Stryker Strikes Out

19 August 2003 | FReeper "Matthew James"

[Matthew James]

The United States Army’s Stryker program is misguided because Desert Storm demonstrates that threats still exist to which Stryker’s protection and firepower are insufficient.[1] In addition, it does not pass basic mobility and deployability requirements.

The measure of success for a combat vehicle is determined by its level of crew protection and its firepower. Many modern vehicles in various stages of testing and development attempt to make maximum use of technological sensors and diagnostics to augment the vehicle’s protection. Modern variants also use technology to augment their fire capabilities by attempting to digitally link them to other modern weapons platforms on the battlefield. But what happens if the vehicle temporarily loses power, or the computer “locks up?” The answer is that those technological systems are no longer available, and the vehicle instantly becomes extremely vulnerable. Such circumstances are not a matter of speculation, they will and do happen all the time. Combat vehicle designers must therefore design the vehicles so that they can fight – and win – in such a “degraded mode.” A vehicle that cannot fight in degraded mode should get a grade of “F” for survivability.

This paper will show why the Stryker concept is misguided, by comparing the Stryker to the M2/M3 Bradley. The Bradley is the most comparable modern fighting vehicle, and as such the Stryker should be markedly better if the Army is to adopt it for its Interim Brigade Combat Teams. This paper will compare the two systems in the areas of Protection, Firepower, Mobility and Deployability.

Protection

The most obvious area to measure from a protection standpoint is the vehicle’s armor. The Bradley provides 65mm of protection on the sides compared to the Stryker’s 14.5mm.[2] These figures are provided by the respective manufacturers. Bradley armor is supposed to offer protection against everything short of direct hits by artillery or tank main gun rounds. However, this writer (an Armor officer with 15 years of experience, to include combat in Desert Storm) personally witnessed the effects of .50 caliber, 25 millimeter (both American), and 12.7 mm (Soviet) machine gun fire against a Bradley. All calibers easily penetrated the front, sides and rear of the Bradley, killing the crew.[3]

As stated above, the Stryker protection level should be better than the Bradley’s; but is it? It appears that the Stryker’s armor is no better than the Bradley’s, and may be worse. During a rigorous field test of the Stryker (Millenium Challenge 2002) conducted in August 2002, “thirteen of fourteen Strykers were destroyed by small arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other encounters on one of the exercise’s missions.”[4] Such performance does not outshine the Bradley’s; but perhaps the Stryker is more lethal?

Firepower

A reasonable criterion to measure success is whether the vehicle can shoot while on-the-move. Stabilized gun platforms have been used on various American and Soviet weapons systems for over two decades; therefore it is well within the limits of technology that such systems be incorporated into future designs due to the decided advantage they provide. In fact, not having a stabilized platform has become a serious disadvantage.

The Bradley’s main weapon systems are a 25 millimeter chain gun, and a TOW missile launcher. One of the vehicle’s offensive limitations is that it cannot fire its TOW while on-the-move. The Bradley must first stop, raise the TOW launcher, arm the missile, then fire. This entire process takes approximately 30 seconds. Therefore, the TOW is usually employed while the vehicle is in a defensive position offering as much protection as possible (hull defilade), but its 4000 meter range gives it exceptional stand-off distance.[5]

The Bradley’s 25mm chain gun can be effectively fired while moving, and has an effective range of 2000 meters.[6] It is a very lethal weapon, capable of penetrating all infantry fighting vehicles on the modern battlefield. This writer has also seen the effects of the 25mm chain gun against older Soviet tanks (T-54/55 and T-62). When able to get a shot at the tank’s thinly armored engine compartment in the rear, the Bradley caused enough damage to disable the tank and engulf it in flames from its own fuel.

In contrast, the Stryker’s main weapons are a 105mm gun (on the Mobile Gun System variant) and a grenade launcher; but neither variant can fire on-the-move. Furthermore, the entire target acquisition process takes approximately two minutes.[7] An evaluation by the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) noted that soldiers had trouble using the vehicle’s remote weapon station periscope, and instead were forced to engage the enemy by climbing on top of the vehicle and using Javelin missiles (not part of the vehicle’s weapons system).[8]

Once again, the Stryker cannot compete against the Bradley. Stryker loses the lethality battle.

