All of Obama's Legal Cases

Also note BO’s PR people have put out several stories about the lawsuits in the past few days.

That tells me that they are very concerned about a case that Berg has filed or is about to file.

Robert’s swearing in of BO was the best thing that has happened to provide a basis for finding bo not eligible to be POTUS

Only if the media plays the scenario out correctly. And because the enemedia hates this nation as a capitalist society, I look for the media to instigate as much rioting as they can muster, to show how important they are!

Media doesn’t have anything to do with it.

By swearing BO in Roberts created the basis to have BO removed from office.

BINGO!That tells me that they are very concerned about a case that Berg has filed or is about to file.

Yes, hoosiermama, and I just noticed that the obots no longer post on the threads about Orly’s cases but they were posting today on threads about Berg’s cases.

Bookmark.

Great research as usual. I am not a SCOTUS scholar or attorney but I realize they spend a lot of time on the founders intent or the writings of that period by the Framers.

It appears to me that Justice Scalia is the lion on the Court who often does some of the heaviest intellectual “lifting.” Someone mention here that Scalia supposedly said at a college speech that a candidate in a case involving an election dispute would have “standing” i.e. Alan Keyes to name one person.

We need to see if he did say that or find evidence that a candidate has standing. Did Leo point that out in referencing Bush v. Gore?

I think the harder part may be proving the
“harm.” Are the big issues “standing” and “harm?”

Does Keyes have “standing” based on Bush v. Gore? Where a candidate in an election has standing? Someone said Scalia said at a college speech that a candidate would have standing in an election dispute. If Scalia said this then Keyes has standing or anyone who ran in 2008 for POTUS.

The other issue I think may be harder is “harm.”

Phil Berg said on Michael Savage last week he is working to get his sealed case unsealed soon but said he could not talk about it. His forums will not allow any posts on the sealed case. I wonder if this is why the “chatter” is up by O’s people. I wonder what Phil has?

Not to change the topic but two other sort of weird issues:

1. The Globe’s story on the g*y issue? It was graphic. Why would they throw that story out there? The Bush getting drunk and made or Clintoin & Hillary fighting in the White House stories are fairly tame stuff. What does the Globe have to gain by running a story like that? I think they would have a lot to lose and he is vendictive. It is really odd.

2. Obama being adopted by American Indian tribe or family? This was a small story I think just after the election? Was it nothing or some weird insurance in case he loses the birth certificate cases? It was just odd.

Yup. Robert’s predecessor, William Rehnquist (good man too), was an avid poker player (like Leo).

My guess is Chief Justice Roberts was doing a little poker playing with you know who.

Far be it from me to think what the Chief Justice might have been thinking.

However, bo has breached his Constitutional Contract which I think was a fraud in the formation and said fraud by bo will be proven shortly.

updates:

http://www.therightsideoflife.com/

Here is the Law Read it for yourself:
http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/18C115.txt
TITLE 18 - CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
PART I - CRIMES
CHAPTER 115 - TREASON, SEDITION, AND SUBVERSIVE
ACTIVITIES
Sec. 2387. Activities affecting armed forces generally
-STATUTE-
(a) Whoever, with intent to interfere with, impair, or
influence the loyalty, morale, or discipline of the military or naval forces of the United States:
(1) advises, counsels, urges, or in any manner causes
or attempts to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny,
or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval forces of the United States; or
(2) distributes or attempts to distribute any written
or printed matter which advises, counsels, or urges
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval forces of the United States -Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his
conviction. (b) For the purposes of this section, the
term “military or naval forces of the United States” includes the Army of the United States,
the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Navy
Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve of the United States; and, when any merchant vessel is
commissioned in the Navy or is in the service of the Army or the Navy, includes the master, officers, and crew of such vessel. ]

***********************************************************

And this is what Orly allegedly said to Military.com about her knowledge of said Law:

California dentist turned attorney Orly Taitz, who has brought the lawsuit, told Military.com Tuesday that it is her “understanding that there will not be a serious consequence to his career [for his statements], but I don’t know for sure.”

http://www.military.com/news/article/February-2009/officer-calls-obama-usurper-imposter-president.html?col=1186032325324

At the very least Orly owes a duty to her clients to posts said Laws on her Blog and state her understanding of said Laws.

