Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee left for China today on June 22, 2003. He will be in China till 27 June. This prime ministerial visit follows P V Narasimha Rao¡¦s visit ten years about ago who had signed the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility treaty along the Line of Actual Control on the India-China border in September, 1993 in Beijing.

During his four-day stay in China, the prime minister will make three important speeches. He will visit three cities --the capital Beijing, Shanghai and Luoyang in the Henan province in central China.

There would be two business meets, one in Beijing and the other in Shanghai, with the latter focusing on Information Technology. Both the countries would sign several bilateral accords, including one to ease visa norms. Conceding that there are several contentious issues, Tibet is not expected to figure on the agenda. There are possible Chinese concerns regarding growing Indo-US ties.

Even as the trip begins, taking advantage of the freedom of speech available in India the Chinese government has employed several of its key professors to spread its version of events about 1962 war in the Indian media.

Take the case of Rong Ying who is deputy director for South Asian, Middle Eastern and African studies, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing. He will have the Indian citizens believe that it was India, which attacked China.

Also take not of the misinformation being spread by likes of Wang Hongwei is professor of South Asia regional studies at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and adviser to the Chinese Association for South Asian Studies. He says, it was India which ordered the 'Forward Policy', under which the Indian Army relentlessly attacked the People's Liberation Army's posts along the entire border and killed many Chinese soldiers in an attempt to extrude them out of all the Chinese territory it claimed.

This aggressive and provocative policy not only interrupted the status quo, but also breached the peace and tranquillity along the entire border. In October 1962, Nehru ordered the army to take the offensive and made a statement about it on the 12th of the same month. His statement shocked the whole world. The New York Herald Tribune published an editorial entitled 'Nehru Declares A War Against China' the following day, quotes Hongwei selectively.

Twenty-four years ago Vajpayee, visited China as external affairs minister of the Janata Party government led by Prime Minister Morarji Desai in 1979. But Vajpayee had to cut short his trip after China, invaded Vietnam. Vajpayee has visited China as part of a parliamentary delegation in 1993 also.

The India lost the war imposed on it by the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the Northeast in 1962. The military defeat was termed a Himalyan blunder. Following the defeat India realsied it was ill prepared and it trusted the Chinese and in 'Hindi-Chini bhai bhai' slogan. It is generally believed that the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, defence minister Krishna Menon, and Lieutenant General B N Kaul who was in charge of the army on India's eastern frontier were responsible for this humiliating military debacle.

India claims that Chinese are occupying about 33,000 square kilometres of its territory in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh while China says India is occupying 90,000 square kilometres. China claims the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory. It as not accepted Sikkim as an integral part of India. There are issues like the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in India, China's non-recognition of Sikkim's merger with India, and India's allegation that China is supporting Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Several decades have passed but real story of what happened, what went wrong which is there in Henderson-Brooks report has never been released. The report investigated the lapses of 1962. Since we do not have exact Indian version of what happened lets look at what is being put in public domain.

China wishes to take in India into confidence with ulterior motives. Government officials had confirmed few years back that the North Korean ship detained at Kandla port was carrying vital components of Pyongyang's hi-tech Nodong I ballistic missile.

Ministry of defence officials, meanwhile, pointed out that it was not surprising that the 44-member crew of the North Korean ship had assaulted Indian officials including the Kutch Superintendent of Police A K Singh because "their cat was out of the bag."


Asked to establish the North Korean link with Pakistan's missile programme as the scrutiny of the cargo in Kandla had indicated, the officials pointed out that the Research and Analysis Wing's reports had established such a link with external inputs.

It was emphasised that following Pakistan's Ghauri missile test, the North Korean connection in Islamabad's missile programme had become clear. Since Pakistan wanted a short-range (150 km) missile to counter India's Prithvi it simply ordered them from the North Korean arsenal, albeit in a dismantled form.

According to senior MEA officials, North Korea is heavily involved with ballistic missile production with China and Iran. They referred to the reports of the Japan Defence Agency which revealed that Pyongyang's Nodong I ballistic missiles were being sold to Teheran as well as Islamabad. They pointed out that the Pyongyang-Islamabad missile connection had surfaced in early 1995 after these missiles had been tested and were operationalised.

It was pointed out that non-missile support was provided by the Sangui General Automotive Factory where the transporter-erector-launcher for tactical ballistic missiles were made, using Russian MAZ-543 components and other parts from European companies.

When Jaswant Singh was the external affairs minister he visited Beijing and announced "that the two sides would enter consultations on establishing a security mechanism" but Beijing has kept silent on this security co-operation.
China still occupies one third of Ladakh, which it took during the 1962 war. It still claims for herself the whole of Arunachal Pradesh and uses Pakistan directly and indirectly via North Korea to neutralise India.

