Remarks to United Nations Security Council by Secretary of State Colin Powell, 7 March 2003

SECRETARY POWELL: Thank you very much, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues. Mr. President, let me join my colleagues in congratulating you on the assumption of the presidency, and I know you will lead us in these difficult days with great distinction. And let me also express to my German colleagues my thanks and admiration for the stewardship that they provided to the Council over the past month.

We meet today, it seems to me, with one question, and one very, very important question before us: Has the Iraqi regime made the fundamental strategic and political decision to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and to rid itself of all of its weapons of mass destruction, all of the infrastructure for the development of weapons of mass destruction? It's a question of intent on the part of the Iraqi leadership.

The answer to that question does not come from how many inspectors are present, or how much more time should be given, or how much more effort should be put into the inspection process. It's not a question of how many unanswered clusters of questions are there, or are there more benchmarks that are needed, or are they enough unresolved issues that have been put forward to be examined and analyzed and conclusions reached about. The answer depends entirely on whether Iraq has made the choice to actively cooperate in every possible way, in every possible manner, in the immediate and complete disarmament of itself of its prohibited weapons. That's what 1441 called for.

I would like to thank Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei for their reports this morning which shed more light on this difficult question. I listened to them very carefully. I listened to them very, very carefully to see if I was hearing that, finally, Iraq had reached that point where it understood that the will of the international community must now be obeyed.

I was pleased to hear from both of these distinguished gentlemen that there has been some continuing progress on process and even some new activity with respect to substance.

But I was sorry to learn that all of this still is coming in a grudging manner, that Iraq is still refusing to offer what was called for by 1441: immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation. Not later, immediate. Not passive, active. Not conditional, unconditional in every respect.

Unfortunately, in my judgment, despite some of the progress that has been mentioned, I still find what I have heard this morning, a catalog still of non-cooperation. If Iraq genuinely wanted to disarm, we would not have to be worrying about setting up means of looking for mobile biological units or any units of that kind. They would be presented to us. We would not need an extensive program to search for and look for underground facilities that we know exist. The very fact that we must make these requests seems to me to show that Iraq is still not cooperating.

The inspectors should not have to look under every rock, go to every crossroad, peer into every cave for evidence, for proof. And we must not allow Iraq to shift the burden of proof onto the inspectors. Nor can we return to the failed bargain of Resolution 1284, which offered partial relief for partial disclosure. 1441 requires full and immediate compliance and we must hold Iraq to its terms.

We also heard this morning of an acceleration of Iraqi initiatives. I don't know if we should call these things initiatives. Whatever they are, Iraq's small steps are certainly not initiatives. They are not something that came forward willingly, freely, from the Iraqis. They have been pulled out or have been pressed out by the possibility of military force by the political will of the Secretary Council.

They have been taking these initiatives, if that's what some would choose to call them, only grudgingly, rarely unconditionally, and primarily under the threat of force.

We are told that these actions do not constitute immediate cooperation, but that's exactly what is demanded by 1441. And even then, progress is often more apparent than real. I am pleased, very pleased, that some al-Samoud II missiles are now being broken up, although perhaps the process of breaking them up has now paused for a moment.

And I know these are not toothpicks, but real missiles. But the problem was we don't know how many missiles there are, how many toothpicks there are. We don't know whether or not the infrastructure to make more has been identified and broken up. And we have evidence that shows that the infrastructure to make more missiles continues to remain within Iraq and has not yet been identified and destroyed.

There is still much more to do, and, frankly, it will not be possible to do that which we need to do unless we get the full and immediate kind of cooperation that 1441 and all previous resolutions demanded.

The intent of the Iraqi regime to keep from turning over all of its weapons of mass destruction seems to me has not changed, and not to cooperate with the international community in the manner intended by 1441.

If Iraq had made that strategic decision to disarm, cooperation would be voluntary, even enthusiastic -- not coerced, not pressured. And that is the lesson we learned from South Africa and the Ukraine, where officials did everything possible to ensure complete cooperation with inspectors.