Orly is not sweating it out in the desert in Iraq.

It is a different matter entirely for Active Military like Lt. Easterling.

An Army Lieutenant simply does not have the discretion to disobey an Order unless he can prove that said Order is unlawful.

Orly has not proven that any of BO’s Orders are unlawful.

Frankly, I doubt that Orly can prove anything other than she might be a fair Dentist.

National Association of Military Defense Lawyers

For any Military Officers with questions about how to proceed in a case against Bo.

Go here for answers to your Questions:

http://www.namdl.org/

I said this same thing on another thread, but since you post it here, too... I will likewise comment.

You said — National Association of Military Defense Lawyers

For any Military Officers with questions about how to proceed in a case against Bo.

—

Yes, that sounds like a wise decision, for anyone in that position. We don’t want our military people “thrown to the dogs” for something that they may have thought would help (but yet, find out that they just ruined their own lives, as a result). That wouldn’t be a good idea for them, personally.

I would hate to think of something bad happening to our military people, in retirement, after having served us so well during their time of duty.

I’m glad you’re pointing this out to people... (sometimes others don’t care what damage some things can do to a person, in their own personal life)...

Bingo 2 !
I thought the AOL/Netscape poll on persistant Obama rumors was sorta “in your face”Sunday afternoon.

The BO supporters at NBC would not have sent this story about Orly and Lt. Easterling to all their TV Stations across the US unless they wanted to publicize Orly’s Military Cases because BO’s lawyers set her up knowing that Orly was not an experienced enough lawyer to win a case against BO.

http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/us_world/US-Soldier-Calls-Obama-an-Impostor.html

U.S. Supreme Court
Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915)
Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell

No. 813

Argued April 13, 1915

Decided June 21, 1915

238 U.S. 537

ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Syllabus

In quo warranto proceedings brought in the name of the United States on the relation of a citizen and taxpayer of the District of Columbia for the purpose of ousting from the office of Civil Commissioner of the District one appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate on the ground that he was not, as required by the Act of June 11, 1878, c. 180, § 1, 20 Stat. 103, an actual resident of the District of Columbia for three years next preceding his appointment, held that:

In early days, usurpation of office was treated as a crime, and could be prosecuted only as such and by duly authorized prosecuting officer, and a private citizen could not prosecute such a proceeding.

Subsequently, after modification of the criminal features, the writ of quo warranto came to be used as a means of determining which of two claimants was entitled to an office.

Under the District Code of 1902, quo warranto is not limited to proceedings against municipal officers, but extends to all persons in the District exercising any office, civil or military; these provisions never having been judicially interpreted heretofore, this

Page 238 U. S. 538

case must be determined according to the special language of that Code in the light of general principles applicable to quo warranto.

Owing to the many reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with litigation over his right to hold office, Congress has not authorized, but has placed obstacles in the way of, a private citizen on his own motion to attack an incumbent’s title to office.

Under the District of Columbia Code, a third person may not institute quo warranto proceedings without the consent of the law officers of the government and also of the Supreme Court of the District.

The District Code makes a distinction between a “third person” and an “interested person” in maintaining quo warranto proceedings.

While every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law and in having only qualified officers execute the law, such general interest is not a private but a public interest, which is not sufficient to authorize the institution of quo warranto proceedings.

The mere fact that one is a citizen and taxpayer of the District of Columbia does not make him an interested party who may maintain quo warranto proceedings against the incumbent of an office on the consent of the court, although the law officers of the government refuse such consent.

An interested person within the meaning of the provisions of the District Code in regard to quo warranto proceedings is one who has an interest in the office itself peculiar to himself whether the office be elective or appointive.

Unless the right to maintain quo warranto proceedings under the District Code were limited to persons actually and personally interested, every officer attached to the government at Washington would be subject to attack by persons having no claim in the office or interest therein different from that of every other citizen and taxpayer of the United States.

