Posted on 02/15/2008 7:15:07 AM PST by drzz
Captain Thomas B. Weir was the commander of company B, in Captain Benteen’s battalion (one of the three columns that Custer sent against the Indians at Little Bighorn). On June 25, 1876, Weir followed Benteen in his scout on the South of the valley, looking for “satellite villages” (other Indian villages around the main one). __
“WE OUGHT TO BE OVER THERE!”
When Benteen understood that the scout didn’t give any results, he came back on Custer’s trail. He had specific orders to follow Custer’s steps and to send him a note about the results of his scouts. Benteen didn’t send any note to Custer (disobedience of order) and moved on the trail with considerable slowness. He then stopped his column to water the horses at a name later called “the morass”. Shots were heard in the valley, a sign that the battle was beginning on Custer’s side. Private Jan Moeller and Sergeant Windolph heard the firing, as well as Lieutenant Godfrey.
Captain Thomas Weir became very impatient. Lieutenant Godfrey stated that many officers became “uneasy by the lengthy stay. One subaltern wondered why the “Old Man” (Benteen) was keeping them out of the battle for so long. Captain Weir’s anger grew. He said to Benteen: “We ought to be over there!” Benteen ignored him. Weir went to his company, mount up and moved towards the sound of the guns. It was a disobedience of orders, because, as Godfrey stated, “his position in the column was that of second unit.” Benteen eventually moved behind Weir. It was the first time Captain Weir was leaving his command because of Benteen’s indifference to the ongoing battle. It wouldn’t be the last.
_____________________________________________ Sources: Hammer, Custer in ’76, page 75 Hunt; I fought with Custer, page 81. Sklenar, To Hell with Honor, pages 224, 365 note 18
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BENTEEN’S DAWDLING, WEIR’S TAKING THE ADVANCE
The battle was still on in the valley of the Little Bighorn. However, Captain Benteen’s battalion was still out of the fight. Benteen travelled at three miles an hour, when Custer’s other battalions did the same in an hour less time. Benteen was slow, and there is no explanation for this betrayal. He just acted as if no battle was going on. He just ignored his duty. He then met Daniel Kanipe, who was carrying a vocal order by Custer. Benteen learnt that Custer was asking for immediate reinforcements, but didn’t act at all. His battalion was still moving at trot. He even stopped in front of a lone tepee to examine it. He was wasting time, and didn’t care about it. Soon, another messenger appeared. Private Giovanni Martini was carrying a written order by General Custer: “Benteen, come on, be quick, bring packs.” The packs were not the entire pack train, as it is often stated, but the “extra ammunitions”. Every soldier knew it, as lieutenant McClernand clearly said in his articles and book. Benteen had to pick the extra ammunition up and then to go quickly towards Custer. Did he act as his orders urged him to? Not at all. He didn’t go at a gallop, but at a walk or a trot (Lieutenant Godfrey). Custer’s men had moved on the same ground on overall speed or fast trot. Captain Weir was outraged again. Ignoring Benteen’s orders once more, he moved quickly, left the command and reached Reno Hill the first. Again, Thomas Weir was the only one in Benteen’s troops who acted like a soldier.
_____________________________________________ Sources: Hammer, Custer in ’76, pages 75-76 Gray, Centennial Campaign, page 183 McClernand, On Time for Disaster, page 71-88
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WEIR’S ULTIMATE MOVE
Benteen’s battalion reached Reno Hill, found Reno’s battalion, which had suffered of casualties after its commander had left it without any bugle in the woods. Benteen dismounted and stayed on the hill with Major Reno. Both never acted to support Custer at any kind. They had orders to “come quick” and knew that the main duty of any soldier is “to support the commander at any level” and to “go to the sound of the guns”. But nothing happened. They just stayed on the hills, while shots and volleys were heard in the valley, coming from Custer’s men.
Lieutenant McDougall testified: “It appeared to everyone that all should go to support of Custer”.
Lieutenant Godfrey wrote: “I thought General Custer was below us and we could join him that we gad no water and a few wounded; that we would have our casualties and burdens increased on the morrow.”
Sitting Bull :
Journalist: “Were not some warriors left in front of these entrenchments on the bluffs, near the right side of the map? (Reno Hill) Did not you think it necessary – did not the warchiefs think it necessary – to keep some of your young men there to fight the troops who had retreated to these entrenchments (Reno’s and Benteen’s men)?”