There were reports of CIA saying, China has transferred one third of its nuclear arsenal to Nagchuka, 250 kms away from Lhasa, a region full of huge caves, which the Chinese have linked together by an intricate underground network and where they have installed nearly a hundred Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, many of them pointed at Indian cities.
Chinese have killed 1.2 million Tibetans, 6,254 monasteries have been razed to the ground, 60 percent of religious, historical and cultural archives have been destroyed and that one Tibetan out of ten is still in jail.
According to a book by Har-Anand Tibet specialist Claude Arpi how shortly after Independence, the Indian army chief of staff had drafted the first paper on the threats to

India's security by China, along with recommendations for a clear defence policy. But when Nehru read the paper, he said: "Rubbish. Total Rubbish. We don't need a defence plan. Our policy is non-violence. We foresee no military threats. Scrap the army. The police are good enough to meet our security needs."

All political parties in India have a policy of appeasing China in exchange for Chinese non-interference in Kashmir.
Indian government must be and ought to be wary of China for the sake of peace in Asia. China wishes to befriend India only because it needs space to execute its hegemonic policy in which has been succeeding so far. It got Tibet. It got Hong Kong, it got part of Ladakh; now it wants Taiwan, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, the Spratly islands and the list goes on, says Francois Gautier, correspondent in South Asia for Le Figaro, France's largest circulated newspaper.

Maharshi Aurobindo, once said: 'the first move in the Chinese Communist plan of campaign is to dominate and take possession first of these northern parts and then of South East Asia as a preliminary to their manoeuvres with regard to the rest of the continent, in passing Tibet as a gate opening to India.' Beware! China keeps silent, but it acts the way it desires.

Swami Rama Tirtha, a great sage of the beginning of the century: 'The policy of appeasement is never successful. It increases the demands of the bully and encourages his unreasonableness. He will never listen to you. On the contrary, he will further insult you, by heaping imaginary allegations on you and finding baseless aberrations.'

Rong Ying says, Chinese Premier Zhou and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi visited New Delhi in April 1960 and held extensive talks with Prime Minister Nehru and other Indian leaders. At the conclusion of the talks, Premier Zhou summed up the following six points as points of common ground or of close proximity emerging from the talks:
1.There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.
2.There exist between the two countries a line of actual control up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.
3.In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys, and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary.
4.A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains.
5.Pending a settlement of the boundary question through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual adjustments may be made.
6.To ensure tranquillity on the border so as to facilitate the discussion, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.

Rong Ying says, the Chinese government had expressed the hope that these points of common ground would be affirmed so as to facilitate further discussion by the two governments. But the Indian side refused. Hence, three further meetings between officials of the two countries in Beijing, New Delhi, and Yangon from June to December 1960 failed to yield results.

Indian troops adopted a "forward policy" by making repeated inroads into Chinese territory. They soon established a total of 43 outposts encroaching on Chinese territory in the western sector prior to the general outbreak of clashes. Some were set up only a few metres from Chinese posts, other even behind Chinese posts, cutting off their access to the rear.

In the eastern sector, Indian troops crossed the illegal McMahon Line, intruded into the Che Dong area north of the line, and launched a series of armed attacks on Chinese frontier guards. Thus, before the full-scale border conflict broke out, the Indian side had already created an explosive situation in both the eastern and western sectors.

New Delhi not only repeatedly rejected the fair proposal of the Chinese, but added new and more pre-conditions, finally blocking the door to negotiations. On October 12, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru declared that he had issued orders to "free" what he termed invaded areas, in reality Chinese territory, of Chinese troops.

On October 14, then Indian defence minister Krishna Menon called for fighting China to the last man and the last gun. Afterwards, Indian troops accelerated combat preparations, and launched massive attacks all along the line. It was only when they were pressed beyond the limits of forbearance and left with no room for retreat that the Chinese frontier guards struck back in resolute self-defence.

On October 24, four days after the border conflict broke out, the Chinese government issued a statement putting forward three proposals to stop the border conflict, reopen peaceful negotiations, and settle the boundary question; but they were again rejected by India. What needs to be pointed out is that one of the three proposals was that the two sides respect the line of actual control along the entire border and the armed forces of each withdraw 20km from that line and disengage.

The LAC referred to in the three proposals did not mean the line of actual contact between the armed forces of the two sides in the border clashes, but the line of actual control that existed along the entire border when Premier Zhou mentioned it to Prime Minister Nehru in his letter of November 7, 1959. The essence of this proposal was to restore the state of the Sino-Indian boundary to the 1959 position, that is, before complications arose.

