Posted on 11/24/2010 5:34:26 PM PST by Nachum
According to tweeting travelers, many backscatter and millimeter-wave AIT scanning machines at airports are not in use at all, making opting out impossible. We've asked DHS/TSA for comment, but you can help us confirm. Not every airport in the country even has the "Advanced Imaging Technology" scanners installed. (A post at FlyerTalk.com has an up-to-date list of airports with the machines, as well as specific terminals.
(Excerpt) Read more at gizmodo.com ...
Nice list, though I just flew 2 weeks ago SFO-LAX-LAS round trip and I didn’t see these machines then. That was T2 at SFO (not on list), T5 at LAX and B at LAS. Perhaps they just got them. In any case, it was the routine metal detector, no pat downs in my case.
The SCOTUS does not constitutionally have the power to declare day is night and night is day. In fact, they don’t even have the power of constitutional review. John Marshall’s court made that up in Marbury.
I also would disagree that Napolitano is acting in good faith. She, like the other totalitarian leftists in the government, doesn’t care what the Constitution says. They made that plain during the Obamacare debate.
What this scanner episode tells us is that most Americans today have the mentality of serfs, and I hold them in utter contempt.
What part of the ICC trumps the 4th ammendment Mr. JD Constitutional law scholar or your own case cite to Carroll stating that in a warrantless search an LEO procedes at his own peril until he can establish probable cause for the search, the burden being upon the LEO?
I disagree though that this is about totalitarian leftists. Go read DU. They are as much up in arms about this as the constitutional conservatives.
This is about the money to be made in hiring training and equiping virtual illiterates to go through meaningless process. A bunch of K-street bandits backing their cohorts of RINOs (this started under Bush don't forget), completely overlooked what the likely public reaction to this would be on SS-day (Strip Search day).
LOL U MAD BRO?
As I already pointed out to you, Carroll specifically rejected the idea that one has to have a warrant for every search. I cited to Carroll solely to point out that the idea that a warrant is required for every single search is misplaced. Instead, there are numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Carroll exception is known as the automobile exception. Under Carroll, if an officer has probable cause, then they can conduct a search of an automobile without a warrant. However, what you fail to comprehend, is that there are OTHER exceptions to the warrant requirement. These include the two categories that I mentioned, Consent and Administrative Searches. There are also exceptions for various exigent circumstances, the border search exception, and others that I haven’t mentioned yet.
I only cited Carroll to debunk one erroneous allegation made by a poster, that being that a warrant is required for every search. You made the amateur mistake of pulling inapplicable dicta from Carroll and tried to twist it to fit something it does not.
If you want to look into cases dealing with administrative searches, then you need to look here:
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 111 (2006); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (2005); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
As for the specific provision of the United States Code, you need to look here:
49 U.S.C. § 44901.
LOL U MAD?
Well, I think we’ll just have to disagree about the American public. The polls on this issue, voting for Obama, and assorted fascists, and, generally, the acceptance of a surveillance state weigh in my favor. I would, of course, prefr for you to be right.
The totalitarian leftists that I was referring to are relatively few, but very powerful people who set the agenda. The children at DU don’t understand what they are saying or doing, even when they aren’t under the influence of some substance or other.
I agree about th emoney angle, and while Ds and Rs whoopped DHS and TSA through Congress, the idea was one of the many imbecile excresences of the Bush Administration.
The argument is not about warrants, in every case, but about probable cause, in every case, which Carroll says you have to have.
49 USC 44901 Screening passengers and property reads:
(a) In General.— The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation.
Having conferred no additional powers except the rather vague and undefined "screeining of all passengers" as you well know from the rules of statutory interpretation, all other laws regarding searches and seizures remain in place. This does not override probable cause or "reasonability" of the screening to be implemented.
What kind of a so-called JD are you anyway?
Ad hominem. Thank you for conceding.
Carroll says IF you have probable cause, then you do not need a warrant to search AN AUTOMOBILE. One does not need probable cause to conduct a search at an airport. (Please see: United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007)).
The fact is, despite what you keep insisting, Carroll says nothing about the various other exceptions that exist to the warrant requirement or searches that require less than probable cause. Please see: (Terry v. Ohio) (protective frisk with reasonable suspicion) (New York v. Burger (Administrative Searches) (Please also look into the exceptions for: exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, searches incident to lawful arrest, seizures in plain view, inventory searches, border searches and roadblocks.)