Sitting Bull: “No.”
Journalist: “Why?”
Sitting Bull: “You have forgotten.”
Journalist: “How?”
Sitting Bull: “You forget that only a few soldiers were left by the Long Hair on those buffs (Reno Hill). He took the main body of his soldiers with him (Custer’s battalion) to make the big fight down here on the left (Medicine Tail Coulee).
Journalist: “So there were no soldiers (warriors) to make a fight left in the entrenchments on the right hand bluff (Reno Hill, Reno’s and Benteen’s position)?”
Sitting Bull: “I have spoken. It is enough. The squaw could deal with them. There were none but squaws and papooses in front of (Reno’s and Benteen’s men) that afternoon.”
Lieutenant Edward McClernand, of Terry’s column, arrived on the battlefield on June 27, 1876. He drew maps of the battlefield and wrote several articles on the battle. Here’s what he wrote on Major Reno, who was the senior commander of Reno Hill: “Some of (Reno’s) officers looking from the edge of the bluffs (from Reno Hill) at the large number of mounted warriors in the bottom below (the valley of the Little Bighorn), observed that the enemy suddenly started down the valley, and that in a few minutes scarcely a(n Indian) horseman was left in sight. Reno’s front was practically cleared of the enemy. It is not sufficient to say that there was no serious doubt about Custer being able to take care of himself. (Custer) had gone downstream with five troops, heavy firing was heard in that direction, it was evident a fight was on (…) Reno with six troops (…) still ignored the well known military axiom to march to the sound of guns.”
Weir was livid. Private John Fox heard this conversation between Captain Weir and Major Reno:
Weir: “Custer must be around here somewhere (shots were heard) and we ought to go to him.” Reno: “We are surrounded by Indians (it’s false. There weren’t any Indian around Reno Hill) and we ought to remain here.” Weir: “Well, if no one else goes to Custer, I will go.” Reno: “No, you cannot.”
Weir was so angered that he left Reno, mounted up and went towards the sounds of the guns with his orderly. Lieutenant Edgerly saw his commander leaving and followed him with the whole company D. As Edgerly understood afterwards, Weir had disobeyed orders. Both Benteen and Reno didn’t want to move.
_____________________________________________ Sources: Hammer, Custer in ’76, page 71 Gray, Centennial Campaign, page 183 McClernand, On Time for Disaster, page 71-88 Captain Michael J. Koury, Diaries of Little Bighorn, page 11 “Wild Life on the Plains”, in Cyclorama of General Custer’s Last Battle, compiled by A. J. Donnelle, Promontory Press, 1889, pages 21-23
WATCHING A BATTLE ON WEIR POINT
Benteen eventually followed Weir, but only 30 minutes after him. The battle was still raging on, as Historian Gregory Michno shows in his book “Lakota Noon.” (he makes the timeline of Custer’s movements with Indian testimonies) Despite what countless books said, when Weir reached a peak named afterwards Weir Point, Custer’s battle was still raging. Little Bighorn specialist Wayne Michael Sarf admits that many officers on Weir Point “apparently saw more than they would later admit. There is little doubt that (Lieutenant) Edgerly destroyed the portion of a letter to his wife dealing with the Weir Point episode.”
Sergeant Charles Windolph remembered what he saw on Weir Point : “Way off to the north you could see what looked to be groups of mounted Indians. There was plenty of firing going on.”
Lieutenant Hare was interviewed by Walter Camp, who wrote: “While out in advance with (Captain Weir’s) Company D, the Indians were thick over on Custer ridge and were firing. (Hare) thought Custer was fighting them.”
Private Edward Pigford: “at first when looked toward Custer ridge the Indians were firing from a big circle, but it gradually closed until they seemed to converge into a large black mass on the side hill toward the river and all along the ridge.”
Captain Weir was watching his comrades battling without helping them, because Benteen and Reno were still on their hill. When Benteen eventually reached Weir Point, he put an American flag on the peak to “show my position to Custer. The bugle began to sound on Custer Hill, which means that Custer was watching the flag or the dust of the other battalions and was using the bugle as a signal. Custer’s men asked for help, after having waited for Benteen and Reno… during more than two hours!
Sitting Bull: “As (Custer’s soldiers) they stood to be killed they were seen to look far away to the hills in all directions and we knew they were looking for the hidden soldiers (Benteen’s and Reno’s soldiers) in the hollows of the hills to come and help them.”