As §§ 1538-1540, Code District of Columbia, apply to actions in quo warranto instituted by authorized parties against national officers of the United States, they are general laws of the United States, and not merely local laws of the District of Columbia, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District construing those sections is reviewable by this Court under § 250, Judicial Code.

43 App.D.C. 53 reversed.

Page 238 U. S. 539

The President, on June 23, 1913, nominated Oliver P. Newman as Civil Commissioner of the District of Columbia. The nomination was referred to a standing committee of the Senate. Certain persons filed objections to the confirmation on the ground that “Newman had not been an actual resident of the District for three years immediately prior to his nomination,” and therefore was not qualified to hold the office under the provision of the Act of 1878 [Footnote 1] (20 Stat. 103, § 1).

At the hearing before the committee, there was testimony that Newman, who was a newspaper correspondent, came to Washington in March, 1910, with the intention of becoming a resident of the District. He rented an apartment in which he resided until the opening of the Presidential Campaign, in the summer of 1912. He was then assigned to newspaper work which took him out of the city. He accepted the employment upon the understanding that it was a temporary arrangement and that he was to return to Washington as soon as the campaign was over. In the discharge of his duties as correspondent, he was absent in Chicago and other places until the inauguration. He then returned to Washington and was there living when, on June 23, 1913, he was appointed one of the Civil Commissioners of the District. The committee made a favorable report, and he was then confirmed by the Senate.

Thereafter, William J. Frizzell called the attention of the Attorney General and the district attorney to facts which, he insisted, “proved that Newman had not been an actual resident of the District for three years next preceding his nomination.” On the basis of such facts,

Page 238 U. S. 540

he requested those officers to institute quo warranto proceedings for the purpose of ousting Newman from the office. Both officers declined the request, and thereupon Frizzell, alleging himself to be a citizen and a taxpayer of the District, applied to the Supreme Court of the District for permission to use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings. The court granted the request, and thereupon this case of the “United States on the relation of William J. Frizzell v. Oliver P. Newman” was instituted.

The respondent demurred on many grounds, among others, that Frizzell was not an interested person, and that the court could not go behind the finding of the President and of the Senate that Newman was qualified. The demurrer was overruled and the case submitted to the jury to decide the question of fact as to Newman’s residence. Testimony was taken explanatory of his absence from Washington on newspaper work. The court, among other things, charged the jury that there was a difference between “legal residence” and “actual residence.” Under the charge, the jury found against Newman. The judgment ousting him from the office was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District, one judge dissenting.

The case is here on a writ of error which raises several important questions which, however, cannot be decided if, under the laws of the District of Columbia, Frizzell, as a private citizen, was not authorized to institute this proceeding to test the title to a public office to which he himself made no claim.

Page 238 U. S. 543

MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the Court.

1. Usurpation of a public office from an early day was treated as a crime, and, like all other crimes, could be prosecuted only in the name of the King by his duly authorized law officers. When a judgment was obtained against the intruder, he was not only ousted from his office,

Page 238 U. S. 544

but fined for his criminal usurpation. A private citizen could no more prosecute such a proceeding in his own name than he could in his own name prosecute for the crime of murder, even though the victim was his near kinsman.

2. But, in time, the criminal features were modified, and it was recognized that there might be many cases which, though justifying quo warranto proceedings, were not of such general importance as to require the attorney general to take charge of the litigation. This was especially true in reference to the usurpation of certain municipal offices named in 9th Anne, c. 20. By that act, passed in 1710, it was therefore provided that it should be lawful

“for the proper officer, by leave of the court, to exhibit an information in the nature of a quo warranto at the relation of any person desiring to prosecute the same”

against the designated municipal officers. The writ thus came to be used as a means of determining which of two claimants was entitled to an office, but continued to be so far treated as a criminal proceeding as to warrant not only a judgment of ouster, but a fine against the respondent if he was found to have been guilty of usurpation. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U. S. 282. This quasi-criminal act was adopted in some of the American states, and formed the basis of statutes in others. It does not seem ever to have been of force in any form in the District of Columbia. Torbert v. Bennett, 24 Wash.Law Rep. 156.

