Free Republic
Browse · Search
News/Activism
Topics · Post Article

Skip to comments.

Wednesday, 7/17, Market WrapUp (IBM profits fall, look out below, tomorrow!)
Financial Sense Online ^ | 7/17/2002 | James J. Puplava

Posted on 07/17/2002 4:39:42 PM PDT by rohry

 
Weekday Commentary from Jim Puplava
Home

So Who is Telling the Tall Story About Big Blue?

Bloomberg.com
IBM's 2nd-Qtr Declines as Computer Sales Decline

CNNMoney.com
IBM's Profits Fall But Top Forecasts

MSNBC.com
 IBM Profits Top Street Forecasts


Editorials
Updated

Transcriptions
Updated


The Chechen War and bin Laden's Nukes


Storm Watch Update for 7/12/2002
Debt Valley

FSO Guest Editorial 7/12
The Significance & Sanity of Silver as Money by David Morgan

 Wednesday Market Scoreboard
 July 17, 2002
 Dow Industrials 69.37 8542.48
 Dow Utilities 2.23 232.47
 Dow Transports 22.34 2411.76
 S & P 500 4.99 906.04
 Nasdaq 21.99 1397.25
 US Dollar to Yen 116.315
 US Dollar to Euro

1.0075

 Gold .20 317.7
 Silver .03 5.005
 Oil .13 27.88
 CRB Index .74 212.33
 Natural Gas

 

.02 2.841

All market indexes
The Week in Graphs
Storm Watch
Geopolitical News in Focus
Energy Resource Page

Precious Metals

07/17 07/16

Change

  HUI (Amex Gold Bugs Index)

Close
YTD
126.30 129.71 3.41
93.71%
52week High 147.82

06/03/02

52week Low 59.86

11/26/01

  XAU (Philadelphia Gold & Silver)

Close
YTD
69.90

71.88

1.98
28.42%
52week High 88.65

05/28/02

52week Low 49.23

11/19/01

 
 
 

 Market WrapUp for the Week 
Monday  l  Tuesday  l  Wednesday  l  Thursday  l  Friday


Wednesday's Stock Market WrapUp

A Question of Beliefs
There was a time not too long ago when the world seemed much simpler. The economy was booming, the stock market went up each year and the talk was of the new era of wealth creation in the US. The old models of stock market valuation and economic paradigms were thrown out the window. This time it was different. We had begun an era of unlimited prosperity. Rapid technological change was transporting us into the 21st century, so you had to think differently. Knowledge was expanding exponentially and our enlightened leaders in Washington and Wall Street were blazing new trails. The Fed had tamed the business cycle so recessions were a thing of the past. There would be no more economic pain.  Monetary policy had advanced to such a stage that recessions and bear markets would be relegated to an anachronism in the economic history books. American corporations had undergone such a transformational change in efficiency that they had morphed themselves into perpetual profit machines of wealth creation for shareholders.

The world stood in awe of America’s economic transformation. Our economy was adding new jobs, economic growth continued to expand at accelerating rates and our stock market continued to turn ordinary people into millionaires. In late 1999 President Clinton lectured the heads of foreign governments at a G-7 meeting about the ways and wonders of America’s new economic paradigm. Our robust financial markets seemed to confirm and only reinforce this view. The year 1999 would be the fifth consecutive year of 20 percent gains for the stock market. In fact, the Nasdaq would rise over 70 percent that year reflecting the miracle earnings and performance of technology companies.

These were indeed prosperous times. The ability to create wealth had become so pervasive that ordinary investors no longer needed advisors. It was now possible to day trade your way to prosperity. Financial advertisements featured day trading investors helping out countries, buying yachts, visiting their islands, and high schollers becoming millionaires through trading the markets. During this time many professionals from doctors to attorneys gave up their profession to take up careers as professional traders. Why work when you could make three times the wealth with just a few trades a day? All you needed was a few good IPO and you were on easy street. If you didn’t have the time to day trade, you simply bought an index fund which would generate annual returns of 20 percent a year. Making money in the financial markets was considered so easy that even the financial media found they no longer needed the experts. Many of them wrote books that divulged their general wisdom for making money in the markets.

So much for storytelling and fantasies. The five-year mania in the stock market came to an end in March of 2000. Initially when the markets began to crack during the first quarter of 2000, financial experts told us that this was a mere correction. By the second half of the year, the markets would resume their upward trend. It didn’t happen. Instead of double-digit gains, investors experienced double-digit losses. By 2001 investors were told the same story. The forecast for prosperity was off by just a few quarters. The Fed was now on board and there should be no worries about the economy and the financial markets. There would be no recession and there would be no bear market. This was just a normal correction and delay in what was a permanent bull market trend. The Fed easing would take care of any recessionary fears and lower interest rates would make stocks that much more attractive. The second half recovery became the mantra of Wall Street. The best and the brightest economists and analysts had plugged the numbers into their computer models and they all spit out "Recovery!"