A little band, led by warchief Low Dog, eventually attacked the men on Weir Point while the battle on Custer Hill was still raging (see Michno). Benteen decided to withdraw his troops, according to Private George Glenn and Lieutenant Francis Gibson. The troops fell back without any rear guard, just like Reno had done in the woods. Lieutenant Godfrey decided to deploy his men on his own initiative. He later said to the Reno Court of Inquiry:
Question by the court: “Was the engagement severe in and around (Weir Point)?”
Answer by Lieutenant Godfrey “No severe engagement at all (on Weir Point).”
Question by the court: “Was there much firing on the part of the Indians down at that point up to the time to command started to go back (from Weir Point to Reno Hill)?”
Answer by Lieutenant Godfrey: “No, sir.”
Question by the court: “State if the Indians drove (Weir’s and Benteen’s) command from that position (Weir Point).”
Answer by Lieutenant Edgerly: “They did not. The orders were to fall back and we fell back.”
400 men fell back without ever supporting the last stand. Custer would never have the support he had asked for during more than two hours. His heroic last stand would end at 6.20 p.m., almost at the time Reno had reached Reno Hill again. A betrayal had just happened at Little Bighorn. A betrayal that would be covered during a century, and which is still covered up by many scholars and historians.
Major General Thomas Rosser, cavalry officer during the Civil War, wrote in 1876: “As a soldier, I would sooner lie in the grave of General Custer and his gallant comrades alone in that distant wilderness, that when the last trumpet sounds, I could rise to judgment from my part of duty, than to live in the place of the survivors of the siege on the hills.”
_____________________________________________ Sources: The official recording of the Reno Court of Inquiry, 1879 Nightengale, Little Big Horn, pages 129, 184-185, 190 Unger, The ABCs of Custer’s Last Stand, pages 191-218 Sklenar, To Hell with Honor, page 302 Michno, Lakota Noon, page 233-287 General Thomas Rosser, Chicago Tribune, August 8, 1876
DYING FROM SADNESS
Captain Weir went back on Fort Lincoln with a look of a “broken man” (lieutenant Garlington). He perhaps even tried to commit suicide by jumping in a stream while the 7th was moving back to the fort. Captain Weir was so sad because he knew that his comrades, his friends, his brother in arms had been deliberately betrayed from start to finish. From Benteen’s dawdling to his refusal to leave Reno Hill, from Reno’s disastrous offensive to his cowardice in battle, everything was made to blow any chance of victory up. Captain Weir wrote to Libbie Custer: “I know if we were all of us alone in the parlour, at night, the curtains all down and everybody else asleep, one or the other of you would make me tell you everything I know.” Thomas Weir began to drink too much, and died on December 9, 1876. Cause of death: “melancholia.” The Army and Navy saluted his death:
(Brevet) Colonel Weir was in the prime of life, 38 years of age, and no preliminary announcement of illness preceded the report of his death, which occurred suddenly in New York on Saturday, December 9, of congestion of brain. Colonel Weir was buried on Governor’s Island with military honours on Wednesday, December 14.
The only loyal officer of Reno Hill, one of the greatest – yet not honoured enough – heroes of Little Bighorn, Thomas Benton Weir, was dead. He wouldn’t be at the Reno Court of Inquiry to tell his story and destroy Reno’s and Benteen’s perjuries. On March 22, 1879, Captain Benteen help a journalist to write an article in the Army and Navy Journal. He wrongly accused Weir of being drugs addicted, which should explain his anger towards Benteen and Reno.
Thomas Weir’s ghost still haunted the traitors of Little Bighorn. _____________________________________________ Sources: Army and Navy Journal, December 9, 1876 Army and Navy Journal, March 22, 1879 Son of the Morning Star, pages 284-285
One problem with a leader who is a arrogant loser is that those who are his junior are placed in an awkward situation where when they remain obedient and loyal, they also become losers and associated with his arrogance. Meanwhile, should they disobey and not follow the arrogant loser, they become liable to indictments of mutiny and traitorous behavior.
IMHO, Custer was an arrogant fool who paid the price of his incompetence with the decimation of his military force. He committed his forces too early without sufficient battlefield intelligence, he failed to have sufficient logistics on hand when he committed his forces, and he split his forces in the heat of battle, while then sending conflicting orders which may not have been received in precedence of when they were intended, all in the heated actions of arrogant desperation.
