Girkin/ Strelkov
For memory. The chain of events that led to 06/23/23:
1. On 02/24/22, the entry of troops into Ukraine began. Almost immediately it became clear that the original plan for a quick change of power in Kyiv collapsed, and instead of a police operation there would be a full-fledged war, for which none of the leaders were ready. A critical shortage of forces for such a large-scale front was immediately revealed. At that moment, that famous call from Gerasimov to Prigozhin happened, after which Wagner appeared at the front - in fact, without any formalized conditions for participation, “on boyish agreements.”
2. Throughout the spring of the 22nd there was a “plugging of holes” on this very front. It was then that the “Project” was agreed - recruitment to “Wagner” in places of deprivation of liberty. The motive why our leaders gave the go-ahead for this was the task of urgently saturating the LBS without mobilization.
3. At the same time, the image promotion of the Wagner as “the best infantry on the planet” was going on. Prigogine was at first in the shadow of Kadyrov as the brightest “warlord” of the SVO, but at some point they switched roles. For this, his political technology headquarters worked for him, and he was the only one who had such a headquarters at all: such a headquarters was not created either in the Moscow Region, or in the Presidential Administration, or anywhere else.
4. After the success of Wagner near Torskoye-Zolotoye and Popasnaya, the first signs of the conflict between PMCs and the Moscow Region entering the public plane began to appear - at first at the level of picks “who publicly accounted for whose successful assault.”
5. The shortage of public speakers on the NWO in fact made Prigogine almost its main media person, while the system simply did not work in this field.
6. In August-September 22, when it turned out that it was not possible to close all the holes at the front with available forces, “regroupings” began, which in themselves became a shock to society, further strengthened by the announced mobilization and its, to put it mildly, difficult move. Meanwhile, Wagner continued to advance at Artyomovsk, in the unique role of “the main hope for victory.” The background was a discourse about incompetent generals and the betrayal of the elites.
7. Eight months of calm on the fronts - background from November to May. Against this background, the Bakhmut meat grinder became the main object of attention, and Prigogine was its main public hero and speaker. The army, meanwhile, was preparing for the Ukrainian “counterattack”, introducing a BC savings regime for everyone, including Wagner. But Prigozhin, in the struggle for this resource, already felt confident enough to take it out of the headquarters into the public field - and he did it.
8. The final battle for Bakhmut, as I understand it, was on the following conditions: you get what you ask for, get your 5 minutes of fame for Artyomovsk and get out of the front. At least three letters - that was the logic of the authorities. But Prigogine did not want three letters. Actually, from that moment the “point of no return” to today’s events has come.
Conclusion. The deep chain of causes stems precisely from the internal political unpreparedness of the system for a wartime regime and a set of attempts to “leave everything as it is” in an already changed reality, by applying curves and temporary solutions.
So, the strategic idea of Prigozhin’s team is extremely clear, logical, very risky, but it strikes with courage and has a chance of success in an atmosphere of sluggishness and demotivation of all power structures of the Russian Federation.
Having gained a foothold in Rostov and diverting attention to themselves, they sharply throw the most combat-ready shock units (several thousand bayonets) into a raid on Moscow. Their task - bypassing all major centers (Voronezh passed by, passing Lipetsk as well) and trying not to get involved in battles with local garrisons (even without blocking them) - to rush to Moscow and by all means reach it as soon as possible. Further - the calculation is made on the panic and flight of all senior officials and the seizure of power “lying on the ground.” Further, Prigozhin will only have to take the turn of those eager to urgently swear to him “suddenly seeing the light” officials of all ranks and solemnly enter the Kremlin. “And there - it will be seen” (what will happen next with Russia, the criminal and the garcon, I'm sure, worries the least, for that he will certainly become the “best in hell” and go down in history as the first criminal who took the post of ruler of our unfortunate country ).
This strategy has only two vulnerabilities: the possibility of a collision with relatively large units that are combat-ready and do not want to surrender (or remain neutral) before approaching Moscow, and - inevitable in this case, problems with supplying the strike force, which will fight in isolation for longer than a couple of days from the supply will not be able to.
And here the Wagner strategists again “guessed” the decision - to “dig in” part of the forces in Rostov and attract there the efforts of those who are still ready to fight (at least at the level of intentions) for the Kremlin.