Posted on 11/14/2004 5:23:06 PM PST by Cyropaedia
In light of the upcoming film Alexander (the Great), who in your opinion were actually the greatest military commanders our world has known...?
Mine are Genghis Khan, Alexander, and U.S. Grant.
Now, let's class them, group them, by STYLES.
E.g., Patton and Zhukov were very similar in approach.
Zhukov, in his bio, mentioned that he'd never hesitate to cross a minefield...he figured he'd take losses crossing it, but certainly no more than if he'd been engaging the enemy the whole while. (What a Theory X manager!)
Tactically speaking, if Franks would have followed the advice of some of our esteemed Senators and flooded the country with troops, not using the Northern Alliance fighters and putting a local face on the fight, I believe it would have taken much longer, possibly similar to the Russians. If Franks would have listened to some of the Monday morning QB's in Iraq, we would have fought Somalia style and it would have taken months to take Baghdad, perhaps losing thousands just to take it. Iraq and Afghanistan could have been ugly disasters.
Well, I would agree with THAT statement. There is no doubt that the Southern Aristocracy wanted slavery to continue, etc., but by the same token, Slavery was protected by LAW, so it is not unreasonable by the standards of the day, to feel quite threatened.......
Tarleton should have been hung for War Crimes....he was a first class B*stard.....
1st favorite Commander and Chief
will be the one who nuk's Mecca,
Saudi Arabia and Qom, Iran.
Osama Bin Laden gets nuclear blessing
to waste America cities from Islamic Imam.
Let's end this war and hit every
Islamic city on earth and get it
over with. I've had enough of this Sheite.
Grant was a first rate commander, but MacArthur is the the greatest American general.
Then it really starts. In the 1805 campaign, he had the hardest task in the French plan. He contained his opposite number in the south while the main forces, French and Russian, collided. He then marched his corps north to make the battle of Austerlitz while leaving the corps he was covering in his dust and out of the battle, setting foot march records in the process that stand to this day.
When he arrived, he was given one of the harder grand tactical tasks - he was to contain the attack of the Russian main effort on their left, while the rest of the French army broke off the wing headed for him, from behind. The overall plan was Napoleon's, and brilliant. It placed great demands on Davout's force to contain the Russians long enough to work - which he not only did easily, he went over to the attack at the right moment. Doing so prevented the detached Russian left from even escaping, trapping it against a marsh. Austerlitz was a Russian mistake and a Napoleonic brilliance, but the odds for it and the execution owe much to Davout. That conquered Austria.
In 1806 it was Prussia. That one was decided at the battles of Jena and Austerstadt. They were reciprocal battles, in each case the main army faced a smaller portion of the enemy. Most of the French army commanded by Napoleon crushed a third or so of the Prussian army at Jena. But if the odds had decided things, Davout's corps would have been overwhelmed in the meantime by the rest of the Prussians, who outnumbered him 3 to 1, and the overall result would have been inconclusive. That is all one can really credit Napoleon personally, with arranging.
Instead Davout defeated the three times superior Prussia main body, with his single corps. Routed it, it fact, enveloping both its flanks, and forcing the retreaters through a narrow defile where they stampeded. The resulting disintegration of the Prussian main body set the stage for the most ruthless strategic pursuit in military history. All of Prussia was overrun in a few weeks, with only tiny forces under a few energetic leaders managing any resistence at all. Davout was made Duke of Auerstadt for this performance. It is not too much to say he conquered Prussia, and Napoleon simply enjoyed the results.
That would have been enough for the military reputation of any other general of the age. Indeed, had he not been overshadowed by Napoleon, he'd be a household word for those accomplishments alone, if that were all he did. Instead, he kept it up for another decade. At Eylau, which Napoleon very nearly lost and was lucky to survive, it was Davout's timely arrival on the French right - early - and his turning that flank of the Russians, that saved the battle late for the French. Napoleon's own plan went badly astray, with a whole French corps shot down by the Russian artillery. Murat's cavalry saved his center, but it was Davout on the right that kept the Russians on the defensive and saved the French.
In 1809, He again faced the enemy main body with a single corps, this time against the Austrians. He forced them to withdraw. At Aspern-Esselring, one of Napoleon's few defeats, he was kept out of the battle until too late to make a difference. At the sequel, Wagram, his attack on the right was again instrumental in the French win, similar to Eylau. In the offensive part of the Russian campaign, he led the expensive but successful French attack on the Russian center at Borodino - (after having advised instead a turning movement) - despite having his horse shot out from under him.
In the retreat from Russia, he had the thankless task of commanding the rear guard for most of the march. At one point, Ney was put in behind him, and some blame him for not keeping Ney out of trouble there - as though that were his job. The fact is, the rear guard got away clean under Davout, and as soon as Ney got the job he lost 90% of his corps failing to do so. (Ney was brave, but to the point of stupidity).
