable media, and election management system computers. Paper ballots, paper audit trails, and voting equipment will only be examined in this manner if there is a recount.
15. A recount is the best way, and indeed the only way, to ensure public confidence that the results are accurate, authentic, and untainted by interference. It will also set a precedent that may provide an important deterrent against cyberattacks on future elections.
http://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/news/wisconsin_recount_petition_of_jill_stein_00268242_12391.pdf

In item 6 is stated that Illinois and Arizona voter registration systems were breached. An NBC news story is cited to support this claim. The NBC news story states that Illinois voter registration systems were breached and that attempts to breach Arizona's system failed.

In item 6 is stated that "attackers broke into [] the email account of John Podesta". Podesta's email was retrieved because he clicked on spam and provided his password. http://www.salon.com/2016/10/21/hillary-clinton-campaign-chariman-john-podestas-email-was-hacked-because-he-clicked-on-a-phishing-link/

In item 6 is stated "The Department of Homeland Security has stated that senior officials in the Russian government commissioned these attacks." The DNI-DHS statement does not claim there is evidence that Russia directed or conducted attacks, specifically stating "we are not now in a position to attribute this activity to the Russian Government." DNI & DHS believe attacks are "consistent with methods and motivations". Methods and motivations are not proof of actions, as the joint statement makes clear. https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/215-press-releases-2016/1423-joint-dhs-odni-election-security-statement

Item 8 is conjecture.

No evidence of hacking or irregularity is presented. All that is presented is conjecture, distortions, and lies.

pa recount laws here
http://ceimn.org/ceimn-state-recount-laws-searchable-database/states/Pennsylvania internet so i don’t know if any of this is factually true.
Pennsylvania Recount Laws

This information was updated June 2015 using Title 25 of the Unofficial Purdon’s Pennsylvania Statutes (25 P.S.) current through Act 2015-4.

All citations below can be found in Title 25, “Elections and Electoral Districts,” Chapter 14, “Election Code.” The index to all statutes can be found here.
Voting System Used:

Mixed paper ballot and DREs without VVPAT

Direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems without voter verified paper trails are used in 47 counties. The remaining 20 counties use optical scanners tabulators with paper ballots or some combination of DREs with optical scan tabulators.

For more details, visit Verified Voting.
Counting Method:

Mix of recount, retabulation and electronic review

The counting method is determined by the recount initiating mechanism and the type of voting system used.

For districts that use paper ballots:

If the recount is initiated by voters or county boards under 25 P.S. 3154(e), or by the Secretary of the Commonwealth under 25 P.S. 3154(g), the recount will consist of a manual count of ballots in counties “in which an election district uses paper ballots other than those used in conjunction with an electronic voting system.” In counties “in which an election district uses an electronic voting system utilizing paper ballots,” the counting method requires that manual, mechanical, or electronic devices of a different type than those used for the initial counting be used, meaning that either a recount or a retabulation is possible; however, all ballots with overvotes must be recounted by hand. See 25 P.S. 3154(e)(2) and (3). See also page 6 of the Directive Concerning the Use, Implementation and Operation of Electronic Voting Systems by the County Board (6/09/2011) , issued by the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

If the recount is initiated by county boards under 25 P.S. 3154(b), then a manual count of the ballots is “authorized,” and will include a “recount of the ballots” in the ballot box. See 25 P.S. 3154(b), (c) and (d).

If the recount is initiated by voters or by the Secretary of the Commonwealth under 25 P.S. 3261, the ballot boxes will be opened and the “entire vote of the election district” will be counted. See 25 P.S. 3261.

For districts using paperless direct-recording electronic machines (DREs):

Only an electronic review is performed. See 25 P.S. 3154 (d)(2) and (e)(1) and 3262 for review procedures. See also the Directive Concerning the Use, Implementation and Operation of Electronic Voting Systems by the County Board (6/09/2011).
Initiating Mechanism:

Close vote margin
Voter-initiated
Election official-initiated

Election Official-Initiated Recounts:

When a discrepancy is found in the reconciliation of the number of registered electors and the total vote, the county board is authorized to “recount the ballots.” See 25 P.S. 3154(b).

In districts using paper ballots or ballots electronically tabulated in the district, when a discrepancy is found in the comparison of the sealed and unsealed general returns, and the subsequent examination of the documentation, then the county board “shall” recount the ballots. See 25 P.S. 3154(d)(1) & (5).

In districts where electronically tabulated ballots are used in conjunction with central ballot tabulation, a discrepancy in the number of persons voting between the computer return sheets and the sealed general returns will require the count board to recount the ballots. See 25 P.S. 3154(d)(4).

Moreover, county boards “shall conduct a recount or recanvass of all ballots cast” whenever “it shall appear that there is a discrepancy in the returns of any election district…” The county board may also conduct a recount or recanvass “of their own motion.” See 25 P.S. 3154(e).

