Discovery of Japanese sub proves sailors of USS Ward hit target in 1941

Center Daily.com / Knight Ridder Newspapers ^ | 12/7/2002 | Bill Gardner

[skeeter]

He thought Kimmel got shafted and hung out to dry.

PS, interestingly Kimmel was cleared by a navy court of inquiry on the single most serious charge, that of not employing long range recon. If he's not guilty of that charge, what could he be guilty of?

[Southack]

"interestingly Kimmel was cleared by a navy court of inquiry on the single most serious charge, that of not employing long range recon. If he's not guilty of that charge, what could he be guilty of?"

Failing to have anti-aircraft batteries manned on the weekends, failing to maintain fighter aircover from his carriers, failing to maintain ship readiness, failing to maintain full crews on the weekends, failing to "take all defensive precautions" per his orders from Washington, etc...

The unsaid part about Pearl Harbor is that the attitude among the commanders was so lax that Yamamato could have sailed his battleships unopposed into the harbor and blasted every living person point blank.

Our forces were lucky that the Japanese overestimated our readiness and therefor used only a few waves of fighters from their maximum range instead of point-blank blasting by their battleships inside our very harbor.

[lentulusgracchus]

Kako, thank you for the link to the essay. I can see why the Honolulu Advertiser called in Stinnett to comment on the Disney movie. I had his book on my wish list, somewhere down the list.

[lentulusgracchus]

He chose unwisely. Admiral Byng lost his head because of it in the 1700's.

One criticism of Kimmel that would seem to bite is why, with the recent example of the British Otranto raid from a year earlier before him, which was executed with Fairey Swordfish inferior to the aircraft available to Japanese naval aviation, he didn't string torpedo netting. American and British capital ships had been equipped, during the Great War, with booms affixed to their armor belts for rigging individual torpedo nets while alongside. Those had been removed by the 1930's, and evidently Pearl's not overly generous room for maneuver would have been very cramped if harbor netting had to be swung out of the way for every sortie, like that at the harbor mouth. The American officers, reading passim in Layton and Toland (and other books), still persisted in believing that Otranto was somehow the exception, and that Pearl was still too shallow for aerial torpedoes. That was the oversight that hurt.

I'm unfamiliar with Admiral Byng, although I recall reading about an early-18th-century English admiral who was executed by firing party on his quarterdeck, IIRC. Is that the same person? That episode was mentioned in an explanation of why the British lost their sea fight off Cape May with the Comte de Grasse's French squadron in 1781: outnumbered in nominal terms by the French, the British admiral decided to mail it in, and fought the engagement "by the book", lest he be found at fault for the outcome and executed pour encourager les autres.

[BlueLancer]

Yup, you've got the right Admiral Byng ... the poor sod.

Trial and execution of Admiral John Byng, 1757

[lentulusgracchus]

What cemented the matter for me vis a vis Roosevelt is the fact that in spite of everything, Kimmel had the fleet out, and was sent back to Pearl.

My theory is that Roosevelt wanted to provoke the attack so that we could get into the war, but underestimated the ability of yhe Japanese fleet. This may be why Stark was sent to England as liason after the attack (in exile) for the balance of the war.

I agree with you, and Toland fills in this picture very effectively by recounting how FDR was simultaneously baiting the Japanese force tasked against Malaya by sending out sailing yachts armed with deck guns and MG's to "observe" the Japanese fleet's progress at close quarters, knowing full well that any such force would be tempted to fire on any foreign naval vessel that tried to fall in with, or shadow, their formations.

A German U-boat captain's war memoir also recalls how, during the summer of 1941, while U.S. destroyers were escorting British convoys near American waters (and depth-charging any U-boats they encountered, which was what the USS Reuben James was doing immediately before she was notoriously torpedoed), President Roosevelt sent the USS Texas, unescorted in any form or fashion, on a visit to Great Britain. It took a direct order from Adolf Hitler, backed up by a promise of execution for overeager U-boat captains, to keep the Texas from being intercepted and sunk.

Roosevelt did a lot of underhanded things like that.

But Doris Kearns Goodwin loves him.

Oh, wait. Doris Kearns Goodwin is a plagiarizer.

<Mr. Rogers voice > Okay, kids, what have we learned today about Liberals?

</Fred Rogers>

[lentulusgracchus]

Erratum: Please substitute the correct "Taranto" for "Otranto". Having trouble with Italian seaports today.

[skeeter]

Failing to have anti-aircraft batteries manned on the weekends, failing to maintain fighter aircover from his carriers, failing to maintain ship readiness, failing to maintain full crews on the weekends, failing to "take all defensive precautions" per his orders from Washington, etc...

Yet in spite of all these 'mistakes' Kimmel was never charged with errors in judgment or dereliction of duty.

