Posted on 09/25/2002 8:41:01 PM PDT by VaBthang4
Scud Hunting with Delta Force and the Special Air Service (SAS)
By Thomas B. Hunter
During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Saddam Hussein launched approximately 350 ballistic missiles against Iran. These attacks included a large number of R-17 single-stage missiles from a stockpile of 650 purchased from the Soviet Union. The R-17, as originally designed, had a maximum range of 300 km and was capable of carrying either a 2,000 lb. conventional or 100 kiloton nuclear warhead. In time, however, Iraqi engineers were ordered to develop a weapon capable of striking deeper into Iranian territory. To this end, designers made use of cannibalized parts from other R-17s to create three longer range hybrids unique to the Iraqi military: a long-range Scud (unnamed), the al-Hussein (600-650 km) and the al-Abbas (750-900 km). Most alterations were made via a reduction in warhead weight and a corresponding increase in fuel load. Saddam also managed to acquire 36 mobile launch vehicles based on the MAZ543 (8x8) wheeled chassis, originally developed in 1965 for the Soviet Army. The TELs as designed had a road range of 550 km, a top road speed of 70 km/hr, and vehicle cab air filtration for use in an NBC environment. Of these, only the Al-Abbas could not be fired from a mobile launcher. However, these successive Iraqi modifications, while providing greater range, dramatically reduced both the structural integrity of the missile and its notoriously poor accuracy (1 km CEP).
Despite these major drawbacks, it did serve one purpose particularly well: when fired in any number against densely populated urban areas, the Scud was an effective terror weapon. This secondary use was not lost on Hussein. On 18 January, seven Scuds struck Haifa and Tel Aviv, destroying 1,587 apartments and causing nearly fifty civilian casualties. Similar attacks followed in the next few days. These terror attacks caused the desired response. Israel immediately sortied aircraft ready to strike Iraqi targets. Later, they launched a nuclear-capable missile into the Mediterranean Sea to clearly demonstrate to Iraq one of the possible responses to further Scud attacks. Only quick intervention by senior U.S. politicians and the immediate dispatch of Patriot missile batteries to Tel Aviv averted a catastrophe. Hussein's intent was clear: to divide the Coalition by prompting Israel to attack and thus become an active participant in the war. There seemed little doubt that at the very least, this action would cause Syria, Egypt and others to abandon the Coalition. At worst, Arab nations might side with Iraq and prompt an all-out Middle East war. For this reason, destruction of Scuds became the overwhelming priority for Allied war planners.
The primary focus of counterforce planning at the hme with regard to the Iraqi Scud threat revolved around the location and destruction of fixed launch sites. By August 1990, the Department of Defense had located five such sites with 28 launchers. TR-1 / U-2R reconnaissance, E-8 JSTARS radar ground surveillance aircraft, and DSP early-warning satellite imagery quickly located fixed sites, however these tools proved insufficient in monitoring the transient mobile Scud launchers. Thus, the decision was made to send special operations forces to hunt the Scuds on the ground. The U.S. Army's Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), better known as Delta Force, and the British Special Air Service (SAS) were selected to perform what would become one of the largest counterterrorist operations in history.
The senior British officer in the Gulf, Lieutenant General Sir Peter de la Billiere, was the first to convince U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, a skeptic of the use of special operations forces, that SAS teams could be inserted behind enemy lines to conduct effective harassment and sabotage missions against the enemy. To the surprise of some, this suggestion was approved and two 'Sabre' squadrons (one half of the Regiment's fighting manpower) were deployed and began operations on 20 January 1991. On 24 January, however, the mission was changed to focus on Scud-hunting in western Iraq. The British teams were assigned a vast expanse near the H-2 airfield, from south of Highway 10 to the Saudi Arabian border. known as "Scud Alley".