In 1902, Congress adopted a District Code, containing a chapter on quo warranto which, though modeled after the English statute, differed therefrom in several material particulars. The writ was treated as a civil remedy; it was not limited to proceedings against municipal officers, but to all persons who in the District exercised any office, civil or military. It was made available to test the right to exercise a public franchise or to hold an office in a private corporation. Instead of providing that “any person desiring to prosecute” might do so with the consent

Page 238 U. S. 545

of the court, certain restrictions were imposed and one enlargement of the right was made. These provisions [Footnote 2] have never received judicial interpretation. This case must therefore be determined according to the special language of that Code, in the light of general principles applicable to quo warranto, — the prerogative writ by which

Page 238 U. S. 546

the government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise.

3. The District Code still treats usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. It permits those proceedings to be instituted by the Attorney General of the United States and by the attorney for the District of Columbia. By virtue of their position, they, at their discretion and acting under the sense of official responsibility, can institute such proceedings in any case they deem proper. But there are so many reasons of public policy against permitting a public officer to be harassed with litigation over his right to hold office that the Code not only does not authorize a private citizen, on his own motion, to attack the incumbent’s title, but it throws obstacles in the way of all such private attacks. It recognizes, however, that there might be instances in which it would be proper to allow such proceedings to be instituted by a third person, but it provides that such “third person” must not only secure the consent of the law officers of the government, but the consent of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia before he can use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.

4. The Code — making a distinction between a “third person” and an “interested person” — recognizes also that there might be instances in which a person might have such an interest in the matter as to entitle him to a hearing, even where he had failed to secure the consent of the Attorney General or District Attorney to use the name of the United States. Section 1540 deals with that case, and provides that, where these law officers have refused the request of a “person interested,” he may apply to the court by a verified petition for leave to have said writ issue. If, in the opinion of the court, his reasons are sufficient in law, the said writ shall be allowed to be

Page 238 U. S. 547

issued in the name of the United States on the relation of said interested person on his giving security for costs.

If the question of Frizzell’s “interest” here had depended upon a matter about which the evidence was in conflict, the finding of the supreme court might not be subject to review. But if the established facts show that, as a matter of law, he was not an “interested person,” the court had no authority to grant him permission to use the name of the government, and the case must be dismissed. So that the fundamental question is whether the law of force in the District permitted him, as a private citizen, without the consent of the law officers, to test Newman’s title to the public office of Civil Commissioner.

Frizzell does not allege that he had been an incumbent of that office and had been unlawfully ousted before his term expired. He does not set up any claim to the office. And, of course, if he, as a citizen and a taxpayer, has the right to institute these proceedings, any other citizen and taxpayer has a similar right to institute proceedings against Newman and all others who “exercise within the District . . . a public office, civil or military.” District Code, §1538(1). Such result would defeat the whole policy of the law, which still regards usurpation as a public wrong to be dealt with primarily by the public prosecutors.

5. In a sense — in a very important sense — every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law, in the administration of law, and in having only qualified officers execute the law. But that general interest is not a private, but a public, interest. Being such, it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District Attorney, who are expected by themselves or those they authorize to institute quo warranto proceedings against usurpers in the same way that they are expected to institute proceedings against any other violator of the law.

Page 238 U. S. 548

That general public interest is not sufficient to authorize a private citizen to institute such proceedings, for, if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer would have the same interest and the same right to institute such proceedings, and a public officer might, from the beginning to the end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.

6. As pointed out in the carefully prepared opinion of the majority of the Court of Appeals of the District, there is much conflict as to the meaning of the phrase “interested person” in this class of cases. At first reading, the conflict seems irreconcilable. But, upon examination, it will appear that the difference is often due to a difference in the public policy and statutes of the respective states. In some, the writ issues only at the request of the government’s law officers; in others, at the instance of a person claiming the office; in others, at the request of a person claiming the office or interested therein; in others, at the instance of a person interested; in others, at the request of any person who can secure the consent of the court, and in five or six others, the legislature has thrown open the door and permitted any person who desires to do so to use the writ. This is true of the acts underlying some of the decisions relied on by the relator, Frizzell.