[lentulusgracchus]

Failing to have anti-aircraft batteries manned on the weekends, failing to maintain fighter aircover from his carriers, failing to maintain ship readiness, failing to maintain full crews on the weekends, failing to "take all defensive precautions" per his orders from Washington, etc...

If you're going to bust Kimmel's chops over these details --

One, it remains to show how keeping short-range CAP's over his (absent) carriers would have helped Kimmel with his big problem, viz., insufficient numbers of PBY's to maintain strategic-range patrols spread around a sufficient proportion of the compass, to have picked up the Japanese force coming down from the north.

The entire point of Yamamoto's approach from the north was to obviate Kimmel's deployment of his limited long-range aviation assets toward the west, and the Japanese mandates.

Two, you must by the operation of logic be equally prepared, as the President and his investigative Rottweilers were not, to tear up Stark and Marshall for failing to share with the Hawaiian commands, not MAGIC decrypts, but the intelligence product of the MAGIC output, and to share with their Hawaiian subordinates a plan of battle that met the President's criteria for establishing Japanese, not American, aggression, while allowing the forces in Hawaii at least to fight without being butchered.

Three, you must be prepared, mustn't you, to argue by the same criteria of omission, that the numerous warnings that came to the President, and to the attention of J. Edgar Hoover, but were never shared with even the top Hawaiian commanders, constituted a grievous breach of duty by the senior commands, including the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States?

[Southack]

No.

Post #26 shows that TWO war warnings (one specific) were given to Kimmel and Short, along with the COMMAND to execute all appropriate defensive manuevers (circa Nov 27, 1941).

Furthermore, even if the U.S. had ZERO intelligence (much less shared any of it or warned any of our commanders with War Warning orders), the commanders of each base are responsible for defending their own base.

And Kimmel and Short failed to defend their base at Pearl.

The Japanese could have sailed the Yamamoto battleship (among others) directly into Pearl itself on the night of December 6. They could have blown up everything that we had at point blank range. Our forces were simply fortunate that the Japanese overestimated our state of readiness (and because of that overestimation, attacked with only long-range aerial fighters).

But even for the aerial attack, Kimmel and Short failed to maintain ANY fighter aircover, they lined their aircraft up wingtip to wingtip making them easy targets on the ground, and they failed to man all of the antiaircraft batteries on the weekends.

Oh, but Kimmel and Short did find plenty of time to do the whole Honolulu social scene.

[Southack]

"Yet in spite of all these 'mistakes' Kimmel was never charged with errors in judgment or dereliction of duty."

If they made no errors in judgement, then why were they removed from their commands?

[lentulusgracchus]

Post #26 shows that TWO war warnings (one specific) were given to Kimmel and Short, along with the COMMAND to execute all appropriate defensive manuevers (circa Nov 27, 1941).

The more germane of the two is the November 27 war warning, and this is the message that the subsequent investigations keyed on. This was actually two messages, one sent by CNO to (equal addressees) Admiral Hart, CINC Asiatic Fleet in Manila and Admiral Kimmel, CINCPAC, and the other sent by the Army Department.

Edwin Layton, in his memoir, produces the Navy war warning in full:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO [Special Naval Observer London] inform British. Continental districts, Guam, Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. [Emphasis supplied.]

Hawaii, Wake, and Guam were not included among the prospective primary targets. Indeed, Guam was included in the commands ordered only to take measures against sabotage, notwithstanding that it was generally considered at that time that Guam would be near the top of the list of Japanese objectives.

There was no, repeat no, indication at any time before December 7th which was passed on to Hawaii that the Hawaiian commands were not only included on the Japanese target lists, but that they were the top of the list.

Worse, the message spoke of Japanese deployments against Malaya and the Kra peninsula -- no mention of Hawaii at all. So what exactly does a Hawaiian commander do, to support the Philippines against a Japanese attack? Fly his short-range pursuit squadrons, burning up valuable avgas? No.

In addition, the Army's warning was significantly diluted further by this codicil:

Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46, so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

Unfortunately, the "overt act" General Short had to key on was the immediate destruction of his flight lines. It's just supposed to be tough cookies, then, that the Japanese failed to commit an "overt act" that didn't involve the prompt and wholesale degradation of Short's resources?

The Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944 strongly criticized Marshall and his war plans chief, General Gerow, for failing to send Short much more specific information in their possession about Japanese intentions, specifically that their intentions included the neutralization of Hawaii. Gerow was torched for his composition of the Army war warning of November 27, and for failing to oversee Short's implementation of joint-preparedness plans with the Navy. Marshall was further criticized for failing to respond to Short's timely report, that he had disposed his aircraft to defend against sabotage.

