Lessons From The Fall Of An Empire

Lessons from the fall of an empire
By Harold James
Published: December 29 2002 19:05

It is the time of year when people are casting about for good books to read to resolve the current perplexity. If you are sitting in Washington, there are few guides to the unique position of the US, whose military expenditure exceeds that of the next 14 countries combined.

The most frequently cited historical parallels, Britain and its 19th-century pax Britannica, or 16th-century Spain, the first country to grasp New World prosperity to dominate the Old World, do not really fit modern America. Both were locked in rivalry with other nearly equal European powers: France and (in the British case) Germany.

Washington readers could do worse than go back to a study of the first real exerciser of unipolar power, the Roman Empire. The book to read is Edward Gibbon's classic study, whose first volume was (by chance) published in 1776, the year of the signing of the American declaration of independence. Gibbon's advice immediately looks quite attractive and relevant to today.

He begins with praise for the peaceful character of the Emperor Augustus and of Roman realism and multilateralism: "Inclined to peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to discover that Rome, in her present exalted situation, had much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms; and that, in the prosecution of remote wars, the undertaking became, every day, more difficult, the event more doubtful, the possession more precarious, and less beneficial."

Previously secure countries can quickly drift away from the political grasp of the hegemon, as resentments and anxieties about the unipolarity of the world grow. Gibbon even had words that might help President George W. Bush understand or deal with Gerhard Schröder's would-be independent foreign policy. "The forests and morasses of Germany were filled with a hardy race of barbarians; and though, on the first attack, they seemed to yield to the weight of Roman power, they soon, by a signal act of despair, regained their independence, and reminded Augustus of the vicissitude of fortune." This is a good description of the often counter-productive psychology of the need to slap the hegemon. But such revolt alone is not enough to overthrow hegemonic power.

Why did the Roman version of uni- polarity collapse? Gibbon's empire depended at the height of its success on a sort of multiculturalism, which Romans put in terms of the admission of local deities to the quite crowded complex of the Roman imperial pantheon. In the same way, the US has recently gone out of its way to show how eagerly it will embrace a non-threatening version of Islamic (or indeed Hindu or Confucian) values. A too emphatic insistence on any uniquely Roman virtue or divinity would destroy a precarious notion of cultural pluralism. But it was exactly that plurality of a social and economic kind that proved to be a mechanism of disintegration.

Gibbon saw his story of decline and fall in terms of a revolt against Roman universalism driven by a Christian and egalitarian protest against the unequal distribution of property. This was an early version of an anti-globalisation movement, in which inequalities stemming from the character of imperial power touched off protests. "Most of the crimes which disturb the internal peace of society are produced by the restraints which the necessary, but unequal, laws of property have imposed on the appetites of mankind, by confining to a few the possession of those objects that are coveted by many." Maybe Gibbon was also making a contemporary reference of his own, to the weaknesses of the late-18th-century British empire, with its global commercial culture, so signally exposed and attacked by the American Revolution.

This 18th-century historian's picture of empire and its rules breeding resentment is at odds with a deeply reasoned view, drawn from American social science, about the way in which the modern world can be made peaceful. The argument of the September 2002 US national security strategy initially appears compelling. Because the US can so clearly outspend and defeat (pre-emptively if necessary) any other power, all other powers have an interest in cutting back military spending and threats to their neighbours. This will probably make them wealthier and, therefore, more democratic and peaceful. The world will in this manner be stabilised by the benign force of Washington - a dream very close to that of Augustus.

Which of the arguments is right: the historian's view of long-term decline and fall, or the social scientist's of permanent peace as a result of rational calculation by rational leaders?

The answer depends as much on the stability of the country at the centre as on the behaviour of the rest of the world. The US, unlike the British empire, is building its rule on a foundation that is potentially quite unstable. The British empire in its 19th-century heyday ran enormous current account surpluses (7 per cent of gross domestic product on the eve of the first world war). For more than 20 years, in the period of its cold war victory and of the conversion of the world to a new consensus about markets, the US has had quite large current account deficits. In 2001, the deficit was 4.2 per cent of GDP.

One way of reading this odd situation - which is popular with many Americans - is that the rest of the world has bought into US stability. The deficits are financed by capital inflows, as the non-American world buys the stock of fast-growing US companies or - when the stock market looks bad - property. Indeed, there appears to be a security premium that the rest of the world pays, in that non-American purchases of US assets show consistently lower returns than US purchases of foreign assets.

But nobody thinks that this kind of inflow can be sustained indefinitely. The inflows of foreign capital could be rapidly reversed on some chance piece of bad news. Such a reversal would involve a collapse of the US stock market, the property market and the dollar. US consumers would no longer be able to binge on cheap goods supplied by the rest of the world. American producers would try to protect their markets; foreign producers would be thrown out of business and no longer see any gains to be realised by peaceful integration in a benign world economy.

The financial reversal would also bring the collapse of the US security policy and of its calculated strategy of world pacification. The cost of US defence spending would look much too high and scaling it down would give a chance to would-be rivals, at least on a regional basis - China, for example.

The American case would then look more like that of Spain (which also ran a current account deficit, financed by the outflow of precious metals from its imperial possessions) than that of 19th-century Britain. And Gibbon's story of decline would begin.

The writer is professor of history at Princeton University and author of The End of Globalization

Gibbon saw his story of decline and fall in terms of a revolt against Roman universalism driven by a Christian and egalitarian protest against the unequal distribution of property.