Then there is the might have beens and weren't of the later campaigns, the ones that sealed Napoleon's fall. In the 1813 campaign in central Germany, Napoleon detailed Davout to hold Hamburg in the north with a small detached corps. A task completely unworthy of Davout's abilities (though perhaps important to French war finance - Hamburg was an important financial center at that time).
Instead Napoleon appointed the barely competent Oudinot to command of a wing of 4 corps. Oudinot was a fine division commander, a bit out of his league in command of a corp. In command of a wing he was a disaster. At a critical point in the campaign, where wins by Napoleon had given the French the initiative, Oudinot had a chance to seize Berlin. He botched it horribly. Napoleon then sent Ney to replace him, leaving Oudinot in command of his corps. They quarrelled. Ney then gave a dumb order and Oudinot carried it out to the letter, losing a battle and the French strategic left.
Some of the best troops in Davout's force were marched down to reinforce that area before all of the above, so it is not like he couldn't have gotten there. Ney would have been fine holding Hamburg. Davout would not have muffed a drive on Berlin. Let alone muffed an order to a division in the middle of a critical battle, losing it. Thus one of the more intriguing might-have-beens of the Napoleonic wars, is what would have happened if Napoleon had used Davout in 1813, instead of having him watch drying paint in Hamburg? Regardless, he was not around for the sequel, Napoleon's catastrophic defeat at Leipzig. He held Hamburg against all odds throughout the rest of the campaign, but had not further involvement in the French defeat.
Then in 1815, he was Napoleon's minister of war. By all accounts, it was a miraculous performance, to put in the field the army that almost beat the Brits and Prussians, from practically nothing right before. But it also meant he wasn't out in the field. And most historians agree, the command of Ney at Quartre Bras, and of Grouchy after Ligny, were missed opportunities of the highest order. Actually Napoleon muffed an order to a reserve corps between Ney and himself - but for Grouchy after Ligny there is really no excuse. Davout at the front, commading a wing, would have made the 1815 campaign quite different.
When you give advice to a state, and it being disregarded, disaster follows, you will reap great glory - said Machiavelli. Well, Davout was there and critical to all the big wins. Vastly outperforming the other French marshals. And he was out for the decisive losses - Leizig and Waterloo. And probably could have prevented them, at least in the form they happened, had he been given different responsibilities. While the tasks he was entrusted with, succeeded.
As for the man, he was by all accounts brilliant. He was considered a cold fish, passionless, unfriendly, and a stern disciplinarian. His men worshipped him anyway (and his corps clearly outperformed in action, showing it) because he was always intellectually right, and always fair. Politically, he betrayed no one in the whole course of the turmoil from pre revolution times to the restoration. Many other officers made oaths to the king at the restoration and broke them in 1815 - he refused to swear. Though Ney attacked him bitterly over events in Russia, he tried to intervene when Ney was charged with treason after Waterloo - unsuccessfully. Other marshals went over to the allies in 1814 - he surrendered Hamburg only after Napoleon abdicated.
It is really quite a record.
The problem the Mongols did solve - though only briefly - was internal political faction on the steppe, allowing uniform recruitment and projection beyond it in all directions, to loot. (Every time a unified army left the steppe, it conquered something - nothing new in that). Once they had places looted, however, they had no remaining principle of unity, and broke up into separate hordes. When they conquered places, they brought a few traditions of steppe court life and changed dynasty bloodlines, and otherwise were assimiliated by the vastly more populace places they grabbed. When Tamurlane tried to put a unified empire back together, all he could do was loot various pieces of it in succession, depopulating them in the process, and leaving nothing.
My knowledge of Napoleanic Warfare is woefully lacking and I appreciate the fact that you went to an in depth analysis of Davout. I will read more about him because of your post.
Any suggestions on what I should read would be welcome.
Arioch7 out.
NB Forrest had a simple battle plan: 'get there the firstest with the mostest".
Reagan won a war that everyone claimed was unwinnable and he did it without firing a single shot.
No, he certainly did not make the claims, but he began to express a belief in his and his armies invincibility by way of the risks and actions he took in the third and fourth years of the war. He also pressed on when it became obvious that the war could not be militarily won. Finally, he did not see Grant and Sherman as adversaries worthy of real regard until the end. He and his lieutenants were outstanding generals and leaders, but they all had too much confidence in their abilities and too little in their adversaries abilities. This was a fatal mistake and historically always been a mistake. You must always respect your adversary as being a worthy opponent because if you don't you will tend not to put forth your best efforts and will suffer the consequences if you have underestimated them.
You really need to read up on the history of the Mongol epoch, since you clearly do not know anything about it. One place to start might be Jack Weatherford's "Genghis Khan, and the Making of the Modern World".
And I'm surprised he's not been mentioned here more.
Could perhaps be because his heroics largely are confined to a single instance of battle--San Jacinto.
Still, one of the most remarkable military acheivements of all time and one of the most decisive battles of all time.
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