Finally, A Scapegoat
By the third quarter, the Fed had been lowering interest rates aggressively. Each time they did there was a momentary rally in the stock market, but those rallies failed to hold. No one acknowledged the fact that we were headed toward recession or that we were even in a bear market. The forecasts still called for 2-3 percent economic growth and new highs for the stock market. The myth of recovery and a resumption of the bull market were shattered after the events of September 11. After 9-11 everyone now had a scapegoat for the inaccuracy of their forecasts. The terrorist attacks on 9-11 gave everyone a way out. It was now okay to say words like “recession” and “bear” market, which were conspicuously absent prior to the events of mid-September. Wall Street blamed the tragedy for their forecasts falling short. Businesses blamed the tragedy for missing their profit estimates. Many firms would now use this as an opportunity to take big bath charges burying goodwill charges-offs and other bloated expense charges as part of the tragedy. Economist could now find an easy way to explain away the reasons for their failed forecasts. The Fed could also cite the tragedy as a reason for why rate cuts had failed to forestall a recession. Everyone now had an alibi.

In the midst of the new crisis the Fed did what it always did when confronted with a crisis, which was to lower interest rates, and inject liquidity into the financial system. By late fall the money supply was growing at double-digit rates. The financial markets responded on cue to the new injections of liquidity. Stocks rose from late October to the end of the year, but not enough to prevent another year of losses for the major averages. The lower interest rates were plugged into the economic models and they spit out the same forecast. The economy would recover along with the stock market. But news from Enron and Global Crossing raised a new issue of trust with investors. What began to unravel was the myth of the new era. Each new week seemed to bring a new accounting scandal. It didn’t end with Enron. A parade of companies were under investigation or began to disclose that their numbers during the miracle years weren’t what they were portrayed to be. New investigations showed culpability rested with not only company officials, but also with the accountants and the analysts.

Truth, Justice & The American Way?
Trust had become the number one issue with investors. Wall Street and corporate America had a credibility problem. The media now had a scandal to report on and evening newscasts became filled with talk of nothing more. While it is easy to focus on the scandals, it takes away the much broader issue of what gave birth them. Certainly greed and human nature are at the top of the list. But if we want to hold corporate America, the accountants, and the analysts accountable, we must also hold government accountable as well. The broader issue of money creation and an explosion of credit are seldom discussed along with the scandals. Yet, it was the decision of the Fed during the end of the first term of the Clinton Administration to flood the markets with money and the strong dollar policy or the Rubin Treasury that is also to blame. Flooding the markets with money brought down interest rates, creating a credit boom never seen before in history. Consumers went on a debt and spending orgy that continues to this day. Corporations did the same. They either borrowed money to buy back stock or to buy other companies. In the process, they overpaid for companies and loaded up their balance sheet with debt. The Fed's easy money policy created the credit boom that flowed through corporate and consumer balance sheets.

The financial markets also participated in inflating the bubble through the securitization of debt. GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack raised billions in the security markets and helped to facilitate the new boom in housing by expanding credit and making it easily available. The deregulation of the financial industry transformed our financial markets. The securitization of assets, derivatives, and new financial products soon replaced the making of goods as a main source of economic growth. In fact many of America’s top industrial giants from GE to GM had morphed themselves into financial entities. All one has to do is to look at the footnotes of GE’s financial statements and where they get the majority of their revenues to come to the conclusion that the company has morphed into a financial conglomerate.

What We Choose to Ignore Will Haunt Us One Day
The point of all of this is that while financial scandals make the front pages, very little time is spent in examining the easy money and credit binge of the 90’s. Nobody in Washington or on Wall Street seems to understand the dangers of this mountain of debt. However, it hasn’t been forgotten in the credit markets. Credit spreads are widening and credit-default swap premiums are rising. This signals that greater credit problems and more Enrons and Global Crossings lie in front of us. The unwinding of the 90’s credit binge has just begun. As this morning's Wall Street Journal article on Credit-swaps indicates, there may be trouble brewing at Sprint, AT&T, AT&T Wireless and Qwest Communications.

Getting back to the issue of accountability, I direct your attention to Washington. Within the display of grandstanding and pompous indignation, it is forgotten that both sides are guilty of malfeasance. These scandals took place during the 1990’s under the watch of both parties. One party controlled Congress and the other party controlled the White House. I understand that this is an election year and both sides are looking for a political issue to run on. However it is disingenuous for one party to blame the scandals on the other. It is demagoguery in its highest form and smacks of hypocrisy as well. Democrats are now calling for Cheney to give back his capital gains for selling Halliburton on which he paid capital gains taxes. When he took office Democrats insisted that he sell his stock now they criticize him for selling it. When a public official takes high office they are required to either sell or put their assets in a blind trust so as to avoid conflicts of interest. Cheney sold his stock. Nothing is said about the capital gains of Robert Rubin, John Corzine, Terry McAuliffe, or Tom Daschle's wife getting paid by John Doer to lobby against stock options, which were conveniently dropped from the Senate Reform Bill.

While the country is suffering from a debt and spending binge and the issue of trust has become paramount for the financial markets, Washington could go a long way in restoring confidence by stopping the demagoguery and the hypocrisy, which has become so widespread. The media has a role to play here as well. They should call Daschle or Corzine to answer on their lobbying efforts. Today the Washington Times did a story on Corizine’s firm Goldman Sachs that ties the firm to stock schemes of inflating stock prices the 90’s boom. So instead of serious discussions as to what really ails the economy and markets, we instead are treated to large doses of hypocrisy. It is no wonder the investor is losing confidence in the markets. The issue of trust and accountability applies to Washington as well as Wall Street. We are shortly to get a dose of that reality when the government releases its economic numbers for the years 1999-2001. Like the corporate books, which took liberty in how the financial numbers were presented to shareholders, we will find it is the same with the government’s books.