For example, the English cases are based on the statute of 9th Anne, c. 20, which, in terms, related to suits against those “who unlawfully exercise an office within cities, towns and boroughs.” It expressly authorized the courts to permit informations in the nature of quo warranto “at the relation of any person . . . desiring to sue or prosecute the same.” Some of the other decisions cited are from states where the statute provides that the proceedings might be instituted at the relation of “any person desiring to present the same;” “upon the complaint of any private party;” “upon the relation of any person desiring to sue or prosecute the same.” But there

Page 238 U. S. 549

are so many and such weighty reasons against permitting private persons to raise questions as to the incumbent’s title to a public office that, even in those states which permit “any person” to institute quo warranto, the courts have always required the relator to show that he was a citizen and taxpayer.

The act of Congress of force in the District, instead of being limited to municipal officers, applies to any office, “civil or military,” and differs from those in any of these states. It specially differs from those which treat the writ as being available to any person. The Code provides that a “third person” — the equivalent of “any person” — may institute the proceedings only after he had secured the consent of the law officers and the court. It makes a distinction between a “third person” and an “interested person,” and provides that, if the Attorney General refuses to give his consent to the latter, such “interested person” may secure the right to use the name of the government by satisfying the Supreme Court of the District that his reasons for applying therefore are sufficient in law.

Frizzell applied to the Attorney General for permission to institute the proceedings. Failing to secure that consent, he then applied to the Supreme Court, claiming that the fact that he was a citizen and a taxpayer made him an “interested person,” entitled to the use of the writ. But such a construction would practically nullify the requirement to obtain the consent of the Attorney General and the District Attorney. For, if being a citizen and a taxpayer was sufficient to warrant the court in giving the consent, it was useless to require an application to be first made to the Attorney General, because practically every litigant would have the qualification of citizenship, and many would have that of being a property owner.

7. Considering the ancient policy of the law and the restrictions imposed by the language of the Code, it is evident that, in passing this statute, Congress used the

Page 238 U. S. 550

words “third person” in the sense of “any person,” and the phrase “person interested” in the sense in which it so often occurs in the law, prohibiting a judge from presiding in a case in which he is interested; preventing a juror from sitting in a case in which he is interested, and permitting interested persons to institute quo warranto proceedings. In the illustrations suggested, the interest which a judge had as a member of the public would not disqualify him from sitting in a case of great public importance and in which the community at large was concerned. The interest which disqualifies a juror from serving, as well as the interest which would authorize this plaintiff to sue, must be some personal and direct interest in the subject of the litigation. The same definition has often been given in quo warranto cases. The interest which will justify such a proceeding by a private individual must be more than that of another taxpayer. It must be “an interest in the office itself, and must be peculiar to the applicant.” Demarest v. Wickham, 63 N.Y. 320; Commonwealth ex Rel. McLaughlin v. Cluley, 56 Pa.St. 270; State v. Taylor, 208 Mo. 442; Robinson v. Jones, 14 Fla. 256; In re Stein, 13 Neb. 529; State ex Rel. Depue v. Matthews, 44 W.Va. 372, 384; Com. ex Rel. Butterfield v. McCarter, 98 Pa.St. 607; State v. Boal, 46 Mo. 528; Brown v. Alderman, 82 Vt. 529; Mills v. State, 2 Wash. 572; Antrim v. Reardon, 161 Ind. 250; Harrison v. Greaves, 58 Miss. 455; Andrews v. State, 69 Miss. 740(3), 746; Tontray v. Budge, 14 Idaho, 639; Hudson v. Conklin, 77 Kan. 764; Vrooman v. Michie, 69 Mich. 47; Dakota v. Hauxhurst, 3 Dak. 205.

The language of the Code, supported by the history and policy of the law, sustains the proposition that one who has no interest except that which is common to every other member of the public is not entitled to use the name of the government in quo warranto proceedings.