U MAD BRO?
We have little difficulty in concluding that, where, as here, regulatory inspections further urgent federal interest, and the possibilities of abuse and the threat to privacy are not of impressive dimensions, the inspection may proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute
In the particular case of fingering women and girls and groping men, the "abuse and threat to privacy" is of impressive dimensions, of a degree that offends many if not most sensible citizens.
And yes I am mad, I am determined to exposed patent silly frauds like you who try to stand on their credentials and sling around BS rather than stand on the force of well-reasoned argument like most well-credentialed professionals do.
§ 44901. Screening passengers and property
(a) In General.— The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including United States mail, cargo, carry-on and checked baggage, and other articles, that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. In the case of flights and flight segments originating in the United States, the screening shall take place before boarding and shall be carried out by a Federal Government employee (as defined in section 2105 of title 5, United States Code), except as otherwise provided in section 44919 or 44920 and except for identifying passengers and baggage for screening under the CAPPS and known shipper programs and conducting positive bag-match programs.
(b) Supervision of Screening.— All screening of passengers and property at airports in the United States where screening is required under this section shall be supervised by uniformed Federal personnel of the Transportation Security Administration who shall have the power to order the dismissal of any individual performing such screening.
(c) Checked Baggage.— A system must be in operation to screen all checked baggage at all airports in the United States as soon as practicable but not later than the 60th day following the date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
(d) Explosive Detection Systems.—
(1) In general.— The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security shall take all necessary action to ensure that—
(A) explosive detection systems are deployed as soon as possible to ensure that all United States airports described in section 44903 (c) have sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all checked baggage no later than December 31, 2002, and that as soon as such systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage at the airport is screened by those systems; and
(B) all systems deployed under subparagraph (A) are fully utilized; and
(C) if explosive detection equipment at an airport is unavailable, all checked baggage is screened by an alternative means.
(2) Deadline.—
(A) In general.— If, in his discretion or at the request of an airport, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security determines that the Transportation Security Administration is not able to deploy explosive detection systems required to be deployed under paragraph (1) at all airports where explosive detection systems are required by December 31, 2002, then with respect to each airport for which the Under Secretary makes that determination—
(i) the Under Secretary shall submit to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure a detailed plan (which may be submitted in classified form) for the deployment of the number of explosive detection systems at that airport necessary to meet the requirements of paragraph (1) as soon as practicable at that airport but in no event later than December 31, 2003; and
(ii) the Under Secretary shall take all necessary action to ensure that alternative means of screening all checked baggage is implemented until the requirements of paragraph (1) have been met.
(B) Criteria for determination.— In making a determination under subparagraph (A), the Under Secretary shall take into account—
(i) the nature and extent of the required modifications to the airport’s terminal buildings, and the technical, engineering, design and construction issues; (ii) the need to ensure that such installations and modifications are effective; and (iii) the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of deploying explosive detection systems in the baggage sorting area or other non-public area rather than the lobby of an airport terminal building.
(C) Response.— The Under Secretary shall respond to the request of an airport under subparagraph (A) within 14 days of receiving the request. A denial of request shall create no right of appeal or judicial review.
(D) Airport effort required.— Each airport with respect to which the Under Secretary makes a determination under subparagraph (A) shall—
(i) cooperate fully with the Transportation Security Administration with respect to screening checked baggage and changes to accommodate explosive detection systems; and (ii) make security projects a priority for the obligation or expenditure of funds made available under chapter 417 or 471 until explosive detection systems required to be deployed under paragraph (1) have been deployed at that airport.
(3) Reports.— Until the Transportation Security Administration has met the requirements of paragraph (1), the Under Secretary shall submit a classified report every 30 days after the date of enactment of this Act to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure describing the progress made toward meeting such requirements at each airport.
