Posted on 09/24/2016 9:40:29 AM PDT by Arthur Wildfire! March
Hard Evidence: ICANN & China Allied to Re-Centralize Internet
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/3472563/posts
ICANN, a Pack of Liars
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3469994/posts
John Bolton on Obama’s Internet Handover: ‘Within Ten Years, the Internet as We Know It Will End’
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3472489/posts
ICANN’s Secret Plot: rigged oversight, designs on .mil, $2.5 mil in lobbying
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3471830/posts
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China, Russia Planning Space Attacks on U.S. Satellites
Critical space infrastructure faces crippling missile strikes, small satellites, lasers
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-russia-planning-space-attacks-on-u-s-satellites/
BY: Bill Gertz
March 16, 2016 5:00 am
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Cyber Attack On Satellite Could Be Act Of War: HPSCI Ranking
By Colin Clark on June 10, 2016 at 4:43 PM
http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/cyber-attack-on-satellite-could-be-act-of-war-hpsci-ranking/
CAPITOL HILL: In a rare public event, the No. 2 member of the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee (HPSCI), Rep. Adam, said a cyber attack on a US satellite could be considered an act of war.
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How Bill Clinton Paved the Way for Internet Surrender
Note that communications satellites and encryption are key to dominating the internet via ‘raw power’.
[Back during President Clinton’s time — 1998 hearing]
U.S. Satellite Technology Transfers To China: What’s At Issue, Questions & Answers
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=420&rid=1
Henry Sokolski’s testimony presented before a joint hering on the House International Relations Committee and the House National Security Committee.
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Easy To Explain — WHY ICANN is dangerous
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-chat/3472522/posts
Obama’s key internet giveaway advocate can’t give a straight answer on free speech concerns
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/3472675/posts
Ping.
[More coming up about how Clinton paved the way for China’s dominance during the 90s.]
[This was in a 1998 hearing regarding Bill Clinton’s Chinagate Scandal]
U.S. Satellite Technology Transfers To China: What’s At Issue, Questions & Answers
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=420&rid=1
Henry Sokolski’s testimony presented before a joint hering on the House International Relations Committee and the House National Security Committee.
Jun 17, 1998
AUTHOR: NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski
US Satellite Technology Transfers to China (PDF) 22.27 KB
U.S. Satellite Technology Transfers To China:
What’s At Issue, Questions and Answers
Q. In allowing U.S. satellite technology transfers to China, isn’t the Clinton Administration simply doing what the Bush Adminstration did before it?
A. No, there are differences. Although Clinton and Bush both waived Tainamen Square sanctions to allow U.S. satellite technology transfers to China, the Clinton administration went much further in loosening controls over them by moving virtually all commercial satellite technology from State to Commerce Department controls. This shift has eliminated systematic government monitoring of prelaunch conversations between U.S. contractors and Chinese space firms and, according to the General Accounting Office, marginalized the previously important licensing input of the Defense Department.
Q. But isn’t the most important point that Reagan and Bush started this commerce?
A. It’s hard to see how. Either the transfer of critically important military technology is an inevitable part of launching U.S.-made satellites or it’s not. If it is, then persisting in the business (with 14 launches) is just as blameworthy as starting it (with 4). Indeed, it could even be worse if you began such commerce in the vain hope that you could control its diversion but persisted in transferring satellites knowing that it couldn’t. On the other hand, if you believe U.S. controls can prevent the Chinese military from benefiting from such trade, then, not who started such commerce, but who has allowed what to be transferred are the critical issues.
Q. OK. But if China could hit Los Angeles with a nuclear warhead before it launched its first U.S.-made satellite,what more of military significance could it gain for its missile forces from U.S. satellite makers?
A: Plenty. China has repeatedly objected to U.S. development of missile defenses that could neutralize China’s missile forces. In this regard, China’s mastering of how to place single and multiple satellites in exact locations in space (with precision satellite kick motors and multiple satellite dispensers) is directly applicable to its current efforts to develop missiles with post boost vehicles (PBVs) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle systems (MIRVs) designed to overwhelm or evade such defenses. Its latest solid-rocket missile projects — the DF-31, DF-41, and J1-2 — in fact, are all believed to be perfecting such systems. Also, China is keenly interested in making their theater missiles accurate enough to destroy targets (e.g., in Taiwan) without having to use chemical, nuclear or biological weapons. Acquiring such accuracy is intrinsic with placing sophisticated satellites precisely on station — something China has had a 100% success rate with since the Loral and Hughes failures of l996.
Q. Putting missile improvements aside, though, isn’t it clear that keeping U.S.-made satellites from prying Chinese eyes has effectively kept the Chinese military from exploiting such commerce for its own satellite needs?
A. Not really. Increasingly, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is using U.S.-made satellites to transmit military encrypted message traffic. China has especially relied upon U.S.-made satellites over which it has operational control — e.g., the APTStar and Chinastar satellite series. China is also trying to develop advanced communications satellites of its own with Western help (a project Hughes wanted permission to work on before the recent Loral-Hughes flap). This, in the final analysis, however, is pointless unless China develops rocket systems that are reliable, gentle, and precise enough to place such satellites safely on station. U.S. satellite launch revenues to China (approximately $500 million since l990), launch experience with advanced U.S.-made satellites (nearly half of China’s last 30 launches), and transfer of associated technology have all served this purpose.
Q. But doesn’t Chinese use of U.S.-made satellites make it easier for our intelligence agencies to intercept whatever encrypted messages the Chinese military might transmit?
