US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice salutes a US Marine as she walks towards a helicopter upon her departure from Beirut after meeting with Lebanese officials.
STRATFOR:
Special Report: The Israeli Puzzle
By George Friedman
The question that is now most pressing is figuring out exactly what Israel is up to. Hezbollah's strategy is fairly clear-cut: Now that the war has started, it cannot maneuver in the open, for fear of Israeli air power; therefore, it is holding its positions, absorbing the airstrikes and engaging Israeli troops as they approach. Hezbollah continues to fire rockets at Israel. The longer it fights and the more resistance it offers, the more of a psychological blow it inflicts on the Israelis and the more it improves its credibility as a fighting force and its influence among groups resisting Israel. In an ideal form, the Israelis would be drawn into Lebanon, forced into an occupation and forced to fight the kind of counterinsurgency in which the United States is now engaged in Iraq.
Israel's stated goal is the destruction of Hezbollah's ability to wage war. This means shutting down Hezbollah's rocket attacks, engaging and destroying deployed forces, destroying Hezbollah's support infrastructure -- and doing this so thoroughly that Hezbollah either will not recover its capabilities or will take years to do so. Israeli forces also must do this without being drawn into an occupation that Hezbollah and others could draw out into an extended counterinsurgency operation. In other words, Israel's goal is to shatter Hezbollah without an extended occupation of Lebanon.
Thus far, Israel's strategy has focused on an air campaign. Supplementing the air campaign has been a substantial mobilization of ground forces and a very shallow insertion of these forces along the southern Lebanese frontier. This is where the mystery begins.
Historically, Israel has tried to fight wars as quickly as possible. There are three reasons for this. First, Israel is casualty-averse and fears wars of attrition. The rapid destruction of enemy forces has always been a principle. Second, large-scale mobilization is extremely expensive for Israel economically. Wars need to end quickly, so as to keep the costs of mobilization low. Third, Israel has a dependency on the United States. An example is its need for additional precision-guided munitions and for jet fuel. The United States normally supports Israel but usually wants to see cease-fires put into place as quickly as possible. Therefore, Israel typically has to end major, conventional combat operations as quickly as possible. In previous wars the Israeli model has been sudden, surprise initiation of war or -- when not possible, as in 1973 -- rapid seizure of the initiative, followed by rapid termination.
But to this point, Israel is fighting a very different war. It essentially has been conducting an extended air campaign without significant engagement on the ground. Now, Israeli commanders, heavily influenced by American thinking, have been attracted to the air option: It holds open the promise of destroying the enemy without exposing Israel's forces to extensive casualties. The war can be conducted in an environment in which air power is immune from defenses.
Historically, the air campaign has been seen as incapable of delivering victory except in concert with a ground campaign. In this particular campaign, Israel clearly has not achieved either of its two objectives. First, rocket fire from Hezbollah has not been suppressed. Israel seems to be having the same problem in this area as the United States had in 1991, with its famous Scud Hunt in Iraq. It could eventually work, but it hasn't yet. Second, the air campaign, from the little we have seen, does not appear to have broken Hezbollah's will to resist. The small-unit combat we have had reported from southern Lebanon describes a capable, motivated resistance that could be absorbing more casualties than the Israelis are, but that has not been defeated.
It is difficult, thus, to envision the air war as the totality of the campaign. If the Israelis have counted on this to be sufficient, it has failed so far. It also is difficult to imagine the Israeli air force having convinced the army that an air campaign by itself would suffice. Therefore, we are drawn to one of two conclusions: Either the main effort will come on the ground but has not yet been launched, or the Israelis envision some diplomatic solution to the problem of Hezbollah. In other words, the air campaign is either preparation for a ground invasion, or it is designed to set the stage for a political settlement.
The Political Option
Let's examine the second possibility. Obviously, there has been a tremendous amount of diplomatic activity going on, not least of which has been U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to the region. There are myriad possibilities, but in the end -- from Israel's point of view -- any settlement must contain the following elements:
1. An end to rocket attacks against Israel and the release of captured Israeli soldiers.
2. Controls over Hezbollah by a third party to assure that Hezbollah would cease to be a threat to Israel.
The first issue can be readily dealt with; the second cannot. First, there is no force that can impose controls on Hezbollah, or that can do so without incurring other consequences. The Lebanese army, even if it had the will, is simply not strong enough to engage and defeat Hezbollah. An outside peacekeeping force -- from Europe, for example -- would not be prepared to engage in direct combat against Hezbollah (or Israel) if either resumed fighting. The assumption that the mere presence of such a force would prevent either party from pursuing their interests assumes that each would fear the consequences of inflicting casualties on the peacekeepers. Since it is not clear that there would be any consequence aside from stern warnings, a third-party buffer would offer no solution for Israel's (or Hezbollah's) security concerns.
There is an assumption that Iran or Syria could simply order Hezbollah to stop the fighting. In our view, this vastly overestimates the political influence of Tehran and Damascus -- or the unity between Iran and Syria. Each has different interests in this fight, the governments are wildly different regimes, and neither has as much trust in the other as might be imagined. Iran is very far away and, though it has covert levers, it has few overt ones. Hezbollah has its own interests in this war -- and though Iran and Syria are enablers, providing the militants with weapons and training, that does not ultimately give them control over Hezbollah. Put it this way: Hezbollah would not be what it is without Syria and Iran, but it does not follow that it is under the control of Syria and Iran. At this point, few if any weapons are getting to the militants anyway. Hezbollah is playing its own game.