I’m reminded of something I wrote back in January of 2000 in Planes, Trains & Dot Coms Revisited ” When this cycle comes to an end, many questions will need to be answered. How could stock prices rise, so fast? How could investors have been so willing to pay so much for what they knew so little about? Our leaders will need a scapegoat—who will it be? Will it be Wall Street or Washington? Whose face will they put on the tragedy…The new era accolades will be replaced by the sarcasm of hindsight. The hubris of the media will change to exaggerated calls for reform and regulation…The era will have its villains and heroes. We’ll remember the millionaires and the billionaires, as well as the rogues and the traders. In the end we will ask ourselves how we could have been so easily mislead. Was it the technology that mesmerized us or was it the fascination with wealth…While Washington and Washington will look for answers to explain today’s technology stock market bubble, they need look no further than human nature itself. The stage and the props may change, but the actors are the same—man himself.”

Today's Markets
The rise in the major indexes reversed nearly seven consecutive days of declines. Investors are hoping that last week's selloff represents the capitulation phase of selling and that a rally is a head of us. Markets never do what they are predicted to do. So when everyone is calling for a capitulation as a sign of the markets' near-term bottom, it is unlikely to occur. There are plenty of technical indicators that signify a short-term oversold condition in the markets. These indicators would seem to imply that a bear market rally should be forthcoming.

But this is turning out to be no ordinary bear market. Hype, intervention, and complacency is preventing a normal course of action. The Fed talks of intervention; while Washington calls for more regulation. The times are uncertain and made more so by the political bickering in Washington and the hyperbole coming out of Wall Street. In the Middle East, two bombs exploded in Tel Aviv. Just when you thought you might get another breather, new headlines appear. Today it was IBM’s earnings, which fell short of estimates, another scandal involving John Corzine’s Goldman Sachs, and bombs in the Middle East. The news caused investors to vacillate all day with the markets going from losses to gains. Buyers showed up in the technology arena hoping to play a summer bounce. Clearly the news from tech stocks point to more problems ahead with no recovery in sight. In Washington, Greenspan laid the blame of faltering markets on corporations. The Fed Chairman tried to distance himself and his own policies at the Fed as part of the problem. Apparently nobody in Washington or Wall Street sees any problem with oceans of credit flooding the economy. The fact that debt and credit have replaced savings in the U.S. is glossed over.

Despite all of these difficulties, investors and analysts still remain optimistic that there will be another rally or temporary relief in the markets. Technicians lament that there have been no follow thorough rallies other than a few brief spurts in stock prices. However, volume is picking up and that is always a sign that something is about to change. Heavy volume on down days is indicative of the often referred to capitulation theory just as heavy volume on up days is a sign of buyers coming back into the market. Volume on the NYSE today was 1.92 billion shares and 2.32 billion on the Nasdaq. Market breath was positive by 18-14 on the big board and 19-15 on the Nasdaq.

The news was good or bad depending on how it was spun. IBM and JP Morgan beat estimates. That was the good news, but their profits were down. As pointed out in earlier Market WrapUps, estimates have been lowered so much now that most companies should be able to exceed them. Perhaps a string of companies beating estimates while real earnings fall, should be enough to give the market that summer rally. However, it should be pointed out the longer we go without a significant rally occurring, then the less likely it is to happen. If the market continues to sell off without a short-term reversal in trends, then that will indicate that the second phase of this bear market has begun and it is time to put your life jackets on because the full force of the storms will be upon us.

Bond Market
The treasury markets moved very little today in choppy trading. The 10-year note was up 3/32nds to yield 4.68; while the 30-year bond rose the same with the yield dipping slightly to 5.44 percent. In economic news today, June Housing starts fell 3.6 percent; while building permits rose 1.4 percent. On the economic docket for tomorrow will be weekly initial employment claims and the leading economic indicator index for the month of June.

Overseas Market
The markets seemed to be in the rally mode across the globe. There was a strong rally throughout Europe with all eight major indexes rallying. Some of those indexes such as the CAC 40 Index rose as much as 3.71 percent. The only weak spot globally on Wednesday was in Asia where the Nikkei rallied while most other markets fell.

© Copyright Jim Puplava, July 17, 2002



TOPICS: Business/Economy; Editorial
KEYWORDS: economics; investing; stockmarket
Navigation: use the links below to view more comments.
first 1-2021-4041-6061-80 ... 101-106 next last
Man, I was going to post lots of links about IBM, but all the info is here!
1 posted on 07/17/2002 4:39:42 PM PDT by rohry
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | View Replies]

To: sinkspur; bvw; Tauzero; robnoel; kezekiel; ChadGore; Harley - Mississippi; Dukie; Matchett-PI; ...
Market WrapUp is delivered...
2 posted on 07/17/2002 4:41:45 PM PDT by rohry
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies]

To: rohry; Poohbah
IBM profits fall, look out below, tomorrow!

Sorry to disappoint any pessimists, but IBM is trading slightly up after-hours.

3 posted on 07/17/2002 4:46:33 PM PDT by dighton
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies]

To: rohry
Loral got a pretty large contract today. A large number of new commsats to be delivered in orbit, and to an exclusive market, the 2 gigaHertz band. LOR bumped up a little, price and volume.
4 posted on 07/17/2002 4:49:28 PM PDT by RightWhale
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 2 | View Replies]

To: dighton
IBM crud already being discounted?
5 posted on 07/17/2002 4:55:32 PM PDT by dennisw
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 3 | View Replies]

To: dennisw
Sure looks like it.