One squadron from Delta arrived in Saudi Arabia by early February 1991 as part of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). Following a period of concentrated planning, teams infiltrated western Iraq by a variety of methods, often working with the pilots and crews of MH-60 Black Hawks and MH-47E Chinooks from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) based in Ft. Campbell, Kentucky. (Heavily armed aircraft from this unit also conducted independent direct action missions against Iraqi radar sites, convoys, and other targets.) The U.S. element was assigned as its hunting ground the area northwest of Highway 10 near Al Qaim, known as "Scud Boulevard".
The primary mission for both SAS and Delta was to locate and designate targets for destruction by Coalition warplanes. To this end, most teams traveled at night, while hiding out during the day. In periods of darkness or for targets obscured by camouflage, the roving teams carried laser target designators (LTD). Using these, an attacking aircraft could employ laser-guided bombs or missiles riding the beam emitted by the LTD. Those targets that were caught out in the open during daylight hours were targeted visually by the operators on the ground who then directed in aircraft armed with unguided bombs and other munitions. The hunters were able to provide information on enemy vehicle movements, however by the time this intelligence was incorporated into the target package oftentimes the mobile launchers had left their hiding place and moved to another location.
In addition to their targeting duties, Delta undertook other direct action missions against the Scuds. These included using long-range, .50-caliber sniper rifles to disable and destroy missiles both in rearming farms and those mounted on their TELs. Other interdictions reportedly involved eliminating Scud crews as well as the use of AT4 anti-tank missiles on larger targets. One of the more interesting elements of the operation was the group based at the outpostof Al Jouf, approximately 150 miles south ofthe Iraqi border. This was a truly 'joint' team made up of SAS personnel, along with USAF A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft and AFSOC MH-53J Pave Lows. These British teams soon developed a close relationship with the USAF crews as the Pave Lows provided insertion and the 'Warthogs' were often the first aircraft to respond to reports of TEL sightings. It should be mentioned that other SAS units were also transported in their own version of the Chinook, flown by its own helicopter squadron (based in Hereford) or Royal Air Force (RAF) crews. One 30-man SAS team, reportedly deployed from Al Jouf, successfully assaulted a Scud command-and-control center, despite the presence of an estimated 300 Iraqi military personnel.
Delta and SAS adapted to the harsh terrain by making effective use of light vehicles during their operations instead of patrolling on foot. Delta operated the Fast Attack Vehicle (FAV) while the SAS drove two versions, the Longline Light Strike Vehicle (LSV) and an updated version of the long-lived "Pink Panther" Land Rover. Both vehicles were designed to carry heavy loads, including two or three fully-equipped soldiers, food, water, ammunition, extra fuel and a wide variety of weapons (up to six Milan or TOW anti-tank missiles, and a mount for a 40mm grenade launcher, 30mm cannon or .50 caliber heavy machine gun). One persistent but unverified report from the Gulf War recounted that a single LSV carried 12 SAS troopers and their gear during one such operation.
It was not long, however, before a major shortcoming in the Scud hunt operations became apparent. Upon sighting a viable target, the troopers had to communicate the intelligence over the emergency "guard" frequency. Response times averaged an unacceptably high sixty (60) minutes, during which some targets were able to escape unharmed. The C3I system that had proven so effective for the advance planning of conventional airstrikes proved insufficient for incorporating real-time intelligence being sent back by the troopers. In order to facilitate communications between the ground teams and Coalition air power, the SAS requested and was approved the posting of liaison officers to the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) in Riyadh. As a result, improvements were made which permitted more direct communication. This was further enhanced by the practice of keeping ground attack aircraft constantly in the air, ready to respond immediately when a suitable target was located. Coalition aircraft were also warned of the presence of special forces operating in western Iraq, in an effort to prevent any "friendly fire" casualties.
