Posted on 12/07/2006 2:46:02 PM PST by TonyInOhio
When history was current events.

Remember Pearl harbor!
Chilling.
And it doesn't list the attackers' identity.
NICE find!!!!
Check the time stamp. At 1830 Zulu Time, all people knew was that bombs were falling.
Pearl Harbor PING
Wow...
Thanks for posting that message.
My wife had a medical test today and needed me to drive her, so I took the day off. I've been watching the History Channel coverage of Pearl Harbor Day since we got home. Great find with the telegram! We must never forget!
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/hart/hart-32.html
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRYSATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1944THIRTY-SECOND DAY
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C.
"The witness made the following statement: ... On the 4th of December, 1941, Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, summarizing significant events up to that date, quoting the "Winds Message", and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent.
Admiral Wilkinson approved this message and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it, and saw it at about three p. m., Washington time, on December 4, 1941.
Admiral Wilkinson asked, "What do you think of the message?" Admiral Noyes replied, "I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief." Admiral Wilkinson stated, "I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man, with a lot of things on his mind, and he may not see the picture as clearly as you and I do. I think it only fair to the Commander-in-Chief that he be given this warning and I intend to send it if I can get it released by the front office."
Admiral Wilkinson then left and I left a few minutes later. At the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I thought that this warning message had been sent, and did not realize until two years later, when I studied the Roberts report very carefully, that McCollum's message had not been sent.
In order to clarify the above statement and my answer to a previous question, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the "Winds Message". The "Winds Message" was a name given by Army and Navy personnel performing radio intelligence duties to identify a plain-language Japanese news broadcast in which a fictitious weather report gave warning of the intentions of the Japanese Government with respect to war against the United States, Britain (including the N. E. I.), and Russia.
We received a tip-off from the British in Singapore in late November, 1941, which was immediately forwarded to the Navy Department by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, with an information copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. We also received a tip-of from the Dutch in Java through the American Consul General and through the Senior Military Observer. The Dutch tip-off was handled in routine fashion by the coding rooms of the State [361] Department, War Department, and Navy Department.
The Director of Naval Intelligence requested that special effort be made to monitor Radio Tokyo to catch the "Winds Message" when it should be sent, and this was done. From November 28 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, Tokyo broadcast schedules were monitored by about 12 intercept stations, as follows: N. E. I. at Java; British at Singapore; U. S. Army at Hawaii and San Francisco; U. S. Navy at Corregidor, Hawaii, Bremerton, and four or five stations along the Atlantic seaboard.
All Navy intercept stations in the continental United States were directed to forward all Tokyo plain-language broadcasts by teletype, and Bainbridge Island ran up bills of sixty dollars per day for this material alone.
The "Winds Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it.
The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java, and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii.
It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department, failed to send out information that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (jg) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer, who came down that evening and identified that message as the "Winds Message" we had been looking for.
The significant part of the "Winds Message" read: "HIGASHI NO KAZE AME. NISHI NO KAZE HARE. The negative form of KITA NO KAZE KUMORI". The literal translation of these phrases is: "EAST WIND RAIN. WEST WIND CLEAR. NEITHER NORTH WIND NOR CLOUDY". The meaning of this message from the previously mentioned tip-off was: "War with the United States. War with Britain, including the N. E. I., etc. Peace with Russia".
I first saw the "Winds Message" about 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, December 4, 1941. Lieutenant A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., came into my office with a big smile on his face and a piece of paper in his hand and said, "Here it is!" as he handed me the "Winds Message".
As I remember, it was the original yellow teletype sheet with the significant "Winds" underscored and the meaning in Kramer's handwriting at the bottom. Smooth copies of the translation were immediately prepared and distributed to Naval Intelligence and to S. I. S. in the War Department.
As the direct result of the "Winds Message", I prepared a total of five messages, which were released between 1200 and 1600 that date, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers by certain activities on the Asiatic Station.
As a direct result of the "Winds Message", McCollum drafted the long warning message, previously referred to, which was disapproved by higher authority, but which the Navy Department C. I. Unit believed had been sent.
Both Naval Intelligence and the Navy Department C. I. Unit regarded the "Winds Message" as definitely committing the Japanese Government to war with the United States and Britain, whereas the information of earlier dates had been merely statements of intent.
We believed that the Japanese would attack by Saturday (December 6), or by Sunday (December 7) at the latest.
The following officers recall having seen and having read the "Winds Message": [362] Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander F. M. Brotherhood, U S. N. R., Lieutenant Commander A. A. Murray, U. S. N. R., and Lieutenant (jg) F. L. Freeman, U. S. N. The following officers knew by hearsay that the "Winds Message" had been intercepted but did not actually see it themselves: Commander L. W. Parke, U. S. N., Lieutenant Commander G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R., Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N., and Major F. B. Rowlett, Signal Corps Reserve. The following officers should have some recollection of the "Winds Message": U. S. Navy-Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Captain A. H. McCollum, Colonel R. A. Boone (U. S. Marine Corps), Commander G. W. Welker, Commander A. D. Kramer, Lieutenant Commander A. V. Pering, and Ship's Clerk H. L. Bryant. U. S. Army-Brigadier General T. J. Betts, Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Colonel R. S. Bratton, Colonel Rex Minckler, Colonel Moses Pettigrew, Colonel Harold Doud, and Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Shukraft.
The "Winds Message" was last seen by myself about December 14, 1941, when the papers which had been distributed in early December were assembled by Kramer, checked by myself, and then turned over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission, according to my understanding at the time.
Further information as to Pearl Harbor's estimates of locations of Japanese forces in early December, 1941, may be found in the monthly report of Station "H"-in the "Chronology" which was prepared daily and forwarded weekly by air mail. This information was, of course, prepared by and currently available to the Pearl Harbor C. I. Unit but was not received in the Navy Department until a delay of about two weeks.
Note: The examining officer has identified the documents mentioned by witness as being C. I. Station "H" "Chronology" for December 1-December 6, 1941, inclusive, now on file in Communication Intelligence Section (Op 20G), Office of Director, Naval Communications, Communication Annex, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., to which is attached a summary of more important extracts, made by the witness under examination.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 11:37 a. m., was adjourned to await the call of the examining officer."
Wow!!
"Remember Pearl harbor!"
Thank you for this "TonyInOhio" I will never forget Pearl Harbor or Wake Island. God Bless All that fought in WW2. America is still here because of what they ALL did. From 1775 till today and beyond there is a SPECIAL GROUP of PEOPLE that are the REASON that AMERICA is still here.
index for later
65th anniversary bump.
Interesting, I didn't know about the Winds Message.
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Hawaii Local Time = GMT - 10 [Hours]
Greenwich Mean Time [GMT] = Zulu Time
1830 Zulu Time minus 10 hours = 8:30 AM HT
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