One non-Israeli way of controlling Hezbollah is Syria. Syria's army is strong enough to compel Hezbollah to cease fire, and it is in a position to assure compliance. But for that, the army would have to re-enter Lebanon. The United States, concerned about Syria's behavior in Iraq, engaged in maneuvers to force Syria out of Lebanon not too long ago. It is unlikely that the Americans want to see them return. Indeed, Israel, which has quietly collaborated with Syria over Lebanon in the past, might have fewer objections and even a degree of trust in this regard. Certainly, the Israelis do not want to see regime change in Syria, since whatever might succeed Bashar al Assad would be worse, from their point of view. But in the end, relying on Syria to end rocket attacks against Israel would be a tenuous solution at best.
It is therefore difficult to see how diplomacy can produce a solution. Even if Hezbollah is being badly hurt by the air campaign, it is not so bad a beating that it is being crushed. In fact, the diplomatic settlement would give Hezbollah what it has not yet won -- and might not win -- on the battlefield. As for Israel, there is near unanimity in the polls that the Israeli public wants a final resolution of the Hezbollah threat. A solution that would simply postpone such a resolution, such as a cease-fire and a NATO peacekeeping force, would be quickly attacked by Likud -- and we would bet the Olmert government could not survive.
This is a moment when diplomacy cannot provide a resolution that is desirable to either side. Now, it is possible that the Israeli view is that, with extended pounding from the air, Hezbollah will reconsider its position. However, aside from the example of Kosovo -- where Yugoslavia was fighting for what was, in the end, a peripheral interest -- air power simply hasn't forced such a capitulation historically. From what we can see, it isn't producing it this time either.
There is also a public relations shift taking place. In the early days of the air campaign, there was a surprising amount of international support for Israel. As the air campaign wears on and the pictures of civilian casualties beam around the world, that support is deteriorating. Israel is coming under greater political pressure. Shortly, the United States will be experiencing it. As we have said, the United States wants to see Hezbollah crippled. At the same time, the Bush administration is politically weak in the United States and is fighting to recover its balance. An extended Israeli air campaign that is not reaching any recognizable goal will generate pressure inside the United States and might force Washington to pressure Israel to terminate the campaign. Israel will not be able to resist that pressure -- not while it requires re-supply from the United States. Bush, with his poll numbers and increasing problems in Iraq, cannot resist indefinitely either.
Next Moves
Israel is engaged in an air campaign that has not yet achieved its goals, it has mobilized ground forces that are standing by, it is engaged in diplomacy that cannot logically achieve a sustainable end, and it is fighting an enemy that shows every sign of being able to continue to resist -- even after being engaged in air-ground operations. The political window is not closed, but is beginning to close. From Hezbollah's point of view, this can and should go on for a long time. From Israel's point of view, the pressure for war termination is building.
There are three possibilities here:
1. Israel is going to go with the air campaign indefinitely.
2. Israel is going to negotiate a diplomatic solution.
3. Israel is going to wage a ground campaign.
We have explained why the first two options do not appear viable to us. Unless Israel's battle damage assessment of the airstrikes is showing its intelligence people something we can't see from afar, the air campaign is a valuable preparation for a ground war but not a substitute. Unless some sort of strange deal is in the works with Syria, which we doubt, we do not see the shape of a diplomatic settlement. And unless Israel is going to declare victory and just stop, we don't see the war ending. Therefore, our analysis continues to point to a major ground operation.
People we have contacted in Israel keep talking about Israel having some surprises. We already are surprised by the amount of time between the initiation of the air attack and the initiation of a major ground offensive. If the Israelis have more surprises waiting, it will be interesting to see what they are. However, at this point, unless Israel wants to abandon the goal of rendering Hezbollah harmless for an extended period of time, it would seem to us that a massive raid in force, followed by destruction of infrastructure in detail, followed by withdrawal, is the most realistic option remaining.
One other possible explanation for events (and perhaps this is the surprise) is that Israel has been taken aback by Hezbollah's abilities and resilience, and that the Israelis are not certain they can attain their political ends militarily. In other words, the cost of imposing defeat on Hezbollah might be seen as so high, or perhaps unattainable, that the outcome of the war must be something of a stalemate. If that is the case, the balance of power in the region has shifted dramatically and Hezbollah has, in fact, won a victory. Since we do not think Israel will concede that point, we continue to await Israel's move.
We have been told to expect surprises in how Israel does this. We agree fully: We are surprised. We see the Hezbollah plan and it is unfolding -- not as well as it might have hoped, but not that poorly either. We await the Israeli solution to the problem posed by Hezbollah. There will be at least one clear criterion for victory or defeat on both sides. If Hezbollah continues to attack Haifa and other major cities without Israel being able to stop it, or it halts those attacks only after a diplomatic compromise, Hezbollah would have achieved its strategic goal and Israel would have lost. If Israel can end the attacks without making political concessions, Israel would have won. At a certain point, it is as simple as that.
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This is one Abu Yousef Jaffar, can't say if it is the one in question. If it is, his web site will not be getting any of those updates.