BREAKING: McConnell Rejects Emergency Session On Impeachment, All But Killing Push To Oust Trump

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has rejected a plan to reconvene the Senate in an emergency session to hold trial over an impeachment article against President Trump in the House.

McConnell press secretary Doug Andres confirmed a report that the Kentucky Republican would not sanction such a move on Wednesday.

Without the emergency session, the Senate is due back in session on Jan. 19., so McConnell’s decision all but kills a Democrat-led effort to oust Trump from office before his term is up and President-elect Joe Biden is sworn in on Jan. 20. A trial over the impeachment article is unlikely to conclude within such a short time.

Democrats have proposed holding the trial over Trump’s impeachment well-into Biden’s presidency. Michael Luttig, a former judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, slammed the idea on Tuesday, asserting that impeaching and removing a president after he left office is “unconstitutional.”

“It appears that even if the House of Representatives impeaches President Trump this week, the Senate trial on that impeachment will not begin until after Trump has left office and President-Elect Biden has become president on Jan. 20,” Luttig wrote in The Washington Post. “That Senate trial would be unconstitutional.”

On Monday, Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV), a moderate, criticized the ongoing impeachment push and noted that any impeachment article passed in the House will likely not have enough support in the Senate.

“I think, my arithmetic, that means we have 19 Republicans. I don’t see that. And I think the House should know that also. We have been trying to send that message over. They know the votes aren’t there. You would think that they would do that,” Manchin said on Monday.

“I think this is so ill-advised for Joe Biden to be coming in, trying to heal the country, trying to be the president of all the people, when we’re going to be so divided and fighting again. Let the judicial system do its job,” he added. “And then, we’re a country of the rule of law. That’s the bedrock of who we are. Let that take its place. Let the investigations go on. Let the evidence come forth, and then we will go forward from there. There’s no rush to do this impeachment now. We can do it later if they think it’s necessary.”

There's precedent for a trial after the person has left office, but since he was acquitted, there's no way to know whether a conviction would have been upheld by the courts.

The question is jurisdiction. The House vote was unanimous. The Senate found it had jurisdiction, the accused admitted the Senate had jurisdiction, and the trial was held.

At the end of the trial, the vote is on conviction or acquittal, not jurisdiction. The vote was a majority for conviction, but less than the two-thirds required.

There is no appeal of an impeachment to the courts. The Constitution gives sole authority over impeachment trials to the Senate.

There's no clear legal precedent establishing that someone can be impeached, convicted, and punished after leaving office. It's been attempted, but never completed.

There is clear legal precedent that the House may impeach, and the Senate has jurisdiction to proceed to hold a trial after the accused has left office. Where they have jurisdiction to try the accused and return a verdict, that verdict may be guilty.

The question of jurisdiction is argued pre-trial. Where a lack of jurisdiction is found, the trial does not proceed. If more than a third of the senators later refuse to convict because they object to the finding of jurisdiction, there is an acquittal on something that resembles jury nullification.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_W._Belknap

Starting on April 5, 1876, Belknap was tried by the Senate. For several weeks Senators argued over whether the Senate had jurisdiction to put Belknap on trial since he had already resigned office in March. Belknap's defense managers argued that the Senate had no jurisdiction; the Senate ruled by a vote of 37–29 that it did.

Belknap argued that the vote on jurisdiction was less than two-thirds. Two-thirds is the standard required on a vote for conviction, not a procedural vote. The Senate went ahead with the trial.

The courts have no say in impeachments. The Senators alone make up the rules. They found jurisdiction with a majority vote of less than two-thirds. The current crop of senators can do it again.

The following goes into the matter in some detail. It appears the Senate voted that it held jurisdiction 37-29. Blount contested jurisdiction as that vote was less than two-thirds. The Senate proceeded to trial. Guilt or acquittal requires two-thirds, but there is no constitutional provision that a vote on jurisdiction requires a two-thirds majority.

To make one point clear, I personally think the Trump impeachment is just bullshit. However, I am considering whether the case can proceed to trial. An argument can be made against jurisdiction, but I doubt an argument that jurisdiction requires a two-thirds majority would succeed. In other words, the Dems will likely have their show trial, if they want it. It is unlikely to result in conviction.

IMPEACHMENT, Selected Materials, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Henry Hyde, Chairman, November 1998.

Committee Print, Ser. No. 10, 105th Congress, 2d Session, U.S. Government Printing Office.

It is a book of almost 1900 pages. ISBN 0-16-057703-9. I have a hard copy to this edition but no online link.

At pp. 1236-1238:

III
The last six articles of impeachment in this case mast faih if for no other reason, because they relate to a time when the respondent held the office of district judge of the United States. He may not be impeached for alleged offenses committed prior to January 31, 1911, when he ceased to be district judge by appointment to a different office.
Articles VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII, and Article XIII in part, charge offenses alleged to have been committed by the respondent before he was appointed to his present position as circuit judge and assigned to duty on the Commerce Court. He was a district judge of the United States from March, 1901, until the 31st day of January, 1911.
No useful information on this subject can be obtained from the English precedents, because in England a private citizen could be impeached as well as officers of the Government.
In this country there have been two attempts to impeach persons who had ceased to be officers for acts done by them while they were officers. One of these cases was that of William Blount in 1798; the other that of William W. Belknap in 1876.
In Blount’s case when he was called upon to answer the articles he filed a plea which set up in substance these two defenses: (1) That a Senator is not impeachable, and (2) that he had ceased to be a Senator. (3 Hinds’ Precedents, 663.)
This double plea was sustained by the Senate by a vote of 14 to 11. (3 Hinds’ Precedents, 679.) There is nothing in the record of the case to enable us to determine whether all the 14 Senators who voted to sustain the plea did so because they held that a Senator is not impeachable, or because Blount was out of office at the time. And, of course, it may be that some voted to sustain the plea on one of those grounds and some on the other.
It will be seen that the managers in that case actually contended that in the United States, as in England, private persons may be impeached as well as officers. It is not thought necessary to consider that question, because that contention has never been made since it was made bv the managers in Blount’s case. Mr. Ingersoll, of counsel for Blount, said in the course of the argument that he would not contend that an officer might escape an impending impeachment by resigning his office for that purpose.
This admission of Mr. Ingersoll’s gave great comfort to the managers and some embarrassment to the counsel for the respondent in Belknap’s case. In that case the respondent filed a plea in which he averred:
“That this honorable court ought not to have or take further cognizance of the said articles of impeachment * * * because he says that before and at the time when the said House of Representatives ordered and directed that he, the said Belknap, should be impeached at the bar of the Senate, and at the time when the said articles of impeachment were exhibited and presented against him * * * he, the said Belknap, was not, nor hath he since been, nor is he now, an officer of the United States; but at the said times was,.ever since hath been, and now is, a private citizen of the United States and of the State of Iowa. (3 Hinds’ Precedents, 919.) ”
To this plea the managers for the House of Representatives filed a replication, in which they set up: (1) That at the time the acts charged in the articles of impeachment were committed, Belknap was Secretary of War; and (2) that Belknap had resigned to escape impeachment, after he had learned that the House of Representatives, by its proper committee, had completed its investigation into his official conduct, and was considering the report it should make to the House upon the same. There were further pleadings, but those above stated set forth sufficiently what the issues were. (3 Hinds’ Precedents, 921.)
After much discussion the Senate determined to hear first the question of the sufficiency of the replication. After a long debate, it was decided, by a vote of 37 to 29, that Belknap was amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done as Secretary of War, notwithstanding his resignation before he was impeached. (3 Hinds’ Precedents, 964.)
Belknap was called upon to plead to the merits, but declined to do so on the ground, as set forth on the record by his counsel, that, as less than two-thirds of the Senate had sustained the jurisdiction, the respondent was entitled to be discharged, without further proceedings. (3 Hinds’ Precedents, 936—937.)
The Senate, however, went on and took evidence in the case, with the result that Belknap was acquitted. The vote on the several articles ranged from 35 to 37 for conviction. On each article 25 voted not guilty. Most of those who voted not guilty stated they did so because they believed the court was without jurisdiction, for the reason that the respondent had ceased to be a civil officer of the United States at the time he was impeached by the House of Representatives.
Hence, in Belknap’s case, as in Blount’s case, it will be seen that the final vote does not indicate that any of the Senators who voted “guilty” did so on the ground that one who has been a civil officer remains liable to impeachment as long as he lives, for acts done during the time he held the office. The evidence in the case showed that Belknap was advised at 10 o’clock of the morning of the day that he resigned, that the Judiciary Committee of the House was about to report a resolution recommending his impeachment. He hurried to the President, tendered his resignation, and had it accepted, a few hours only before the Judiciary Committee did present to the House the resolution recommending his impeachment. There was much controversy in the discussion of the case before the Senate by the managers and counsel, respectively, as to whether Belknap was an officer when the resolution of impeachment was presented to the House, on the theory that the law takes no notice of fractions of a day. But, aside from this, it was strenuously contended by the managers that even if the general rule be that an officer ceases to be subject to impeachment when he leaves the office, there should be an exception to that rule when the officer resigns for the very purpose of escaping impeachment.
It is impossible to determine what proportion of the Senators who voted against Belknap at the conclusion of the trial did so on the ground that he could not escape impeachment by resigning for that purpose, even if he would not be subject to impeachment had he not vacated the office in that way and for that purpose. In other words, the case is not a precedent for the proposition that one whose term of office has expired remains subject to impeachment during the whole of his life for acts done while he held the office.
When Manager Hoar was making his argument a Member of the Senate interrupted him and propounded the following question:
“There are no doubt several Members of the Senate who have been in past years civil officers of the United States. Are they liable to impeachment for an alleged act of guilt done in office?”
The manager did not flinch at this question, but said, as he was evidently required to say or abandon his contention: “The logic of my argument brings us to that result.”
It will be seen that the contention which was made on behalf of the House in Belknap’s case, and which we understand is maintained by the managers in the case at bar, is far-reaching. The present President of the United States at one time held the office of Solicitor General; at another time he was circuit judge of the United States; at another time he was governor of the Philippine Islands; at another time he was Secretary of War. Is it possible that le can now be the subject of impeachment for any act committed by him at the time he held either one of those offices? If so, he may be removed from his present office as President of the United States by a majority of the House and two-thirds of the Senate for alleged offenses charged to have been committed while he held any one of the other positions above mentioned.
And so of any other public man who has ever held office under the United States. It would seem that a contention which leads to such absurd results can not be sustained.

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