Golitsyn’s Predictions re: The Phony Collapse of the Soviet Union

“I don’t think Gorbachev is a Leninist anymore…I don’t think we have been deceived—-at least, I hope we haven’t.”

MARGARET THATCHER, Personal interview with Christopher Story, former occasional advisor to M. Thatcher and editor of Anatoly Golitsyn’s second book, Perestroika Deception.

As many of you are already aware, Mark Riebling, author of the book Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA, pays tribute to Anatoly Golitsyn by crediting his predictions in regards to the phony collapse of the Soviet Union with “an accuracy record of nearly 94%” [pg. 408].

There has been a recent and very public spate of mainstream news articles attempting to smear Anatoly Golitsyn and his principle sponsor in the CIA, James Jesus Angleton. I can only assume that either the CIA or the KGB, or both, have decided that Golitsyn’s warnings are beginning to catch on, so it has become necessary to dust off the old smear campaign folder and once again spread their lies about these two.

For the purposes of this post, I would like to communicate just how specific Golitsyn’s predictions are, and let the reader decide for himself whether or not they have come to pass. Please note that these predictions are taken from his 1984 book New Lies For Old (the manuscript was completed in 1980, ten years before the events themselves). Golitsyn is no psychic; his predictions are based on his inside knowledge of Soviet long-range strategy. It should also be noted that many of the predictions contained in New Lies For Old date back to the 1960s and 1970s, as the book is based on memos he was writing to the CIA during that time while still under their employ (he defected from the KGB in 1961). Of course, the CIA refused to heed Golitsyn’s warnings about the coming phony collapse of the Soviet Union (the one exception being the head of Counter Intelligence, James Angleton, and his staff…some of which, along with members of MI5 and MI6, took the bold step of writing the Editor’s Forward to Golitsyn’s book). It is my hope that you will read Golitsyn’s predictions, based as they are on his inside knowledge of long-range Soviet strategy, and forward them to as many people as possible!!! (Please keep in mind this is only a partial list of Golitsyn’s predictions...also, I typed this, so all spelling errors are my own).

Pages 327-328: “The Communist strategists are now poised to enter into the final, offensive phase of the long-range policy, entailing a joint struggle for the complete triumph of Communism. Given the multiplicity of parties in power, the close links between them, and the opportunities they have had to broaden their bases and build up experienced cadres, the Communist strategists are equipped, in pursuing their policy, to engage in maneuvers and stratagems beyond the imagination of Marx or the practical reach of Lenin and unthinkable to Stalin. Among such…stratagems are the introduction of false liberalization in Eastern Europe and, probably, in the Soviet Union and the exhibition of spurious independence on the part of the regimes in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Pages 224-226: “It would be worthwhile for the West to study the scenario and techniques of the Czechoslovak experiment [of 1968]—so as not to be taken in again. The scenario could well be repeated in essence, although with local variations…The staging of the ‘quiet revolution’ and its reversal served a wide variety of strategic and tactical objectives. [Among them:]

· To increase pressure in the West for the convening of a conference on security in Europe, the Communist interest in which is to promote the dissolution of military pacts, the creation of a neutral, socialist Europe, and the withdrawal of the American military presence.

· To rehearse and gain experience for the repetition of ‘democratization’ in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, or elsewhere in Eastern Europe during the final phase of the long-range policy of the Bloc.”

Pages 241-242: “The creation of a false, controlled opposition movement like the dissident movement serves the internal and external strategic purposes.

Internally it provides a vehicle for the eventual false ‘liberalization’ of a Communist regime; it provokes some would-be opposition elements to expose themselves to counter-action, and others are driven to conformity or despair. Externally, ‘dissidents’ can act as vehicles for a variety of disinformation themes on the subject of the evolution of the Communist system… It sets the scene for an eventual dramatic ‘liberalization’ of the system by heightening the contrast between neo-Stalinism and future ‘socialism with a human face.’ It creates a cadre of figures who are well known in the West and who can be used in the future as the leaders and supporters of the ‘multi-Party system’ under Communism. ‘Dissident’ trade unions and intellectuals can be used to promote solidarity with their Western counterparts and engage them in joint campaigns for disarmament and the reform of Western ‘military-industrial complexes.’ In the long run the Western individuals and groups involved will face the choice of admitting that their support for dissidents was mistaken or accepting that Communism has undergone a radical change, making ‘convergence’ an acceptable, and perhaps desirable, prospect.”

Page 262: “One of the objectives [of Euro-Communism] was to prepare the ground, in coordination with Bloc policy in general, for an eventual ‘liberalization’ in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and a major drive to promote the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of the American military presence from a neutral, socialist Europe.”

Page 323: “The Western strategy of a mildly activist approach to Eastern Europe, with emphasis on human rights, is doomed to failure because it is based on misconceptions and will lead ultimately into a trap when a further spurious liberalization takes place in Eastern Europe in the final phase of the long-range Communist policy. Not the least disturbing aspect of the present crisis in Western assessments and policy is that, if it is recognized at all, its causes are misunderstood. As matters stand the West is acutely vulnerable to the coming major shift in Communist tactics in the final phase of their policy.

Page 331: “The conclusion [is that] the ‘renewal’ in Poland was planned thoroughly, and well in advance, by the Polish Communist Party in cooperation with its Communist allies and with a view to furthering the Communist strategy for Europe. The conclusion is further supported by the evidence of the Polish Communist Party’s involvement in the formation and functioning of Solidarity.”

Page 334: “The creation of Solidarity and the initial period of its activity as a trade union may be regarded as the experimental first phase of the Polish ‘renewal.’ The appointment of Jaruzelski, the imposition of martial law, and the suspension of Solidarity represent the second phase, intended to bring the movement under firm control and provide a period of political consolidation. In the third phase it may be expected that a coalition government will be formed, comprising representatives of the Communist Party, a revived Solidarity movement, and of the church. A few so-called liberals might also be included. A new-style government of this sort in Eastern Europe would be well equipped to promote Communist strategy by campaigning for disarmament, for nuclear-free zones in Europe, perhaps for a revival of the Rapacki Plan, for the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and ultimately for the establishment of a neutral, socialist Europe. The revival of other elements of Communist strategy for Europe [such as human rights negotiations] would be timed to coincide with the emergence of such a government.