The bears are awfully numerous and awfully sure of themselves lately. That, IMHO, is a sign that we're near the bottom.

6 posted on 07/17/2002 5:01:12 PM PDT by dighton
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 5 | View Replies]

To: dighton
To:John Koligman who wrote (7749)
From: Kirk
Tuesday, Jul 16, 2002  9:13 AM
View Replies (1) | Respond to of 7759

Irrational Pessimism???

In 1996, the FED model said the stock market was over valued. Fed Chairman Allan Greenspan said the market was "Irrationally exuberant." Today the Fed Model says the market is undervalued by about 15%

Fed Model:
2001 Earnings Est = $51.15
10 yr note = 4.85%
Target S&P = 51.15/.0485 = 1,055
S&P today = $918
Under valued by (1055-918)/918 = 15%

In 1996, the GDP was about $7.8B
Today the GDP is about $9.9B
chart http://martincapital.com/chart-pgs/CH_gdp.HTM

In 1996 the DJIA was ~6,000
Today the DJIA is 8,639
I have charts of the DJIA and S&P500 on a log scales here
http://www.suite101.com/discussion.cfm/investing/55973/533-5...
going back to 1980.

Extrapolate a line along ANY of the BOTTOMS on that chart and the line hits the current level or higher and I believe we have more economic growth these days than in the 1980's...


7 posted on 07/17/2002 5:01:52 PM PDT by dennisw
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 6 | View Replies]

To: dighton
Sorry to disappoint any pessimists, but IBM is trading slightly up after-hours.

I'm not a pessimist, just an (amateur) analyst.We'll see tomorrow and many tomorrows after this...

IBM=$50/share in the next six months...

8 posted on 07/17/2002 5:02:26 PM PDT by rohry
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 3 | View Replies]

To: RightWhale
Loral got a pretty large contract today. A large number of new commsats to be delivered in orbit, and to an exclusive market, the 2 gigaHertz band.

But Bernie did not disclose the terms of the contract. He claims he sold 60 satellites. How many have been sold industry wide this year total?

One?

Could it be Bernie is trying to get LOR above $1 a share so he is not delisted?

9 posted on 07/17/2002 5:04:59 PM PDT by LarryLied
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 4 | View Replies]

To: All
New York, July 17 (Bloomberg) -- Capital One Financial Corp. shares plunged, leading other credit-card stocks lower, after the fifth-largest U.S. issuer of Visa and MasterCard said regulators required it to set aside additional reserves for loan losses.
Capital One shares fell $14.60, or 29 percent, to $36.50, the most since the company went public in 1994.
Shares of rivals Providian Financial Corp. fell 80 cents, or 20 percent, to $3.25; MBNA Corp. slid 78 cents, or 3.8 percent, to $19.57, and Household International Inc. declined $1.37, or 3 percent, to $44.73.
``I have a feeling that if it happens to Cap One, we've got a lot of others coming,'' said Donald Coxe, who manages the Harris Insight Equity Fund, which owns Capital One shares.
Federal regulators are scrutinizing lenders to people with poor credit histories after a surge in unpaid bills at Providian last year lowered profit 94 percent. Providian abandoned high-risk customers and regulators demanded the company maintain certain capital levels, a cushion against unexpected losses.
10 posted on 07/17/2002 5:07:54 PM PDT by rohry
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 2 | View Replies]

To: dighton
The bears are awfully numerous and awfully sure of themselves lately. That, IMHO, is a sign that we're near the bottom.

----> We won't know the bottom for a few years. My predict/ is 5 or 6,000 Dow low but not right way. Will be whip sawed up and down like the Japanese are. Why should market lows be quick and easy and pre-packaged in a sanitary way? Think more like a serial killer who will prey time and time again upon the DOW (major markets)
11 posted on 07/17/2002 5:10:12 PM PDT by dennisw
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 6 | View Replies]

To: rohry; dennisw
As you said, rohry, we shall see.

Disclaimer: I'm no damned good at this game. Otherwise I'd be rich.

12 posted on 07/17/2002 5:11:23 PM PDT by dighton
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 8 | View Replies]

To: rohry
IBM=$50/share in the next six months...

WIth all due respect, you're nuts.

You could liquidate the IBM company, and get more than $50 a share!

13 posted on 07/17/2002 5:11:34 PM PDT by sinkspur
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 8 | View Replies]