Page 238 U. S. 551

For if the allegations in such a suit by a private citizen set out any cause of action at all, it shows on its face that it was a cause of action belonging to the whole body of the public, and which therefore should be prosecuted by the public representative.

The rule is the same regardless whether the office is elective or appointive. For in neither case is there any intent to permit the public office to be the subject matter of private litigation at the instance of one who has no interest therein which differs from that of every other member of the public. The claim that this construction makes the statute nugatory cannot be sustained, for the statute, as already pointed out, gives a person who has been unlawfully ousted before his term expired a right, on proof of interest, to the issuance of the writ, and there might be cases under the civil service law in which the relator would have an interest and therefore a right to be heard.

8. The conclusion that the relator must have a personal interest in the office before he can sue in the name of the United States is strengthened by the fact that the courts of the District not only have jurisdiction to issued quo warranto against officers of the District, but against all those, attached to the seat of government, who held a statutory office. For, if a private citizen and taxpayer could institute quo warranto proceedings to test the title to the office of Civil Commissioner of the District, he could, under the same claim of right, institute like proceedings against any of those statutory officers of the United States who, in the District, exercise many important functions which affect persons and things throughout the entire country.

The President has the power of removal, and there have been few, if any, cases brought to test the title of federal offices. But such cases might arise as to statutory officers attached to the seat of government, and if

Page 238 U. S. 552

they did, the Supreme Court of the District could exercise quo warranto jurisdiction, as it now does in cases of mandamus and injunction against appointed federal officers who perform duties in Washington. This appears from comparing the provisions of Rev.Stat. §§ 1795 and 1796 with § 1538(1) of the District Code. The Revised Statutes declare that the District of Columbia shall be the seat of government, and “all offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia.” The Code (§ 1538(1)) provides that the supreme court shall have jurisdiction to grant quo warranto “against a person who unlawfully holds or exercises within the District a . . . public office, civil or military.” It was probably because of this fact that national officers might be involved that the Attorney General of the United States was given power to institute such proceedings, instead of leaving that power to the District Attorney alone, as would probably have been the case if only District officers were referred to in the Code.

Manifestly, Congress did not intend that all these officers attached to the executive branch of the government at Washington should be subject to attacks by persons who had no claim on the office, no right in the office, and no interest which was different from that of every other citizen and taxpayer of the United States.

9. This fact also shows that §§ 1538-1540 of the District Code, in proper cases, instituted by proper officers or persons, may be enforceable against national officers of the United States. The sections are therefore to be treated as general laws of the United States, not as mere local laws of the District. Being a law of general operation, it can be reviewed on writ of error from this Court. American Co. v. Commissioners of the District, 224 U. S. 491; McGowan v. Parish, 228 U. S. 317.

It follows that the motion to dismiss is denied; the

Page 238 U. S. 553

application for a writ of certiorari is refused, the judgment is reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the quo warranto proceedings.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE McKENNA and MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissent.

MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER dissents upon the ground that, the sections of the District Code being local laws, the case cannot be reviewed here on writ of error.

[Footnote 1]

“The two persons appointed from civil life shall, at the time of their appointment, be citizens of the United States, and shall have been actual residents of the District of Columbia for three years next before their appointment, and have, during that period, claimed residence nowhere else. . . .”

[Footnote 2]

“SEC. 1538. Against whom issued. — A quo warranto may be issued from the Supreme Court of the District in the name of the United States —”

“First. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises within the District a franchise or public office, civil or military, or an office in any domestic corporation.”

“Second. Against any one or more persons who act as a corporation within the District without being duly authorized, or exercise within the District any corporate rights, privileges, or franchises not granted them by the laws in force in said District.”

“And said proceedings shall be deemed a civil action.”

