Posted on 08/24/2016 11:50:17 PM PDT by Mr. Mojo
Why the Obama administration is refusing to say where the funds ended up.
It appears that when it comes to its dealings with the Islamic Republic, the Obama administration’s miscues are boundless. The latest fiasco involves the recent transfer of $1.3 billion in taxpayer money to Iran’s mullahs. Both the White House and the State Department are shamefully unable or unwilling to provide the public with any pertinent information concerning the transfer.
At a State Department briefing, spokesman Mark Toner remained opaque and evasive about the transaction and said that he did not know who in Iran received the money. Nor was he able to confirm the method of payment -- check or cash, U.S. or foreign currency. All he was able to disclose was that the funds transferred reflected money -- principle and interest -- owed to Iran from a 1979 aborted arms deal.
An additional $400 million was transferred to Iran last month and was part of an overall payment of $1.7 billion. According to the administration, the monies paid reflected a settlement of Iran’s claims against the U.S. stemming from the 1979 aborted arms transaction. Ironically, the Iranians were not required to pay anything to the 52 American hostages they kidnapped in 1979. Those hostages were held in dungeon-like conditions for 444 days. Like all transactions conducted by the Obama administration, the benefits flow one way.
There are several troubling aspects to this story. Though the administration has issued strenuous denials, it is clear that the first installment of $400 million was a ransom payment made to secure the release of Americans held hostage in Iran.
At a briefing in early August, White House spokesman Josh Earnest refused to directly address the following question posed by a journalist; “would these prisoners have been released if this money had not been paid?” The question was posed on no less than three occasions and required a simple “yes” or “no” response. The shifty Earnest was evasive and refused to provide a direct response. Instead, he offered painfully convoluted explanations that shed light on nothing except for how disingenuous he is.
At the State Department briefing, Toner came very close to acknowledging that the $400 million payment was in fact a ransom payment. He stated that while the payment was part of an overall commercial settlement, it was used as “leverage” to ensure that the Americans were released. The White House however, immediately repudiated the State Department’s characterization.
We thought that Obama could stoop no lower after he traded five hard-core Taliban terrorists held at Guantanamo for the deserter and traitor Bowe Bergdahl. We were wrong. The feckless White House is now in the business of disgracefully paying two-bit dictators protection money. Obama can issue all the denials he wants but if it walks like a ransom payment and talks like a ransom payment, it is most likely a ransom payment.
Even if we gave the administration the benefit of the doubt, the harm caused by the mere appearance of a ransom payment is incalculable and puts the safety of Americans throughout the world at risk. Somali pirates, Islamic terrorists, the North Koreans and others engaged in the kidnapping business are all watching.
Even more disconcerting is the second installment of $1.3 billion to the Iranians. One would think that with such a large transfer of taxpayer money, the recipients and method of payment could be verified. But the administration is being deliberately evasive on this issue because it is cognizant of the fact that the money was likely transferred to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the entity that pulls the strings in the Islamic Republic and is responsible for much of region’s turmoil.
Once in the coffers of the IRGC, the hefty sum was almost certainly used to further fuel regional mischief. The IRGC is the entity singularly responsible for propping up Bashar Assad of Syria. It is also a virtual certainty that some of the money was allocated to Iran’s Shia mercenary force in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and it could not have come at a more opportune for the group, which had been suffering from financial distress in recent years.
The Obama administration has turned into Iran’s White Knight, saving the Islamic Republic from financial ruin while providing it with a legal pathway to acquire nuclear weapons through the flawed Iran deal. Ironically, Obama, who claims that running the Guantanamo facility is too expensive and drains resources has no qualms whatsoever about transferring $1.7 billion in taxpayer money to America’s most implacable foe. But then again, judging by his foreign policies, it is unclear whether he even considers Iran an enemy.
Obama didn’t have to pay the money.
How many of America’s poor could have been fed for $1.3 billion.
TRAITORS.
Here is another question: Where did the money come from?
From the Treasury Department's Judgement Fund.
obamma kept the money as the last iman from hell
Yo, thanks. If it was a legitimate transaction, why did they structure it?
ValJar?
More importantly, how was the $1.3 billion transferred to Iran? The excuse given for the pallets of cash $400 million payment was because we didn't have any formal banking agreements with Iran, so it had to be delivered in hard cash.