I also listened to Dr. ElBaradei's report with great interest. As we all know, in 1991, the IAEA was just days away from determining that Iraq did not have a nuclear program. We soon found out otherwise. IAEA is now reaching a similar conclusion, but we have to be very cautious. We have to make sure that we do keep the books open, as Dr. ElBaradei said he would. There is dispute about some of these issues and about some of these specific items.

Dr. ElBaradei talked about the aluminum tubes that Iraq has tried to acquire over the years. But we also know that notwithstanding the report today, that there is new information that is available to us, and I believe available to the IAEA, about a European country where Iraq was found shopping for these kinds of tubes. And that country has provided information to us, to IAEA, that the material properties and manufacturing tolerances required by Iraq are more exact, by a factor of 50 percent or more, than those usually specified for rocket motor casings. Its experts concluded that the tolerances and specifications Iraq was seeking cannot be justified for unguided rockets. And I am very pleased that we will keep this issue open.

I also welcome the compilation of outstanding issues that Dr. Blix and his staff have provided to some of us and will make available to all of us. UNMOVIC put together a solid piece of research that adds up, when one reads the entire 167 pages, adds up fact by chilling fact, to a damning record of 12 years of lies, deception and failure to come clean on the part of Iraq.

This document is, in fact, a catalog of 12 years of abject failure, not by the inspectors, but by Iraq. We have looked carefully at the draft given to the UNMOVIC commissioners and which will be available more widely after this meeting, and we have found nearly 30 instances where Iraq refused to provide credible evidence substantiating its claims. We have counted 17 examples when the previous inspectors actually uncovered evidence contradicting Iraqi claims. We see instance after instance of Iraq lying to the previous inspectors and planting false evidence, activities which we believe are still ongoing.

As you read this document, you can see page after page of how Iraq has obstructed the inspectors at nearly every turn over the years. Just by way of example, we've talked about the R-400 bombs. The report says that during the period 1992, Iraq changed its declaration on the quantity of bombs it had produced, changed the declaration several times. In 1992, it declared it had produced a total of 1,200 of these bombs. With the admission, finally, after it was pulled out of them, of an offensive biological warfare program in 1995, this number was subsequently changed to a total of 1,550 such bombs. Given the lack of specific information from Iraq, UNSCOM could not calculate the total number of R-400 bombs that Iraq had produced for its programs.

And so, this report says it has proved impossible to verify the production and destruction details of R-400 bombs. UNMOVIC cannot discount the possibility that some CW- and BW-filled R-400 bombs remain in Iraq.

In this document, UNMOVIC says actions that Iraq could take to help resolve this question, present any remaining R-400 bombs and all relevant molds, provide more supporting documentation on production, inventory relating to the R-400 and R-400A bombs it manufactured, provide further documentation explaining the coding system that it had used with the R-400 type bombs, including coding assigned to specific CBW agents, provide credible evidence that the R-400 bomb production line stopped after September 1990.

This is just one example of the kinds of documentation we'll all be seeing. The question that leaps out at you is that these are issues, these actions that Iraq is being asked to take, they could have taken many times over the preceding 12 years. We're not talking about immediately. We're talking about why hasn't it been done over the last 12 years, and how can we rely on assurances now in the presence of this solid record of lying and deceit over the years?

These questions could easily have been cleared up in Iraq's December 7th declaration. There should not be these kinds of outstanding issues to work on, but there are, and we will all examine them carefully.

The point is that this document conclusively shows that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture these kinds of weapons, that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture not only chemical but biological weapons, and that Iraq had and still has literally tens of thousands of delivery systems, including increasingly capable and dangerous unmanned aerial vehicles.

These are not new questions being presented for our consideration. These are old questions that have not been resolved and could have been resolved in December with a declaration, or could have been fully resolved over the last four months if Iraq had come forward and do what 1441 wanted it to do.