“SEC. 1539. Who may institute. — The Attorney General or the District Attorney may institute such proceeding on his own motion, or on the relation of a third person. But such writ shall not be issued on the relation of a third person except by leave of the court, to be applied for by the relator, by a petition duly verified, setting forth the grounds of the application, or until the relator shall file a bond with sufficient surety, to be approved by the clerk of the court, in such penalty as the court may prescribe, conditioned for the payment by him of all costs incurred in the prosecution of the writ in case the same shall not be recovered from and paid by the defendant.”

“SEC. 1540. If Attorney General and district attorney refuse. — If the Attorney General and District Attorney shall refuse to institute such proceeding on the request of a person interested, such person may apply to the court by verified petition for leave to have said writ issued, and if in the opinion of the court the reasons set forth in said petition are sufficient in law, the said writ shall be allowed to be issued by any attorney, in the name of the United States, on the relation of said interested person, on his compliance with the condition prescribed in the last section as to security for costs.”

“SEC. 1541. Relator claiming office. — When such proceeding is against a person for usurping an office on the relation of a person claiming the same office, the relator shall set forth in his petition the facts upon which he claims to be entitled to the office.”

Civil Cases
	Name	Court	Case No.	Filed	NOS	Closed
1	OBAMA, B	ilcdce	3:2008cv03169	08/04/2008	440	08/15/2008
Armstead v. HSBC Card Services et al
2	OBAMA, B.	ilndce	1:2008cv04487	08/08/2008	550	09/23/2008
Luevano v. Obama et al
3	OBAMA, B. H.	hidce	1:2009cv00006	01/06/2009	441	01/27/2009
Roy v. Bush et al
4	OBAMA, B. H.	hidce	1:2009cv00041	01/29/2009	441
Roy v. Obama
5	OBAMA, B. H.	hidce	1:2008cv00362	08/11/2008	440	08/27/2008
Roy vs. USDC
6	OBAMA, B. H.	hidce	1:2008cv00424	09/22/2008	441	10/22/2008
Roy v. USA Govt et al
7	OBAMA, B. H.	hidce	1:2008cv00580	12/22/2008	441
Roy v. Obama et al
8	OBAMA, B.H.	hidce	1:2009cv00048	02/03/2009	440
Roy vs. Obama
9	OBAMA, B.H.	hidce	1:2008cv00448	10/08/2008	440	10/27/2008
Roy v. Federal Election Commission et al
10	OBAMA, BARACK	dedce	1:2009cv00014	12/29/2008	550
Gadson v. Obama et al
11	OBAMA, BARACK	nhdce	1:1997mc00024	12/04/1997	0	12/09/1997
WILSON MASTER FILE v. ALL DEFENDANTS, et al
12	OBAMA, BARACK	kyedce	3:2008cv00028	06/10/2008	530	07/11/2008
Becker v. Mukasey et al
13	OBAMA, BARACK	tnmdce	3:2008mc00036	02/01/2008		02/05/2008
Ervin v. Bush et al
14	OBAMA, BARACK	ilndce	1:2007cv00053	01/16/2007	550	01/16/2007
Awala v. Norgle et al
15	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2009cv00079	01/14/2009	550	01/14/2009
HYLAND v. OBAMA et al
16	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00088	01/14/2005	550	11/25/2005
RIVERA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al
17	OBAMA, BARACK	candce	3:2007cv00109	01/09/2007	440
Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. et al v. Bush et al
18	OBAMA, BARACK	nddce	3:2008cv00126	12/16/2008	330
Gleeson v. McDonald
19	OBAMA, BARACK	tnmdce	3:2008cv00146	02/12/2008	440	02/12/2008
Ervin v. Bush et al
20	OBAMA, BARACK	txwdce	5:2008cv00159	02/28/2008	440	03/18/2008
Smith v. University of Texas At Austin et al
21	OBAMA, BARACK	nhdce	1:2008cv00185	05/09/2008	530	06/10/2008
Becker v. Blightler et al
22	OBAMA, BARACK	flndce	1:2007cv00187	09/28/2007	440	10/06/2008
MORRIS v. BUSH et al
23	OBAMA, BARACK	caedce	1:2006cv00195	02/22/2006	530	04/10/2006
(HC) Thomas v. Federal Congress et al