(e) Mandatory Screening Where EDS Not Yet Available.— As soon as practicable but not later than the 60th day following the date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and until the requirements of subsection (b)(1)(A) are met, the Under Secretary shall require alternative means for screening any piece of checked baggage that is not screened by an explosive detection system. Such alternative means may include 1 or more of the following:
(1) A bag-match program that ensures that no checked baggage is placed aboard an aircraft unless the passenger who checked the baggage is aboard the aircraft. (2) Manual search. (3) Search by canine explosive detection units in combination with other means. (4) Other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary.
(f) Cargo Deadline.— A system must be in operation to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of all cargo that is to be transported in all-cargo aircraft in air transportation and intrastate air transportation as soon as practicable after the date of enactment of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
(g) Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft.—
(1) In general.— Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft operated by an air carrier or foreign air carrier in air transportation or intrastate air transportation to ensure the security of all such passenger aircraft carrying cargo.
(2) Minimum standards.— The system referred to in paragraph (1) shall require, at a minimum, that equipment, technology, procedures, personnel, or other methods approved by the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, are used to screen cargo carried on passenger aircraft described in paragraph (1) to provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of passenger checked baggage as follows:
(A) 50 percent of such cargo is so screened not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
(B) 100 percent of such cargo is so screened not later than 3 years after such date of enactment.
(3) Regulations.—
(A) Interim final rule.— The Secretary of Homeland Security may issue an interim final rule as a temporary regulation to implement this subsection without regard to the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5.
(B) Final rule.—
(i) In general.— If the Secretary issues an interim final rule under subparagraph (A), the Secretary shall issue, not later than one year after the effective date of the interim final rule, a final rule as a permanent regulation to implement this subsection in accordance with the provisions of chapter 5 of title 5. (ii) Failure to act.— If the Secretary does not issue a final rule in accordance with clause (i) on or before the last day of the one-year period referred to in clause (i), the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate a report explaining why the final rule was not timely issued and providing an estimate of the earliest date on which the final rule will be issued. The Secretary shall submit the first such report within 10 days after such last day and submit a report to the Committees containing updated information every 30 days thereafter until the final rule is issued. (iii) Superceding 1 of interim final rule.— The final rule issued in accordance with this subparagraph shall supersede the interim final rule issued under subparagraph (A).
(4) Report.— Not later than 1 year after the date of establishment of the system under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall submit to the Committees referred to in paragraph (3)(B)(ii) a report that describes the system. (5) Screening defined.— In this subsection the term “screening” means a physical examination or non-intrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security. Methods of screening include x-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection, explosives detection canine teams certified by the Transportation Security Administration, or a physical search together with manifest verification. The Administrator may approve additional methods to ensure that the cargo does not pose a threat to transportation security and to assist in meeting the requirements of this subsection. Such additional cargo screening methods shall not include solely performing a review of information about the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo that is not performed in conjunction with other security methods authorized under this subsection, including whether a known shipper is registered in the known shipper database. Such additional cargo screening methods may include a program to certify the security methods used by shippers pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (2) and alternative screening methods pursuant to exemptions referred to in subsection (b) of section 1602 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
(h) Deployment of Armed Personnel.—
(1) In general.— The Under Secretary shall order the deployment of law enforcement personnel authorized to carry firearms at each airport security screening location to ensure passenger safety and national security.
(2) Minimum requirements.— Except at airports required to enter into agreements under subsection (c), the Under Secretary shall order the deployment of at least 1 law enforcement officer at each airport security screening location. At the 100 largest airports in the United States, in terms of annual passenger enplanements for the most recent calendar year for which data are available, the Under Secretary shall order the deployment of additional law enforcement personnel at airport security screening locations if the Under Secretary determines that the additional deployment is necessary to ensure passenger safety and national security. (i) Exemptions and Advising Congress on Regulations.— The Under Secretary— (1) may exempt from this section air transportation operations, except scheduled passenger operations of an air carrier providing air transportation under a certificate issued under section 41102 of this title or a permit issued under section 41302 of this title; and (2) shall advise Congress of a regulation to be prescribed under this section at least 30 days before the effective date of the regulation, unless the Under Secretary decides an emergency exists requiring the regulation to become effective in fewer than 30 days and notifies Congress of that decision.