A. Not enough to justify U.S. satellite transfers. Indeed, supplying the PLA with satellite communications is hardly the preferred way for the U.S. to intercept China’s message traffic since it enables China to use a variety of antenna to transmit an increasing volume of encrypted messages at a lower cost. To the extent Chinese encryption may be strong and the satellite antenna used are narrow in beam width, our intelligence agencies’ task of intercepting Chinese communications will become more, not less difficult with increased PLA use of our satellites.
Q. At the end of the day, though, don’t U.S. satellite makers have to use Chinese launchers to stay competitive since Chinese launchers are so much cheaper than alternative launch services?
A. Hardly. Even by the U.S. satellite industry’s own calculations, Chinese launch services save them only 10 to 15 percent over alternative providers and this advantage is expected to evaporate over the next 36 to 48 months when newer American., Russian, and Ukrainian alternative launch services come on line. What makes U.S. satellite makers competitive, moreover, is not lower cost launchers, but higher quality satellites: These frequently cost one or two times more than the launch and produce even more in revenues over their lifetime.
Q. But if the U.S. forgoes satellite business with China,won’t this merely open the Chinese satellite market to America’s competitors?
A. None that we know of. Over 75 percent of the world’s commercial satellites, in fact, are either made in the U.S. or require U.S. permission to be launched because they contain key U.S. components. Virtually all the remaining commercial satellites come from member nations of the European Space Agency (ESA), who are inclined to launch their satellites on ESA launchers. As for making satellites in China, this market is already saturated: Dailmer-Benz is already working with the Chinese military to develop an advanced communications satellite but so far the system (after two launchings) has yet to work.
Q. If there is a technology transfer problem, isn’t putting all commercial satellites back under State controls the preferred fix?
A. Not necessarily. If State controls are not enforced with proper monitoring or if compliance concerns are not taken up by senior political officials and the contractors challenged to address possible control infractions (two complaints some government monitors had from l993 through l995), shifting back to State controls will do little good. Indeed, merely shifting controls back to State might only give use a dangerous, false sense of security. If the customer (e.g., the PLA) is intent on diverting technology, even the best controls cannot prevent it. Here, barring satellite technology transfers or, at least, transfers of the most advanced satellite types may be appropriate.
Q. What, then, should Congress do?
A. Keep things from getting worse until it gets all the answers. The House and Senate should insist that no further satellite transfers be allowed until its investigations and deliberations over this matter are complete. There simply is no substitute for determining what, if anything, of military significance was transferred to China and whether or not such transfers could have been prevented by tighter controls. If nothing was transferred, then, all’s well. If something was transferred, then, Congress must determine what it was, what else of value might be at risk, and whether or not these risks can be eliminated by tighter export controls or if barring future transfers is required.
Q. How should Congress go about doing this?
A. Stop pointing fingers or proposing easy solutions and get to work. It would be useful to depose all of the current and previous officials tasked to monitor this commerce along with their private corporate counter parts. It may be necessary to grant the later immunity. In no case, however, should Congress be reassuring the Executive Branch or private industry now that politically easy solutions — such as merely moving commercial satellites back to State controls — are the agreed way out. Indeed, too much partisan political capital has already been expended on this controversy for Congress to do anything less than a substantive oversight effort unprejudiced by preconceived solutions. Certainly, if Congress fails to do this, the credibility of both parties — Democratic and Republican — will suffer along with pubic regard for Congress and, more important, for the rule of law and our nation’s security.
FYI PING !
Arthur,
I’ve only gotten through the first few topics and find this scary and a bit overwhelming. Is itpossible to republish this piece as a serial exclusive to FR?
This is outstanding journalism. I’ve never thought far ahead to China taking control and what it means in their long-range plan to run the world.
The Panama Canal was moving to check. ICANN and cyber warfare just might be checkmate. Or as they said, “All our bases are belong to us”!
T.W.
Brilliant, original thinking by our own Artthur Wildfire! March.
I'm putting libertarians on notice — if you have any love for internet freedom of speech and online intellectual property rights, your choice is clear: Hillary Clinton must lose this election unless you think that high-tech drone development will fail to suppress China's people even more than they already are. The helplessness of China's people is getting worse every year. The government's technology outstrips human initiative.
I value your informed opinion.
Not sure how much I’m permitted to share about your background.
So if there’s a need for refinement, please don’t worry about my ego.
This is ‘on the fly’ study. I understand war, but not the technical side.
FRegards ....
Ping.
Synopsis. America invented the internet and monetized it. Our enemies weaponized it.
Donald Trump now opposes the ICAN/Internet transition as well as many others.
Jeff Sessions & Other Senators Unite Against Internet Giveaway [last Friday]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/chat/3470719/posts
Well said.
If our GPS is blinded, we are sitting ducks.
I don’t know how good our satellite encryption is, but it might be some ‘anonymous hacker’ who suddenly does something with them.
We would not even know who to blame. We would be floundering, and China could offer to rescue us, for a price.
Buckalfa, if you could synopsize the cyber warfare and encrytion aspect of this, it would be much appreciated. I’m just a civilian in the world of engineering,
“In fact, it might be prudent to ask President Obama if it is already too late to oppose China’s dominance. Behind closed doors he might be feeling ‘blackmail pressure’ to hand over ICANN to them as a gesture of surrender.”
They are waiting for Trump get in.
Awesome research you have done. My hat is off to you. You have made a very compelling case as to why this is a very important issue.
BFL, thanks for all your hard work on this, Arthur
Ping. We have a clear and present danger. If China escalates the cyber-war, that would most likely knock us back to 70s level communications.
You make a point.
I would guess that Obama ‘bought time’ through various shady deals.
The moment Trump is sworn in, they will make a private call and some tiny event will happen that proves their dominance.
If I were China, that’s how I would do it.
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