Timing: See 25 P.S. 3154(f).
Close Vote Margin:

Less than or equal to .5%

Close vote margin recounts are initiated by the Secretary of the Commonwealth and are only available for candidates or ballot questions “appearing on the ballot in every election district in [the] Commonwealth.” They are required when the margin is 0.5% or less of all votes cast for the office or ballot question. See 25 P.S. 3154(g)(1). Close vote margin recounts may also take place under a court’s jurisdiction. See 25 P.S. 3161 and 3162. Counties receive a reimbursement from the state for the recount. See 25 P.S. 3154(g)(8).

Timing: See 25 P.S. 3154(g)(2), (g)(5) and (g)(6). For recounts ordered by the Secretary and conducted under the jurisdiction of the court see 25 P.S. 3161(a.1) and 3162(a)(2).
Candidate-Initiated Options:

While candidates cannot file a direct request for a recount, they may appeal the “order or decision of any county board regarding the computation or canvassing of the returns of any primary or election, or regarding any recount or recanvass thereof.” During the appeal process, the court may determine that a recount is necessary. See 25 P.S. 3157.

Timing: See P.S. 3157(a).
Voter-Initiated Options:

Voters may request recounts for offices
Voters may request recounts for initiatives/questions

Pennsylvania uses the terms “election district” to identify a district, division or precinct, within which all qualified electors vote at one polling place. As of June 2015, there were 9,175 election districts in Pennsylvania. Note the references below to petitions required for each election district.

Voters may initiate recounts with the county boards with a “petition of three voters of any district, verified by affidavit, that an error, although not apparent on the face of the returns, has been committed….” The county board shall then “conduct a recount or recanvass of all ballots cast.” See 25 P.S. 3154(e).

Voters may also initiate recounts in the court of common pleas under 25 P.S. 3261, which governs recounts requested in counties using paper ballots or they may initiate a recanvass under 25 P.S. 3262, which governs counties using voting machines (DREs). In the counties using paper ballots and in those using voting machines, voters may petition for a recount in any general, municipal, special or primary election, for either an office or a question. These recount requests must be accompanied by the signatures of at least three voters per precinct or election district. See 25 P.S. 3261(a) and 3262(a). Unless the recount initiators are alleging a particular act of fraud or error and offer evidence supporting the allegation, then the recount “shall include all election districts in which ballots were cast for the office in question” and that the initiators’ petition “must be filed in each election district.” See 25 P.S. 3263(a)(1).

Timing: For voter initiated recounts under 25 P.S. 3261 and 3262, see 25 P.S. 3263(a)(1), 3261(f) and 3262(c). For voter initiated recounts under 25 P.S. 3154(e), see 3154(f).
Cost for Voter-Initiated Recounts:

Initiator pays set or per jurisdiction fee
Initiator pays deposit or bond before recount
Payer of costs depends on outcome of recount

Voters must either deposit $50 in cash or present a bond of $100 with their petition for a recount for each election district. See 25 P.S. 3261(b) and 3262(a.1). If “fraud or substantial error” is discovered during the course of the recount the bond is cancelled or the deposit is returned to the petitioners. See 25 P.S. 3261(d) and 3262(b.1).
Challengers and Observers:

Party/candidate or initiator has statutory authority to appoint observers

There are no statutes requiring that recounts be conducted in public.

For recounts under 25 P.S. 3154(e), “each . . . candidate may be present in person, or by attorney, and each [party or political body affected by the recount or recanvass] may send two representatives to be present at such recount or recanvass.” See 25 P.S. 3154(e).

For recounts ordered by the Secretary under 3154(g), “A candidate affected by the recount and recanvass may be present, in person or by attorney, at the recount and recanvass” and “A party or body affected by the recount and recanvass may send two representatives to the recount and recanvass.” See 25 P.S. 3154(g)(4).

For recounts under court jurisdiction, where paper ballots are used, “each . . . candidate may be present at such recount, either in person or by his attorney or by his duly authorized representative….” See 25 P.S. 3261(c). In districts where voting machines are used, “each candidate whose name appears on the ballot labels . . . may be present at such recanvass, either in person or by his attorney, or by his duly authorized representative....” See 25 P.S. 3262(b).

“Any candidate, attorney or watcher present at any recount of ballots or recanvass of voting machines shall be entitled to examine the ballots, or the voting machine and to raise any objections regarding the same….” See 25 P.S. 2650(c).
Rules for Determining Voter Intent:

Statutory guidance provided

Guidelines for counting voter marks are provided in 25 P.S. 3063. See also the guidelines for counting irregular ballots in 25 P.S. 3155.
Audit Laws:

State has audit laws

See: http://www.ceimn.org/state-audit-laws-searchable-database/states/pennsyl...
Additional Resources:
Pennsylvania Department of State Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation

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