In his report this morning, Dr. Blix remarked on the paucity of information on Iraq's programs since 1998. We've all been working hard to fill that gap. But Iraq is the one who could fill that gap, if it was truly complying with 1441. It would be inundating the inspectors with new information, not holding it back begrudgingly.

The draft we reviewed today in preparation for this meeting was 167 pages long. If Iraq were genuinely committed to disarmament, Dr. Blix's document would not be 167 pages of issues and questions; it would be thousands upon thousands of pages of answers about anthrax, about VX, about sarin, about unmanned aerial vehicles. It would set out in detail all of Iraq's prohibited programs. Then, and only then, could the inspectors really do the credible job they need to do of verification, destruction and monitoring.

We've been down this road before. In March 1998, Saddam Hussein was also faced with the threat of military action. He responded with promises. Promises to provide inspectors at that time with immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. The then-chief inspector reported to this Council a new spirit of cooperation, along with his hope that the inspectors could move very quickly to verify Iraq's disarmament.

We know what happened to that hope . There was no progress on disarmament, and nine months later the inspectors found it necessary to withdraw.

I regret that not much has changed. Iraq's current behavior, like the behavior chronicled in Dr. Blix's document, reveals its strategic decision to continue to delay, to deceive, to try to throw us off the trail, to make it more difficult to hope that the will of the international community will be fractured, that we will go off in different directions, that we will get bored with the task, that we will remove the pressure, we will remove the force. And we know what has happened when that has been done in the past.

We know that the Iraqis still are not volunteering information and, when they do, what they are giving is often partial and misleading. We know that when confronted with facts, the Iraqis still are changing their story to explain those facts -- but not enough to give us the truth.

So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership in Baghdad? My judgment, I think our judgment, has to be clearly not. And this is now the reality we, the Council, must deal with.

Security Council membership carries heavy responsibility, responsibility of the community of nations to take the hard decisions on tough issues such as the one we are facing today.

Last November, this Council stepped up to its responsibilities. We must not walk away. We must not find ourselves here this coming November with the pressure removed and with Iraq once again marching down the merry path to weapons of mass destruction, threatening the region, threatening the world.

If we fail to meet our responsibilities, the credibility of this Council and its ability to deal with all the critical challenges we face will suffer. As we sit here, let us not forget the horror still going on in Iraq, with a spare moment to remember the suffering Iraqi people whose treasure is spent on these kinds of programs and not for their own benefit; people who are being beaten, brutalized and robbed by Saddam and his regime.

Colleagues, now is the time for the Council to send a clear message to Saddam that we have not been taken in by his transparent tactics. Nobody wants war, but it is clear that the limited progress we have seen, the process changes we have seen, the slight, substantive changes we have seen, come from the presence of a large military force -- nations who are willing to put their young men and women in harm's way in order to rid the world of these dangerous weapons.

It doesn't come simply from resolutions. It doesn't come simply from inspectors. It comes from the will of this Council, the unified political will of this Council and the willingness to use force, if it comes to that, to make sure that we achieve the disarmament of Iraq.

Now is the time for the Council to tell Saddam Hussein that the clock has not been stopped by his stratagems and his machinations. We believe that the resolution that has been put forward for action by this Council is appropriate and, in the very near future, we should bring it before this Council for a vote.

The clock continues to tick and the consequences of Saddam Hussein's continued refusal to disarm will be very, very real.

Remarks After United Nations Security Council Debate

Secretary Colin L. Powell
New York, New York
March 7, 2003
(2:15 p.m. EST)

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm prepared to take any questions you might have.

QUESTION: Sir, France suggested to bring together the heads of state for one last-ditch effort to try and forge a consensus on this matter, and if you have heard of this idea, what do you think of it?

SECRETARY POWELL: I did hear the idea. I was in the Council when Dominique de Villepin mentioned it. I think the history of this is that Security Council meetings at heads of state level, and we've only had two of those in any recent history that anyone can remember, both were principally for ceremonial purposes.