But Delhi insisted that no negotiations were possible unless the state of the entire boundary as it prevailed before September 8, 1962, was restored. This implied that in the eastern sector, Indian troops would reoccupy Chinese territory north of the illegal McMahon Line; in the western sector, they would invade and reoccupy military strong points they had set up on Chinese territory after 1959. This was not fair, and was rejected by the Chinese side.
On November 21, 1962, the Chinese government issued a statement that from October 22, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards would observe a ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border, and from December 1, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards would withdraw 20km from the line of actual control existing along the entire border on November 7, 1959.

In the eastern sector, the counter-attack of self-defence was launched in the area of Chinese territory north of the traditional boundary, but the Chinese frontier guards were ready to withdraw from their positions to the line of actual control, that is, 20km north of the McMahon Line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese side would withdraw 20km from the line of actual control.

What must be pointed out is that the positions of the Chinese frontier guards after their stated withdrawal would be much farther away from their positions before September 8, 1962. These measures fully demonstrated the sincerity of the Chinese side to stop border conflicts and seek a peaceful settlement of the dispute.

The Chinese side also expressed its willingness to hold a meeting between the prime ministers of the two countries after related measures were implemented so as to seek a friendly settlement of the boundary question. On December 10, 1962, the Indian government, persuaded by Egypt and other five non-aligned nations, finally accepted the Chinese proposals.

The Chinese expert says, this historic truth of the border conflict clearly shows that it was solely created by the then Indian government, which insisted on having its own way by stubbornly clinging to its wrong position, refusing to accept the peace proposals of the Chinese, and embarking on the road of military adventurism. It was not China's "invasion" or "betrayal" of India, nor an "India war" waged by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, who had the so-called agenda "to split India and compete for the leadership with Jawaharlal Nehru of developing countries", he adds.

The Chinese expert further opines, as for the Sino-Indian boundary question, the two governments, after many rounds of talks since 1981, have reached a consensus of "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation" and "mutual adjustment" to settle the issue. In 1993 and 1996, China and India signed two important agreements on the boundary question -- one on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the LAC and another on confidence-building measures along the LAC. The former was exactly what Premier Zhou had proposed in his letter to Prime Minister Nehru on November 7, 1959. (if some one has access to the text of the 1993 treaty, please put it out in public domain). The 1993 agreement does not seem to be in the public domain but here is the text of the 1996 historic treaty.

