[TLBSHOW]

Space Shuttle Operations Costs and Flight Safety

The Space Shuttle is a money hog. Its operations will require 25% of the NASA Fiscal Year 2000 budget allotment. Even with 25% of the budget, NASA is hard pressed to fly just seven flights per year. This budget reports that the Shuttle cost per flight has been reduced from over $600 million to around $360 million in Fiscal Year 1997. A closer look at the NASA budgets indicates this reduction is more a book-keeping ploy than actual cost reductions.

From Fiscal Year 1994 to 2000 the Shuttle budgets were approximately, $2.4 billion per year plus the undefined mission support costs. The flight rate varied from four to eight flights per year. In 1999 when the fleet was grounded and only four flights were flown, the launch cost for that year soared to over $700 million per flight. Adding in the institutional, upgrades, and ISS support, the average costs are still approximately $500 million per flight. The highly automated Ariane 5 commercial expendable launch system can fly the same Shuttle payload weight to orbit for $100 million. Automation of Shuttle operations is a mandatory requirement to reduce the heavy financial burden the operation cost put on the Agency’s resources.

Space Shuttle Upgrades Money Pit

From Fiscal Years 1994 to 2000 NASA Shuttle managers have spent $4.9 billion on Shuttle safety and performance upgrades. With all this money being spent on Shuttle, it would seem that all significant safety and performance problems would have been solved by now. Unfortunately, this has not been the case.

[TLBSHOW]

Crew Escape Module

A crew escape module was considered in the original design trades for the Shuttle. The original escape module would have weighed up to 10,000 pounds, depending on the number of crew required. Placing this much weight in the crew compartment of the Shuttle moves the center of gravity to a point so far forward that the aerodynamic control surfaces could not control it. In other words the vehicle was nose heavy and could not maintain stable flight. At this time the crew escape module was abandoned and the vehicle was flown with aircraft ejection seats for the two astronauts conducting the test flights. As the Shuttle flights proceeded, NASA made the erroneous assumption the vehicle redundant flight systems made it safe enough to remove the ejection seats.

After the Challenger accident crew modules were again studied. The results were the same; the escape module was just too heavy to be placed in the crew compartment area. The issue was again reviewed in 1994 for the Access to Space studies and with the same conclusion. In July of 2000, another crew escape module study group was formed to study the problem. They were told that the crew module could weigh no more than 5000 pounds, but the crew size could be reduced to six. Their study resulted in a module weighting 10,000 pounds. History does repeat especially when all the conditions are the same. The problem can be solved, but NASA management must be willing to change the conditions.

There are two options for solution to the problem. Both options require that Shuttle management give up its unjustified position requiring piloting for Shuttle flights. Removing the flight deck piloting function systems will allow that weight to be used for the escape module. This will include the weight of the commander and pilot, their seats, forward flight deck displays and controls systems, escape pole system, forward windows, and other non-required items. The first option places the crew escape module(s) in the payload bay nearer the vehicle center of gravity. This solution solves the aerodynamic stability problem. However, the volume of the escape module must be charged against the payload carrying capability.

The second option is to install the escape module (seats) on the flight deck. A seat ejection system would eject four crew members from seats on the flight deck. Two additional crew members could be ejected from the lower middeck on rails connected to the seat ejection rails on the flight decks. The weight of this ejection system is approximately 3700 pounds. Removing the piloting sub-systems (commander and pilot weight, their seats, forward flight deck display and control systems, escape pole, forward windows, etc.) would provide the weight saving to install the 3700 pound ejection crew escape system without violating the aerodynamic stability limit. This is the preferred option. The ejection seat concept was developed and flown on the Columbia OV-102 Shuttle. The ejection trajectory is shown in the following NASA image:





NASA management will not consider either option because both require that their irrational requirement for piloting be deleted. Piloting is a non-mandatory requirement. It is an emotional and political issue. Deleting piloting and automating flight control would show that it does not take a "marching army" government jobs’ program to fly Shuttle missions. It is not a technical issue because all phases of space flight have been successfully demonstrated with automated control systems. With all the technology advancements made in autonomous flight control, this has become a ridiculous requirement, a requirement that places the lives of Shuttle crews in great danger.

It is ironic, that NASA, a leader in advance technology is so opposed to accepting advance flight control technology for the Space Shuttle.

[I_dmc]

The Space Shuttle is a money hog.

Yes.  It was designed to be.  In a Democrat controlled Congress, the most important question is, "How many votes does this buy us?"  The Democrat base doesn't place space exploration very highly on a list of priorities.  To the contrary, the highest priority is to send more government checks to more people, in order that they have a vested interest in keeping Democrats in power.

In this environment, designing and building the shuttle, as envisioned, could not be funded.