Given the mushmouth November 27 message's failure to include Hawaii as a Japanese military target, it was reasonable for Short and Kimmel to conclude that their major problem would be sabotage and, for Kimmel, Japanese submarine activity.

The exactly contemporaneous Naval Court of Inquiry completely exonerated Kimmel, found that he had conferred adequately at his end with Short, and that he had mounted a reasonable reconnaissance effort with the resources available, which was also appropriate in its orientation, to the intelligence he had in hand.

The Naval Court of Inquiry criticized the Navy war warning of November 27, which it said "standing alone could not convey to the commanders in the field the picture as it was seen in Washington" -- and it blistered Stark for failing to relay the information that was in his hands prior to December 7th.

The Hewitt Inquiry, which was the sixth in Layton's recounting of them (Toland counts ten), was convened by SecNav in response to the Naval Court of Inquiry, and it treated Kimmel unfairly by denying him any right to be present to explain or defend his actions, or to conduct cross-examination of its witnesses. Afterward, SecNav stood up and announced that the onus was back on Kimmel and Short.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not above reproach, and they were reproached by several of the inquiries on various points, including the minority Republican report that disagreed with the major conclusions (all hagiologically exonerative of President Roosevelt) of the Democratic majority on the Joint Congressional Committee, but not to the same degree as they were by the dishonest Hewitt and Roberts inquiries, whose essential findings you reproduce.

[Southack]

You don't always get precise intelligence that your base is about to be attacked, but if you are the commander, it is still your job to defend your base.

For Kimmel and Short, not only did they fail to defend their base, but they failed even though they had been sent TWO war warnings. They failed even though the USS Ward sighted and sank a Japanese midget submarine on December 7, a full hour before the Japanese fighters arrived. They failed even though their new radar station detected the incoming Japanese air attack.

They lined their planes up wingtip to wingtip, as if to make them better targets. They didn't fly any fighter cover on the weekends. They didn't man all of their anti-aircraft batteries. They didn't even hold enough drills to know that they had a problem with their artillery shells not detonating (and they had a similar problem with our torpedoes).

But they had plenty of time to enjoy the Honolulu social scene. They sure burned up the cocktail circuit.

[lentulusgracchus]

Oh, but Kimmel and Short did find plenty of time to do the whole Honolulu social scene.

Kimmel was a very hard worker and was busily running himself into the ground. He also attended social functions usually put on by subordinate commands. The evening before the attack, Edwin Layton recalled, the Japanese consulate actually invited Kimmel over for drinks. He declined, and instead attended a small dinner party laid on by his successor as commander of the Pacific Fleet cruiser force at a Honolulu hotel. Kimmel was unaccompanied on this tour, having left his wife in California. General Short spent that evening at a charity dinner-dance with his wife, at the Schofield Barracks officers' club.

You've made that insulting and unsupported innuendo a couple of times. You might consider leaving it alone, since it is manifestly untrue of Admiral Kimmel so to paint him as a fop. Kimmel was a "workhorse, not a showhorse".

Oh, and think about this: Kimmel was promoted unexpectedly over several senior commanders to the post of CINCPAC by Franklin Roosevelt himself.

Can you spell "fall guy"?

Red flag number seven, if you're still counting.

[lentulusgracchus]

If they made no errors in judgement, then why were they removed from their commands?

You must be one of those guys who believes everything management tells you.

[Southack]

So do you think that Patton, had he been placed in charge of Pearl's defense, would have left anti-aircraft batteries unmanned, ignored the report of the sinking of a Japanese midget sub, ignored the radar report on the Japanese air attack (or even had people in those positions who would have so easily disregarded the data)?

Would he have failed to mount fighter air cover?

Would Pearl have been as easily overwhelmed and "surprised" had a serious warrior such as Patton had been in charge?

[lentulusgracchus]

They failed even though the USS Ward sighted and sank a Japanese midget submarine on December 7, a full hour before the Japanese fighters arrived.

The Japanese were supposed to be on the other side of the Pacific -- or so the war warning you keep bringing up told them.

The Navy's watch commanders spent half an hour playing phone tag and trying to decide whether Ward's message traffic added up to a Japanese submarine attack. Kimmel was told about it at 6:30, standing there in his house in robe and slippers. At 6:30 he had one hour left to accomplish everything you think he should have done, to receive the Japanese raid.

They failed even though their new radar station detected the incoming Japanese air attack.