Page 335: “A coalition government in Poland would in fact be totalitarianism under a new, deceptive and more dangerous guise. Accepted as the spontaneous emergence of a new form of multi-party, semi-democratic regime, it would serve to undermine resistance to Communism inside and outside the Communist Bloc. The need for massive defense expenditure would increasingly be questioned in the West. New possibilities would arise for splitting Western Europe away from the United States, of neutralizing Germany, and destroying NATO.”

Page 338-340: “The intensification of hardline policies and methods in the Soviet Union, exemplified by Sakharov’s arrest and the occupation of Afghanistan, presages a switch to ‘democratization’ following, perhaps, Brezhnev’s departure from the political scene… Brezhnev’s successor may well appear to be a kind of Soviet Alexander Dubcek. The succession will be important only in the presentational sense.

The reality of collective leadership and the leaders’ common commitment to the long-range policy will continue unaffected… The Brezhnev regime and its neo-Stalinist actions against ‘dissidents’ and in Afghanistan would be condemned as Novotny’s regime [in Czechoslovakia] was condemned in 1968.

The economic field reforms might be expected to bring Soviet practice more into line with Yugoslavia, or even seemingly, with Western socialist models… The Party would be less conspicuous, but would continue to control the economy from behind the scenes as before…

Political ‘liberalization’ and ‘democratization’ would follow the general lines of the Czechoslovak rehearsal in 1968. This rehearsal might well have been the kind of political experiment Nikolay Mironov [former head of the Party’s Administrative Organs Department] had in mind as early as 1960. The ‘liberalization’ would be spectacular and impressive. Formal pronouncements might be made about a reduction in the Communist Party’s role; its monopoly would be apparently curtailed. An ostensible separation of powers between legislative, executive, and the judiciary might be introduced. The Supreme Soviet would be given greater apparent power and the president and deputies greater apparent independence.

The posts of President of the Soviet Union and First Secretary of the Party might well be separated. The KGB would be ‘reformed’. Dissidents at home would take up positions of leadership in government. Sakharov might be included in some capacity in government or allowed to teach abroad. The creative arts and cultural and scientific organizations, such as writers’ unions and the Academy of Sciences, would become apparently more independent, as would the trade unions. Political clubs would be opened to non-members of the Communist Party.

Leading dissidents might form one or more alternative political parties. Censorship would be relaxed; controversial books, plays, films, and art would be published, performed and exhibited. Many prominent Soviet performing artists now abroad would return to the Soviet Union and resume their professional careers. Constitutional amendments would be adopted to guarantee fulfillment of the provisions of the Helsinki agreements and a semblance of compliance would be maintained. There would be greater freedom for the Soviet citizens to travel. Western and United Nations observers would be invited to the Soviet Union to witness the reforms in action.

But, as in the Czechoslovak case, the ‘liberalization’ would be calculated and deceptive in that it would be introduced from above. It would be carried out by the Party through its cells and individual members of government, the Supreme Soviet, the courts, and the electoral machinery and by the KGB through its agents among the intellectuals and scientists…”

Pages 340-342: “The dissident movement is now being prepared for the most important aspect of its strategic role, which will be to persuade the West of the authenticity of Soviet ‘liberalization’ when it comes. Further high-level defectors, or ‘official émigrés’, may well make their appearance in the West before the switch in policy occurs.

The prediction of Soviet compliance with the Helsinki agreements is based on the fact that it was the Warsaw Pact countries and a Soviet [agent of influence] who initiated and pressed for the [negotiations]…

‘Liberalization’ in Eastern Europe would probably involve the return to power in Czechoslovakia of Dubcek and his associates. If it should be extended to East Germany, demolition of the Berlin Wall might even be contemplated…

Western acceptance of the new ‘liberalization’ as genuine would create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of Communist strategy for the United States, Western Europe, and even, perhaps, Japan… Euro-Communism would be revived. The pressure for united fronts between Communist and socialist parties and trade unions at the national and international level would be intensified.

This time, the socialists might finally fall into the trap. United front governments under strong Communist influence might well come to power in France, Italy, and possibly other countries. Elsewhere the fortunes and influence of Communist Parties would be much revived. The bulk of Europe might well turn to left-wing socialism, leaving only a few pockets of conservative resistance.

Pressure could well grow for a solution of the German problem in which some form of confederation between East and West Germany would be combined with neutralization of the whole and a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. France and Italy, under united front governments, would throw in their lot with Germany and the Soviet Union. Britain would be confronted with a choice between a neutral Europe and the United States.

NATO could hardly survive this process. The Czechoslovaks, in contrast with their performance in 1968, might well take the initiative, along with the Romanians and Yugoslavs, in proposing (in the Helsinki context) the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in return for the dissolution of NATO.

The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact would have little effect on the coordination of the Communist bloc, but the dissolution of NATO could well mean the departure of American forces from the European continent and a closer European alignment with a ‘liberalized’ Soviet Bloc. Perhaps in the long run, a similar process might affect the relationship between the United States and Japan leading to abrogation of the security pact between them.

The EEC [EU] on present lines, even if enlarged, would not be a barrier to the neutralization of Europe and the withdrawal of American troops. It might even accelerate the process. The acceptance of the EEC by Eurocommunist parties in the 1970s, following a period of opposition in the 1960s, suggests that this view is shared by the communist strategists. The efforts by the Yugoslavs and Romanians to create stronger links with the EEC should be seen, not as inimical to Soviet interests, but as the first step in laying the foundations for the merger between EEC and COMECON. The European Parliament might become an all-European socialist parliament with representation from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ would turn out to be a neutral, socialist Europe.

