Trump sues House Select Committee over Jan. 6 records

Former President Donald Trump sued federal officials Monday in a bid to block the release of records related to the Jan. 6 Capitol riot.

The lawsuit targets the House special committee investigating the attack and the National Archives, accusing them of engaging in an “illegal fishing expedition.”

The suit filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia claims Mr. Trump is acting in his capacity as the 45th president, claiming executive privilege over the documents sought by the Democratic-dominated panel.

“Today, President Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in defense of the Constitution, the Office of the President, and the future of our nation, all of which the sham Unselect Committee is trying to destroy,” a spokesperson for Mr. Trump said in a statement Monday. “The fact is America is under assault by Pelosi’s Communist-style attempt to silence and destroy America First patriots through this hyper-partisan and illegitimate investigation.”

Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi Democrat and the committee chairman, is named individually as a defendant in the case along with National Archivist David S. Ferriero. The full select committee and National Archives and Records Administration are also named as defendants.

After reading Trump’s 26 page complaint I found it very compelling. One thing that stuck out was his reliance to the 1977 Nixon case concerning his presidential papers. Nixon was fighting a new law that took the presidential papers away from Nixon’s control and place it totally under the National Archivist. Nixon argued that as a former president he still had the right to contest release of any of his papers.

This case went to the Supreme court, and even though he lost on the merits, (basically because it was the executive branch controlling a former executive branch members papers for review for purposes of separating personal from government documents), the Supreme court totally adopted this Solicitor General’s opinion as their own;

“Nevertheless, we think that the Solicitor General states the sounder view, and we adopt it:

“This Court held in United States v. Nixon . . . that the privilege is necessary to provide the confidentiality required for the President’s conduct of office. Unless he [433 U.S. 425, 449] can give his advisers some assurance of confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of his duties depends. The confidentiality necessary to this exchange cannot be measured by the few months or years between the submission of the information and the end of the President’s tenure; the privilege is not for the benefit of the President as an individual, but for the benefit of the Republic. Therefore the privilege survives the individual President’s tenure.” Brief for Federal Appellees 33.”

Trump is relying on this opinion from the USSC heavily in his complaint and the court’s concession that Nixon had the right to advance any legal or constitutional argument in the future to contest release of documents he considered privileged. This is the footnote for the above:

“[ Footnote 13 ] Aside from the public access eventually to be provided under 104, the Act mandates two other access routes to the materials. First, under 102 (b), access is available in accordance with lawful process served upon the Administrator. As we have noted, see n. 7, supra, the appellant is to be advised prior to any access to the materials, and he is thereafter free to review the specific materials at issue, see 102 (c); 41 CFR 105-63.301 (1976), in order to determine whether to assert any rights, privileges, or defenses. Section 102 (b) expressly conditions ultimate access by way of lawful process upon the right of appellant to invoke any rights, defenses, or privileges.

Second, 102 (d) of the Act states: “Any agency or department in the executive branch of the Federal Government shall at all times have access to the tape recordings and other materials . . . for lawful Government use . . . .” The District Court eschewed a broad reading of that section as permitting wholesale access by any executive official for any conceivable executive purpose. Instead, it construed 102 (d) in light of Congress’ presumed intent that the Act operate within constitutional bounds - an intent manifested throughout the statute, see 408 F. Supp., at 337 n. 15. The District Court thus interpreted 102 (d), and in particular the phrase “lawful use,” as requiring that once appellant is notified of requested access by an executive official, see n. 7, supra, he be allowed to assert any constitutional right or privilege that in his view would bar access. See 408 F. Supp., at 338 n. 18. We agree with that interpretation.”

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