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The following is the official SSPX response to scurrilous accusations such as yours:
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DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION OF THIS SUPPLIED JURISDICTION

1. can. 20 (1917 Code; also can. 19 in 1983 Code) says that if the law does not 'foresee a certain case, the case must be solved according to the norms "a legibus latis in similibus; generalibus juris principiis cum aequitate canonica servatis; jurisprudentia et praxi Curiae Romanae; communi constantique doctorum sententia" ' [taken from laws given in similar cases, from the general principles of law applied with the mildness proper to Canon Law, from the manner and the custom of handling similar cases in the Roman Curia, and from the common and accepted teaching of doctors]. (As Wernz and Vidal say : "jus ergo suppletorium est jus applicandum in particularibus casibus, cum circa illud non habeatur in codice prescriptum quod peculiari illi casui sit applicandum" n. 180). [therefore to supplement the law the law is to be applied in particular cases, when the rule to be applied in an extraordinary case is not found in the law]

2. Application — three things occur:

a) parallel place ie. the "analogia legalis" [analogy of law] (Wernz-Vidal n. 181): "per quam juris dispositio pro aliis casibus applicatur simili de quo lex non disponit" [through which the disposition of the law for other cases is applied in a similar way concerning what the law does not dispose]. Here the parallel place is the case when it is impossible to have recourse to the local bishop for the dispensation of a diriment impediment of ecclesiastical law: "in danger of death" or "quando omnia sunt parata ad nuptias" [when all is prepared for the wedding] the parish priest or confessor can dispense (can. 1044 -1045). This means the Church gives them supplied jurisdiction ad casum [for particular cases].

b) Practice (jurisprudence) of the Roman Curia: an answer from the Commission for the interpretation of the Code of July 29 1942 (AAS 34, 241) allows the extension of the dispositions of can. 1045 to the case of urgent necessity where there is "periculum in mora" [danger to morals] (cf. Can. 81)

c) Epikeia and the opinion of doctors concerning canon 1043 sq., but which also applies elsewhere: (Cappello, Tractatus de Sacramentis III ii. 199: "Si finis legis cesset contrarie pro communitate, ie si damnum commune inde sequatur, lex non urget, quia merito censetur suspendi ex benigna mentis legislatoris interpretatione" [If the object of the law remains in a way contrary to the community, that is if a damage would commonly follow from it, the law does not oblige, because it is thought to have ceased out of the kindly interpretation of the mind of the legislator].) This is the case of being obliged to have recourse to modernist tribunals. But if the obligation of recurring to modernist tribunals ceases, the obligation of recurring to some tribunal remains.

3. By joining all these elements we can infer that our canonical commission in the actual case of impossibility of having recourse to the official tribunals, has the power to judge matrimonial cases (we can say that the Holy See, if it were not as modernist as the tribunals, would give us this jurisdiction).
It is graver to dispense from a diriment impediment (which change the condition of the person who from incapable becomes capable of contracting marriage) than it is to declare a marriage invalid (which does not change the condition of the person, but merely states a fact existing from the beginning). It is only a declarative power of jurisdiction. So if supplied jurisdiction is given to us to dispense, a fortiori it is given to us to judge.

4. The institution of marriage tribunals in the orb of Tradition is especially justified by the fact that:
a) their authority will be more easily accepted than a private opinion,
b) thus it will not be necessary to reject doubtful or contrary private opinions,
c) many judges and instances are necessary in order to proceed prudently and according to the spirit and letter of the law,
d) in the present case of necessity, a priest receives supplied jurisdiction for what a priest can normally do by himself and not for what he cannot normally do. But judging matrimonial cases is not normally done by a priest but by the bishop or the authorities he has delegated.

In all this the rule "in as much as and no more than" applies: The Church supplies jurisdiction in favour of the faithful in as much as it is necessary and no more than is necessary.

IV EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF JUDGING MATRIMONIAL CASES by the canonical commission and the priests designated by it
As we have said our jurisdiction is supplied. Here are its properties:

a) It is not habitual, but only ad casum per modum actus [for individual cases and means of action]. Consequently we do not have standing tribunals, nor are their members named ad universas causas [for every reason], but on the contrary each time ad hoc, appointed by the canonical commission, even if for practical reasons and because experienced and competent persons are needed, the judges and defender of the bond are always the same.

b) The jurisdiction is not territorial but personal.

c) It depends on the necessity of the faithful ie., it lasts as long as the state of common necessity lasts, even if, per impossibile [through impossible circumstances], an official tribunal judging according to traditional norms could be found.

d) It is a true jurisdiction and not an exemption from the law and the obligation the faithful have of receiving a judgement. Therefore we have the power and the duty of handing down true sentences having potestatem ligandi vet solvendi [the power of binding and loosing]. Our sentences are therefore binding. The proximate reason is that we must be able to tell the faithful what they must follow, quod debent servare. [what they must obey]
Our sentences are not mere private opinions because such an opinion do not suffice when the common good is at stake; and the common good is at stake in every case where the matrimonial bond is discussed. To resolve the doubt authority in the external forum is necessary.

e) This jurisdiction does not usurp any of the powers the Pope has of divine right. It is true that our sentences in the third instance replace the sentences of the Roman Rota which acts in the Pope’s name as third instance tribunals. But this is not an usurpation of divine right of the Pope because the fact that this third instance is reserved to the Pope is of ecclesiastical law.

f) Finally our sentences like all our acts of supplied jurisdiction and the episcopal consecrations of 1988 and 1991 etc., will ultimately need to be confirmed by the Holy See: