Columbia Was Beyond Any Help, Officials Say

New York Times ^ | 2/03/03 | KENNETH CHANG

[kattracks]

OUSTON, Feb. 3 — Even if flight controllers had known for certain that protective heat tiles on the underside of the space shuttle had sustained severe damage at launching, little or nothing could have been done to address the problem, NASA officials say.

Virtually since the hour Columbia went down, the space agency has been peppered with possible options for repairing the damage or getting the crew down safely. But in each case, officials here and at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida say, the proposed solution would not have worked.

The simplest would have been to abort the mission the moment the damage was discovered. In case of an engine malfunction or other serious problem at launching, a space shuttle can jettison its solid rocket boosters and the external fuel tank, shut down its own engines and glide back down, either returning to the Kennedy Space Center or an emergency landing site in Spain or Morocco.

But no one even knew that a piece of insulation from the external tank had hit the orbiter until a frame-by-frame review of videotape of the launching was undertaken the next day. By then, Columbia was already in orbit, and re-entry would have posed the same danger that it did 16 days later.

Four other possibilities have been discussed at briefings or in interviews since the loss of Columbia, and rejected one by one by NASA officials.

First, repairing the damaged tiles. The crew had no tools for such a repair. At a news conference on Sunday, Ron D. Dittemore, the shuttle program manager, said that early in the shuttle program, NASA considered developing a tile repair kit, but that "we just didn't believe it was feasible at the time." He added that a crew member climbing along the underside of the shuttle could cause even more damage to the tiles.

Another idea, widely circulated on the Internet in the last few days, was that the shuttle could have docked with the International Space Station once the damage was discovered. But without the external fuel tank, dropped as usual after launching, Columbia had no fuel for its main engines and thus no way it could propel itself to the station, which circles the earth on a different orbit at a higher altitude.

"We have nowhere near the fuel needed to get there," said Bruce Buckingham, a spokesman at the Kennedy Space Center.

Another shuttle, Atlantis, was scheduled for launching on March 1 to carry supplies and a new crew to the space station, and it is possible to imagine a Hollywood-type series of events in which NASA rushed Atlantis to the launching pad, sent it up with a minimal crew of two, had it rendezvous with Columbia in space and brought everyone down safely.

But Atlantis is still in its hangar, and to rush it to launching would have required NASA to circumvent most of its safety measures. "It takes about three weeks, at our best effort, to prepare the shuttle for launch once we're at the pad," Mr. Buckingham said, "and we're not even at the pad." Further, Columbia had enough oxygen, supplies and fuel (for its thrusters only) to remain in orbit for only five more days, said Patrick Ryan, a spokesman at the Johnson Space Center here.

Finally, there is the notion that Columbia's re-entry might have been altered in some way to protect its damaged area. But Mr. Dittemore said the shuttle's descent path was already designed to keep temperatures as low as possible. "Because I'm reusing this vehicle over and over again, so I'm trying to send it through an environment that minimizes the wear and tear on the structure and the tile," he said at his news conference on Sunday.

Today he added that he did not know of a way for the shuttle to re-enter so that most of the heat would be absorbed by tiles that were not damaged, on its right wing. "I'm not aware of any other scenarios, any other techniques, that would have allowed me to favor one wing over the other," he said.

Even if that had been possible, it would probably have damaged the shuttle beyond repair and made it impossible to land, requiring the crew to parachute out at high speed and at high altitude. He said there was no way managers could have gotten information about the damaged tiles that would have warranted so drastic a move.

Gene Kranz, the flight director who orchestrated the rescue of astronauts aboard the crippled Apollo 13 in 1970, said that from what he knew about the suspected tile damage, there was probably nothing that could have been done to save the flight. "The options," he said in a telephone interview, "were just nonexistent."

[Southflanknorthpawsis]

We're all going to jail!

Oh well. Except for that unfortunate fact that horizontal stripes add pounds, think of the wealth we'll have when we get out.

[Diddle E. Squat]

Snicker. Lemme guess, Astro-doctor now?

[SirAllen]

The undeniable fact is the Astronauts have a one in fifty chance of being blown to bits.

Even with these odds I'd gladly hop on a shuttle tomorrow - even before they conclusively find the cause of the Columbia accident.

120 people will die today in auto accidents in the US. Should we give up on the automobile? No, it's an acceptable risk for the benefit it gives. The same goes for space exploration.

[Howlin]

LOL! Then I know you are GUILTY!

[Southflanknorthpawsis]

Uh-oh. I had the exact same thought. I really did.

A picture of Susan McDougall popped into my head as soon as I read "jail".

[TLBSHOW]

Excerpts from NASA Book

"NASA New Millennium Problems and Solutions"

By Don A. Nelson

3 – Is the Space Shuttle Safe?

When NASA loses an unmanned Mars spacecraft due to human error.. it’s an embarrassment.


