Posted on 03/15/2005 5:07:59 AM PST by billorites
ON FEB. 19, 1945, 30,000 Marines splashed ashore on a small volcanic island in the central Pacific. After four days of bitter fighting, a small patrol reached the peak of Mount Suribachi, where it planted a U.S. flag in an iconic scene captured by photographer Joe Rosenthal. This famous image was hardly the end of the battle. Iwo Jima would not be secure until March 26. Almost all of the 21,000 Japanese defenders elected to die rather than surrender. Rooting them out cost more than 6,000 American dead and 20,000 wounded, making this the costliest battle in the storied history of the U.S. Marine Corps. It is right and proper that there should be 60th-anniversary commemorations of these heroics. For, as Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz famously said, ". . . on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue." Yet it would be a mistake to bury this battle in a haze of "Greatest Generation" sentimentality. Our awe at the bravery of the Marines and their Japanese adversaries should not cause us to overlook the stupidity that forced them into this unnecessary meat grinder. Selective memories of World War II, which record only inspiring deeds and block out all waste and folly, create an impossible standard of perfection against which to judge contemporary conflicts. That is why Marine Capt. Robert S. Burrell, a history instructor at the Naval Academy, has performed a valuable service by publishing in the October 2004 issue of the Journal of Military History an article called "Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology." Burrell examines the planning of Operation Detachment, as the invasion was known, and shows that it was badly bungled. The planners actually thought that Iwo Jima would be lightly defended. Nimitz had no idea that the Japanese had been preparing an elaborate defensive network of caves, bunkers and tunnels. As a result, he failed to allocate enough aircraft or warships to seriously dent the enemy defenses before the infantry landings. This oversight consigned the Marines to what a war correspondent called "a nightmare in hell." And for what? The rationales for taking the island were shaky at the time and utterly specious in hindsight. The original impetus came from the U.S. Army Air Corps, which wanted a base from which fighters could escort B-29 Superfortress bombers on missions over Japan. But Iwo Jima was so far away from most Japanese targets — a 1,500-mile round trip — that even the newest fighter, the P-51D Mustang, lacked sufficient range and navigational equipment for that purpose. In any case, Japanese air defenses were so weak that B-29s didn't need any escort; they were able to reduce Japanese cities to ashes on their own. When the fighter-escort mission didn't pan out, U.S. commanders had to come up with another rationale for why 26,000 casualties had not been in vain. After the war, it was claimed that Iwo Jima had been a vital emergency landing field for crippled B-29s on their way back from Japan. In a much-quoted statistic, the Air Force reported that 2,251 Superforts landed on Iwo, and because each one carried 11 crewmen, a total of 24,761 airmen were saved. Burrell demolishes these spurious statistics. Most of those landings, he shows, were not for emergencies but for training or to take on extra fuel or bombs. If Iwo Jima hadn't been in U.S. hands, most of the four-engine bombers could have made it back to their bases in the Mariana Islands 625 miles away. And even if some had been forced to ditch at sea, many of their crewmen would have been rescued by the Navy. Burrell concludes that Iwo Jima was "helpful" to the U.S. bombing effort but hardly worth the price in blood. In modern parlance, you might say that Iwo Jima was a battle of choice waged on the basis of faulty intelligence and inadequate plans. If Ted Kennedy had been in the Senate in 1945 (hard to believe, but he wasn't), he would have been hollering about the incompetence of the Roosevelt administration, which produced many times more casualties in five weeks than U.S. forces have suffered in Iraq in the last two years. No such criticism was heard at the time, in part because of the rah-rah tone of World War II media coverage but also because Americans back then had a greater appreciation for the ugly, unpredictable nature of combat. They even coined a word for it: snafu (in polite language: "situation normal, all fouled up"). It's a shame that so many sentimental tributes to the veterans of the Good War elide this unpleasant reality, leaving us a bit less intellectually and emotionally prepared for the trauma of modern war. Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
I guess this guy doesn't seem to remember (or acknowledge) the DESPERATION people felt in fighting that war.
Leave it to a British guy to reflect on mistakes in WW2.
A British guy who, if not for America, would be speaking German... TWICE
Note the number of dead, Freepers. Now listen to Hannity, Ingraham, Rush, etc., etc. Consistently, day in and day out, year after year, these guys will tell you that 60,000 Americans died at Gettysburg, 20,000 dead at Iwo, 50,000 at Normandy, 40,000 at Antietam. It's a bee in my bonnet you might say, how I get irritated at talking head types for always lumping ALL casualties (killed, wounded, missing) in with the dead.
The author is only passing along information from the above source, so don't blame the messanger.
That said, the fact is we were at war for our very existance. Mistakes were made and I doubt that Capt. Burrell could have done any better. Hindsight is always 20/20.
I was offended when the US returned this island to Japan. We paid too high of a price for the real estate in 1945.
Working midnight shift and the Jim Beam is beginning to take affect.
Say what you like the courage and competence of those Marines was monumental.
It's a shame that so many sentimental tributes to the veterans of the Good War elide this unpleasant reality, [combat causalities] leaving us a bit less intellectually and emotionally prepared for the trauma of modern war.
War means death and destruction but freedom, and security, are only for those who are willing to pay the price for it. That the price is always high does not dimish the truth of the statement.
Upon reflection, I think he raises an important point: all wars involve faulty intelligence. Brave men give their lives in a noble cause -- sometimes, even in cases where their sacrifice was not required.