These missions were not without loss to the hunters. At approximately 0300 on 21 February, four pilots and crew from the 160th SOAR and three Delta operators were killed when an MH60 helicopter crashed into a sand dune during zero-visibility weather conditions near the Ar Ar airfield. The ground team was reportedly conducting counterforce operations when one of the team was injured in a fall from a cliff and required medevac, to which the 160th responded. Similarly, one eight-man SAS team was compromised while on a reconnaissance mission. Four of these troopers died during escape-and-evasion after they were engaged by subsequent Iraqi patrols. Commandos from both groups were injured in firefights with Iraqi forces on a number of occasions in addition to casualties from exposure to unexpectedly cold nighttime weather.
The effect of the overall ground-based 'Scud Hunt' from a military perspective is skill a matter of speculation. There is no question that Coalition aircraft attacked a number of decoys and other targets that only after-action analysis revealed were not Scud-carrying TELs. One graphic incident occurred at a press briefing during the war in which General Schwarzkopf claimed video footage being displayed showed Scud launchers being destroyed when in fact later analysis indicates it was instead a group of fuel tanker trucks. At the end of the war UNSCOM found 62 complete al-Hussein missiles, six MAZ-543 TELs and four other TELs, along with parts of 88 other missiles and nine TELs. The Iraqis were also suspected of hiding other missiles from the UN inspection teams. 14 of 28 fixed sites were also destroyed. From a political perspective, however, the hunt was an unqualified success and may have provided one of the single greatest, and least known, contributions to the victory of Coalition forces in the Gulf.
I have done that before. Not against a SCUD launchers but some french getup. The AT-4 is an awesome piece of equipment. Totally idiot proof [unless the guy is pointing it at himself or doesnt secure the backblast area] and is quite a bang.
I also lit up an old Israeli M-60 tank with one during a training ex with Israeli forces in Tel Aviv.
Me and another Marine about 300 yards to my right [and slightly above] hit him almost simultaniously...tossed the turret on the ground next to it like it was a silver dollar.
I havent dug into it but it looks like we're using extended launchers in Afghanistan...I assume to increase accuracy.
Another 1992 investigation done by the General Accounting Office found that only 9 percent of the Patriot-Scud engagements "are supported by the strongest evidence that an engagement resulted in a warhead kill." (The GAO defined "the strongest evidence" as instances in which Scud debris or radar data indicated that a Scud was destroyed or disabled after a Patriot detonated near it.) Except in 9 percent of the cases, the GAO report said the Army could prove only that "the Patriots came close to the Scuds, not that they destroyed them."
Both reports, as well as studies by analysts (in particular MIT scientists George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol) concluded that Gulf War television pictures showing Patriots chasing Scuds were misleading. The television images didn't fully reflect that a number of the Patriots were just wounding Scuds or pushing them off course; big chunks of both missiles then fell to the ground. In Israel, the amount of damages and casualties increased after the Patriots were deployed there.
The Patriot missile which was designed to shoot down airplanes and not missiles was used against the SCUDs as they were coming in and we were all treated on television to the sight of the big explosion in the sky but then we were little surprised to see another explosion on the ground shortly thereafter and figured what's going on? Well, the truth of the matter is that the Patriot was pretty much doing its job as the government claimed, but the job wasn't quite proper. The Patriot missiles were going after the hottest part of the incoming SCUD, which was the tail, and would blow up in proximity to the tail and blow up that part of the SCUD, but the payload which was the warhead was on the front of the SCUD. And that was unaffected and it would simply tumble to the earth and freefall and explode on the ground. So in a sense yes, they were getting the SCUDs, but by the same token they weren't getting the warhead on the SCUD, which was doing... doing the damage.
The Israelis believed that the Americans didn't fully understand the deficiencies of the Patriot. That the Americans were being willfully blind about it. And there were bitter complaints. Moshe Arens came to Washington in February and had a meeting with Bush and his senior advisors in which he said, the Patriot is not working... We believe that only 20 percent of the SCUDs that are attacked with the Patriot are in fact, destroyed. Cheney at the same meeting spoke up and said, there is a fundamental disagreement over how effective the Patriots are. Nevertheless, the Israelis recognized that a belief that the Patriot was effective was almost as important as the effectiveness of the missile itself. It helped to calm the Israeli population. It helped to prevent the Israeli government, the Shamir government from coming under pressure to actively leap into the war. It was a very effective propaganda tool. And whenever suggestions were made within the Israeli government that the truth about the Patriot as seen by the Israelis be made public other voices prevailed saying, why would we tell Sadam that the Patriot is not working when in fact it's in our best interest to let him believe that it's infallible.