The United States, betrayed by her former European allies, would tend to withdraw into fortress America or, with the few remaining conservative countries, including perhaps Japan, would seek and alliance with China as the only counterweight to Soviet power.”

Page 348: “The timing of the release of the Solidarity leader and the news of the appointment of Adropov confirm… that the ‘liberalization’ will not be limited to the USSR, but will be expanded to Eastern Europe and particularly Poland. The experiment with ‘renewal’ in Poland will be repeated again.

This time, however, it will be with full strategic initiatives and implications against Western Europe and NATO. The appointment of Andropov, the release of the Solidarity leader, and the invitation to the Pope to visit Poland in June 1983, made by the Polish government, all indicate that the Communist strategists are probably planning the re-emergence of Solidarity and the creation of a quasi-social democratic government in Poland (a coalition of the Communist Party, the trade unions, and the churches) and political and economic reforms in the USSR for 1984 and afterward.”

Pages 349-350: “How will the Western German social democrats respond when the Communist regimes begin their ‘liberalization’ by making concessions on human rights, such as easing emigration, granting amnesty for the dissidents, or removing the Berlin Wall? One can expect that the Soviet agents of influence in Western Europe, drawing on these developments, will become more active.

It is more than likely that these cosmetic steps will be taken as genuine by the West and will trigger a reunification and neutralization of Western Germany and further collapse of NATO. The pressure on the United States for concessions on disarmament and accommodation with the Soviets will increase.

During this period there might be an extensive display of the fictional struggle for power in the Soviet leadership. One cannot exclude that at the next Party Congress or earlier, Andropov will be replaced by a younger leader with a more liberal image who will continue the so-called ‘liberalization’ more intensively…

In is not inconceivable that the Soviets will make concessions on Afghanistan in order to gain new strategic advantages.”

Additional Predictions on ‘perestroika’ in Golitsyn’s memoranda to the CIA

(Taken from declassified memos published in Golitsyn’s second book The Perestroika Deception, 1995)

July 4, 1984: ‘At this time, the Soviet Strategists may replace the old leader, Konstantin Chernenko, who is actually only a figurehead, with a younger Soviet leader who was chosen some time ago as his successor, namely Comrade Gorbachev. One of his major tasks will be to implement the so-called liberalization. The strategists may also replace the old ‘hardliner’ Andrei Gromyko with a younger ‘soft-liner’…The new Soviet leadership may introduce economic reforms and striking political initiatives in order to project a clear message that the changes in the Soviet leadership and in Soviet policy require changes in US leadership, in US military policy and in the US budget. Inasmuch as both conservatives and liberals are confused by strategic disinformation about Soviet strategic intentions, it is possible that these manoeuvres, assisted by Soviet agents of influence, will be successful.’

July 5, 1985: ‘The changes in the Soviet leadership should be seen, not as indicating the consolidation by Gorbachev of his personal power, but as meeting the requirements of strategy. The appointment of Gromyko as President and of Eduard Shevardnadze as Minister of Foreign Affairs should be viewed as preparation for the coming programme of calculated economic and political reform which has already been described. Shevardnadze was chosen because of his experience as Minister of Internal Affairs in Georgia during the 1970s. His role will be to link the strategy of so-called “liberalization” with the strategies of Europe and disarmament. In all probability, the model for his appointment was Janos Kadar in Hungary. It was Kadar, the Minister of the Interior under the old regime, who launched the so-called liberalization in Hungary. Gromyko’s image as an old Stalinist would have made him unsuitable for the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs during “liberalization”. But his promotion to the Presidency is very important. It is a mistake to regard the position of President of the Soviet Union as purely ceremonial. Since the adoption of the present long-range policy in 1960, the Soviet President, then Brezhnev, later Podgorniy, has played an important role in the execution of that policy. As a member of the Politburo, Gromyko will provide Gorbachev with important advice on strategy. As President, he will use his exalted position to give guidance to Soviet agents of influence among heads of state in Europe and the Third World’.

August 1985: ‘There are no valid grounds for favourable illusions or for the euphoria in the West over the Gorbachev appointment and the coming ‘liberalisation’. In fact, these developments may present a major challenge and serious test for the United States’ leadership and for the West. The liberalization will not be spontaneous nor will it be genuine. It will be a calculated liberalization patterned along the lines of the Czechoslovak ‘democratisation’ which was rehearsed in 1968. It will be initiated from above and will be guided and controlled by the KGB and the Party apparatus. The ‘liberalisation’ will include the following elements:

(a) Economic reforms to decentralize the Soviet economy and to introduce profit incentives on the lines of those in Hungary and China. Since Gorbachev is a Soviet agricultural expert, one can expect a reorganization of the kolkhozy or collective farms into sovkhozy or state farms. In fact, Lavrentiy Beria was already planning the liquidation of the kolkhozy in 1953.

(b) Religious relaxation along the lines of Iosif Stalin’s relaxation during the Second World War. The recent sensational Soviet invitation to the Reverend Billy Graham to preach in Soviet churches indicates that the Soviet strategists have already introduced this element and have not waited for the formal installation of Gorbachev as Party leader.

(d) Relaxation of travel restrictions to allow Soviet citizens to make visits abroad. This will be done to impress the West with the Soviet government’s compliance with the Helsinki agreements.

(e) Some relaxation for Soviet intellectuals and cultural defectors. Soviet writers and producers will be permitted to write books and produce plays on controversial subjects. Cultural defectors, musicians and dancers will be allowed to perform in the USSR and to travel abroad, thus getting the best of both worlds. One can expect that amnesty will be declared for the so-called dissidents.

(f) Some reduction in the military budget and the transfer of some military funds to improve the state economy’.

‘If presented and advertised by the innocent and uninitiated media as major radical change in the Communist system, the “liberalization” will allow the Communist leaders immediately to regain the political initiative and to revive the political and diplomatic détente which was so disastrous for the West and so beneficial to the Communists in the past. The charismatic personality of Gorbachev may play an important role in the over-reaction of the Western media’.

