Posted on 06/29/2013 6:49:03 AM PDT by Michael.SF.
GETTYSBURG, Pa. (AP) — On the second day of fighting at Gettysburg, Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee listened to scouting reports, scanned the battlefield and ordered his second-in-command, James Longstreet, to attack the Union Army's left flank.
It was a fateful decision, one that led to one of the most desperate clashes of the entire Civil War — the fight for a piece of ground called Little Round Top. The Union's defense of the boulder-strewn promontory helped send Lee to defeat at Gettysburg, and he never again ventured into Northern territory.
Why did the shrewd and canny Lee choose to attack, especially in the face of the Union's superior numbers?
Our analysis shows that he had a very poor understanding of how many forces he was up against, which made him bolder," said Middlebury College professor Anne Knowles, whose team produced the most faithful re-creation of the Gettysburg battlefield to date, using software called GIS, or geographic information systems.
(Excerpt) Read more at news.yahoo.com ...
On the other hand Lee did give Stuart his orders and if they came back and bit him then you can't blame Stuart for that.
Closer to 15%; 257 out of 1924.
Out of the one hundred and 2 men in the Company that was directly surrounding him in the 32 survived. He was in the middle of the worst fighting and lost two horses in the same engagement.
So vicious was the charge he spearheaded that horses and riders were flung into the air from the impact of the collisions. He lost 219 in that charge 70 from the troops he was immediately leading.
Agreed. I did note earlier, that the same point made by another was a valid one.
When I visited Gettysburg many years ago, I came to that same conclusion, as well as the best opportunity to take Culp's Hill was on day one. Had Ewell maneuvered to the east and then south, while the Union was in disarray retreating through Gettysburg, he may have boxed a sizeable number of them in the town.
Why?
In studying the War of 1812 last year, one fact I had forgotten was that between 4,000 and 10,000 American sailors had been impressed into service on British vessels. If that is not justification for war, I do not know what is.
One of the problems was that Lee needed to keep his forces between the AotP and Cashtown Gap, while Meade needed to keep the AotP between the AoNV and Washington.
I’d also suggest that on the second day Lee thought that the Emmitburg Pike ran parallel in front of Cemetary Ridge rather than diverging as it did at an angle. Lees original orders to Longstreet were to anchor his left flank on the Pike, piviot to the North and crash into and roll up the Union left flank.
Had he done this Longstreet would have been enfiladed (sp?) by the AotP’s 2nd and 3rd Corps, which were further East. Except that Sickles had a flashback to Chancellorsville and decided to move forwar and take the Peach Orchard.
At that point it pretty much became a melée.
And yes, Stuart dropped the ball.
After the War, someone (tactlessly) asked Longstreet who he thought was responsible for the defeat at Gettysburg: Lee? Stuart? Pickett? Himself? Longstreet replied, “I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.”
The major factor leading to the American declaration of war was probably the desire of westerners (War Hawks) to annex Canada, which they proclaimed would be, "merely a matter of marching." LOL
The war was admittedly probably "necessary" in the sense that it taught the Brits to stop thinking of USA as a semi-colony not deserving the respect of the "real" nation.
OTOH, there was something shameful in our attempt to stab the British in the back when they were the main factor keeping the world's worst dictator before Hitler contained.
Our performance in the War was an astonishing mishmash, with the most abject and humiliating possible defeats alternating with sublime courage and valor. Bladensburg and New Orleans. Detroit and Constitution/Guerriere.
Johnston was an excellent general at staying in the fight, but somehow his brilliant maneuvers always wound up with him retreating. Admittedly with minimal losses and his army intact to fight another day. But always retreating will eventually lose you the war.
It is likely the Peninsula Campaign of 1862 might have had a quite different result had Johnston remained in command and not been replaced by the infinitely more aggressive Lee.
OTOH, Hood showed what could happen when Johnston was replaced by a more aggressive but less effective leader. But then it's difficult to see how the Atlanta campaign would have ended any differently had Johnston remained in command. Just would have taken longer.
I've been thinking recently about how differently either Antietam or Gettysburg would have turned out had Grant, Sherman or Thomas been in command of the Army of the Potomac. Lee was lucky in his opponents.
It was reported that he was suffering mightily from dysentery during this period.