Gibbons hated christianity, so he blamed it on the Christians

However, a better explanation is the new presence of malaria in the swamps near Rome (Imported from North Africa) which does not kill adults, but kills babies and weakens people's ability to work. And then there were several very bad epidemics,including the bad one brought in from fighting the Persians. They think it was smallpox, but it could have been typhus or typhoid or even measles (which is fatal in new populations). The financial collapse, which was one of the causes of the French revolution, was also important to Rome. But when depopulation occurs due to disease, the tax base collapses (a problem more likely in socialist Europe than here).

The decadence of Rome led to promiscuity and the collapse of the native Romans. But then the the influx of new blood first from the other Italian states and later from other Roman provences allowed Rome to last a couple hundred more years.So multiculturalism was not the problem: Like St. Paul, these outsiders were proud to be Roman (just like my husband is proud to be an American and a vet despite the fact he was born outside the country). Rome fell because outsiders were taught to fight, and when they came into Rome they realized that Rome wouldn't fight for itself, but relied on mercenaries. Again, this shows more danger to Europe than to the US.

The History channel is supposed to have a program on Vespusius this week, the emperor who saved Rome. Might be interesting.

Interesting post. In short, no country has come up with a successful formula to sustain 'Empire'. Of course this is measured over time for a country. However, controlling individuals(groups) in that country will benefit during their own time and, hence, they will not make any effort to reverse the slouch to collapse.

Hopefully our form of government, an 'of the people' democracy, will avoid the dominating ruler syndrome of the past and be able to cast out leaders unwilling to right the ship. Or will we be also captivated by some 'great man' acting as the pied piper as we willingly drown?

Decline and Fall covers a 1500 year period of time. It is probably the greatest historical observation on the nature of people and of nations. However, this author's "lessons" drawn from Gibbons are nonsense. Gibbons felt the Romans became effeminate and unwarlike due in part to the influence of christianity. But Gibbons was not that simplistic and one has to read the incredible history of those hundreds of years to understand what happened.

One of my favorite passages is Gibbons' statement that Rome fell to Alaric after the gates of the city were thrown open in the middle of the night by Germanic inhabitants who were more devoted to Rome's enemies than to Rome. If you want to make an analogy you can compare this to the threat posed by illegal aliens or by immigrants who don't share American values today.

Gibbons recognized military reality and he did not believe that Rome should have just played defense. He recognized many many Roman victories as essential to the Empire's survival, and noted many lost opportunities as well.

There is something different this time. The technology of war, including weapons of mass destruction, is such that a mere handful can control hundreds of millions --yes, even billions. That is why Iran, Iraq and N Korea will all be disarmed of WMD or have regime changes or both. Only a few larger powers will have WMD. Even these must be reduced in number and power.

The remaining nuclear and other powers will gradually interact so much, it will be unnecessary to continue with multiple sources of WMD. It may take decades but globalization will eventually result in only one military power. How this will be finalized is unclear, but it will happen or else we will have a catastrophe. Considering the many years of confrontation, it is almost a miracle that we and the old Soviet Union and Red China did not have a nuclear exchange. Someone did their job.

"Why did the Roman version of uni- polarity collapse? Gibbon's empire depended at the height of its success on a sort of multiculturalism, which Romans put in terms of the admission of local deities to the quite crowded complex of the Roman imperial pantheon. In the same way, the US has recently gone out of its way to show how eagerly it will embrace a non-threatening version of Islamic (or indeed Hindu or Confucian) values."

Up until the mid-1960's, American values were the highest in the world.

When was the last time you heard things like "An honest day's work for an honest day's pay." or "I hate a liar and a thief."?

Our culture has been so raped, squeezed, dumbed-down, and ravaged by the likes of the NAACP, ACLU, NOW, The (socialist) Democrat Party that noone even knows what a "value" is anymore.

Lying, cheating and stealing are glorified in our national media (movies, talk shows, newspapers, magazines) that honesty is literally laughed out of the picture.

Enron, Watergate, CNN, The Immigration and Natrualization Service are all icons of political correctness gone crazy.

An American. What the Hell is an American?

"Dispite the authors willingness to engage the term, America is not an empire, nor empirialistic."

It may not be an empire in the truest sense of the word, but America's impact on the rest of the world has been as significant as any of the ancient empires in history.

Of interesting note is that the longest single-running period in history where global peace reigned was during the reign of the Roman Empire - 200 years of peace.

"Turns out the world is a less safe place without the CCCP, not safer."

I agree with this to a degree.

The nukes we were afraid of raining down on us in the form of ICBMs have now changed hands (to the Muslims) and are now in the form of small nuclear bombs and "dirty" bombs capable of rendering areas of detonation uninhabitable for hundreds of years.

Which was worse?

At least during the Cold War, we had MAD and containment.

Now with the Muslims seeking to use the United States as a catalyst to propogate their creed of hatred, we are not quite sure who the enemy is.

"What the hell is an American"?
I have heard it said that the truest test of a person's (or a society's) character is adversity. What is facing America now is adversity, nothing more. Would it be safe to call it a national test of character? You ask what an American is? It is those of us in this society who grasp that America is worth fighting for, and are willing to do so. When the current problems facing our nation are solved, or dealt with, Americans will be seen as the ones who made it happen. I just hope there are enough of us left to do what will be necessary.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.