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Is Iraq inspired by strategy that caused the greatest defeat in British military history?
1914-1918.net ^ | 2003 | Chris Baker

Posted on 03/27/2003 8:13:56 PM PST by Destro

Is Iraq's strategy inspired by that which caused the greatest defeat in British military history?

Who's Who: Khalil Pasha

Khalil Pasha (1864-1923) was placed at the head of the Turkish Sixth Army during World War One, based in Mesopotamia.

Simultaneously military governor of Baghdad (and all territory south-west of Aleppo), Khalil's policy during the extended Anglo-Indian advance of 1915 appeared simple: he consistently permitted his field commanders to retreat under fire.

Progress was slow however, if sure, on account of heavy rain and an overriding concern to minimise casualties. Additional difficulties were faced by the retreating Turks in fighting off repeated attacks by local Marsh Arabs (the Shi'ites of the South), who attacked both sides at every opportunity.

This approach was reversed at the Battle of Ctesiphon (after an initial withdrawal by the Turks) with a counter-attack launched at the retreating British force under Sir Charles Townshend.

After successfully conducting the conclusion of the siege of Kut, when Townshend finally surrendered unconditionally on 30 April 1916, Khalil was inclined to support a more aggressive policy, proposing a Turkish sweep into Persia.

Considered an honoured guest by his Turkish captors Sir Charles Townshend was treated with lavish hospitality; meanwhile his 10,000 troops were largely subjected to barbaric treatment (including homosexual rape). A remarkable two-thirds of this group died while being marched into captivity.

Mesopotamia

A long, drawn-out campaign in appalling conditions that was initially about protecting British oil interests, but later gave rise to visions of glittering prizes in the capture of Baghdad.

Why here?

Mesopotamia was part of the Turkish Ottoman empire. Germany had for many years before the war assiduously developed Turkey as an ally, which it saw as an important part of the Drang nach Osten (The Thrust towards the East: Germany wanted new lands, new markets, lebensraum). The Turkish army was led by German 'advisors', as was much of its trade and commerce.

Britain relied heavily on Gulf oil to keep its Navy at sea. It determined very quickly on the outbreak of the war with Germany to protect its interests by occupying the oilfields and pipeline near Basra. Later, after an early string of cheap successes, British eyes fell on Baghdad. Victory over the Turks was believed by some to be a less costly way towards defeat of Germany than the painful battering at the Western Front. They began a series of attempts to move north along the rivers to the ancient city. Pushed by Germany - which also tried to encourage a Jihad (Muslim Holy War) against the British forces - Turkey was to strongly resist the British incursion.

What happened?

It was the Indian Army, which included a number of British units (initially of the Regular Army but soon joined by Territorials), that supplied the 'British' fighting forces ordered to Mesopotamia. This army had been under-invested for decades, and it showed in the quality of equipment and in training. Guns, shells, small arms and ammunition - of which there was never enough - were often literally museum pieces or considered not good enough for the Western Front and other areas. The Army command also failed to realise the difficulties of supplying an army that moved further upstream from the Gulf. There were never enough shallow-draught boats, nor enough mules or camels, to adequately supply the fighting forces that were to be up to 500 miles away from port.

Like Gallipoli, conditions in Mesopotamia defy description. Extremes of temperature (120 degrees F was common); arid desert and regular flooding; flies, mosquitoes and other vermin: all led to appalling levels of sickness and death through disease. Under these incredible conditions, units fell short of officers and men, and all too often the reinforcements were half-trained and ill-equipped. Medical arrangements were quite shocking, with wounded men spending up to two weeks on boats before reaching any kind of hospital.

The early successes in the river delta were misleading; more and more troops were sent to the Mesopotamia theatre, for operations towards Baghdad which stretched the supply lines to the limit. There was a serious difference of opinion between London, India and the Commander of the force, regarding the role of the army. The fomer saw it as defensive; the latter two as offensive with a view to capturing Baghad. The campaign was muddled: the attitudes and complacency disastrous. The advance plodded on, until a resounding defeat in November 1915 in front of Ctesiphon led to headlong retreat to Kut-al-Amara. The army in Kut became surrounded and besieged; eventually 9,000 (3,000 British and 6,000 Indian troops) surrendered five months later - the greatest defeat and loss in British military history up to that point.

Following the fall of Kut, the British ordered Major-General Stanley Maude to take command of the British army in Mesopotamia. He introduced new methods, which culminated in a decisive defeat of the Turks in February 1917, and the capture of Baghdad in March 1917. On this day, the Berlin-Baghdad railway was captured, and German schemes for Turkey were finished.

British forces (and Russians, advancing from the north and east) closed in on the Turks throughout the autumn of 1917, and into the Spring of 1918. Despite making great advances, however, and the additional pressure coming from the north-west, where British forces in Palestine defeated the Turks, no decisive victory was gained.

An armistice was signed by the Turks in Mesopotamia on 1st November 1918.

Landscape for battle

Mesopotamia is an ancient land, through which run the great Rivers Tigris and Euphrates. At the southern end, this is a complex river delta. The two rivers meet at Qurna, 40 miles north of Basra, where they come together to form the Shatt-al-Arab, which flows into the Persian Gulf. The land is for the most part desert, and is very flat. The rivers flood the plains to a great extent, when the winter snows in the northern mountains thaw. The small towns and villages that existed along the river banks in 1914 were generally constructed several feet above water level. There is virtually no water in this land, except that from the rivers. There were no roads, so all transport had to be by boat along the rivers. The major centre of population was Baghdad, almost 570 miles upstream from the Gulf.