Mobility

The Bradley is capable of maximum speeds of 45 miles per hour, and has a range of 300 miles. It was specifically designed to be able to keep up with the M1 series tank on the modern battlefield, over any terrain. In fact, over extremely broken terrain, the Bradley can actually travel slightly faster than the M1. The reason for the Bradley’s cross-country success is that is has a set of wide tracks, powered by a 600 horsepower engine.

It is important to note that General Shinseki and his supporters (during the vehicle selection phase of Stryker’s development) attempted to seed disinformation by claiming that wheeled vehicles are more mobile than tracks, in a blatant attempt to effect vehicle selection. There are also many allegations of rigged tests in favor of the wheeled vehicle, and Shinseki has stated that his ultimate goal is to rid the Army of tracked vehicles. But despite Shinseki’s disinformation attempts, armor experts know very well that wheeled vehicles cannot compete against tracked vehicles for mobility.[9]

In addition to the Bradley’s superior off-road mobility, it is fully amphibious. Different variants have either a pontoon or a skirt, which take between 15 and 30 minutes to deploy, respectively. Once ready, the Bradley can swim by using its tracks to propel it through the water at a top speed of four miles per hour.[10]

The Stryker also has a maximum range of 300 miles, but can travel at a top speed of 62 miles per hour while on roads. During its Millennium Challenge field testing, the Stryker impressed some dismounted soldiers by its speed at getting them to the fight. But the vehicle had its problems when operating off-road; “a total of 13 tires on the 16 Strykers needed to be replaced during the 96-hour war game."[11]

Wheeled vehicles in Desert Storm, to include the much-vaunted HMMWV, had significant problems operating in the desert sands; and the rocky portions of the desert wreaked havoc on tires. Every wheeled vehicle in this writer’s unit had tire problems. The situation became so bad that the brigade leadership issued a directive requiring all wheeled vehicles to remain on paved (or improved) surfaces whenever possible.

Deployability

The Bradley weighs approximately 25 tons. It can be transported by any mean, to include transport aircraft, but must utilize aircraft larger than the C-130 which is only capable of transporting 13 tons when it is fully fueled and outfitted for combat operations.[12]

The original requirement for an interim armored vehicle stated that it must be easily transportable by C-130. At 19 tons the basic version of the Stryker is lighter than the Bradley, yet it is still too heavy and too tall to be deployed by C-130.[13] The Stryker is not yet certified for C-130 transport. While Strykers were transported by C-130 for their field test during Millenium Challenge 2002, they required a special one-time waiver from the Air Force. In addition, the C-130s lightened their load by using as little fuel as possible, and by discarding additional armor protection normally required for combat operations.[14]

The Strykers do not meet the “easily transportable” test because they must be modified for flight. The crew must disassemble and remove the remote weapon station (40mm grenade launcher, or .50 caliber machine gun), as well as externally mounted ammunition and racks, so that the Stryker can fit into a C-130.[15]

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Stryker cannot surpass the Bradley in lethality or survivability, as demonstrated by the Bradley’s successes during Desert Storm and Stryker field-testing. The Stryker is, in fact, inferior to the Bradley in these areas. Mobility and deployability are two additional fields in which the Stryker demonstrates its inferiority. Stryker is not a leap ahead in technology or innovation, but merely an inadequate weapons system championed by senior Army leadership who have wed themselves to a wheeled vehicle, at any cost. Ultimately, Stryker will fail before it reaches full production, and where it counts the most – on the battlefield. This failure will have a significantly adverse effect on Army Transformation, and will cause the new Army leadership to cancel (or drastically change) the entire transformation process.

End Notes

[1] Preliminary data coming back from units in the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom confirm the same.

[2] “M2A3 Bradley,”[data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003; and “Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems [data on-line] www.gdls.com; accessed 11 August 2003. The Stryker’s 14.5mm armor is applique (bolt-on) that must be added to the vehicle once it reaches its destination. No data is available concerning the Stryker’s actual armor thickness, although it is rumored to be only ½ inch aluminum.

[3] This incident occurred on 26 February 1991 in southern Iraq, during an engagement between a Bradley from Task Force 4-32 Armor (3rd Armored Division) and an Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 tank. A partial account is given in Brigadier General Robert H. Scales Certain Victory (Washington: Brassey’s, 1994), 274. Staff Sergeant Christopher Stephens and Private First Class Adrian Stokes were both killed in action.

[4] Frank Tiboni, “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002: 2.