‘The Soviet “liberalization” is a major part of the strategy of the whole Communist Bloc, and particularly of Poland and East Germany, against the West. The main objective is to launch a political offensive against the United States and NATO and to develop a military détente in Europe by changing the political and military situation. This strategy is designed to accomplish the following:

(a) To bring about a “German Confederation” of East and West Germany and withdrawal from both the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

‘One can expect that, in order to accomplish their objectives, a similar “liberalisation” will be introduced in Poland and East Germany.

‘Presented and advertised as a new reality in Europe, the Soviet, Polish and East German “liberalization” will have a stunning and mesmerizing effect on both West Europeans and Americans. The resulting confusion will be exploited by the Soviet, Polish and East German leaders through their activist diplomacy especially towards West Germany. Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Romanian leaders may actively contribute to this strategy…’

‘The “liberalization” in the USSR, Poland and East Germany may set off a chain reaction in the West and inflict irreparable damage particularly on the NATO countries and the US military posture unless its true nature and role in Communist strategy are realized.’

‘The “liberalization” and its strategic manipulations, combined with overt and covert Communist operations, will also present problems for the leadership of the West. It will be aimed at confusing the Western leaders, splitting the West European allies from the United States and then splitting the people from their elected leaders. The leaders who are taken in by the “liberalization” can be expected to make erroneous and costly decisions, albeit unwittingly, in the interests of the Communists’.

Winter 1986: ‘The essence of the strategy is to introduce a calculated and controlled false democratization and to revive a discredited regime by giving it an attractive aspect and a “human face”. Its strategic objective is to generate support, good will and sympathy in the West and to exploit this sympathy in the West and to exploit this sympathy in order to shape new attitudes and new political realities which will favour Soviet interests. Another objective is to undercut and isolate traditional political parties and their leaders, particularly the conservatives and the realists in the West. A further objective is to shape new attitudes towards the Strategic Defence Initiative, the budget and the US military and to disarm the United States, basing these new attitudes on the premise that “the new regime which has emerged in the USSR is liberal and no longer poses any threat to the United States”. Given the surprise aspect of the Soviet Strategy, it may succeed. The possible implications of a failure to understand the essence of this strategy would be damaging to both the United States and Western Europe. The Americans, the West Europeans, their leaders and their military strategists would be influenced and misled by these developments all to the detriment of the national interests of the democracies. The probable impact on the West of such a Soviet revival would be equal to or greater than that of the October Revolution’.

‘The impact would in fact be greater and deeper because it would not be alarming but disarming for the West. The revival would become a significant influence in the political life of the United States and Western Europe. The revival might have a disproportionate influence on the attitudes of the democracies towards their military strategy, the NATO alliance and the Strategic Defence Initiative, all to the detriment of their national interests. It might eventually lead to the realization of the final goal of Soviet strategy, namely the convergence of the capitalist West with the Communist East on Soviet terms and the creation of a World Government as a solution to the arms race and nuclear confrontation’.

March 1987: ‘The USSR, China, Poland and probably East Germany are now in a position to launch a political and diplomatic offensive against the West to shatter its structure and its foundation…The next strategic moves will include: (a) Mass Jewish emigration intended to swing Western public opinion towards an acceptance of “democratization” as genuine; (b) The revival of “liberalization” in Poland and the introduction of economic reforms there; (c) New initiatives around the time of the Pope’s visit to the USSR; (d) An initiative leading towards German federation’.

March 1989 ‘The great majority of the predictions both in New Lies For Old and in my subsequent Memoranda to the CIA have proved accurate both in substance and in detail. The question arises: why were these predictions correct and why did Western experts fail to predict these developments? The answer lies in the different methods of analysis. The new method takes into account the adoption by the leaders of the Communist Bloc in the period 1958 to 1960 of a long-range strategy of which ‘perestroika’ is the logical culmination.’

(a) The Author’s inside information on the adoption of the strategy, the essence of which was the revitalization of Communism through the economic and political reform of the earlier repressive Stalinist system.

(b) The Author’s inside information on Shelepin’s 1959 report allotting the KGB a crucial role in the new strategy, in particular the task of creating a controlled political opposition which would give the Soviet and other Communist regimes a more liberal image.

(c) The Author’s inside information that the Party and the KGB launched a programme of strategic disinformation to support their strategy.

(d) The Author’s twenty-eight years of experience in interpreting developments in the Communist world in the light of this knowledge.

(e) Study of the official documents of the 1958-60 period in which the long-range policy was openly expressed and approved.’

‘In addition to predictions on forthcoming ‘liberalisation’ in the Soviet Union, New Lies for Old contained a critique of Western methods of analysis and an account of the new method. It is worth mentioning that the late Sir John Rennie, at that time head of the British Secret Service, read the whole of the chapter on this subject in New York in 1968 and expressed the opinion that it should be published. He offered to help in arranging this through his friendship with Mr. Armstrong, then editor of Foreign Affairs. The Author acknowledges that he mistakenly declined this offer. When New Lies for Old was published in 1984, its message did not attract the attention of the American media and public.’

‘Only the late Mr. James Angleton and his colleagues in the ‘Intelligence and Security Foundation’ realized the importance of the book as the basis for understanding ‘perestroika’ and devoted three special reports to a review of the main ideas in the book on long-range strategy. In subsequent Memoranda to the CIA, the Author emphasized that ‘perestroika’ is not Gorbachev’s invention but the logical culmination of the long-range strategy of 1958-1960’ (these dates fly in complete contradiction to the notion promoted by Soviet agents of influence and the naïve Western media that glasnost and perestroika were desperate last-ditch efforts initiated by the Soviet elites to save themselves from collapse—TTS).

