"Prior" is the operative word here. Arguably, though the first part of your statement is indubitably correct, the Seventeenth Amendment absolutely detached the Senate from the state governments which they were intended to represent. They no longer represent state governments; arguably, they no longer even represent the people of their states. They are just a big political faction or club of "solons" in Washington, mainly representing party interests. In recent times, the Senate has ensured legislation that a majority of citizens demand has not got a snowball's chance in Hell of being enacted.
That's history now, and we have to live with it. Unless we repeal the Seventeenth.... Which subject the Georgia Application contemplates.
With all respect, PJ, I hope we can just agree to (cordially!) disagree on the entire matter of state Applications. You see the Application as "a Congressionally-imposed burden on states, which makes states subordinate to Congress."
I just don't see it that way. In the first place, this is not a Congressionally-imposed burden. It is authorized by the plain language of Article V itself:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments.... [emphasis added]This is hardly a constitutional demand that the States offer obeisance to Congress. It is a mere stipulation of the Article V procedural rules for the calling of a COS.
After the COS is CALLED, Congress has neither a legislative nor executive role to play. Then, Congress' role becomes, as Prof. Natelson puts it, purely ministerial, like that of a diplomat acting as agent for a sovereign government in its dealings with other sovereign governments. (Which to my mind is perfectly fitting.) Congress has no will or power of its own WRT the COS or any of its procedures, rules, or subject matter.
I sense perhaps what aggravates you even more than the "Application" issue is the "aggregation" issue. It is "best evidence" for upholding the well-precedented historical and juridical view that Article V does not recognize a "general convention" as an Article V COS. From this, I infer that a CALLED convention is always called for a reason, or reasons. Otherwise, to me, it might just as well be yet another drunken frat party, or late-night bull session of a bunch of stoned underclassmen.... Something completely beneath the dignity of the U.S. Constitution.
Aggregation sets the criterion of states' intent to address common concerns, as stated in their Applications, by proposing and ratifying amendments to the Constitution. Thus, you need 34 states sending Applications addressing substantially similar subject matter. Then, once you've got 34 states, Congress MUST issue the CALL for the COS. And completely steps out of the picture, not to return until the Convention concludes its business, and actually proposes amendments.
Then, Congress steps back in, to specify which mode of Ratification will be used, by state legislatures, or by state conventions. After Congress "disposes" of this matter, whichever ratification mode they choose, Congress is not further involved in the ratification process, other than to validate and record the states' votes.
But here's some news that might cheer you up: According to The Article V Library, there are now 32 applying states that have qualified for aggregation by the National Archivist, for the purpose of convening a COS on a proposed balanced-budget amendment to the Constitution.
Only two more states to go.... :^)
Thanks ever so much for writing, PJ!
The audit reduced the count from 34 to 26, and this year 2 more states piled on to make it 28.
If Article V (less the last clause regarding equality of state suffrage) was by some magic removed from the Constitution, do you think the people/states would retain the power to frame our national government?
The reason is for proposing amendments.
I just want to know where the requirement to agree on the amendments beforehand originated.
Aggregation sets the criterion of states' intent to address common concerns, as stated in their Applications, by proposing and ratifying amendments to the Constitution.
Up-thread, Jacquerie cited Alexander Hamilton in Federalist #85, but he stopped short of the point of aggregation. Continuing, Hamilton wrote:
Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
To me, this reads that Hamilton was not ruling out that states might try to offer amendments of "local interests," but that amendments addressing general liberty and security are more likely to get three-fourths of the states to ratify. How would "local interest" amendments get past an aggregation requirement before even calling the convention?
Or, maybe I'm reading that passage wrong?
-PJ