I think we have all had good opportunity over the last month to express our views openly and candidly with each other here in the Council at ministerial level, and our heads of state and government are in constant touch with each other. They have a solid understanding of each other's positions. So, at the moment, I don't see a particular need for a heads of state and government meeting at the Security Council, which really isn't the place to deal with issues like this or the forum to deal with issues like that.

QUESTION: Sir, the last time you were here, the Security Council was divided, and today it is again, as we see, is divided. What's wrong?

Also, you have seen everyone's cards today. How are you going to play it?

SECRETARY POWELL: What's wrong is there is a fundamental difference of opinion as to what Iraq is doing, and I think a number of us tried to make the case today that Iraq still is not fully complying, unconditionally complying, immediately complying. That was the standard of 1441. We knew what we were doing when we passed that resolution. It does not take a long time to comply. Just get on with it. Don't keep confusing the world. Don't keep handing out little bits of information. Don't keep grudgingly responding to what the inspectors ask for and what they need.

Iraq knows what it is supposed to do. It was made clear in 1441. There are those of us who believe therefore that it is time to deal with that basic reality that Iraq is not complying. Others believe that just continuing the inspections, but they never quite say how long. For months? How many months? For what purpose? With what additional inspectors? And can anyone commit to me and guarantee the international community that we will achieve disarmament just with more inspections without a fundamental change on the part of Iraq to come into full compliance, and therefore full cooperation, with the verification and monitoring activities of the inspectors.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Jack Straw is trying to find some more time, to have a compromise for a few days. Do you have the patience for that now?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, I think the amendment to the resolution put down by Foreign Secretary Straw is, of course, one we support and worked on with Mr. Straw in developing, along with our Spanish colleagues. And I believe in the very near future, sometime next week, that resolution ought to be brought to the Council for a vote, and let's see where everyone is. And I don't think this just can continue on and on and on, and I think Mr. Straw powerfully made the point that the reason we are getting compliance is because the presence of the armed forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. The inspectors have their jobs to do. We have put out powerful, strong political resolutions and determinations, political determination. But it's also the presence of military force that is causing Iraqi compliance. We've got to keep that pressure up. We've got to let him know that it's going to come to a head in the very near future.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the French Foreign Minister stressed the importance of the United Nations in the world. What would it mean for the United Nations if you went ahead with war without being authorized by the UN? Would you sacrifice the UN for the sake of going to war?

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, we have no intention of sacrificing the UN. And my concern right now is the clear will of the UN, as expressed in 1441. They are in material breach, come into compliance, and serious consequences will follow. And we have had four months to see how that resolution has unfolded and the actions they have taken, and it seems to me the UN is damaged when there are members who do not want to stand up to the requirements of that resolution and take the action that was clearly intended in the absence of Iraqi compliance.

The UN is a very noble institution, it's been here over 50 years, and it will continue to serve a purpose in the future. You will remember the resolution that was mentioned so frequently earlier today, Resolution 1284. That was debated here in the Council for some seven to nine months, and France abstained in the final analysis.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the French Foreign Minister suggested that it could be an idea for heads of government, heads of states, to come here for the vote next week. Is that something you'd be in favor of?

SECRETARY POWELL: I just said a moment ago -- I did answer that one.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what is wrong -- what is unreasonable about the French suggestion that we have achieved now active, proactive cooperation from Iraq, according to both these chief inspectors for the last month, and we have achieved, thanks to your presence and pressure in the Middle East area with your forces, now that we achieved this, why do we want to go back to the conflict?

SECRETARY POWELL: Because I don't think we've really achieved that much. When you see the 167-page paper that we are making reference to, and if you read every page of it, as we have recently, and when you see the history associated with each one of these programs for weapons of mass destruction, and when you see the questions that are remaining, questions that could have been answered anytime over the past five years, the past ten years, and remain unanswered, what you are seeing is a continued pattern of lack of cooperation. And that is a problem for us.