‘The new method applies ‘creative Leninist thinking’ to the analysis of Soviet strategy. Leninist thinking, freed from Stalinist dogma and stereotypes, continues to be a principal source of inspiration in the Soviet strategic approach to national and international problems. The new method augments Leninist thinking by taking three factors into account in its analysis: Vladimir Lenin’s introduction of a limited form of capitalism into the Soviet system in the 1920s in order to strengthen the drive for world Communist revolution; Felix Dzerzhinskiy’s creation of GPU-controlled ‘political opposition’ in the USSR in the same period and its introduction to Western intelligence services and general staffs for strategic political deception purposes; and the thirty years of Soviet experience in applying the strategy culminating in ‘perestroika’.

‘It was not in 1985 but in 1958 that the Communist leaders recognized, after the Hungarian and Polish revolts, that the Stalinist practice of mass repression had severely damaged the system and that radical measures were necessary to restore it. It was then that they decided to transform the Stalinist system into a more attractive form of ‘Communist democracy’.

‘It was not in 1985 but in 1958 that the Communist leaders accepted that their economic system was ineffective and lagging behind the West in productivity. It was then that they decided that it would have to be revived through the introduction of market incentives.’

‘It was then that the Communist leaders realized that Communism could not be spread abroad against a background of fear and mass repression and that world Communist victory could only be achieved by transforming the Soviet and other Communist regimes into a form more attractive to the West.’

‘It was during 1958-1960 that the Communist leaders envisaged the convergence of restructured and transformed capitalist systems leading ultimately to one system of World Government. Taking account of the military strength of NATO, the Communist leaders decided to build up their military strength as a guarantee of the success of their programme of domestic ‘reform’ and as a pressure weapon for disarmament negotiations with the West and the execution of their strategy of convergence.’

‘Accepting the necessity for stability in the political leadership of the USSR for the execution of the long-range strategy, the Soviet leaders rejected Stalin’s practice of eliminating his rivals and reverted to Lenin’s style of leadership. They solved the problem through the selection by the Central Committee of Nikita Khrushchev’s successor in advance of Khrushchev’s own retirement. Leonid Brezhnev had already been chosen in this way in July 1960 when he was made President and was given a special briefing by the Chairman of the KGB in preparation for the new responsibilities he would be assuming when Khrushchev stepped down.’

‘A common commitment to the long-range strategy itself became a factor in the prevention of further power struggles. Western experts failed to understand this because Khrushchev’s retirement was deliberately misrepresented by the Soviet leaders to the West as his dismissal.’

‘In this and in other ways, the origin of the long-range deception strategy of ‘perestroika’ was successfully concealed.’

(I am skipping Golitsyn’s rather lengthy review of Soviet research and preparation for the new long-range strategy, or perestroika. Instead, I pick up where Golitsyn talks about experiments and rehearsals for perestroika).

‘Since 1959 the Communist bloc Parties and governments have been involved in practical experiments and rehearsals for separate elements of ‘perestroika’ in different countries in preparation for its introduction overall.’

· Publication of an article about market economics by Professor Yevsei Liberman and experiments with firms and ‘trusts’ in 1962 (along the same lines as Lenin’s NEP experiments in the 1920s—TTS).

· The ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China—in fact a campaign of ideological and political re-education and a preparation of the inexperienced and inept Chinese Party bureaucracy for détente with the capitalist West.

· The introduction of capitalist incentives in China and Hungary during the 1070s and the 1980s.’

‘The Soviet strategists studied the performance, outcome, lessons and mistakes of these experiments and rehearsals. No doubt, they drew proper, practical conclusions from the excesses of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in China and the loss of control over the experiments with ‘democratisation’ in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland. They probably also drew conclusions from the painful experiences of Yugoslavia. The experience gained was of enormous benefit for influencing the introduction of ‘perestroika’ in all its elements in their totality in the USSR.’

‘The development and execution of the strategy over a thirty-years period has strengthened Soviet power militarily, politically and, with Western help, economically. The Author strongly disagrees with Brzezinki’s assessment that the USSR is collapsing. The execution of the strategy has broadened the political base of the Communist Party in the Russian and other national Republics.’

‘Careful preparation has created the conditions for overall ‘perestroika’ and the transition of the regime in the most powerful and experienced of the socialist countries to a phase of ‘Communist democracy’.

‘Naturally, the Soviet leaders seek to avoid alerting the West to what is happening by describing the process in these terms.’

‘From the time the strategy was adopted, the Party leadership made it clear to its technocrats, bureaucrats, military and intellectuals that the requirements of the strategy are paramount for their activities and the assessment of their performance. Because of these demands and Party discipline, there can be no genuine opposition among conservatives in the Party, the military or the technocracy.’

‘Bold experiments and successful execution of the strategy in the USSR, Eastern Europe and Communist China have given Party leaders, KGB officials, generals, technocrats and leading intellectuals a political maturity and sophistication which they have revealed in ‘perestroika’.

‘Because of their longer historical experience, their greater political, economic and military potential and their thorough preparation, the Communist strategists and the ruling elite are confident that they can guide and lead their people without the loss of control which occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland (1981). However, in the event of control nonetheless being endangered in given contexts, the situation will be retrieved in the usual manner—by means of military repression.’

‘The new method sees ‘perestroika’, not as a surprising and spontaneous change, but as the logical result of thirty years of preparation and as the next and final phase of the strategy: it sees it in a broader context than Soviet ‘openness’ has revealed.’

‘It sees it, not only as a renewal of Soviet society, but as a global strategic design for ‘restructuring’ the entire capitalist world.’

‘The following strategic objectives of ‘perestroika’ may be distinguished:

(a) ‘Restructuring’ and revitalization of the Soviet socialist economy through the incorporation of some elements of the market economy.

(b) ‘Restructuring’ of the Stalinist regime into a form of ‘Communist democracy’ with an appearance of political pluralism [= ‘democratism’, or false democracy].

(c) ‘Reconsructing’ a repressive regime with a brutal face into an attractive socialist model with a human façade and seeming similarity to the Swedish social democratic system.’

‘Economic and political ‘restructuring’ of the existing regimes into pseudo-social democratic models while preserving specific national historical features such as the strong Catholic Socialist tradition in Poland and the pre-war democratic tradition in Czechoslovakia.’