I (and apparently Abraham Lincoln) would agree with you there.
However, 1812 I'd fight for. We were sort of maneuvered into it by Britain, who expected to take us back!
Lee, OTOH, was not very well served on this occasion by his subordinates. A.P. Hill, Early, Ewell, Longstreet, and of course JEB Stuart, not to mention his artillery, were all tried and found wanting at crucial points in the battle.
Captain, Sir: as hardened Yankee and an amateur historian of this period, I must voice a complaint! These books written about Confederate generals read more like the medieval lives of the saints with their endless lists of miraculously brilliant strategies and the impossible virtues of the "Knights of the Olde South." What really is impossible is trying to figure out what the heck really happened!
That didn't work so well in Montana.
Which brings us to.... George Armstrong Custer
His refusal to obey orders, instead riding to the sound of the guns.
And his blunting of Jeb Stuarts attack with his 4 Michigan units.
As a Gettysburg College alumni who walked the battlefield countless times over my four years there and on many return trips, I would suggest that the terrain between Seminary Ridge (what is now Confederate Ave) and the Union lines makes for a very, very subtle optical illusion which may have made Pickett's Charge seem a much more viable option and possibly accounted for the inaccuracy of the Confederate artillery.
Frankly, when you stand at the Confederate positions and look east across the Emmitsburg Road, the Union positions appear much closer, and lower than they actually are. Once you start walking it however, it's not really until you get to the Emmitsburg Road that you realize it's much further than it first appeared and, oh by the way, the slope up to the Union lines is longer and steeper than it appears from Seminary Ridge. I can only wonder what went through the minds of the CSA soldiers as they made that realization once they were out in the open, and turning back was no longer a viable option.
Somehiw Custer managed to get promoted from Captain to General.
The movie on Custer portrays the promotion as a mistake that the Generals were then going to remedy the next day.
However it happened, Custer was bumped five ranks that day from CPtain to General.
He was immediately in the thick of the battle.
Hunterstown, Day 2.
He blunts Stuarts advance with his troops.
http://custerlives.com/custer26.htm
Quote”. Gettysburg: Cavalry Battle At Hunterstown
The Hunterstown Cavalry Battlefield, also known as North Cavalry Field at Gettysburg, marks the first time George Armstrong Custer made a name for himself as a gutsy Cavalry Commander. The cavalry battle was waged there after 4:00 PM on July 2, 1863. Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer led his beloved Michigan Cavalry Wolverines against the Confederate States of America’s very capable Brigadier General Wade Hampton.
Battle lines were established about a mile apart, General Custer’s artillery at Felty-Tate Ridge on the northern end and Rebel General Hampton’s artillery at Brinkerhoff’s Ridge to the south. General Custer had ordered most of his Troopers to dismount and lie in wait as he attempted to lead the Rebel cavalry into a trap. Elements of the 6th and 7th Michigan Cavalry dismounted and moved south on foot along both sides of Hunterstown Road. The Michigan Troopers were hidden by tall wheat while they waited for the Rebels to be led into a crossfire.
To complete the trap, the Confederate horsemen would have to be lured into the crossfire. Leading from the front as always, General George Custer led the “bait” himself. The Boy General took about sixty mounted men of Company A 6th Michigan on a daring cavalry charge toward the Confederate position. Riding forward at a gallop, General Custer’s small contingent of Michigan Wolverines established contact with the Confederate Troopers. General Custer then retreated, hoping to draw the Confederates back north to the waiting trap.
The Confederate Cavalry chased General Custer and his Wolverines about a quarter mile up the narrow Hunterstown Road between the fences which hemmed them in. As soon as the Union Cavalry Wolverines cleared the dismounted Union Troopers, the trap was sprung. The Confederate Cavalry was caught in a devastating crossfire. Many of the Confederates continued on, hoping to race past the trap. Unfortunately for them, Union artillery concealed by a barn opened fire at close range, sealing their fate.”
Worked very well for him during the civil war.
Sutart was just out fought by the improved U.S. Cav. Under Pleasonton.
Promoted Mat 1863 In May 1863 to command the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac
Brandy Station. June 8, 1863.
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/civilwarintheeast/p/battle-of-brandy-station.htm
Custer is still a Captain in this battle.
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