Too many people associate desperate behavior with weakness, while ignoring how arrogance scars the thinking processes of those most arrogant. The desperation of the most arrogant is frequently characterized by resolute behavior forcefully thrusting itself upon the volition of one’s juniors, rather than respecting the volition of one’s juniors and providing responsible guidance always respecting legitimate authority.
Thanks, this was very interesting. I am going to find out more about Weir. He sounds like an outstanding cavalry officer. It’s a nice break from hating MCCnutts. Now, back to hating McCnutts.
Regards
sorry, but you are very ill-informed about the Little Bighorn.
You seem to suffer from a very usual hate against Custer based on myths and tradition - the arrogant fool at LBH.
Custer attacked a strong force with a front-flank attack which wasn’t only logical, but which worked until his support betrayed him. There was nothing foolish in attacking the Indians. US General-in-chief Nelson A Miles supported Custer’s decisions, as well as many historians (see custerwest.org)
You should review the true story of the battle of the Little Bighorn before writing such inflammatory statements. Hollywood cannot be used as historical reference.
thanks for the kind words, man. Weir was the overlooked character of the Little Bighorn
Many Custerologists---who do not "hate Custer"---rightly conclude in my opinion that had Custer even taken the additional cavalry regiment he was offered AND had Benteen AND had the pack train, he still would have been wiped out.
It's one thing to "attack a strong force" that hasn't seen your tactics before; it's quite another to send 260 vs. about 4,000 on broken ground. Fox undisputably shows that no one in either Keough's or Custer's command EVER even formed a skirmish line.
Fox never “undisputably” showed anything. His theory of “lack of resistance” doesn’t stand up to the basics of the battle.
Fox claimed to have found “not enough cartridges on the battlefield” although he knew that thousands of artefacts had been collected since 1876 by relic hunters. I personally know people who picked up hundreds of bullets and cartridges on the hill. So analyzing a “contaminated” field and drawing conclusions on a lack of material is useless - and destroys Fox’s credibility. Moreover, the Indian testimonies clearly don’t back Fox’s theory at all.
Indian forces never numbered 4’000, but 1’000 to 1’500. The “4’000” myth was created by Benteen and Reno to cover their own asses and their betrayal.
Custer attacked 1’000 warriors with 650 soldiers. He lost the battle because of these 650, 400 never supported him because their commanders, Benteen and Reno, refused to do their duty and commited high treason against their superior and their flag.
INDIAN ACCOUNTS ON THE LAST STAND
Crow King: “Riderless mounts scattered across the hills and ran to the river but the soldiers kept in order and fought like brave warriors.”
Moving Robe: “It was a hotly contested battle.”
Eagle Elk: “The shootings [by the soldiers] Eagle Elk had witnessed within the last minutes had been enough to convince him of the good sense in staying away from the front lines.”
Red Horse : “Even tough virtually surrounded, the soldiers put up a stiff resistance, for it was in this charge [chief Lame White Man’s charge] that the Lakotas lost more of their men. Red Horse thought that 136 Indians were killed and 160 were wounded in that phase of the battle.”
Hollow Horn Bear: “In fact, Hollow Horn Bear believed that the troops were in good order at the start of the fight, and kept their organization even while moving from point to point.”
Sitting Bull: “There was so much doubt about the outcome [of the battle] that I told the squaws to break the camp and be ready to leave.”
Red Hawk: “Here the soldiers made a desperate fight.”
Iron Hawk:”The Indians pressed and crowded right in around Custer Hill. But the soldiers weren’t ready to die. We stood there a long time.”
Thunder Hawk’s wife: “It was quite a fight” (on Custer Hill)
Wooden Leg could see “that all the soldiers were killed except for a band that remained hidden behind their dead horses.”
Flying By: “(the stand) was made in the place where Custer would be killed, down at the end of the long ridge.”
Flying Hawk: “Custer made a stand on his hill.”
Gall: Gall neared the end of the ridge where the last soldiers were making a stand. “They were fighting good” he said.
Lights: he could see the soldiers who had fled the Keogh fight joining those making the stand on the hill.
Two Eagles: The most stubborn stand the soldiers made was on Custer Hill. From his position a short way north and west of that point, Two Eagles noticed the hilltop was very level and the soldiers took the spot to continue their defense. (…) “They were killed on top of the ridge” Two Eagles declared.