(j) Blast-Resistant Cargo Containers.— (1) In general.— Before January 1, 2008, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration shall—
(A) evaluate the results of the blast-resistant cargo container pilot program that was initiated before the date of enactment of this subsection; and
(B) prepare and distribute through the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to the appropriate Committees of Congress and air carriers a report on that evaluation which may contain nonclassified and classified sections. (2) Acquisition, maintenance, and replacement.— Upon completion and consistent with the results of the evaluation that paragraph (1)(A) requires, the Administrator shall—
(A) develop and implement a program, as the Administrator determines appropriate, to acquire, maintain, and replace blast-resistant cargo containers;
(B) pay for the program; and
(C) make available blast-resistant cargo containers to air carriers pursuant to paragraph (3).
(3) Distribution to air carriers.— The Administrator shall make available, beginning not later than July 1, 2008, blast-resistant cargo containers to air carriers for use on a risk managed basis as determined by the Administrator.
(k) General Aviation Airport Security Program.—
(1) In general.— Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration shall—
(A) develop a standardized threat and vulnerability assessment program for general aviation airports (as defined in section 47134 (m)); and
(B) implement a program to perform such assessments on a risk-managed basis at general aviation airports.
(2) Grant program.— Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Administrator shall initiate and complete a study of the feasibility of a program, based on a risk-managed approach, to provide grants to operators of general aviation airports (as defined in section 47134 (m)) for projects to upgrade security at such airports. If the Administrator determines that such a program is feasible, the Administrator shall establish such a program. (3) Application to general aviation aircraft.— Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Administrator shall develop a risk-based system under which—
(A) general aviation aircraft, as identified by the Administrator, in coordination with the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, are required to submit passenger information and advance notification requirements for United States Customs and Border Protection before entering United States airspace; and
(B) such information is checked against appropriate databases.
(4) Authorization of appropriations.— There are authorized to be appropriated to the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration such sums as may be necessary to carry out paragraphs (2) and (3).
Now reference: United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 111 (2006); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612 (2005); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
Finally reference Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
OK, let's see how well you can read.
Read the next case, slowly, and try to comprehend it, as it deals DIRECTLY with airport screenings:
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007).
The only part of the Act to which you refer that talks about the screening of passengers, as opposed to the long section on baggage screening is secion 44901 supart a.
First, you need to deal with the section that I just quoted.
Second and more to the point, what is my earlier contention that Biswell just destroyed? I presume you are back to putting unuttered words in my mouth like the pompous cheap slimeball attorney that you are.
Well my pompous foaming at the mouth BRO, it was your case cite and now you are trying to argue, since it does not uphold YOUR position, that it is irrelevant to your position. You decide.
Second, we are not talking about searching airports. The government can have at it all they like. We are talking about searching human beings.
Third, you state "Please see: (Terry v. Ohio) (protective frisk with reasonable suspicion"
But that is exactly my point and the point raised in Carroll. It has to do with "reasonable suspicion, probable cause, etc. etc." Since when is their reasonable suspicion to finger the private parts of a blond 4 year old girl? When, my learned pompous attorney friend?
And you go on with your list of exceptions "exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, searches incident to lawful arrest, seizures in plain view, inventory searches, border searches and roadblocks"
Now, since when is Topeka to Fresno a boarder search. What is in plain sight when it is not under granny's smock, but we go looking anyway. I don't think "hot pursuit" and pursuit of a hot female are legally the same thing, but you are the legal ass around here, not me.
No, ignorant hack, as I already told you, I cited it to debunk the proposition that a WARRANT was ALWAYS required in EVERY circumstance. You were the one that than began twisting it. NEXT.
Second, we are not talking about searching airports. The government can have at it all they like. We are talking about searching human beings.
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007).
Third, you state "Please see: (Terry v. Ohio) (protective frisk with reasonable suspicion")
Uh huh, I was just pointing out ANOTHER exception. Since you seem to think that ALL searches EVERYWHERE, require probable cause. I didn't say that this was the exception that was applicable to airport searches. You are apparently too stupid to see the distinction
But that is exactly my point and the point raised in Carroll. It has to do with "reasonable suspicion, probable cause, etc. etc." Since when is their reasonable suspicion to finger the private parts of a blond 4 year old girl? When, my learned pompous attorney friend?
Once again, hack, United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007).