We are seeing some cooperation on process. We see when they are up against a wall, when they know there's going to be another ministerial-level meeting at the Security Council, suddenly some more action is taken. Only when they see this kind of pressure and they're afraid that the Security Council might act in a united way, do they step forward and take additional steps to make the inspectors believe, make us believe, that they're really in compliance when they really aren't.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, this resolution and this amendment are somewhat sketchy. It doesn't -- once again does not define full cooperation or any of the other terms that are used. What is to say that if it's adopted we won't be here on March the 17th arguing again about whether Iraq is in full, immediate cooperation?

SECRETARY POWELL: We know what full compliance should look like and we know what it does not look like, and it does not look like full compliance now. They have known for these past 12 years what the requirements are, what the benchmarks are, what they are supposed to do, what we are expecting from them. And for 12 years, they have failed to comply, they have failed to cooperate. More than that, they have done everything to divide, to deceive, to put out practice of deceptions.

And what we are saying is in this amendment to the resolution we are laying out clearly, I think, in that third operative paragraph, what we are looking for in order to see whether or not Iraq has or has not lost this last chance is with --

QUESTION: When you say you know --

SECRETARY POWELL: Yeah, I know.

QUESTION: We've just heard a different interpretation this morning about --

SECRETARY POWELL: Well, there are different interpretations. There are some people who simply, in my judgment, don't want to see the facts clearly. I do not see the level of cooperation that should satisfy us that Iraq is complying in a way that we would know they are no longer going to have weapons of mass destruction and they have given up the intent, the desire, to have weapons of mass destruction.

One more, then I have to go.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that Hans Blix doesn't see the facts clearly, and is it not the U.S. who is making the UN look irrelevant by failing to listen to the man who sent over there to find out what's going on?

SECRETARY POWELL: No, we listened very carefully to Hans Blix, and I thought he gave a very thoughtful, balanced report. But even Dr. Blix, if you listen very carefully to his report and read his report, he expresses concern about the level of cooperation that he has received.

I give all credit to Dr. Blix and Dr. ElBaradei and the terrific people who work for them for the work they have been doing, but that work is being frustrated by the continuing actions on the part of Saddam Hussein and his regime to keep them from doing their job properly. And their job is to assist Iraq in the process of coming into compliance, and that's what Iraq has not yet decided to do.

Thank you.
[End]

Released on March 7, 2003

Raw Data: Blix's Report

Friday, March 07, 2003

The following is the oral introduction of the 12th quarterly report of UNMOVIC, delivered by Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix to the U.N. Security Council on March 7, 2003.

Mr. President,

For nearly three years, I have been coming to the Security Council presenting the quarterly reports of UNMOVIC. They have described our many preparations for the resumption of inspections in Iraq. The 12th quarterly report is the first that describes three months of inspections. They come after four years without inspections. The report was finalized ten days ago and a number of relevant events have taken place since then. Today’s statement will supplement the circulated report on these points to bring the Council up-to-date.

Inspection process

Inspections in Iraq resumed on 27 November 2002. In matters relating to process, notably prompt access to sites, we have faced relatively few difficulties and certainly much less than those that were faced by UNSCOM in the period 1991 to 1998. This may well be due to the strong outside pressure.

Some practical matters, which were not settled by the talks, Dr. ElBaradei and I had with the Iraqi side in Vienna prior to inspections or in resolution 1441 (2002), have been resolved at meetings, which we have had in Baghdad. Initial difficulties raised by the Iraqi side about helicopters and aerial surveillance planes operating in the no-fly zones were overcome. This is not to say that the operation of inspections is free from frictions, but at this juncture we are able to perform professional no-notice inspections all over Iraq and to increase aerial surveillance.

American U-2 and French Mirage surveillance aircraft already give us valuable imagery, supplementing satellite pictures and we would expect soon to be able to add night vision capability through an aircraft offered to us by the Russian Federation. We also expect to add low-level, close area surveillance through drones provided by Germany. We are grateful not only to the countries, which place these valuable tools at our disposal, but also to the States, most recently Cyprus, which has agreed to the stationing of aircraft on their territory.