To: All
Corzine tied to stock scheme By Dave Boyer THE WASHINGTON TIMES Sen. Jon Corzine, whose Wall Street expertise plays a key role in Democrats' strategy on corporate responsibility, led an investment banking firm that is being accused of inflating stock prices in the 1990s and contributing to the market crash. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle lately has kept Mr. Corzine at his side frequently as Democrats call on President Bush to get tougher with corporate executives who fraudulently inflate company earnings to boost stock prices. "I think he's made a stellar contribution," said Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland Democrat and author of a bill approved Monday by the Senate that would increase the penalties for corporate wrongdoers. But Goldman Sachs, the firm that Mr. Corzine left as chairman in May 1999, has been a target of class-action lawsuits and accusations by a former broker who complained to the Securities and Exchange Commission that the investment house engaged in a scheme to force unwitting investors to pay artificially high prices for certain stocks. Mr. Corzine, New Jersey Democrat, said he knew nothing about such schemes when he ran the firm from 1994 to 1999. "I don't believe there is ever going to be anything that sticks about us at Goldman Sachs forcing anybody to buy anything," Mr. Corzine said in an interview. "Goldman Sachs never forced anyone to buy anything when I was chairman, I can tell you that." But Nicholas Maier, who was syndicate manager of the Wall Street firm Cramer & Co. from 1996 to 1998, told SEC investigators in the spring that Goldman Sachs routinely forced him to buy stocks at inflated prices if he wanted to purchase shares of an initial public offering (IPO). "Goldman, from what I witnessed, they were the worst perpetrator," Mr. Maier said. "They totally fueled the [market] bubble. And it's specifically that kind of behavior that has caused the market crash. They built these stocks upon an illegal foundation — manipulated up, and ultimately, it really was the small person who ended up buying in." For example, Mr. Maier told the SEC that Goldman Sachs would offer him shares of a new company's IPO at the initial, low price of $20 per share only if he agreed to purchase "aftermarket" shares of the same company at $100 each. In turn, he would sell the shares of the higher-priced stock to small investors. "None of these aftermarket orders had anything to do with what I honestly valued a company to be worth," Mr. Maier said. "Goldman created the convincing appearance of a winner, and the trick worked so well that they seduced further interest from other speculators hoping to participate in the gold rush. The general public had no idea that these stocks were actually brought into the world at unnaturally high levels through illegal manipulation." Mr. Bush on Monday said Wall Street went on a "binge" in the 1990s and now has a "hangover," a characterization that Mr. Corzine called "a diversion away from reality." "What we had was a breakdown in corporate ethics and corporate responsibility that I don't think has anything to do with anything other than excessive focus on share price and managed earnings," he said. Mr. Corzine retired from Goldman Sachs in 1999 after taking the firm public and receiving $320 million worth of its stock. He ran for the Senate in New Jersey in 2000, spending more than $60 million of his fortune to win the seat. The bubble of high-priced technology stocks began to burst in March 2000. In August 2000, the SEC issued a warning against aftermarket sales, also known as "laddering." "I've never even heard the term 'laddering' before," Mr. Corzine said yesterday. "We may have recommended on the analysis that we had that [a stock] was a 'good buy,' but you can't force anyone to buy anything. Investors make their choices about where people invest, unless they've asked somebody to manage their money." Mr. Corzine was highly respected in his tenure at Goldman, and no one has accused him of encouraging "laddering" or even knowing about the practice. But Mr. Maier said it happened on Mr. Corzine's watch. "For Corzine not to know of a common practice being utilized to generate and manipulate stock prices would be surprising," Mr. Maier said. "He was obviously there during this time. I definitively saw his company engaged in illegal activity." The SEC would not comment yesterday on whether Goldman is under investigation. Mr. Maier said he has not spoken to the investigators in several months. "They expressed to me that laddering is a trickier thing [to prove]," Mr. Maier said. "I will say it. They did it. They laddered. Whether the SEC can construct a case is a different story." Asked whether he knew about an SEC investigation, Mr. Corzine said, "That could very possibly be; I'm not aware of it. I'm divorced from [Goldman] since 1999." A class-action lawsuit filed in April 2001 accused Goldman Sachs and others of engaging in "laddering" on the initial sale of stock of NetZero, driving up the company's share price to artificially high levels. In another class-action suit, shareholders of Buy.com have accused the firm and its underwriters, including Goldman Sachs, of engaging in a laddering scheme in its IPO in February 2000, after Mr. Corzine left Goldman. And investors of defunct online grocer Webvan.com have filed a similar suit in federal court concerning that firm's initial public offering in November 1999. Another class-action suit filed last year says that underwriters, including Goldman Sachs, manipulated several IPOs since 1997, including at least six when Mr. Corzine was still at the helm of Goldman.

Yeah, right, he never heard of the term "laddering." I've known about laddering for 4 or 5 years and I am a simple 401-k investor...

14 posted on 07/17/2002 5:13:17 PM PDT by rohry
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 10 | View Replies]

To: rohry
But Nicholas Maier, who was syndicate manager of the Wall Street firm Cramer & Co. from 1996 to 1998, told SEC investigators in the spring that Goldman Sachs routinely forced him to buy stocks at inflated prices if he wanted to purchase shares of an initial public offering (IPO). "Goldman, from what I witnessed, they were the worst perpetrator," Mr. Maier said. "They totally fueled the [market] bubble. And it's specifically that kind of behavior that has caused the market crash. They built these stocks upon an illegal foundation — manipulated up, and ultimately, it really was the small person who ended up buying in." For example, Mr. Maier told the SEC that Goldman Sachs would offer him shares of a new company's IPO at the initial, low price of $20 per share only if he agreed to purchase "aftermarket" shares of the same company at $100 each. In turn, he would sell the shares of the higher-priced stock to small investors. "None of these aftermarket orders had anything to do with what I honestly valued a company to be worth," Mr. Maier said. "Goldman created the convincing appearance of a winner, and the trick worked so well that they seduced further interest from other speculators hoping to participate in the gold rush. The general public had no idea that these stocks were actually brought into the world at unnaturally high levels through illegal manipulation."