[5] “M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org.man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Don Loughlin, “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” 9 October 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003. Loughlin uses quotes from the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s (ATEC) 6 August 2002 report entitled “Stryker Findings.” The report was originally presented as a vugraph presentation, and was formerly available at http://www.geocities.com/lavdanger/strykerfindings.htm. Several authors reference this ATEC report, yet I have been unable to locate a working link the actual document.

[9] Loughlin, 16-19; and David T. Payne Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003, 2.

[10] Military Analysis Network, 2.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Military Analysis Network, 2; and Tiboni, 9.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Loughlin, 4-8.

[15] Tiboni, 3.

Bibliography

Books

Clancy, Tom and General Franks, Fred, Jr., Into the Storm – On the Ground in Iraq. New York: Berkley Books, 1998.

Kraus, Theresa L. and Schubert, Frank N. General Editors, The Whirlwind War – The United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1995.

Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Certain Victory – The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington: Brassey’s, 1994.

Periodicals

Cox, Matthew. “Airborne Units Land Fast, Hit Hard, Remain Relevant,” Army Times, August 14, 2000.

Gourley, Scott R. “Stryker’s Mobile Gun System,” Army Magazine, May 2003.

Svitak, Amy and Tiboni, Frank. “DoD May Scale Back Stryker to Fund FCS,” Defense News, October 7, 2002.

Tiboni, Frank. “Stryker Falls Short in First Major Field Test,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.

“Inside the Army,” Defense News, September 16, 2002.

Other

Loughlin, Don. “Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program Have Failed ‘Army Transformation,’” October 9, 2002 [data on-line] http://www.combatreform.com/gg021006a.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

Payne, David T. Esq. “Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Designate Donald Rumsfeld: A Feasibility Study on the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Transformation Plan” December 7, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/tanklessarmy.htm; accessed 17 August 2003.

“Future Combat Systems: Badly Reinventing the M113 or ‘Cash Cows’ That Will ‘Morph’ into the ‘LAV-4’ Armored Car?” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/wheeledfcscashcow.htm; accessed 12 August 2003.

“M2A3 and M3A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems,” in Military Analysis Network, May 5, 2000 [data on-line] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m2.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2A3 Bradley,” [data on-line] http://www.geocities.com/banzaidyne/heavygear/M2A3.html; accessed 11 August 2003.

“M2/M3 Series Bradley Fighting Vehicle,” United States Army Center for Military History, June 11, 2001 [data on-line] http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/www/256.htm; accessed 11 August 2003.

“Stryker Family of Vehicles,” General Dynamics Land Systems, available from www.gdls.com; Internet, accessed 11 August 2003.

[centurion316]

Not to mention the effect on the environment. Poke another stick in their eye, I'll back you up.

[blanknoone]

I think the saddest thing about the Styker program is its history. Whether or not we have a need for a 'medium' armored force, the original program (which became the stryker) was the Future Scout/Cavalry System (FSCS). Instead, this became a family of medium vehicles. There is a requirement for a proper scout system, and the M3 Bradley is not it (it is loud, tall, and lacks specialized sensor systems). The FSCS was to address these specific needs of the scouts/cavalry, but instead the program became about medium forces, and the scouts are stuck with a IFV instead a vehicle designed for their unique mission. That ain't right, but the armor/cavalry community only has a little political capital, and they are spending it on medium forces instead of (as opposed to in addition to) the scouting role.

[blanknoone]

By the way, that is also the history of the name, specifically the British spelling. The FSCS was a joint program with the Brits, and their name for it was Stryker (which was a lot more catchy than FSCS), so the whole thing went by Stryker...and now the program is essentially defunct, and the name means something totally different.

[R. Scott]

But now we use “green” bullets! (Thanks, Mr. Clinton.)
I have read some comments here about the advantages of tracks over wheels. Even tracks – and the much vaunted (on this thread) Bradley have limitations. In 1982 or 1983 I had the pleasure of driving a Bradley. Their Platoon Sergeant warned me not to make a hard left turn – the vehicle would throw a track.
Sure hope the problem was fixed.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Well, I am trying to keep an open mind about the vehicle and 3/2's deployment next month. I sincerely want those guys to do well and prove the kibbitzers wrong, but from the open-sources that I google and the info shared by the various posters on all the FR Stryker threads I detect a serious imbalance in the positives versus negatives. I have looked at:

The LAV-III Armored Car

LAV III Stryking Out

LAV Danger

Army Leadership and the Stryker Armored Car Program have failed 'Army Transformation'

Let’s Ask The Questions And Then Go Where The Answers Are

Khaki Throat

Heavy Metal and many others. There is a cottage industry putting out anti-Stryker screeds, and some of it is histrionic and polemical but too much of it sounds too true to discount all of it. I don't know much about Victor O'Reilley or his credibility or lack thereof, but his report dovetails nicely with the above.