Historians and journalists do us a disservice if they fail to remind us that war is messy. The myopia of MSM allows them to wail and gnash their teeth over every little thing in Iraq, when, in fact, the Revolution, the Civil War, and WWII were so much messier. But heroes can be celebrated even while we acknowledge that mistakes are always made in war. That's why they say that War is Hell.
I hear people say this all the time but I think in reality after WWII Europe and England would actually have been speaking Russian and not German.
With the Allies helping by furnishing equipment, supplies and naval blockades the Russian army would have defeated Germany, it would have taken longer without Germany having to fight a western front. But I think Germany's defeat was inevitable
Read "Tennozan", a history of the Battle of Okinawa and the subsequent deployment of the Atomic Bomb. The fact is, the Americans had been taking progressively horrific casualties throughout the Pacific War, from Guadalcanal to Tarawa to Peleliu to Iwo Jima to Okinawa. Iwo Jima may have been the bloodiest battle in Marine history, but Okinawa was the absolute bloodiest battle experienced by Americans in the Pacific theatre in WWII and was fought by the US Army. With over 20,000 dead, the casualty rate was so high that President Truman was determined to use the Atomic Bomb to end the war rather than risk any more loss of life likely to occur during an invasion of Japan. You can say that the tenacity and brutality of the Japanese made the use of the Atomic Bomb a wartime necessity.
Just one more "deconstructionist" pissed off that America is number one, and feels compelled to do something about it.
I'm just glad I had the honor of knowing my grandfather. That is enough for me.
True.
However, if one wanted they could spend a life time chronicling the BLUNDERS of the BRITISH military during WWII.
Hell, the outright IDIOCY and arrogance of 'Monty' alone (from Africa onward) extended the war at least a year.
As an example I offer three words: Operation Market Garden.
Sure, given what we know now, almost every battle in every war was a madhouse of error and illusion. But the people on the ground at that time, on that particular day of that particular battle, didnt have the luxury of such hindsight.
So, right off the starting line I tend to take such sniping as the first indicator of contempt and disdain.
The rationales for taking the island were shaky at the time and utterly specious in hindsight. The original impetus came from the U.S. Army Air Corps, which wanted a base from which fighters could escort B-29 Superfortress bombers on missions over Japan. But Iwo Jima was so far away from most Japanese targets — a 1,500-mile round trip — that even the newest fighter, the P-51D Mustang, lacked sufficient range and navigational equipment for that purpose. In any case, Japanese air defenses were so weak that B-29s didn't need any escort; they were able to reduce Japanese cities to ashes on their own.
Iwo Jima, or any other particular base, does not have to reach 'most' potential targets to be useful or strategically necesary. Take a look at a map of the PAcific ocean SE of Japan sometime. There are not a lot of islands to choose from. No one knew if we would be able to take Okinawa, so Iwo Jima might have been all we had available to hit the southern reaches of the Japanese main islands.
It is totally NOT necesary for Iwo Jima to be within range of ALL possible targets in Japan to be useful, even required, for an invasion of the southern shores of Japan.
Also, we wanted to have fighters capable of shooting down kamikaze pilots to protect our fleet off shore when the invasion started. Islands cant be sunk, so having Iwo Jima would be a great asset in protecting any offshore fleet.
When the fighter-escort mission didn't pan out, U.S. commanders had to come up with another rationale for why 26,000 casualties had not been in vain. After the war, it was claimed that Iwo Jima had been a vital emergency landing field for crippled B-29s on their way back from Japan. In a much-quoted statistic, the Air Force reported that 2,251 Superforts landed on Iwo, and because each one carried 11 crewmen, a total of 24,761 airmen were saved.
Burrell demolishes these spurious statistics. Most of those landings, he shows, were not for emergencies but for training or to take on extra fuel or bombs. If Iwo Jima hadn't been in U.S. hands, most of the four-engine bombers could have made it back to their bases in the Mariana Islands 625 miles away. And even if some had been forced to ditch at sea, many of their crewmen would have been rescued by the Navy. Burrell concludes that Iwo Jima was "helpful" to the U.S. bombing effort but hardly worth the price in blood.
Give me a break.
According to this type of logic, most fire trucks are unecesary unless they go to put out fires most days of the week! What utter nonsense.
I am so sick of these 'myth busters' trying to rewrite history so they can sell some cheap book. The same kind of BS has led some historians to claim that Crocket was captured and executed at the Alamo when the majority of surviving eye-witnesses say he died fighting.
The constant and continual destruction of our national symbols and memories proceeds uninteruptedly due to the kabal of anti-American 'former' Marxist hippies like Ward Churchill that now control our history proffession across this nation.
Dont believe any historical works if they are under 30.
My grandfather will be happy to know that he lost his friends, his innocence, and part of his left leg for nothing. I can't wait to tell him...
And this is precisely the point. During WW II the Marines also invaded the Peleliu Islands. Those islands were of absolutley no importance but cost the lives of 3,000 Marines. Then there was Dieppe where the Canadians lost 2,000 men, the "Lost Battalion" during WW I, or how about all those Union soldiers that charged Confederate positions at Cold Harbor during the Civil War
These were all stupid wasteful unnecessary battles. They were however based on the best judgement of leaders at the time. Mistakes happen but the lesson is that the courage of the men who fought those fights was undoubtable. And that courage is what wins the wars.
My father was in the Army in 1944, deployed in the Japanese theatre. He was 17 years old
For as long back as I can remember, I heard my father and his buddies, with the help of a few beers, saying, "it is a good thing there was the A-bomb or we would probably not be here. Nor you, young man," as he looked at me.
We're Marines. They send us, we fight, we win. Its what Marine's do.
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