----->>>>>Monday May 13, 2002

ORIGINAL SIN

How prices of initial public offerings were manipulated by Goldman Sachs through the illegal practice of "Laddering"

By Nicholas W Maier
Special to Dotcom Scoop

For five years I worked on the front lines of Wall Street for one of the most well known professional money managers in the business, James Cramer. During my time at his firm, I witnessed more than a few manipulative tactics that served to perpetuate and ultimately destroy the bubble of the nineties. One in particular, known to insiders as "laddering," was especially potent and egregious, serving to ravage the small, uninformed investor.

Fresh out of college, I earned my way up at Cramer & Company from office gopher to trader, analyst, and from January 1996 through 1998, to "syndicate manager." A syndicate, or a group of underwriting investment banks, brings a private company into the publicly traded world through the process of an initial public offering. As syndicate manager, I was responsible for overseeing all of our firm’s activity into IPOs.

Cramer himself explained to me the day I was given the position that the task of syndicate manger was deathly important. During the mid-nineties, the investment banks were essentially printing money by bringing any company with a pulse public. We obtained shares of an IPO for a bargain price, and by the time that stock started to trade and the small investor joined the party the stock would have spiked a few hundred percent. I calculated the contributions and we made millions of dollars a year being given these stocks.

The specifics of my job were relatively simple - determine which upcoming deals would be hottest, or open at the most inflated premium to the issue price, and do whatever it took to secure an allocation. The most important measure the investment banks used in determining allocations was commissions, which is why institutional money managers such as Cramer & Company are the only people who ever get in on these deals. Based on our active trading style and high commission bracket, I could expect at least some participation just by asking, while the little guy at home could expect only to get hooked.

What helped me most was that my firm had an especially lucrative relationship with the premier investment bank, Goldman Sachs. Besides them being our ‘prime broker,’ or the clearinghouse that handled all of our trades with any other Wall Street broker (and thus they received added fees), there were three Goldman alumni, including Cramer himself, at our shop. Needless to say, our Goldman salesman liked us, and took me into his confidence. This individual guided me through the specifics of the other factors involved in winning points with the investment bankers that were responsible for handing out the free money.

Our broker did not mince words. To increase my allocation, I should always agree to buy more stock after the IPO opened for trading. The proposal was that Goldman would give me extra shares at the initial, low price, if I bought in the "aftermarket," that is once mom and pop were allowed on board, usually at a significantly higher price. The math was not tricky and the rewards far outweighed the risks: any money lost from my aftermarket buy would be more than compensated for by receiving extra shares at the initial, low price.

The way our broker put it, this was not an idle suggestion on his part. There would be a direct correlation both on an existing deal and all future deals. The more I promised to buy in the aftermarket, the more shares I could expect to get at the initial, low price. Most importantly, he asserted that scores were kept. If I reneged on my aftermarket order, I could expect to feel the consequences, or to be docked on future allocations. All of this was kept track of in an investment banking "book," as he often called it.

The "book," as he put it, was the insider’s look into an IPO. From one peek within it, he could tell me exactly how high the deal would go and where to place my aftermarket order. If he told me to place my order at fifty, I would place it at fifty. If he told me to place it at a hundred, I would place it at a hundred, knowing it to be worth my while in that the deal would trade at least that high. This "book," as I was told, also made its way with an investment banker to the brokerage house’s trading desk on the day the IPO opened. It was, above all else, a written record to hold me to my word.

“ This simple "tie-in" agreement, or the forcing of a client to buy more stock of an IPO with the understanding that they would receive a larger allocation on current and future IPOs, eventually had a profound impact upon the marketplace. ”


This game was a perpetual cycle for the duration of my time at Cramer & Company. I would get my five thousand shares of an IPO at twenty, agree to buy more at a hundred, and over the next day or two sell it all with another broker. Remember, none of these aftermarket orders had anything to do with what I honestly valued a company to be worth. I only bought more because of the direct kickback, or increased allocation. Honestly, we at Cramer & Company all knew these IPOs were trading at, to say the least, ridiculously inflated prices. Still, the deals kept coming, and many of them even continued to go up.

Goldman wasn’t the only investment bank soliciting these after market orders. Most of the major brokerage houses that had investment banking divisions did the exact same thing. Overall, the solicitation of aftermarket orders by investment banks became so commonplace that I never suspected any of it might have actually been blatantly illegal. Then the bubble began to burst. Starting in March of 2000, the stock markets, and especially the heavily IPO laden NASDAQ, began to plunge. Finally, on August 25, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the industry’s police, issued the following warning:

Summary: This staff legal bulletin sets forth the views of the Division of Market Regulation, reminding underwriters, broker-dealers, and any other person who is participating in a distribution of securities, that they are prohibited from soliciting or requiring their customers to make aftermarket purchases until the distribution is completed.

The rule, as stated, means that investment banks are not, in fact, allowed to make any customer commit to buy additional shares in an IPO until after it has already started trading. This simple "tie-in" agreement, or the forcing of a client to buy more stock of an IPO with the understanding that they would receive a larger allocation on current and future IPOs, eventually had a profound impact upon the marketplace.

Solicitations for aftermarket purchases give (other) purchasers in the offering the impression that there is a scarcity of the offered securities. This can stimulate demand and support the pricing of the offering. Moreover, traders in the aftermarket will not know that the aftermarket demand, which may appear to validate the offering price, has been stimulated by the distribution participants.