Documents and interviews

Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq’s Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed – or the proscribed items, if they exist.

Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. The provision of names prompts two reflections:

The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.

The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, 7 of these during the last week.

As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.

Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq’s programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.

There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.

I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.

Recent developments

On 14 February, I reported to the Council that the Iraqi side had become more active in taking and proposing steps, which potentially might shed new light on unresolved disarmament issues. Even a week ago, when the current quarterly report was finalized, there was still relatively little tangible progress to note. Hence, the cautious formulations in the report before you.

As of today, there is more. While during our meetings in Baghdad, the Iraqi side tried to persuade us that the Al Samoud 2 missiles they have declared fall within the permissible range set by the Security Council, the calculations of an international panel of experts led us to the opposite conclusion. Iraq has since accepted that these missiles and associated items be destroyed and has started the process of destruction under our supervision. The destruction undertaken constitutes a substantial measure of disarmament – indeed, the first since the middle of the 1990s. We are not watching the breaking of toothpicks. Lethal weapons are being destroyed. However, I must add that no destruction has happened today. I hope it’s a temporary break.

To date, 34 Al Samoud 2 missiles, including 4 training missiles, 2 combat warheads, 1 launcher and 5 engines have been destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Work is continuing to identify and inventory the parts and equipment associated with the Al Samoud 2 programme.

Two ‘reconstituted’ casting chambers used in the production of solid propellant missiles have been destroyed and the remnants melted or encased in concrete.

The legality of the Al Fatah missile is still under review, pending further investigation and measurement of various parameters of that missile.

More papers on anthrax, VX and missiles have recently been provided. Many have been found to restate what Iraq had already declared, some will require further study and discussion.

There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.

Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.

With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.

What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.

This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.

Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated “immediately, unconditionally and actively” with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:

The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.

It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as “active”, or even “proactive”, these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute “immediate” cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.

Mr. President,

Members of the Council may relate most of what I have said to resolution 1441 (2002), but UNMOVIC is performing work under several resolutions of the Security Council. The quarterly report before you is submitted in accordance with resolution 1284 (1999), which not only created UNMOVIC but also continues to guide much of our work. Under the time lines set by the resolution, the results of some of this work is to be reported to the Council before the end of this month. Let me be more specific.

Resolution 1284 (1999) instructs UNMOVIC to “address unresolved disarmament issues” and to identify “key remaining disarmament tasks” and the latter are to be submitted for approval by the Council in the context of a work programme. UNMOVIC will be ready to submit a draft work programme this month as required.

UNSCOM and the Amorim Panel did valuable work to identify the disarmament issues, which were still open at the end of 1998. UNMOVIC has used this material as starting points but analysed the data behind it and data and documents post 1998 up to the present time to compile its own list of “unresolved disarmament issues” or, rather, clustered issues. It is the answers to these issues which we seek through our inspection activities.

It is from the list of these clustered issues that UNMOVIC will identify the “key remaining disarmament tasks”. As noted in the report before you, this list of clustered issues is ready.

UNMOVIC is only required to submit the work programme with the “key remaining disarmament tasks” to the Council. As I understand that several Council members are interested in the working document with the complete clusters of disarmament issues, we have declassified it and are ready to make it available to members of the Council on request. In this working document, which may still be adjusted in the light of new information, members will get a more up-to-date review of the outstanding issues than in the documents of 1999, which members usually refer to. Each cluster in the working document ends with a number of points indicating what Iraq could do to solve the issue. Hence, Iraq’s cooperation could be measured against the successful resolution of issues.

I should note that the working document contains much information and discussion about the issues which existed at the end of 1998 – including information which has come to light after 1998. It contains much less information and discussion about the period after 1998, primarily because of paucity of information. Nevertheless, intelligence agencies have expressed the view that proscribed programmes have continued or restarted in this period. It is further contended that proscribed programmes and items are located in underground facilities, as I mentioned, and that proscribed items are being moved around Iraq. The working document contains some suggestions on how these concerns may be tackled.