Yet only days later the remaining $1.3 billion was paid out of the Judgement Fund, presumably not by shipping more pallets of hard cash, so that means there indeed was a banking relationship of some sort that could have also wired the initial $400 million.
Clearly, the Iranians, with sanctions in place all over the world, could not get a hold of hundreds of millions in hard currency, so they demanded the $400 million so it could be used for terror related payments.
If only we had a press who liked to do their job when the subject was a Democrat.
Can anyone explain why the USA would be obligated to pay any money owed to the SHAH’s government which no longer exists??
The USA has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979, when the evil Mullahs kicked out the Shah. The $400 million plus (who decided the interest) $1.3 billion “interest” is said to be from an arms purchase paid for by the Shah’s govt but never delivered due to the Iranian revolution.
So did we actually “owe” money to a revolutionary govt we have no diplomatic relations with???? And who decided that we also “owe” $1.3 billion in “interest” in addition to the $400 million principal???
Presumably this is an outcome of the supposed “nuclear deal” which Iran never signed and does not consider itself bound by???
Of courses taqiyya allows certain practices to be used against the infidel. Wonder if this is action is justified by taqiyya?
Great point, the Muzzies are not supposed to pay or receive interest!!!!
The USA should have said “we’re sorry you can’t have any interest on the money but we wouldn’t want to violate your religious conscience”.....
We can see just how much of a “conscience” the scum of Tehran have..... so much for Islam!
Well, let’s see. Hezbollah. Hamas. ISIS. CAIR. The Open Society Foundation. The Clinton Global Initiative.
Mr. Trump,
When you take the oath of office in January.
Please, order the immediate arrest of the traitor Obama.
Thank you.
Oh my God! The money was not owed at all! The Hague determined that decades ago...Iran was over-extended and is the country that owed funds/monies, everything was escrowed and Iran got what they were owed! America owes Iran NOTHING! The media optics they are pushing is a rewrite of the actual history! This was all settled in International Court!
History Lesson
•When President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977, he inherited a unique relationship with the shah of Iran, who had been returned to his throne by a U.S.-British covert action and who had accepted the role of protecting U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. The shah had some of the most sophisticated arms in the U.S. inventory.
•When the monarchy was overthrown, the United States and other countries in the world got their first real introduction to radical political Islam, not only during the revolution against the shah but also in the 444-day captivity of American diplomats in Tehran. That experience shaped the U.S. relationship with Iran for decades thereafter.
•The Algiers Accords ending the hostage crisis returned only a fraction of Iran’s frozen assets. It created a claims tribunal that settled hundreds of U.S. claims against Tehran. Those costs, plus Iran’s alienation from much of the world, suggests the hostage model is not likely to be repeated.
•The Carter administration’s effort to build an independent military capability in the Gulf established the initial framework that was completed by its successors.
Overview
When President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977, he inherited a unique relationship with Iran and its imperious and ambitious ruler Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi. That relationship was the product of interaction dating back to World War II and included a U.S.-British covert operation in 1953 to remove Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and return the shah to the throne.
Most importantly, during the eight years before Carter’s election, President Richard Nixon and his foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, had created a unique and unprecedented relationship with the Iranian ruler. As part of what was dubbed the Twin Pillar policy, the shah was identified as the primary guardian of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. (Saudi Arabia was the other pillar.) In return, the shah was permitted to purchase whatever non-nuclear U.S. military technology he wished.
The explosion of oil prices in the preceding four years had given the shah a windfall of revenues, and he used this money to fund a massive economic and military buildup. Tens of thousands of U.S. technicians were provided to install and maintain an enormous arsenal and to train Iranians to use it. But when oil prices declined, Iran was hugely over-extended. Disaffection with the shah’s rule, which had been simmering for years, burst into the open.
The revolution
During the first two years of the Carter administration, Iran went through a wrenching societal transformation that steadily gathered momentum. Both Washington and the shah’s own forces were constantly surprised at the speed of events, and the shah could not maintain control. Opposition forces, led from abroad by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, took over the streets of Tehran in December 1978, and the shah left the country the following month.