Simply put, it is the SEC’s opinion that through the process now known as "laddering" orders, or the insertion of forced demand by investment bankers for an IPO stock at progressively higher levels, a "hot" offering was almost guaranteed to fly. By specifically requiring a customer to buy more shares of an IPO, Goldman had placed an artificial catalyst into the marketplace. Obviously, as I stated, none of my orders were based on any traditional methods of valuation, but solely to secure more of an initial allocation, or a sizable kickback. Goldman Sachs had essentially, through their complete monopolistic control of an initial public offering, manipulated the share price higher.

It does not take a genius to recognize that the net effect of laddering was immense. There is nothing that validates an exorbitantly priced deal more than when it rises even higher. The uninformed investor, seeing the instant gains, is inevitably sucked into the fervor. Goldman created the convincing appearance of a winner, and the trick worked so well that they seduced further interest from other speculators hoping to participate in the gold rush. The general public had no idea that these stocks were actually brought into the world at unnaturally high levels through illegal manipulation.

This process of "laddering" worked so well for the investment banks that it changed all the traditional rules of the marketplace. Here we have the very genesis of the new economy stocks based on fraud. By making winners out of losers, everyone had to reassess valuation methods. For every IPO that traded at higher levels, fifty existing stocks could be revalued. Enron, with little actual assets, became the fifth largest corporation in the country. The brokerage house analysts, given a benchmark to rationalize ridiculous valuations, rolled out ever-aggressive targets that stopped just short of the moon. Meanwhile, people in the know like Kenneth Lay and Cramer & Company were getting out as fast as they could.

Obviously the SEC is aware of violations, or they never would have issued the afore mentioned warning in the first place. Recently the investment banks are feeling some ramifications. Apparently, towards the very end of the bull market, a few of them elected to simply demand a direct profit sharing agreement with their clients. There have been various cases where the brokers received exorbitant commissions in return for allocations. So far First Boston, without admitting guilt, has agreed to pay a hundred million dollar fine, and both JP Morgan and Robertson Stephens are facing similar charges.

The differences between these cases and those of laddering are many. Higher commissions, although easy to prove with written records and paper trails, are less harmful to the overall integrity of the marketplace. They do not cause a move, but are rather a product of it. In one last desperately greedy attempt to milk the end of the IPO craze for all it was worth, the investment banks simply demanded a huge check from participants.

On the other hand, there has been only limited speculation up to this point regarding any investigations regarding laddering. For my part, after being contacted, I have been voluntarily talking to the SEC regarding a current investigation, as they call it, into "Certain Initial Public Offerings." I have been asked specifically about laddering practices enacted by Morgan Stanley, Smith Barney, and most recently, regarding Goldman Sachs. After I told them what I knew, the staff attorney for the SEC handed me a document and asked me what I thought it appeared to be. It was nothing less than the investment banking "book" that my Goldman Sachs broker had told me so much about.

This specific "book" was for a deal called Marvell Technologies that was brought public by Goldman Sachs in the year 2000. Although the IPO came after I left Cramer & Company, I recognized my former fund’s name, and in the far right hand margin, directly next to the allocation we received, was a column marked for aftermarket orders. Cramer & Company had agreed to buy in the aftermarket for this deal, and received a sizable allocation. I guess this proves that scores really were kept, after all.

There is a classic fraud that many in the investment world have heard of called a "Ponzi scheme," where initial investors are given outsized returns to entice subsequent investors who are eventually robbed of everything. The parallel to laddering is easy to make. In this case, the perpetrator was the investment banks, the initial investors given outsized returns were institutions like Cramer & Company, and the victims were the small, uninformed investors who didn’t have a clue what was really happening. Maybe Goldman and the other investment banks will ultimately pay for their indiscretions. The small investor obviously already has.


Nicholas Maier is the author of a new book about his experience on Wall Street working for James Cramer entitled "Trading with the Enemy." He lives in New York City with his wife and daughter. He can be reached via email at nwmaier@aol.com.







©2002 (Copyright 2002), Nicholas Maier, All Rights Reserved
©2002 (Copyright 2002), Dotcom Scoop, All Rights Reserved
No excerpts from this article may be reprinted without permission of the author.
Ben Silverman is the Publisher of Dotcom Scoop. He can be reached at editor@dotcomscoop.com.

DotcomScoop.com
15 posted on 07/17/2002 5:16:22 PM PDT by dennisw
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 14 | View Replies]

To: rohry
I don't know what happened to the formating on this. Let me do it again:

 