(a) ‘Bringing about a new political alliance between the pseudo-social democratic regimes in the USSR and Eastern Europe and the Euro-Communist parties and genuine social democratic parties in Western Europe.

(b) ‘Restructuring’ political and military blocs—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—and the creation of a singe ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ incorporating a reunited, neutral Germany.’

(b) Dissolution of NATO and the US-Japan security pact, and the withdrawal of US troops from Western Europe and Japan.’

‘The introduction and promotion of a new Soviet model with a mixed economy and a human face in Latin America, Africa and Asia through a joint campaign by the pseudo-social democratic regimes of the USSR and Eastern Europe and the genuine social democrats of Western Europe led by the Socialist International.’

(a) ‘To neutralize the influence of the anti-Communist political right in the American political parties and to create favourable conditions for a victory of the radical left in the 1992 US presidential elections (In this context, Clinton’s stay with top Communists in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union during the latter part of the Vietnam war has profound and disturbing implications—TTS).

(b) To ‘restructure’ the American military, political, economic and social status quo to accommodate greater convergence between the Soviet and American systems and the eventual creation of a single World Government.’

‘The paramount global objective of the strategy of ‘perestroika’ is to weaken and neutralize anti-Communist ideology and the influence of anti-Communists in political life in the United States, Western Europe and elsewhere—presenting them as anachronistic survivors of the Cold War, reactionaries and obstacles to ‘restructuring’ and peace. Anyone who warns about Moscow’s true objectives is automatically branded a ‘Cold Warrior’, even by people who have doubts about Moscow’s motives.’

‘The new method penetrates the façade, tears the verbal mask off ‘perestroika’ and reveals its true meaning—which Gorbachev and ‘glasnost’ have failed to do. Lenin’s teaching and the experience of the New Economic Policy [NEP] are keys to understanding the essence of ‘persestroika’ and the reasons for Gorbachev’s downgrading and renunciation of elements of ideological orthodoxy like the class struggle and his emphasis on common interests and the benefits of close cooperation.’

‘Lenin advised the Communists that they must be prepared to ‘resort to all sorts of stratagems, manoeuvres, illegal methods, evasions and subterfuge’ to achieve their objectives. This advice was given on the eve of his reintroduction of limited capitalism in Russia in his work ‘Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder’.

‘The new method sees ‘perestroika’ as an application of Lenin’s advice in new conditions. Another speech of Lenin’s in the NEP period at the Comintern Congress in July 1921 is again highly relevant to understanding ‘perestroika’. ‘Our only strategy at present’, wrote Lenin, ‘is to become stronger and, therefore, wiser, more reasonable, more opportunistic. The more opportunistic, the sooner will you again assemble the masses around you. When we have won over the masses by our reasonable approach, we shall then apply offensive tactics in the strictest sense of the word.’

THE WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST FEDERATION (should they succeed…taken from Golitsyn’s book New Lies For Old, 1984)

‘Integration of the Communist Bloc would follow the lines envisaged by Lenin when the Third Communist International was founded. That is to say, the Soviet Union and China would not absorb one another or other Communist states. All the countries of the European and Asiatic Communist zones, together with new Communist states in Europe and the Third World, would join a supranational economic and political Communist federation (this is precisely what the Soviets have in mind for the impending EU collective—TTS). Soviet-Albanian, Soviet-Yugoslav, and Soviet-Romanian disputes and ‘differences’ would be resolved in the wake, or possibly in advance of, Sino-Soviet reconciliation (Golitsyn goes to great lengths in previous chapters to show how the split between the Soviets and the Chinese was completely healed immediately after Stalin’s death…however, they continued the illusion of a split to dupe the West into backing alternating sides, depending on circumstances—TTS). The political, economic, military, diplomatic, and ideological cooperation between all the Communist states, at present partially concealed, would become clearly visible. There might even be public acknowledgment that the splits and disputes were long-term disinformation operations that had successfully deceived the “imperialist” powers. The effect on Western morale can be imagined’ (the Soviets have employed this tactic on numerous occasions—TTS).

‘In the new worldwide Communist federation the present different brands of Communism would disappear, to be replaced by a uniform, rigorous brand of Leninism. The process would be painful. Concessions made in the name of economic and political reform would be withdrawn. Religious and intellectual dissent would be suppressed. Nationalism and all other forms of genuine oppositions would be crushed. Those who had taken advantage of détente to establish friendly Western contacts would be rebuked or persecuted like those Soviet officers who worked with the Allies during the Second World War. In new Communist states—for example, in France, Italy, and the Third World—the “alienated classes” would be reeducated. Show trials of “imperialist agents” would be staged. Action would be taken against nationalist and social democratic leaders, party activists, former civil servants, officers, and priests. The last vestiges of private enterprise and ownership would be obliterated. Nationalization of industry, finance, and agriculture would be completed. In fact, all the totalitarian features familiar from the early stages of the Soviet revolution and the postwar Stalinist years in Eastern Europe might be expected to reappear, especially in those countries newly won for Communism. Unchallenged and unchallengeable, a true Communist monolith would dominate the world.’

Nice picture!

Speaking of Chechnya...

QUESTIONS WESTERN MEDIA SHOULD BE ASKING ABOUT CHECHNYA…BUT AREN’T

MEMO TO CIA FROM KGB DEFECTOR, ANATOLY GOLITSYN, 1 FEBRUARY 1995 (Taken from his book, Perestroika Deception, Edward Harle Limited, 1998, ISBN 1-899798-03-X).

Snippet (footnotes removed):

THE EVENTS IN CHECHNYA EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY

The events in Chechnya, like the events of August 1991 and October 1993, have been deliberately staged largely for Western consumption by the Kremlin strategists in the pursuit of their objectives. One indication of this is the timing of the events. Chechnya declared its independence from Russian in 1991. Yet for three years the Russians did not react, other than ineffectually. Why did they do so only at the end of 1994?