And you go on with your list of exceptions "exigent circumstances, hot pursuit, searches incident to lawful arrest, seizures in plain view, inventory searches, border searches and roadblocks" Now, since when is Topeka to Fresno a boarder search. What is in plain sight when it is not under granny's smock, but we go looking anyway. I don't think "hot pursuit" and pursuit of a hot female are legally the same thing, but you are the legal ass around here, not me.
You really are stupid aren't you? Your assertion was that every single search at all times requires probable cause. The other poster above claimed that every search at all times requires both a warrant AND probable cause. I listed these exceptions to the warrant requirement to show that contention was erroneous.
Once again, if you want to deal with a case directly related to airport searches, please see: United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (2007). I noticed that you deliberately ignored it.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." This inestimable right of [392 U.S. 1, 9] personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. For, as this Court has always recognized,
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people , not places [so much for your search the airport search the granny theory of the 4th ammendment]," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," id., at 361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.
We would be less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity - issues which have never before been squarely [392 U.S. 1, 10] presented to this Court. Reflective of the tensions involved are the practical and constitutional arguments pressed with great vigor on both sides of the public debate over the power of the police to "stop and frisk" - as it is sometimes euphemistically termed - suspicious persons. [Now please inform all of us Mr. Lawyerman exactly what suspicious person is being frisked when the TSA agent fingers granny?]
And Warren continues [you might well heed the following passage yourself, Mr. Lawyerman]:
it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a "search." Moreover, [really think about this part Mr. Lawyerman] it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure [392 U.S. 1, 17] performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a "petty indignity." [It is not undertaken lightly by the US SC, but it is undertaken lightly by the majestic learned scholar Mr. Lawyerman his pompous ass self right here on this thread!]
And then Warren invokes your other case, Carroll, when he writes:
the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 -535, 536-537 (1967). [read here about probable cause again, Mr. Lawyerman] And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts [392 U.S. 1, 22] available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)[not only did I say you misrepresented your case cite, but apparently Mr. Warren writing for the majority also feels you misrepresented your case site]; Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 -97 (1964). Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. [funny you say the sanction that which Warren says they don't sanction. Not only do you put words in my mouth, but, you mealy mouth slime ball, you are perfectly happy to put words in the mouth of Mr. Warren as well] See, e. g., Beck v. Ohio, supra; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). And simple "`good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 97.
Applying these principles to this case...
particular airport security screening search is constitutionally reasonable provided that it "is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives [] [and] that it is confined in good faith to that purpose." Davis, 482 F.2d at 913. We conclude that the airport screening search of Aukai satisfied these requirements.
The search procedures used in this case were neither more extensive nor more intensive than necessary under the circumstances to rule out the presence of weapons or explosives. After passing through a magnetometer, Aukai was directed to secondary screening because his boarding pass was marked "No ID." Aukai then underwent a standard "wanding procedure." When the wand alarm sounded as the wand passed over Aukai's front right pants pocket, TSA Officer Misajon did not reach into Aukai's pocket or feel the outside of Aukai's pocket. Rather, Misajon asked Aukai if he had something in his pocket. When Aukai denied that there was anything in his pocket, Misajon repeated the wanding procedure. Only after the wand alarm again sounded and Aukai again denied having anything in his pocket did Misajon employ a more intrusive search procedure by feeling the outside of Aukai's pocket and determining that there was something in there.
IOW Aukai was not just hauled off to the side and felt up.
You have completely struck out. Neither the statute nor any of your case cites suggest that a TSA agent can just feel someone up as part of a general regulatory scheme.
Wow, I am not the one calling myself a JD who goes around spouting caseses that he apparently forgot to read.
I think by every definition of the word you are the hack. You have:
1. Put words in the mouths of others and then beat them up for it.
2. Rested on an argument to authority - your supposed JD - and stated you should not have to bother responding to anyone who does not have one.
3. Put words in the mouths of various Supreme Court Justices they did not utter.
4. Spewed off a number of cites to cases and statutes that do not say what you say they say, because apparently you never read them.
5. Put together an impossible to follow argument about why I am wrong in quoting verbatim from the text of the cases that you attempt to rely upon for your claim that TSA agents can go fingering little girls.
No, you are done here. If you want to argue your point, like a good attorney, argue your point like a good attorney.
In brief, your legal scholarship stinks like a 20 day beached whale.
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