There is quite a bit less pro-Stryker stuff out there, and most of it reads like something some PAO hack or GDLS publicist wrote.

I think many on these FR Stryker threads are pre-disposed to believe the negative information and suspect the positive. The negative info rings truer to their perception of how the Army really does things.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

How long does a Stryker take to drive off a C-130, "reconfigure", upload ammo and gear, refuel, bore sight and zero, perform pre-combat checks and drive off to the war? Can the Remote Weapons Station be "reconfigured" by the gunner with on board tools? What kind of reception committee do they need? Seems like a lot of planes are going to have to come into that recently captured airfield before the Airborne sees any Strykers do something useful.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Stormer

[Rockpile]

" You're correct, and anyone who's seen it (or done it) will agree. "Fully amphibious" is how the Bradley is advertised; the reality is a bit different!"

You know, going out the back of the ship really got my adrenaline pumping in P7 Amtracs which really are fully amphibious. But I'll tell ya' I'd have been petrified to do it in a Bradley!

If Bradley's are capable of crossing rivers then that's a Good Thing but going in over the beach makes one picture the Duplex drive Shermans on D-Day.

[exnavy]

Not a lot of changes. The R&D department is still hard at work, when they get some pictures of the new eight wheeler available we'll get em posted. If I had to describe the vehicle, it looks like a frowning eagle. It is long and low, lean and mean looking. Stay safe.

[historian1944]

What you are describing is why the C-130 requirement was stupid to begin with. The reason it was put in there (same with why one of the Brigades is going to be an Army National Guard one in Pennsylvania) is that it was easier to sell the idea if the Air Force could get money to upgrade C-130s everyone was happier. The ANG was happy because that way they get more money, also. There is no way that an entire brigade is going to be moved by C-130, and not just because of the time required to put the vehicle back together. You're talking about at least 300 sorties for the vehicles alone, plus .5 to 1 plane per vehicle for the stuff that has to be removed, plus crew. Add the other brigade vehicles, and you're talking somewhere near a thousand sorties necessary. There aren't going to be that many planes available anyway. If we did things like the Marines do, and deployed companies, or even battalions alone, it would be more realistic.

[Matthew James]

1. Please see #28 below.

2. Our basic requirements for fighting vehicles prior to the Stryker was that it should be able to fight in degraded mode. Otherwise, it's not even as good as a pill-box; it's just a stationary coffin. All I'm saying is that we should maintain that standard.

3. I can't speak for all "Stryker critics," but this one doesn't like it because it does not meet the basic requirements layed out prior to the selection of a prototype. It is a fraud that is going to get American soldiers killed.

[Matthew James]

The Bradley's swim capabilities were designed for rivers -- and waves can't be very large either, or it will get swamped.

[R. Scott]

I am no fan of General Shinseki, but there are so many arguments against the Stryker that sound like some are grasping at straws or simply want something to complain about.
I can’t think of any piece of military equipment that was perfect from day one.

[centurion316]

Yep, those sites are the usual suspects. The names behind these sites appear to be Lonnie Shoultz, Don Loughlin, and Mike Sparks. To this list you need to add novelist Victor O'Reilly. Mike Kelly is a reporter who apparently knows how to google. The interesting question is: who are these people and what is their agenda?

At least one of these people is a M113A3 salesman and is very sore that he has lots of these vehicles sitting around unsold. I know that there are some sour grapes out there from some in the Combat Development community at Ft. Knox. Part of it is the long-standing debate between wheeled and tracked armored vehicles. Many at Knox are not happy about the MGS version of the Stryker, they are still upset about the Army's decision to cancel the M-8 some years ago. On top of all of that, the Army made the Infantry School the proponent instead of Knox, so I suspect that some rice bowls were knocked over.

I'm sure that there is some GS-14 out there who does not like the way that this was done - from concept to combat in about four years. He would have preferred to spend 5 years developing the requirement, doing lots of R&D, build a prototype, play with it for four or five years, and rush to production in say, 7 or 8 more years. This process has been quick, which means that parts of it have also been ugly. Some of it was no doubt political - how do you convince Congress to support something you claim to be Transformational: with a new vehicle (Stryker) or a 40-year old APC?

