Posted on 04/13/2004 1:50:29 PM PDT by TomGuy
Graphics of the Gorelick memo
MEMORANDUM
TO: Mary Jo White, Louis Freeh, Richard Scruggs and Jo Ann Harris
FROM: Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy AG
RE: Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations
The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI have been conducting criminal investigations of certain terrorist acts, including the bombing of the World Trade center, and potential obstruction of the indicted case of United States v. Rahman. et al. During the course of these investigations significant counterintelligence information has been developed related to the activities and plans of agents of foreign powers operating in this country and overseas, including previously unknown connections between separate terrorist groups. Although information and evidence relevant to possible future criminal prosecutions is still being sought, it has become overwhelmingly apparent that there is a compelling need to further develop and expand that foreign counterintelligence information. Consequently, the FBI has initiated a separate full field counterintelligence investigation.
Although the counterintelligence investigation may result in the incidental collection of information relevant to possible future criminal prosecutions, the primary purpose of the counter
intelligence investigation will be to collect foreign counterintelligence informatics. Because the counterintelligence investigation will involve the use of surveillance techniques authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) against targets that, in acre instances, had been subject to surveillance under Title III, and because it will involve acme of the same sources and targets an the criminal investigation, we believe that it is prudent to establish a act of instructions that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the mere limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation.
(1) The focus of the Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) investigation will be on preventing future terrorist acts and obtaining foreign counterintelligence information about the individuals and groups encaging in, or preparing to engage in. terrorist activities in the United States and abroad.
(2) The criminal investigations will focus on the indicted cases of United States v. Yousef, et al. and United States v. Rahman, et al., and the potential obstruction of the Rahman case. The criminal investigations will also focus on the conspiracy to bomb United States airlines recently uncovered in the Philippines and the bombing of a Philippine airliner.
(3) No "pro-active" investigative efforts or technical coverages are presently contemplated in any of the ongoing criminal investigations, which primarily focus on past criminal conduct, with the exception of the obstruction investigation. If in the future, the criminal investigations develop information requiring "pro-active" efforts or technical coverages, the United States Attorneys Office (USAO) and the criminal agents will consult with the office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and the FCI agents before undertaking such efforts, absent exigent circumstances, in order to determine the impact, if any, an the FCI investigation.
(4) The subjects, who are presently under pen register surveillance in the criminal investigation, will be investigated as FCI subjects under the FCI guidelines using all available techniques, including FISA. without any direction or control by the USAO, Southern District of New York or the criminal Division, Department of Justice. 'The current pen registers will be discontinued before any F1SA-authorized surveillances are initiated.
(5) FBI memoranda and investigative reports including 302's from (redacted) will be prepared as follows: cases and investigations, including the obstruction case will be segregated into separate reports which will be provided to the USAO, OIPR, and the Criminal Division. All foreign counterintelligence information (including all foreign counterintelligence relating to future terrorist activities) will be in classified reports which will be provided to OIPR, but will not be provided either to the criminal agents, the USAO, or the Criminal Division, without Federal Bureau of investigation Headquarters and OIPR concurrence. The FBI agent responsible for handling the will remain Involved In the on-going trial of United States v. Rahman, but will otherwise be assigned to the foreign counterintelligence investigation and report to foreign counterintelligence supervisors.
(6) Foreign counterintelligence collected during the course of the FCI investigation will be disseminated pursuant to FBI guidelines and FISA. If, in the case of the FCI investigation, facts or circumstances are developed that reasonably Indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed, the FBI and OIPA are each independently responsible for notifying the USAO and the Criminal Division. Notice shall include the facts and circumstances developed during the FCI investigation that supplied the indication of significant federal criminal activity, whether or not such activity relates to the indicted cases or criminal investigations referred to in subparagraph (2) above. An Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) from the Southern District of New York who has knowledge of, but no active involvement in, the on-going criminal investigations, will continue to be assigned to work with OIFR and the FCI agents to review such foreign intel1igence information to ensure that evidence that might be exculpatory to any defendants currently under indictment is promptly considered for dissemination to criminal investigative personnel. the CSAO, and the Criminal Division. This AUSA will also serve to ensure, in conjunction with the FBI and OIPR, that information which reasonably Indicates chat a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed Is appropriately disseminated to criminal investigative personnel, the USAO, and the Criminal Division pursuant to the procedures set forth above. That AUSA will continue to be"walled off" from participation in the on-going criminal investigations and cases and will continue to abide by all FISA dissemination provisions and guidelines.
Just like Memogate, the story will be the fact that Ashcroft dropped the dime on her, rather than the fact she was part of the problem.
Jamie Gore Lick's memo posted herein is the sum and substance of that gordian knot, created I believe to give clinton-gore the ability to feather ANYTHING from public scrutiny that might impact their re-elections.
What comes after conflict of interest, obstruction of justice?
-PJ
I'm not sure, but "bitchiness" is sandwiched in there somewhere.
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