I guess that is one of the reasons the Israelis developed the Arrow anti-missile missile which is said to perform much better than the Patriot. Although i still think Patriots protect the Arrow crews (i.e the Patriots protect the Arrows and the Arrows protect the country or something like that).
Stay Safe !
ROTFLMAO! and shaking my head in disbelief.
Gimme a break here gentlemen. What the hay does this idiot writer think should happen? Both missiles totally vaporize? Both missiles continue on into outer space orbit!? Of course the damn things fell to the ground. Things you toss into the air generally do. The question is, did you disrupt a) the flight path and/or b) the warhead enough that the target was less/unaffected.
You can't really ask for much more, and if your enemy is just lobbing the things at a large populated area, yes, there are going to be some casualties.
What idiocy.
Actually some ICBMs utilize decoys that pop out to deceive anti-ballistic missile defenses into sending their kill vehicles against the false warheads while the real one goes through. Saddam's Scuds (he had made some modifications to them to add range, but a side effect was they broke up easily) had a pseudo form of this decoy effect (although not on purpose) and the Patriots of the Gulf war could not overcome it. (Actually i do not know why i ma telling you this GunRunner since you obviously know more about the Patriot that i know ...but hey, it seems i love to write and write a lot LOL). Anyways.....
Which is why reports came out that the actual kill rate of those Patriots was 9%.
However todays Patriots are a different breed and are not so easily fooled.
As for your post Freedom Poster i would not say the whole article was BS. It is common knowledge that when a Patriot impacts it will not totally disintregate the whole Scud. Obviously some chunks will fall to the ground and if a chunk falls on your head or your house you will not be a very joyous chap! What the article is contending is that the Patriots, instead of destroying the warhead, usually just broke up the missile. Falling chunks of metal are one thing .....however falling chunks of metal plus a falling warhead is another thing. A falling piece of missile would only do localized damage (eg total your car). However an intact warhead will do a lot worse. That was the problem ...intact warheads.
As an aside i believe the kill vehicle of the proposed national defense missile program (by the way totally different in every respect from the Patriot) will have the capability to destroy the incoming warhead completely. Disintegrate it. However the kill vehicle uses pure kinetic energy instead of a HE warhead.
I agree, the AT-4 is a nice little item. But I'm not sure if it's idiot proof.
LOL, there's the legend from the Persian Gulf- never could find out if it was true or not- about the NCO from the 101st Airborne who was going to give some of his soldiers a class on how to employ the weapon. Seems he had given the class a zillion times before, as have I. What he didn't take into account was the AT-4 he was using to give the class didn't have the little yellow band on it denoting it as a "trainer". He went through the whole class just like he had so many times before. Pull safety pin, pop up plastic sites, set range, cock arming lever, "back blast area clear!"- and then he pushed down the little plastic trigger...
The legend has it, nobody was hurt but he took out a bunch of tents in the tent city. I doubt it's true, but I've seen Joe do a lot of stupid things. I saw an E7 in Bosnia get "flustered" one day as he tried to enter camp. We had clearing barrels outside the gate and a very strict procedure for clearing all weapons. He whips out his 9mm and never drops the magazine. He charges- a round is ejected. He pokes out his lip, like- "Hmmmm?". Charges again- another round is ejected. The procedure called for three charges and then pull the trigger to make sure it's clear. He charged it one last time and was just about to pull the trigger when an LT standing nearby grabbed him and stopped him...
I have heard alot of crazy stories in my day but that AT-4 story takes the cake. Oi...
I guess in the end...you're right...there are all kinds of things that can go wrong.
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