24	OBAMA, BARACK	flndce	1:2008cv00208	09/26/2008	440	12/12/2008
MORRIS v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO et al
25	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00270	02/04/2005	530	04/09/2007
EL-MASHAD et al v. BUSH et al
26	OBAMA, BARACK	flmdce	3:2008cv00284	03/20/2008	441
Bloom et al v. The Democratic National Committe et al
27	OBAMA, BARACK	mndce	0:2008cv00360	02/11/2008	440	03/19/2008
Sinclair v. Obama et al
28	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00492	03/10/2005	530	04/09/2007
AZIZ et al v. BUSH et al
29	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00569	03/18/2005	530	04/09/2007
SALAHI et al v. BUSH et al
30	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00748	04/11/2005	530	05/30/2007
ABOASSY et al v. BUSH et al
31	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00765	04/15/2005	530
HABASHI et al v. BUSH et al
32	OBAMA, BARACK	ilndce	1:1996cv00823	02/13/1996	440	03/04/1996
Ewell v. Bd of Elect Comm, et al
33	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv00877	05/03/2005	530	04/09/2007
KHIALI-GUL v. BUSH et al
34	OBAMA, BARACK	flmdce	8:2008cv00948	03/20/2008	441	05/28/2008
Bloom et al v. The Democratic National Committe et al
35	OBAMA, BARACK	flmdce	3:2007cv00964	10/11/2007	440	11/26/2007
Herbert v. United States of America et al
36	OBAMA, BARACK	paedce	2:2006cv01055	03/09/2006	550	07/26/2006
RICHES v. BUSH et al
37	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01124	06/07/2005	530	05/30/2007
MOUSOVI et al v. BUSH et al
38	OBAMA, BARACK	miwdce	1:2008cv01154	12/08/2008	440	01/06/2009
Hyland #228879 v. Levin et al
39	OBAMA, BARACK	flmdce	3:2008cv01164	12/04/2008	440
Herbert v. Obama et al
40	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01189	06/14/2005	530	04/09/2007
KHALIFH et al v. BUSH et al
41	OBAMA, BARACK	flmdce	3:2008cv01201	12/15/2008	440	01/21/2009
Herbert v. United States of America et al
42	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2008cv01224	07/17/2008	530
GUL v. BUSH et al
43	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2008cv01228	07/17/2008	530
HADI v. BUSH et al
44	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2008cv01232	07/17/2008	530
BIN ATEF v. BUSH et al
45	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2008cv01237	07/17/2008	530
AL WADY v. BUSH et al
46	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01353	07/05/2005	530	05/09/2007
SAIB et al v. BUSH et al
47	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2008cv01430	08/18/2008	550	09/11/2008
THORNTON-BEY v. OBAMA
48	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01487	06/13/2008	530
SADKHAN v. BUSH et al
49	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01497	07/29/2005	530
AL WIRGHI et al v. BUSH et al
50	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01506	07/28/2005	530	05/15/2007
SHAFIIQ et al v. BUSH et al
51	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2005cv01592	08/09/2005	530
ATTASH et al v. BUSH et al
52	OBAMA, BARACK	moedce	4:2008cv01757	11/12/2008	550	01/08/2009
Towne v. Obama
53	OBAMA, BARACK	dcdce	1:2006cv01758	07/31/2008	530
SULIMAN et al v. BUSH et al
54	OBAMA, BARACK	candce	M:2006cv01791	08/14/2006	440
In re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation

338 Total Party matches for selection OBAMA, B
for ALL COURTS

Mon Feb 10 7:57:00 2009

Selections 1 through 54 (Page 1)

ALL of Obama, Soetoro Court Cases on Scribd

338 Total Party matches for selection OBAMA, B for ALL COURTS Mon Feb 10 7:57:00 2009 Selections 1 through 54 (Page 1)

ALL of Obama, Soetoro Court Cases on Scribd

338 Total Party matches for selection OBAMA, B
for ALL COURTS

Mon Feb 10 7:57:00 2009

Selections 1 through 54 (Page 1)