Khomeini returned to Tehran on February 1, 1979, and 10 days later the monarchy fell and was replaced by an Islamic revolutionary government. This was the first contact between the United States and radical, political Islam. It set the tone for future dealings with Iran and other radical Islamic states.
The United States attempted to develop a working relationship with the new government. Some modest progress was made in the summer of 1979 with the relatively secular, technocratic provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi.
U.S. Embassy seizure
But in October 1979, President Carter reluctantly permitted the shah, who was desperately ill with lymphoma, to enter the United States for medical treatment. This triggered a violent reaction in Tehran. Mobs of students invaded the U.S. Embassy on November 4, taking its occupants prisoner and demanding the return of the shah and his financial assets to Iran. Khomeini threw his support behind the students and the Bazargan government was dismissed, thus beginning a 444-day siege usually referred to as the hostage crisis.
When the students attacked the U.S. Embassy, Khomeini and his clerical circle were facing an internal problem of their own. They were pressing for adoption of a new constitution that would permanently enshrine the concept of an Islamic Republic, with direct clerical oversight of the government. Many, if not most, Iranians who had joined forces against the shah had not anticipated that the monarchy would be replaced by a theocracy, and opposition was growing.
The conflict with America—the hated Great Satan—rallied the public behind Khomeini. The referendum on Islamic rule was passed by a nearly unanimous vote one month after the hostages were taken. Khomeini subsequently referred to the taking of the U.S. Embassy as a second Iranian revolution.
The fallout
Iran publicly considered withdrawing all its deposits from Western banks, but the United States responded by freezing all Iranian assets on deposit in the West—some $12 billion. The massive arms purchasing program started by the shah was also frozen. Many of the weapons systems—including major warships—that were under construction were cancelled or sold to other parties. The proceeds were used to pay termination costs of the many contracts. Other materiel was placed in storage. The magnitude and disposition of this account (managed entirely by the United States) would later become a point of bitter legal contention between Iran and the United States.
President Carter was primarily motivated in his decision-making by concern for the welfare of the hostages. When Iran threatened to put them on trial, he sent a private note to Iran’s leaders warning that if any of the hostages were harmed, the United States would interrupt Iran’s commerce. Iran never acknowledged the message, but talk of trials ceased. When one hostage, Richard Queen, was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, Iran quickly returned him to U.S. custody.
But it was also an election season in the United States. The hostage issue initially became a rallying point for Americans in support of their government. But, as popular frustration mounted with both with the hostage impasse and a stagnant economy, the continued imprisonment of U.S. diplomats became emblematic of a loss of confidence in Carter’s leadership.
The squeeze
One of the most extensive diplomatic campaigns in American history was mounted to pressure Iran’s revolutionary government to release the hostages. Nations around the world and key Islamic statesmen were persuaded to intervene with Iran’s leadership on the grounds that the taking and holding of diplomatic prisoners were clear violations not only of international law but also of Islamic law and practice.
The Palestine Liberation Organization interceded in the early days of the conflict and succeeded in securing the release of 13 blacks and women held at the embassy. Tehran apparently believed that this gesture would convince Americans about the justice of their cause. When it did not, they were never willing to repeat the process. Iranian relations with the PLO progressively soured, taking them out of the picture.
The United Nations repeatedly condemned the Iranian action, although the Soviet Union vetoed Security Council resolutions that would have penalized Iran. The Carter administration brought a case against Iran in the World Court. Washington established secret negotiating channels to the Iranian government leadership, leading to a tentative agreement in which Iran would be given an international forum to express its grievances against the shah in return for transfer of the prisoners from the students to government control as the first step toward release. To that end, both the U.N. Secretary General and a formal U.N. fact-finding commission traveled to Tehran to meet with victims of the shah’s regime.
Despite many efforts, however, Washington never succeeded in developing contacts with Ayatollah Khomeini or the clerical circle. In the end, Khomeini vetoed all diplomatic initiatives.
Failed rescue
The administration contemplated a rescue mission from the earliest days of the crisis, but rejected it as unworkable. The 52 hostages were being held inside a fortified complex in the heart of a hostile city far from any U.S. military facilities. But in early 1980, several developments made a rescue more feasible. U.S. intelligence had developed a network of agents in Iran. Reconnaissance had also identified a number of Iranian facilities that could be used to support such a mission. Special Forces had trained for months for the actual breaching of the embassy walls, and new information was available about the specific location of each hostage within the embassy compound.