One of the things I find interesting in the screeds that are out there is how they carefully choose different comparisons depending on the point they are trying to make. When talking about weight, the compare the uparmored Stryker with a stripped down M113. When talking Armor protection, it is the applique armor M113 vs. the bare Stryker. The M113's engine seems not to be addressed: any M113A3 solution would require a more powerful engine than the one currently in production. Many of the comparisons are of the LAVII, a completely different vehicle. These folks conveniently forget that the Army examined the LAV concept for years at the 9th Infantry Division, and intended to field a LAVII equipped force. Money, not technology was the stopping block.

Most of the criticisms expressed on these web sites have been addressed in the course of development. Others have been determined to be of minor importance. Of course, we are talking about light armored vehcles here, which are by their very nature a compromise - the question is which set of compromises do you prefer - and whose voice is the most credible.

The candidates are:

the M113A3 - good choice, probably could be made to work, might not be sellable on Capitol Hill

Stryker - good choice, needs work to improve - MGS may be problematic

The advocates are:

M113A3 salesmen and sorehead bureaucrats with an axe to grind

The Army CSA, his staff, and a large group of experienced armor officers

You decide.

[Matthew James]

"I can’t think of any piece of military equipment that was perfect from day one.

Good statement. But there's so much wrong with the Stryker that it begs the question "Why?"

It was a wheeled vehicle that was rammed through (by Shinseki) with no discussion, completely sidestepping the normal acquisition process. And since then they've lied about test results that clearly show that the vehicle does not meet the basic requirements outlined in the concept plan.

The Stryker is only an interim vehicle on the Army's road to the "Objective Force." It is supposed to be (by design) better than anything else in the inventory. If we are going to use this same flawed procedure in the development of the "Future Combat System," then we're in trouble -- especially because that system is supposed to replace all other combat vehicles in the inventory.

[blanknoone]

The stormer is not the result of the FSCS/strkyer original program. It is like the current American stryker program, a family of medium/light armored vehicles. The original stryker was a system expressly designed for the scout cavalry mission, and the essential element in it was an incredibly advanced mast sensor system. (The Canadians currently have a mast mounted sensor system for their scouts, it would have been a dramatic upgrade in those capabilities)

[Cannoneer No. 4]

The Raytheon Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisiton-Mission Equipment Package (RSTA-MEP)

See Post #11 about the Coyote

[Cannoneer No. 4]

M113A3 salesmen and sorehead bureaucrats with an axe to grind versus the Army CSA, his staff, and a large group of experienced armor officers

The legacy of 1993-2000 is that to many people the Army leadership and a bunch of used track salesmen are equally believable. Both camps have their large group of experienced armor officers.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

Where is the Future Scout Cavalry System?

[Light Speed]

Several Abrams were lost in Iraq from RPG's....not that the unit was holed thru..but several caught fire via engine compartment.

I haven't seen any Koronet damage photos as yet.

One ponders how survivable armor is ..ie to a U.S. Javelin strike..Russian or Euro comparative.

Israels Merkava 4 can fire a guided missile from its gun tube...another Merkava can pick up guidance and guide the missile to target.

In a sense..modern armor has not really faced modern missiles in combat as yet..unless France or Russia slipped a few in to Iraq to see how they performed.

If the heavies are vulnerable...Bradleys..Strykers, LAV's are not likely to fare much better.
sort of a numeric reality..how many missiles fired..how many write offs.

Israel lost a few Mekavas due to mines..have not come accross data as per anti tank missiles fired and write offs.
Palies would crow for sure if a ATGM got a Merk..havent heard anything in last few years.

Merkava 4 is said to have refinements in turret for ATGM's designed to penetrate from above.

One can ponder what type of ATGM's have actually been fired at IDF mech units.

Supposedly..Russia has ATGM.s designed to defeat Blazer reactive armor..well supposedly.

I think you can only expect so much protection from a mech vehicle designed with weight restrictions for airlift to be survivable on a modern battlefield.

If Stryker is more reliable..ie..wheel vs track.
maintenece and multi terrian endurance..then field it.
or stay with tracks..and accept the maintenece reality.

What happens when EMP weapons appear..this is on the horizon to soon.
I image telemetry weapons exist too..ones designed to enter a vehicles computer suite and corrupt its boards.
Every now and then..Electrical warfare options appear in Janes intel briefs..the hint that one day..this form of warfare will visit the battlefield.