Independence for Chechnya is a wholly artificial concept...their territory has no direct access to the outside world…The Chechens lost half their numbers in exile under Stalin. By 1994 50% of the population of Chechnya were ethnic Russians. Russians control the pipeline to Noverossiisk, giving them powerful leverage in the area. Given these circumstances the idea of a serious Chechen independence struggle is a non-starter.

Equally artificial is the Russian choice of method for dealing with Chechen aspirations. The Yeltsin Government inherited over 70 years’ worth of Soviet experience of dealing politically and militarily with nationalist opposition in the Republics. Yet it chose to wield an enormous military sledgehammer to crack a small nut in Chechnya, when the only rational way to handle the situation would have been the path of negotiation leading to a peaceful settlement as in the case of Tatarstan.

In earlier Memoranda I suggested that the confrontation between Yeltsin and his then Vice-President Rutskoi and the parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov—a confrontation which culminated in the televised bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow [a new kind of ‘Reichstag Fire’: see page 163] was contrived by the strategists with Rutskoi and Khasbulatov playing the role of provocateurs. The release and amnesty granted to Rutskoi and Khasbulatov after a ludicrously truncated period of imprisonment was consistent with their having played such a provocative role.

Frequent press mentions during December 1994, in the Chechnyan context, of Khasbulatov, himself a Chechen, provided a possible pointer to provocation there: he could well have played a role behind the scenes as an advisor to the ‘Chechen Fighters’. Another pointer to the likelihood of provocation ins Dzhokhar Dudayev’s own background. Like Shevardnadze in Georgia and Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Dudayev is a ‘former’ Communist. He is also a former Soviet Air Force General.

The conduct of the Chechnyan operation raises a number of questions. For instance: why, given the vast military and secret police experience at their disposal, did the Russians choose to dispatch in to Chechnya in the first place, inexperienced young Soviet army draftees who put up a poor performance in front of Western television cameras? Why were the Russian special forces who, for example, captured General Pal Maleter during the Hungarian upheaval of 1956, too inept to capture any of the Chechen leaders? How did the Chechen Fighters come to be so well armed? Why did the army and Ministry of the Interior troops not take immediate action to surround the city of Grozny and cut off the one route which remained available for the movement of Chechen Fighters and supplies in and out of the city centre?

Why, with their huge preponderance of firepower, did it take the Russians so long to capture the Presidential Palace, the symbolic centre of Chechen resistance? Why, before the Palace fell, were its Chechen defenders, according to their own accounts, allowed to leave, taking their Russian prisoners with them, so that they were free to continue the struggle elsewhere? Why was the bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny conducted with what Chancellor Kohl described as ‘senseless madness’? And why, as the Chechen fighters ‘took to the hills’, was a local guerrilla leader willing to receive a Western journalist in his own home in a mountain village without disguise, providing his full name and a history of his family? [The New York Times, 20 January 1995].

I am skeptical about much of the Western press and television coverage of Chechnya. In the first place, coverage was restricted by various factors. For example, Western access to Russian troops engaged in the operation was severely limited according to John Dancey, the NBC News correspondent in Moscow, speaking on the Donahue-Pozner Program on 12 January 1995. The bombardment itself was a powerful disincentive to intrusive journalism, and reporters obviously cannot be blamed for their inability to provide a coherent account of the fighting which took place in the centre of Grozny.

The important general point is the Western press and TV representatives reported the events as Westerners observing what they took to be a real conflict in a free society. It is not their fault that they were not briefed concerning the possibilities of provocation along Communist lines. Hence they were not looking for evidence of mock confrontations, faked casualties of planted information. The prominent Western reporters themselves, though courageous, appeared young and lacking in experience as war correspondents.

Nevertheless, some revealing items surfaced in the coverage. For example, the New York Times reported on 15 January that ‘some of the least serious’ of the Chechen fighters ‘would parade before the cameras’ at the Minutka traffic circle. That report prompted questions as to how many serious Chechen fighters were actually involved in action against Russian troops. Another report insisted that ‘ the last Western reporters’ had left the area of the Presidential Palace, where the ‘murderous fighting’ was concentrated and that Chechen fighters were no longer able to move easily to the south of the city in order to brief journalists about what was happening. It seems therefore that there were no Western eyewitnesses of the ‘final battle’ for the Palace, and that much of the evidence on the fighting was derived from Chechen fighters, whose reliability the reporters were no position to assess.

Two Western reporters were killed during these events. Though these deaths were reported as accidental, the fact is that the Russians would have no compunction about eliminating Western journalists if they thought they might be liable to expose their provocation. It was no coincidence that 40 Russian rockets were targeted at, and hit, Minutka Circle—which up to that moment had been favoured for meetings between journalists and fighters. Almost certainly, Russian officers who told journalists that they had arrived in Grozny without maps were briefed to tell this tall story. A Russian General who was shown on television going through photographs taken by reporters, said the pictures they had taken were useful because they helped him to assess what was going on in Grozny. In all likelihood, he was checking to make sure that the photographs taken by the reporters conveyed the images the Russian wanted conveyed for international public consumption.

The spectacular and continuous bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny, many of them probably empty, struck me as deliberately designed to monopolise television cameras, replicating in many ways the ‘Reichstag Fire’ bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow in October 1993.

Inevitably, the detonation of so much high explosive was accompanied by casualties. But the actual number of casualties was probably limited by the departure of many inhabitants of the centre of Grozny before the bombardment started in earnest. As early as 7 January 1995, the Red Cross reported that 350,000 people had fled from the fighting, a figure equivalent to over 80% of the population of Grozny. It would be interesting to know to what extent the authorities encouraged or arranged the evacuation of central Grozny before the bombardment began.