Mr. President,

Let me conclude by telling you that UNMOVIC is currently drafting the work programme, which resolution 1284 (1999) requires us to submit this month. It will obviously contain our proposed list of key remaining disarmament tasks; it will describe the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification that the Council has asked us to implement; it will also describe the various subsystems which constitute the programme, e.g. for aerial surveillance, for information from governments and suppliers, for sampling, for the checking of road traffic, etc.

How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.

Raw Data: ElBaradei's Report

Friday, March 07, 2003

The following is a report entitled The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq: An Update, delivered by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei to the U.N. Security Council March 7, 2003.

My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions.

Inspection Activities

When I reported last to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the "reconnaissance phase" - that is, re-establishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities - into the "investigative phase", which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived or attempted to revive its defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.

At the outset, let me state one general observation: namely, that during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially, due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late 1980s, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade, and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel been taken on. This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is naturally of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme.

Inspections

The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before. In addition, IAEA experts have taken part in many joint UNMOVIC-IAEA inspections.

Technical Methods

Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected, from key locations in Iraq, weekly air particulate samples that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analyses have been received from the relevant laboratories.

Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2000 kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.

Interviews

Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel - at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews even when the conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a view to gaining as much information as possible - information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation.

As you may recall, when we first began to request private, unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and keeping the recorded tapes. Recently, upon our insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escort and without a taped record. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq.

I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews, to ensure that they are conducted freely, and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free. We intend therefore, to request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those States.

Specific Issues

In the last few weeks, Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities, and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly on the progress made on each of these issues.

Uranium Enrichment
Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge manufacturing experts.

Aluminium tubes : The IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that these aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use these 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse engineering of rockets.

The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of these rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples. A thorough analysis of this information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances.

Drawing on this information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve operational efficiency. The project languished for long periods during this time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion.

Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import these aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.

Magnets: With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets -- or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets -- for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of twelve different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for a centrifuge magnetic bearing.

In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line, for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, the contract has been evaluated by the IAEA centrifuge enrichment experts. They have concluded the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-1991 period makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will continue therefore to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges.

Flow forming capabilities : Iraq has used its relatively low-accuracy flow forming capability for the production of rocket parts in steel. Investigations in the field indicate that Iraq has recently started to flow form its own tubes in aluminium as well.

Based upon Iraqi documentation, experts' observations of Iraq's industrial capabilities and the IAEA's knowledge of Iraq's industrial assets - including the availability of raw materials - our assessment to date is that Iraq still possesses an abundance of high-strength aluminium materials procured during the 1980s, and has the expertise needed to produce pre-forms of high quality, but that it currently has low-quality flow forming equipment. In addition, Iraq's lack of experience and expertise in this field makes it highly unlikely that it is currently able to produce aluminium cylinders consistently to the tolerances required for centrifuge enrichment. Nevertheless, the IAEA will monitor all potentially capable machines and facilities using 24-hour camera surveillance, supported by a regime of unannounced inspections. The IAEA will also continue to assess the level of centrifuge-related expertise remaining in Iraq.

Uranium Acquisition

The IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001.

The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports. The IAEA was also able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation.

Based on thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and Niger - are in fact not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials.

Procurement Patterns

Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a number of States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have been conducted in contravention of sanction controls specified under Security Council resolution 661 and other relevant resolutions.

The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. An IAEA team of technical experts, customs investigators and computer forensic specialists is currently conducting a series of investigations, through inspections at trading companies and commercial organizations, aimed at understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated:

• There is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as being reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites.

• There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990.

• There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even had Iraq pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question.

• Although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.
As I stated above, the IAEA will continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of the above issues.

After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate. I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its co-operation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I do hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its co-operation.

The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991 --combined with the extended rights provided by resolution 1441, the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi co-operation -- should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour - in view of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process, and, particularly in light of Iraq's past record of co-operation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme, in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real time assurances.

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