Red Hawk: The bluecoats were “falling back steadily to Custer Hill where another stand was made”, said Red Hawk. “Here the soldiers made a desperate fight.”
Two Moon: (…) Two Moon turned back to watch the fight. (…) The “grey bunch” was still fighting.
Moving north along the ridge to where he could see better, Standing Bear noticed dismounted soldiers holding their horses by the bridles. “They were ready for us”, he said, and they began to shoot, “the bullets were just raining”. (…) Bear Horn rode up too close (to the last stand) and was himself shot down.
On Last Stand Hill, Iron Hawk saw about twenty men on horseback and about thirty men on foot. “The Indians pressed and crowded right in and around them on Custer Hill” But the soldiers weren’t ready to die. Said Iron Hawk,“We stood there a long time.”
Big Beaver: Big Beaver crawled back down the coulee to put a bit more distance between himself and the deadly soldiers bullets. (…) The Indians were rushing toward the hill where the soldiers were making their desperate fight.
Fox's account places these, and others, within the timeline.
But you are welcome to perpetuate the myth.
no, Fox’s thesis is not only wrong, but is a careful fraud. Michno’s “Lakota Noon” showed that the Indians never supported an overall disintegration, as show the accounts above. Moreover, if put in a timeline (something not done by Fox, who gathers all the accounts and use the “run away” ones while throwing away all the others), Indian accounts tell this story:
1) very organized resistance
2) tactical disintegration near the end with the Last Stand
this is false.
Custer told his officers that they had to attack 1’000-1’500 warriors, and there were 1’000-1’500 warriors. It’s confirmed by Lieutenants Godfrey and Edgerly.
You are making wrong statements, without evidence, you should try to stick on facts rather than on your opinion.
Very true and exactly what I was going to say. I would also add this, Custer had faced the Indians numerous times before and had always been strongly out numbered. However, based on his experience, the Indians had rarely fought back. Instead their tactics were to hit and run, then return later and repeat this. Rarely did they launch a continuous attack as they did at LBH.
LBH represented a change in Indian attack planning, which took Custer by surprise. It was this change that led to his defeat.
One very eerie sight is to stand at the top of the hill and look down towards where the attacks started and to see the serpentine like long line of crosses leading to the crest of the hill. Indeed by the time Custer's last men reached the hill, the outcome of the battle had long been decided.
You nailed it. Custer SAID it. More nonsense. Stop trying to defend this poor, arrogant excuse for an officer.
There is an element of truth in what you all say however... numbers stated really do not matter. Us Injuns were armed with repeaters, you white eyes were armed with single shot Springfield's. And anyone who seriously knows tactical ops will tell you that is the name of the game.
Further the Sioux/Cheyenne warriors uncharacteristically used a volley fire for the first couple of minutes. That is the only time in all the history of the Indian Wars that they showed that much discipline.
Nothing could have saved Custer that day except a massive infusion of troops, repeating rifles, or possibly having the Gatling guns offered to him that he supposedly refused. Even then he would have had to found some way to induce the Sioux/Cheyenne to attack him.
Two comments:
Custer's downfall was that he learned to late that the Indians battlefield tactics had changed. He fought as he was use to fighting. The Indians did not, they adapted.
He did in fact refuse the Gatling guns, as he thought them impractical against Indians on horse back.
Although many Indians had repeaters, as you have said, I thought they was the exception, not the rule. I am not sure on how many repeaters the Indians actually had.
Also, as you well know, and has been documented many places, the cavalry's carbines were notorious for jamming.
Also, as you well know, and has been documented many places, the cavalry's carbines were notorious for jamming.
“So, with all this movement, consolidation and change, what was the size of the village, and how many Indians were there to confront Custer and the 7th Cavalry on June 25th? In answer we again turn to the above named book by Dr. John S. Gray. It is his estimate, after much analysis, that the village was comprised of approximately 1,000 lodges, of which around 120 were Cheyenne. This made for a village of about 7, 120 people, 1,780 of which were adult males. The ranks of those fighting that day may have been swelled to 2,000 by the inclusion of older youths, some seniors and women. But this would be a maximum. Not everyone fought, let alone all at once. And certainly, not everyone fought on all fields of battle. This is irrelevant, however. There were sufficient numbers willing to fight to get the job done.”
From:http://home.comcast.net/~jbusse1/
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