Verification of casualty number is the most difficult problem. According to Dudayev, cited in The New York Times of 12 January, 18,000 Chechens had already died, a figure which the reporter said ‘seems exaggerated’. Casualty figures for the Russian army quoted in The New York Times of 17 January varied from 400 to 800 killed. Again there is no knowing whether these figures were exaggerated or minimized. The Russian authorities are reported to have delayed the admission of European observers interested in verifying numbers. Even if they were eventually to arrive on the scene, such observers would be unlikely to be able to check the numbers allegedly buried in mass graves. Total casualties will probably never be known with any certainty. From the Kremlin strategists’ point of view, casualties are inevitable during this kind of operation and a necessary price to pay of the attainment of defined strategic objectives.

THE KREMLIN’S OBJECTIVES AND THE CHECHNYA CRISIS

The timing of the Chechnyan crisis is an essential key to understanding the strategic objectives which underlie it. The crisis followed closely on the Republican Congressional victory, with its possible consequence of a reversal in the US military rundown. Contrived and televised Russian military bungling during the Chechnyan campaign has sent a strong message to the West that Russian military leaders are divided amongst themselves and that there is widespread incompetence and low morale in the army—factors which demonstrate that it can be discounted as a serious military adversary for the foreseeable future.

This message is intended to influence US Congressional debate on the subject of Russia’s military potential and the size of US forces required to maintain a balance with it. The message can also be used as a pretext for deepening the partnership between the US and Russian armed forces by seeking American advice and help in ‘reforming’, reorganizing and retraining the Russian army in order to enable it to serve as a ‘democratic’ system.

The events in Chechnya have enabled the Russians to play especially on European fears of destabilization in Russia and the development there of an internal ‘Bosnian situation’. These fears have injected a further boost to the European desire for partnership with the ‘democratic forces’ in Russia in developing democratic solutions to Russian problems. European hopes of promoting real democracy in Russian will of course prove illusory. The Russians will use the partnership to ease their entry into European institutions as a rightful member of the ‘European house’, a house which over the longer term they intend to dominate.

Given continuing Russian influence and leverage in Eastern Europe, East European and eventually Russian involvement in NATO are in the long term Russian strategic interest in accordance with Sun Tzu’s principle of ‘entering the enemy’s camp unopposed’. Though for different reasons, I share the view expressed by a writer in The New York Times of 11 January 1995 that East European membership would mean the ruin of NATO. The ruin of NATO is a long-term Russian objective, towards the achievement of which much progress has already been made. The televised spectacle of Russian barbarity in Chechnya has aroused apprehension in neighboring states of comparable Russian military operations against themselves, thereby strengthening the argument that former members of the Warsaw Pact should be admitted to membership of NATO. Yeltsin’s firmly expressed opposition to their membership and his Foreign Minister’s ambivalence (see, for instance, The New York Times of 20 January 1995) can be read as possible preludes to dramatic ‘change’ in Russian policy, perhaps under a new government.

Furthermore, the reassertion of Kremlin control over Chechnya through massive military intervention (which, despite the calculated impression of bungling, achieved its objective, thereby itself revealing the contrived nature of the televised ‘bungling’), the spectacular, televised destruction of buildings in Gozny and the publicity surrounding the level of casualties, have sent the strongest possible signals to genuine would-be Muslim and non-Muslim secessionists in Chechnya and other Republics that secessionism is a very dangerous game. The strategists may well have chosen Chechnya for their demonstration of force specifically because real secessionism can be more easily contained in that territory than in others.

It would also be consistent with the strategists’ method that the publicized impression of Yeltsin’s inept handling of the Chechnyan situation was intended in part to help destroy suspicions that Russian leaders are capable of implementing a long-range strategy, as this Author has consistently contended that they do. For the strategists, it is particularly important to keep obscuring this fact, even though it is largely beyond Western comprehension, since belated Western understanding of strategic continuity would inevitably lead to the far-reaching reassessment of Soviet-Chinese strategy and objectives which they seek to preclude.

Just as consistently, the Russian scenario for Chechnya provides for a peaceful solution of the Chechnyan problem under either Yeltsin or his successor. Khasbulatov might emerge as a new Chechnyan leader just as Shevardnadze and Aliyev emerged in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively. Although at present there is obvious European revulsion against Russian brutality in Chechnya, given a peaceful solution and the associated psychological sense of ‘relief’, European and Arab capital could be attracted to help finance the reconstruction of Grozny and to undertake investment in the Caucasian oil industry.

In my letter of 12 October 1993 I referred to the military/nationalist option as the third course upon which the Kremlin strategists might embark in future to adjust the style and leadership of a new government if, for example, Yeltsin was considered to have exhausted his usefulness in extracting concessions from the West. In this context, the Chechnyan ‘crisis’ can be seen not as a likely cause of a military coup, but as a possible planned prelude to a change of government. The new government might be military of nationalistic. Certain indications that this is envisaged, are apparent.

It should be remembered, too, that the emergence of ‘perestroika’ in Russia was accompanied by the tightening of military and political control in China, starting with the Tienanmen Square episode. Far from being coincidental, this was the result of a joint Sino-Soviet decision—confirmed during Gorbachev’s visit immediately ahead of the Tienanmen Square provocation—that, while one main pillar of the Leninist world was engaged in ‘perestroika’, the other should be held under firm control. Similarly, the introduction of a Chinese version of ‘perestroika’, which may be expected in China after the death of Deng, would be a probable reason for a tightening of control in Russia.

Since an outright military or nationalist government might prejudice the flow of Western aid and the continued ‘cooperation’ with the West which furthers the strategists’ interests, it is more likely that the Kremlin stategists will opt for a hybrid solution involving, for example, a new President and Commander-in-Chief with a military background and a ‘reformist’ Prime Minister, in the context of overtly tighter KGB control. The President would be presented as a guarantee of Russian stability while the Prime Minister’s task would be to ensure the continued flow of Western aid and the continuation of cooperative operations. The transition might be brought about, for example, by the resignation of Yeltsin on health grounds and/or through elections, due anyway in 1996, for which the strategists would have chosen and groomed their presidential candidate. In this way, ‘legitimacy’ could be preserved and the election could be used as further ‘proof’ that democracy, cherished by the West, was ‘working’ in Russia (albeit in step with increasing authoritarianism).

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