For centuries before the Great War, this land had been part of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. Lying along its eastern border was Persia, generally friendly to the British. The Arab Sheiks of Kuwait and Muhammerah also supported Britain; the Arab tribes of coastal Mesopotamia often changed sides.

Today the land where the British forces were active in 1914-1918 lies in Iraq.


TOPICS: Foreign Affairs; Free Republic; News/Current Events; United Kingdom; Your Opinion/Questions
KEYWORDS: iraq; iraqhistory
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Any thoughts? The Iraqi's do seem to be drawing us in toward the "red zone" around Baghdad, which corresponds to the location roughly where the battle of Ctesiphon crushed the British advance. Does not mean the Iraqi's will succeed with this strategy (not by a long shot), only that I think I see the inspiration for their strategy.
1 posted on 03/27/2003 8:13:56 PM PST by Destro
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To: Admin Moderator
That should read: Is Iraq inspired by strategy that caused the greatest defeat in British military history?
2 posted on 03/27/2003 8:15:09 PM PST by Destro (Fight Islamic terrorisim by visiting www.johnathangaltfilms.com)
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To: Destro
Any thoughts?

Inspired by repeated viewings of "Blackhawk Down"

3 posted on 03/27/2003 8:18:33 PM PST by Shermy
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To: Destro
I hope and pray our military leadership has learned lessons from the past and is on top of all this.
4 posted on 03/27/2003 8:19:56 PM PST by OperationFreedom ( www.OperationFreedom.com)
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To: Destro
No, we have big planes now and bigger bombs.
5 posted on 03/27/2003 8:20:06 PM PST by Porterville (Screw the grammar, full posting ahead.)
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To: Destro
Fantasizing again?

One, the troops were two-thirds Indian colonials -- not exactly high on the training and equipment list. Two, they were only 9,000 men in total. By WWI standards, that's a miniscule force. Three, greatest defeat in British history? Only to a Serb-lover obsessed with Muslims committing anal rape.

6 posted on 03/27/2003 8:20:27 PM PST by LenS
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To: Destro
Other than operations are being waged over the same geography, I can't think of any parallels between coalition forces of 2003 and empire forces of 1917.
7 posted on 03/27/2003 8:21:06 PM PST by x1stcav (HooAhh!)
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To: Destro
This approach was reversed at the Battle of Ctesiphon (after an initial withdrawal by the Turks) with a counter-attack launched at the retreating British force under Sir Charles Townshend.

Must remember to pack extra vowels this time.

8 posted on 03/27/2003 8:21:12 PM PST by x
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To: Shermy
Yea, that too.
9 posted on 03/27/2003 8:21:14 PM PST by Destro (Fight Islamic terrorisim by visiting www.johnathangaltfilms.com)
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To: Destro
There were never enough shallow-draught boats, nor enough mules or camels, to adequately supply the fighting forces that were to be up to 500 miles away from port.

Oh damn, we forgot the mules and camels. We are screwed.
10 posted on 03/27/2003 8:21:22 PM PST by Arkinsaw
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To: Destro
I think that Stalingrad is perhaps more likely as a model for Sadam's strategy. The US presumably has a plan for handling Baghdad when they get it surrounded, but I don't know what it is.
11 posted on 03/27/2003 8:21:25 PM PST by expatpat
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To: expatpat
Stalingrad was never surrounded by the Germans.

It's a horrible analogy for about a billion reasons.
12 posted on 03/27/2003 8:22:07 PM PST by John H K
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To: LenS
Fantasizing what? I am not saying we will lose--just what I think maybe is inspiring the Iraqi strategy.
13 posted on 03/27/2003 8:22:44 PM PST by Destro (Fight Islamic terrorisim by visiting www.johnathangaltfilms.com)
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To: John H K
I was referring to the urban house-to-house fighting; the encirclement is Baghdad-specific.
14 posted on 03/27/2003 8:23:51 PM PST by expatpat
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To: Destro
It is not analogous situation. The present day Iraqi's have no realistic way to interdict our supply lines.

Once Baghdad is surrounded we can lay seige to the city and attrit the Republican guard. They have no way to resupply themselves. Once Baghdad is surrounded the apple should fall from the tree pretty quickly.
15 posted on 03/27/2003 8:24:07 PM PST by ggekko
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To: Destro
There is no comparison.

The coalition forces are an Iraqi meatgrinder unparalleled in history. While Saddam feints and jabs and sends his fedayeen fools scrambling over the sand with AK-47s, the coalition forces annihilate them by the thousands. Saddam's elite thugs cannot continue to bleed in this way. There is a limited supply of them.

16 posted on 03/27/2003 8:24:09 PM PST by Kevin Curry
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To: LenS
Is he still sore about Kosovo? Is that the reason for all the Chicken Little posts?
17 posted on 03/27/2003 8:24:31 PM PST by ambrose
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To: x1stcav
Just musing on the inspiration of the strategy that has the Iraqis pulling back, picking fights in the same areas that the Turks did and planning to draw Coalition forces deep in for the fight around Baghdad.
18 posted on 03/27/2003 8:25:03 PM PST by Destro (Fight Islamic terrorisim by visiting www.johnathangaltfilms.com)
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To: Destro
No comparison!

We have F-16's!

:-)
19 posted on 03/27/2003 8:28:37 PM PST by jacksonstate
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To: Destro
There were never enough shallow-draught boats, nor enough mules or camels, to adequately supply the fighting forces that were to be up to 500 miles away from port.

I think we solved this problem by inventing helicopters, airlifts, tanker trucks etc.

20 posted on 03/27/2003 8:28:40 PM PST by Jorge
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