The Historic Treaty
Recognising the need for effective confidence building measures in the military field along the line of actual control in the border areas between the two sides.
Noting, the utility of confidence building measures already in place along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas.
Committed to enhancing mutual confidence and transparency in the military field, China and India have agreed as follows :
Article I
Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. No armed forces deployed by either side in the border areas along the line of actual control as part of their respective military strength shall be used to attack the other side or engage in military activities that threaten the other side or undermine peace, tranquillity and stability in the India-China border areas.
Article II
The two sides reiterate their determination to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary question. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question, the two sides reaffirm their commitment to strictly respect and observe the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.
Article III
The two sides agree to take the following measures to reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas:
„h The two sides reaffirm that they shall reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas to minimum levels compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two countries and consistent with the principle of mutual and equal security.
„h The two sides shall reduce or limit the number of field army, border defence forces, paramilitary forces and any other mutually agreed category of armed force deployed in mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control to ceilings to be mutually agreed upon. The major categories of armaments to be reduced or limited are as follows: combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and any other weapon system mutually agreed upon.
„h The two sides shall exchange data on the military forces and armaments to be reduced or limited and decide on ceilings on military forces and armaments to be kept by each side within mutually agreed geographical zones along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas. The ceilings shall be determined in conformity with the requirement of the principle of mutual and equal security, with due consideration being given to parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communication, and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments.
„h Unarmed transport aircraft, survey aircraft and helicopters shall be permitted to fly up to the line of actual control.
„h No military aircraft of either side shall fly cross the line of actual control, except by prior permission. Military aircraft of either side may fly across the line of actual control or overfly the other side's airspace or land on the other side only after obtaining the latter's prior permission after providing the latter with detailed information on the flight in accordance with the international practice in this regard.
Notwithstanding the above stipulation, each side has the sovereign right to specify additional conditions, including at short notice, for flights or landings of military aircraft of the other side on its side of the line of actual control or through its airspace.
„h In order to ensure flight safety in an emergency situation, the authorities designated by the two sides may contact each other by the quickest means of communications available.
Article VI
With a view to preventing dangerous military activities along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree as follow:
„h Neither side shall open fire, cause bio-degradation, use hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hung with guns or explosives within two kilometres from the line of actual control. This prohibition shall not apply to routine firing activities in small arms firing ranges.
„h If there is a need to conduct blast operations within two kilometres of the line of actual control as part of developmental activities, the other side shall be informed through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance.
„h While conducting exercises with live ammunition in areas close to the line of actual control, precaution shall be taken to ensure that a bullet or a missile does not accidentally fall on the other side across the line of actual control and causes harm to the personnel or property of the other side.
„h If the border personnel of the two sides come in a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the line of actual control or any other reason, they shall exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation. Both sides shall also enter into immediate consultations through diplomatic and/or other available channels to review the situation and prevent any escalation of tension.
Article VII
In order to strengthen exchanges and co-operation between their military personnel and establishments in the border areas along the line of actual control, the two sides agree:
„h to maintain and expand the regime of scheduled and flag meetings between their border representatives at designated places along the line of actual control;
„h to maintain and expand telecommunciation links between their border meeting points at designated places along the line of actual control;
„h to establish step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities of the two sides.
Article VIII
„h Should the personnel of one side cross the line of actual control and enter the other side because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disasters, the other side shall extend all possible assistance to them and inform their side as soon as possible, regarding the forced or inadvertent entry across the line of actual control. The modalities of return of the concerned personnel to their own side shall be settled through mutual consultations.
„h The two sides shall provide each other at the earliest possible with information pertaining to natural disasters and epidemic diseases in contiguous border areas which might affect the other side. The exchange of information shall take place either through diplomatic channels or at the border personnel meetings.
Article IX
In case a doubtful situation develops in the border region or in the case one of the sides has some questions or doubts regarding the manner in which the other side is observing this agreement either side has the right to seek a clarification from the other side. The clarifications sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through diplomatic channels.
Article X
„h Recognising that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India-China border area, the two sides agree to speed up the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control.
As an initial step in this process, they are clarifying the alignment of the line of actual control in those segments where they have different perceptions. They also agree to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions of the entire alignment of the line of actual control as soon as possible.
„h Pending the completion of the process of clarification and confirmation of the line of actual control, the two sides shall work out modalities for implementing confidence building measures envisaged under this agreement on an interim basis, without prejudice to their respective positions on the alignment of the line of actual control as well as on the boundary question.
Article XI
Detailed implementation measures required under Articles I to X of this agreement shall be decided through mutual consultations in the India-China joint working group on the boundary question. The India-China diplomatic and military expert group shall assist the India-China joint working group in devising implementation measures under the agreement.
Article XII
This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. It shall remain in effect until either side decides to terminate it after giving six months's notice in writing. It shall become invalid six months after the notification.
This agreement is subject to amendment and addition by mutual agreement in writing between the two sides.
Signed in duplicate in New Delhi on 29 November, 1996 in the Hindi, Chinese and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence, the English text shall prevail.
Dr Srikanth Kondapalli who is a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi has raised issues like multipolarity is one of the issues that can only be discussed at a high level.

He says India is taking note of China-Bangladesh defence cooperation, China's relations with the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka are the major developments of the last 10 years. India and China have had 14 joint working groups meetings so far. Three major issues have been discussed at such meetings: The China-India border, Sino-Pak nuclear and missile cooperation and China's military agreements with South Asian countries. From 1991 onwards -- except in 1998 -- we have continuously been discussing these bilateral issues with China. Actually, we have discussed the border issue with China for the last 21 years.

In the middle sector, which spans 524 kilometres in Himachal Pradesh and Uttaranchal and shares a border with Tibet, maps have been exchanged during the meetings of the Joint Working Groups.

In the western sector, the border issue has come to a standstill because the Chinese are reluctant to exchange maps of the border areas of Ladakh, Tibet and Aksai Chin. India has also asked for a route through Demchok in Ladakh to Mansarovar.

From Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh, India predominantly shares a border with Tibet. Aksai Chin shares a border with the Xinjiang region in China. In 1963, Pakistan transferred about 6,000 square kilometres called the Sakshgam valley to China. Since then the Chinese have occupied that area. Probably that is one reason for not exchanging a map of the western sector.

Over the years, there seems to be a positive shift in the Chinese attitude towards respecting the Line of Control which we share with Pakistan. If that were so, it would mean that China wants to stabilise the area of the Sakshgam valley.

A statement by a spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry said there would not be any renegotiations with any future Kashmir government over the Sakshgam valley. We have not even exchanged maps of Arunachal Pradesh known as the eastern sector. China would recognise Sikkim provided India opens up some trade post on the border. Non-military issues like energy and environment are also important topics between India and China. China has reservations about a proposed oil pipeline passing through Ladakh from the Central Asian Republics to India. The Chinese navy would like to shift its attention to the Indian Ocean though they don't have Blue Water capabilities right now. Former Chinese naval commandant Liu Huaqing once mentioned China did not have such ambitions, but one director general of China's logistics department in the early 1990s said the Indian Ocean was not India's ocean, informs Kondapalli.