In late March 1980, Khomeini rejected a negotiated settlement of the crisis, after a comprehensive plan had been accepted by Iran’s provisional president and foreign minister. Negotiations seemed at a dead end, and U.S. political pressure was mounting to do something about the hostages after five months of futile efforts. So Carter broke diplomatic relations with Iran and secretly approved a complex rescue plan. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance vehemently opposed any use of force. When his objections were overridden, he told Carter that he would resign after the mission, regardless of the outcome, and he did.
The mission took place on the night of April 24-25. It involved eight large military transport helicopters launched from a U.S. carrier in the Gulf of Oman. Six were required to complete the mission. Other fixed wing aircraft, bringing a Delta Force team and supplies, were to rendezvous with the helicopters at a site dubbed Desert One, a small abandoned airstrip some 200 miles from Tehran.
The mission ran into early trouble. The helicopters encountered a massive dust cloud (invisible to the satellites that were the only available source of weather information) almost as soon as they crossed the coastline into Iran. One helicopter developed mechanical problems and had to stop. Another helicopter’s warning light indicated a possible cracked rotor and it decided to turn back just short of the landing site. A third was found to have an irreparable hydraulic problem upon arrival at Desert One, thus bringing the number below the necessary six.
The commander at Desert One made the agonizing decision to abort the mission, and the president accepted his judgment. As the helicopters maneuvered in the dark and dust to refuel for the return trip, one of them clipped the wing of a transport aircraft and both aircraft burst into flames, killing eight U.S. servicemen. Carter went on radio early in the morning to announce the mission’s failure and to clarify that this was a limited rescue mission, not a military invasion. Until his announcement, Iran was unaware of the operation.
The endgame
On September 12, 1980, after the establishment of an Iranian cabinet and parliament, Iran sent an emissary to Germany to propose negotiating an end to the crisis. Initial talks, under German auspices, were held in mid-September. But the process was interrupted by Iraq’s invasion of Iran on September 22. Although some expected Iran to be forced to come to the United States for arms and spare parts, the Iran-Iraq War was more of a distraction than a boon to the hostage negotiations. In the end, Iran solved its military problems without U.S. government assistance.
After the Reagan landslide over Carter in November, Iran nominated Algeria to act as the intermediary for talks to end the hostage impasse. Washington accepted. The talks were tortuous and continued to the very last second of the Carter administration. Unraveling the various strands of the problem, and particularly the frozen assets was immensely complicated.
In the end, Iran paid off its various loans at incredible financial cost and agreed to establish a claims tribunal in The Hague to adjudicate commercial claims against Iran. In the Algiers Accords of January 1981, the United States promised not to interfere in Iran’s internal politics and not to bring claims against Iran on behalf of the hostages.
The agreement was criticized for being negotiated under duress, but it has been validated by every succeeding U.S. administration. The claims tribunal has resulted in payment by Iran of hundreds of millions of dollars to dozens of companies that had contracts under the shah’s regime. The shah died in Egypt in July 1980, and his assets were not returned to Iran.
The aftermath
•The Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis dramatized to U.S. policy-makers the gap between U.S. regional interests and its ability to project force.
•The shah had been anointed as the substitute for a robust U.S. military presence at a time when U.S. forces were tied down in Southeast Asia and the American public was opposed to any new overseas commitments. When the shah fell, the United States was left strategically naked, without a safety net.
•The Carter administration began to rebuild a regional capability in the form of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and to undertake urgent negotiations with regional states for operating facilities.
•At the end of Carter’s four-year term, however, those plans were more intention than reality. They would be completed by his successors.
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/carter-administration-0
ping
It was Iran’s money. Honest.
The Shah bought four destroyers with it, that Iran never got. The USN got them, and we held on to the money.
It is sad that the money is going to the scum that rules Iran, but it is their money.
The US spent billions propping up the Shah. Calculated in today’s dollars, the amount would be stunning. As is usually the case, American aid usually earmarks certain amounts that must be spent on American arms.
Congress should have taken control of the money that they originally appropriated, but they allowed the Executive Branch to control it as part of the president’s authority in foreign policy.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.