When NASA loses a Space Shuttle . . . it’s a national tragedy!

[Chad Fairbanks]

Astro-Doctor? I wish... LOL

[TLBSHOW]

The Shuttle is the only human space transportation launch system that does not have a crew escape module. Instead the crew must rely on a manually activated escape pole system that is difficult to operate and has very limited capability. It requires a manual activation by a flight crew member in the middeck compartment to pyrotechnically jettison the crew ingress/egress side hatch and then manually deploy the escape pole. One by one, each crew member attaches a lanyard hook assembly to the escape pole, and then the crew member slides down the pole and off the end. The escape pole is suppose to provide a trajectory for the crew member’s body so that it will not impact the Orbiter’s left wing. This escape system can only be used during atmospheric flight and vehicle accelerations that allow the crew to operate the system. It takes 90 seconds for a crew of eight to bail out of the Shuttle using this system. In a catastrophic Shuttle explosion, milliseconds can mean the difference between life and death . . . 90 seconds can be a death sentence!
The following is an excerpt from the October 27, 1999 statement of Michael L. Coats, Vice President, Reusable Transportation Systems Lockheed Martin Astronautics before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives. From 1978-1991, Mr. Coats was a NASA Astronaut, flying three Space Shuttle missions, the last two as Crew Commander.

Don Nelson

[Howlin]

12 incidents in five years?

I've had more work done on my convertible than that!

[TLBSHOW]

"I cannot emphasize safety enough. I personally experienced sitting on the pad during STS-41-D in 1984 while a hydrogen fire was burning below us, knowing that we had no way to escape if the ground crew could not contain the fire. We should never put astronauts in that situation again. That is why we have recommended to NASA that a crew escape system definition and demonstration be a high priority over the next five years in any launch vehicle architecture."

[Jhoffa_]

Even with these odds I'd gladly hop on a shuttle tomorrow - even before they conclusively find the cause of the Columbia accident.

Me also.. In a second.

Man was made to explore and nothing is "conquered" till there's an American standing on it.

Everyone is going to die.. It's a fact. Its just a matter of when.

They died with glory and honor, knew the risks and didn't care.

There's no reason to abandon the space program over our fallen heroes.

[strela]

When NASA loses an unmanned Mars spacecraft due to human error it’s an embarrassment. When NASA loses a Space Shuttle it’s a national tragedy!

I just pray that Columbia's destruction doesn't turn out to have been caused by the equivalent of using English instead of metric calculations.

[Diddle E. Squat]

Whoa, check out the Gertz article in Breaking News

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/835476/posts

"Arrests of al Qaeda terrorists disrupt plans for attack"

[TLBSHOW]

I don't give a damn about your car. This space shuttle is how old?

[justshe]

1. What proof do you have that the issues raised in the memo are accurate?

2. What proof do you have that the memo wasn't 'looked into' and found to be deficient and hence, dismissed?

3. Why, after pinging Gracey to your post on another thread, to confirm the accuracy of the memo, and seeing her dismiss Nelson's assertions, do you not accept her opinion?

4. Why do you not accept Don Nelson's own words that nothing in the memo would have prevented the tragedy that occured with Columbia?

5. Are you as sure of all of your facts as you were that Bill O'Reilly called Don Nelson's home?

[Howlin]

[Chad Fairbanks]

So, how much does an orbiter weigh in Stones????

[Southflanknorthpawsis]

ROFLOL !!!!!!!

[TLBSHOW]

Space Shuttle Operations Costs and Flight Safety

The Space Shuttle is a money hog. Its operations will require 25% of the NASA Fiscal Year 2000 budget allotment. Even with 25% of the budget, NASA is hard pressed to fly just seven flights per year. This budget reports that the Shuttle cost per flight has been reduced from over $600 million to around $360 million in Fiscal Year 1997. A closer look at the NASA budgets indicates this reduction is more a book-keeping ploy than actual cost reductions.

From Fiscal Year 1994 to 2000 the Shuttle budgets were approximately, $2.4 billion per year plus the undefined mission support costs. The flight rate varied from four to eight flights per year. In 1999 when the fleet was grounded and only four flights were flown, the launch cost for that year soared to over $700 million per flight. Adding in the institutional, upgrades, and ISS support, the average costs are still approximately $500 million per flight. The highly automated Ariane 5 commercial expendable launch system can fly the same Shuttle payload weight to orbit for $100 million. Automation of Shuttle operations is a mandatory requirement to reduce the heavy financial burden the operation cost put on the Agency’s resources.

Space Shuttle Upgrades Money Pit

From Fiscal Years 1994 to 2000 NASA Shuttle managers have spent $4.9 billion on Shuttle safety and performance upgrades. With all this money being spent on Shuttle, it would seem that all significant safety and performance problems would have been solved by now. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

[Jhoffa_]

I am reminded of Sparta when I think of the astronauts.

Heroes to the last man.