Corzine tied to stock scheme
By Dave Boyer
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sen. Jon Corzine, whose Wall Street expertise plays a key role in Democrats' strategy on corporate responsibility, led an investment banking firm that is being accused of inflating stock prices in the 1990s and contributing to the market crash.
Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle lately has kept Mr. Corzine at his side frequently as Democrats call on President Bush to get tougher with corporate executives who fraudulently inflate company earnings to boost stock prices.
"I think he's made a stellar contribution," said Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Maryland Democrat and author of a bill approved Monday by the Senate that would increase the penalties for corporate wrongdoers.
But Goldman Sachs, the firm that Mr. Corzine left as chairman in May 1999, has been a target of class-action lawsuits and accusations by a former broker who complained to the Securities and Exchange Commission that the investment house engaged in a scheme to force unwitting investors to pay artificially high prices for certain stocks.
Mr. Corzine, New Jersey Democrat, said he knew nothing about such schemes when he ran the firm from 1994 to 1999.
"I don't believe there is ever going to be anything that sticks about us at Goldman Sachs forcing anybody to buy anything," Mr. Corzine said in an interview. "Goldman Sachs never forced anyone to buy anything when I was chairman, I can tell you that."
But Nicholas Maier, who was syndicate manager of the Wall Street firm Cramer & Co. from 1996 to 1998, told SEC investigators in the spring that Goldman Sachs routinely forced him to buy stocks at inflated prices if he wanted to purchase shares of an initial public offering (IPO).
"Goldman, from what I witnessed, they were the worst perpetrator," Mr. Maier said. "They totally fueled the [market] bubble. And it's specifically that kind of behavior that has caused the market crash. They built these stocks upon an illegal foundation — manipulated up, and ultimately, it really was the small person who ended up buying in."
For example, Mr. Maier told the SEC that Goldman Sachs would offer him shares of a new company's IPO at the initial, low price of $20 per share only if he agreed to purchase "aftermarket" shares of the same company at $100 each. In turn, he would sell the shares of the higher-priced stock to small investors.
"None of these aftermarket orders had anything to do with what I honestly valued a company to be worth," Mr. Maier said. "Goldman created the convincing appearance of a winner, and the trick worked so well that they seduced further interest from other speculators hoping to participate in the gold rush. The general public had no idea that these stocks were actually brought into the world at unnaturally high levels through illegal manipulation."
Mr. Bush on Monday said Wall Street went on a "binge" in the 1990s and now has a "hangover," a characterization that Mr. Corzine called "a diversion away from reality."
"What we had was a breakdown in corporate ethics and corporate responsibility that I don't think has anything to do with anything other than excessive focus on share price and managed earnings," he said.
Mr. Corzine retired from Goldman Sachs in 1999 after taking the firm public and receiving $320 million worth of its stock. He ran for the Senate in New Jersey in 2000, spending more than $60 million of his fortune to win the seat.
The bubble of high-priced technology stocks began to burst in March 2000. In August 2000, the SEC issued a warning against aftermarket sales, also known as "laddering."
"I've never even heard the term 'laddering' before," Mr. Corzine said yesterday. "We may have recommended on the analysis that we had that [a stock] was a 'good buy,' but you can't force anyone to buy anything. Investors make their choices about where people invest, unless they've asked somebody to manage their money."
Mr. Corzine was highly respected in his tenure at Goldman, and no one has accused him of encouraging "laddering" or even knowing about the practice. But Mr. Maier said it happened on Mr. Corzine's watch.
"For Corzine not to know of a common practice being utilized to generate and manipulate stock prices would be surprising," Mr. Maier said. "He was obviously there during this time. I definitively saw his company engaged in illegal activity."
The SEC would not comment yesterday on whether Goldman is under investigation. Mr. Maier said he has not spoken to the investigators in several months.
"They expressed to me that laddering is a trickier thing [to prove]," Mr. Maier said. "I will say it. They did it. They laddered. Whether the SEC can construct a case is a different story."
Asked whether he knew about an SEC investigation, Mr. Corzine said, "That could very possibly be; I'm not aware of it. I'm divorced from [Goldman] since 1999."
A class-action lawsuit filed in April 2001 accused Goldman Sachs and others of engaging in "laddering" on the initial sale of stock of NetZero, driving up the company's share price to artificially high levels.
In another class-action suit, shareholders of Buy.com have accused the firm and its underwriters, including Goldman Sachs, of engaging in a laddering scheme in its IPO in February 2000, after Mr. Corzine left Goldman. And investors of defunct online grocer Webvan.com have filed a similar suit in federal court concerning that firm's initial public offering in November 1999.
Another class-action suit filed last year says that underwriters, including Goldman Sachs, manipulated several IPOs since 1997, including at least six when Mr. Corzine was still at the helm of Goldman.

16 posted on 07/17/2002 5:17:05 PM PDT by rohry
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 14 | View Replies]

To: rohry
You should have seen Capital One's stock today ..... lost 39.9% of it's value in ONE day.
17 posted on 07/17/2002 5:18:07 PM PDT by Centurion2000
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies]

To: LarryLied
How many have been sold industry wide this year total?

Not many. The whole comm industry is in a holding and weakening pattern, has been for a couple of years, and will be for another year. That's probably optimistic.

18 posted on 07/17/2002 5:18:35 PM PDT by RightWhale
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 9 | View Replies]

To: rohry
About your title- their profits were down but not by more than had already been anticipated. In other words, this bad news wasn't really bad news but was actually somewhat good news. IBM is up in after hours trading (or was an hour ago) and the market will likely open higher.
19 posted on 07/17/2002 5:19:17 PM PDT by Dales
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 1 | View Replies]

To: rohry
Thank you kindly!
20 posted on 07/17/2002 5:20:27 PM PDT by meyer
[ Post Reply | Private Reply | To 2 | View Replies]


Navigation: use the links below to view more comments.
first 1-2021-4041-6061-80 ... 101-106 next last

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.

Free Republic
Browse · Search
News/Activism
Topics · Post Article

FreeRepublic, LLC, PO BOX 9771, FRESNO, CA 93794
FreeRepublic.com is powered by software copyright 2000-2008 John Robinson