A junior pilot stuck with weekend indications-center duty decided erroneously that the inbounds were a flight of B-17s from the Coast. Every kid in America knows that story. What is your point? That Short should have had a major from his G-2 section standing that duty instead? Every watch section in the world is run by junior officers, it's what they do. Except that the air-indications center watch bill was full of off-duty pilots, stick jockeys who'd rather have gone up and had a look for themselves than stick around a chartroom all day. Should Short have had a full section of intelligence officers standing duty watches in that center? Depends on what the Army Air Corps gave him to work with. And you sure wouldn't use ground-pounders, company officers from line infantry backgrounds, in a duty billet like that. So the questionable use of discretion comes down to using flying officers and giving them the watches as a collateral duty, rather than commanding air-intelligence officers to appear, to take the duty instead. Think that was Short's call?

They didn't man all of their anti-aircraft batteries. They didn't even hold enough drills to know that they had a problem with their artillery shells not detonating (and they had a similar problem with our torpedoes).

Whether these criticisms are true or not, they do not go to the central breakdown, which was an intelligence failure. The necessary intelligence was in hand -- but it was withheld in Washington, evidently at FDR's insistence.

It's worth noting for the record, that two days after he arrived in Singapore in Prince of Wales, British Admiral Sir Tom Phillips flew to Manila and conferred on Dec. 6th (late on the 5th, Hawaiian time) with General MacArthur and Admiral Hart, C-in-C of the weak Asiatic squadron. Phillips brought with him British information about secret diplomatic agreements among the U.S., the Dutch government in exile, and Whitehall, about cooperation and commitments to use force in one another's defense in the event of the impending Japanese landings in Malaya. This was a blinding revelation to Admiral Hart, who like Kimmel had been kept completely in the dark about these secret demarches. He fired off a cable, which survives, demanding confirmation from Washington that indeed the United States had given assurances of armed assistance to the British and the Dutch, and that American forces in the Philippines would indeed be at war within hours:

"Learn from Singapore we have assured British armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."

Unfortunately, he didn't include Kimmel or Short as in information addee on his message. Kimmel, however, had independently signalled Washington asking the same question. Neither of them ever received a reply.

Hart fortunately had MAGIC material at his disposal from Station Cast (Cavite) decrypts of Purple material (contrary to your assertion above), and he used them to deduce Japanese intentions with respect to the Philippines. He sent his ships south, out of range of Japanese airfields on Formosa, to rendezvous eventually, per his joint plan with Admiral Phillips, with Prince of Wales's battle force and Dutch naval elements. But as you know, Admiral Phillips was KIA four days later when his big ships were sunk by Japanese Army aviation operating out of Tan Son Nhut and other Indochinese airfields, and never kept his appointment.

[lentulusgracchus]

So do you think that Patton, had he been placed in charge of Pearl's defense, would have left anti-aircraft batteries unmanned, ignored the report of the sinking of a Japanese midget sub, ignored the radar report on the Japanese air attack (or even had people in those positions who would have so easily disregarded the data)?

Admiral Kimmel didn't ignore the report about the submarine incident -- in which, btw, the Japanese fired no shots, thus failing to relieve him of his obligation under his rules of engagement to "be nice".

As I told you previously, his people rolled him out of the rack to discuss it, but what they actually had was a couple of sketchy, adrenaline-soaked messages from the Ward. The messages did not read, "Admiral Nagumo is here in force," or anything of the sort.

Kimmel might have guessed that the submarine probe presaged an attack by over 300 aircraft. Would you?

As for who had what people where......remember that FDR appointed Kimmel to command PACFLT personally. FDR is a hell of a lot more exposed to charges of failure to supervise than Kimmel was. Are you sure you want to keep pushing that line? After all, you know where the buck is going to stop.

[Southack]

FDR can be guilty of all manner of bad things, but FDR was a third of the planet away in Washington, not in personal command at Pearl.

And intelligence failures don't mean squat as far as exonerating a couple of cocktail party brass for failing to defend their base.

If they didn't have the right chain of command set up to get them the right information from their radar and from the USS Ward, then it is their fault, no matter what "intelligence" they were given or not.

If they didn't have the right air patrols and air cover, then it is their fault, not the fault of any lack of intelligence.

If they thought that they could sit around sipping cocktails until someone from Washington gave them a third, yet even more specific, war warning telling them to man their own anti-aircraft batteries, then again the fault lies in them.

"Gee, we didn't think that anyone would attack us on a Sunday" simply won't cut it.

"Gee, we didn't think that torpedoes would work inside the harbor" simply won't cut it.

"Gee, we thought that we could sip drinks and socialize until Washington gave us more specific orders or told us that the Japanese were going to strike at precisely 7 am" simply won't cut it.

[tubebender]

I watched "WAR STORIES" with Ollie North on Fox Sunday about the little subs and at the end they used footage of the UH tapes of the sub sitting on the floor in about 1500 feet of water and get this...there was a hole in the conning tower exactly were the crew said they hit it. It was very emotional when they interviewed the remaining crew. There was a lot more on the show about more of the subs and Pearl Harbor.