Golitsyn’s Predictions re: The Phony Collapse of the Soviet Union

I've considered the USSR as being in 'stealth' mode ever since Reagan made Gorby tear down the Wall. Sinister Senator Barbara Boxer's recent statement that Communism is Dead -- even in Cuba -- (approx. quote) has not assured me of anything except her useful idiocy....

BTTT

==I've considered the USSR as being in 'stealth' mode ever since Reagan made Gorby tear down the Wall....BTTT

Thanks!!! We need to get the word out to the American public/West while there is still time to make a difference--TTS

bump.

Do you have an original link for this?

==Do you have an original link for this?

No links. I had to type it directly from his books--TTS

Actually, if unfortunately, we need the USSR to counter the Assyrian Empire when it reemerges from from stealth mode. Don't be fooled by the fact that they have dwindled to a few thousands in Iraq and environs, the Assyrians are the real threat! I can prove it once I scan some cuneiform stone tablets outlining their long range strategies.

good grief. Thanks for the work.

Yawn...as if a "stealth" Soviet Union would have let the U.S. hire more than 10,000 of their top scientists for our R&D instead of theirs for the past 15 years since the Soviet collapse. Or to demilitarize their heavy industries. Or to fail to bring to bear new tanks. Or to see their satellite fleet dwindle. Or to see their submarine fleet rust and sink. Even their super-cavitating torpedo blew up on them on the Kursk. Or to lag further behind in IC chip and software design. Or to be entangled in Checknya by mobs of radical Islamists. Or to lose the Ukraine's lucrative energy contracts with Germany.

Look, some people are so bored with their lives that they *need* to believe in giant conspiracy theories; facts be hung. The adrenaline rush from such fear-mongering is all that they've got.

Don't be someone like that.

Good points...provided, for example, that none of the 10K scientists are moles... Definitely no risk of that, right?

I know we agree there is some risk no matter what. And what you mention is certainly better than a fully escalated Cold War having continued for another couple of decades....

FReegards.

This article makes my brain wrinkle.

Again? We just got it back from being dry cleaned!

TTS, you find the most interesting stuff!

This all takes on a new meaning when you consider how Putin has been slowly "DE-democritizing" Russia.

He's a pure weasel and I never trusted him.

Putin exacerbated the Checnya problem and created the "Black Widows" by doing so.

Then there was that whole Ukranian election fiasco...

There's still too many Commies in Russia, and WHY are the Commies here and around the world still holding on to their ideology so tightly?

Anticom web

Nice picture!

Speaking of Chechnya...

QUESTIONS WESTERN MEDIA SHOULD BE ASKING ABOUT CHECHNYA…BUT AREN’T

MEMO TO CIA FROM KGB DEFECTOR, ANATOLY GOLITSYN, 1 FEBRUARY 1995 (Taken from his book, Perestroika Deception, Edward Harle Limited, 1998, ISBN 1-899798-03-X).

Snippet (footnotes removed):

THE EVENTS IN CHECHNYA EXPLAINED IN TERMS OF RUSSIAN STRATEGY

The events in Chechnya, like the events of August 1991 and October 1993, have been deliberately staged largely for Western consumption by the Kremlin strategists in the pursuit of their objectives. One indication of this is the timing of the events. Chechnya declared its independence from Russian in 1991. Yet for three years the Russians did not react, other than ineffectually. Why did they do so only at the end of 1994?

Independence for Chechnya is a wholly artificial concept...their territory has no direct access to the outside world…The Chechens lost half their numbers in exile under Stalin. By 1994 50% of the population of Chechnya were ethnic Russians. Russians control the pipeline to Noverossiisk, giving them powerful leverage in the area. Given these circumstances the idea of a serious Chechen independence struggle is a non-starter.

Equally artificial is the Russian choice of method for dealing with Chechen aspirations. The Yeltsin Government inherited over 70 years’ worth of Soviet experience of dealing politically and militarily with nationalist opposition in the Republics. Yet it chose to wield an enormous military sledgehammer to crack a small nut in Chechnya, when the only rational way to handle the situation would have been the path of negotiation leading to a peaceful settlement as in the case of Tatarstan.

In earlier Memoranda I suggested that the confrontation between Yeltsin and his then Vice-President Rutskoi and the parliamentary Speaker Khasbulatov—a confrontation which culminated in the televised bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow [a new kind of ‘Reichstag Fire’: see page 163] was contrived by the strategists with Rutskoi and Khasbulatov playing the role of provocateurs. The release and amnesty granted to Rutskoi and Khasbulatov after a ludicrously truncated period of imprisonment was consistent with their having played such a provocative role.

Frequent press mentions during December 1994, in the Chechnyan context, of Khasbulatov, himself a Chechen, provided a possible pointer to provocation there: he could well have played a role behind the scenes as an advisor to the ‘Chechen Fighters’. Another pointer to the likelihood of provocation ins Dzhokhar Dudayev’s own background. Like Shevardnadze in Georgia and Aliyev in Azerbaijan, Dudayev is a ‘former’ Communist. He is also a former Soviet Air Force General.

The conduct of the Chechnyan operation raises a number of questions. For instance: why, given the vast military and secret police experience at their disposal, did the Russians choose to dispatch in to Chechnya in the first place, inexperienced young Soviet army draftees who put up a poor performance in front of Western television cameras? Why were the Russian special forces who, for example, captured General Pal Maleter during the Hungarian upheaval of 1956, too inept to capture any of the Chechen leaders? How did the Chechen Fighters come to be so well armed? Why did the army and Ministry of the Interior troops not take immediate action to surround the city of Grozny and cut off the one route which remained available for the movement of Chechen Fighters and supplies in and out of the city centre?

Why, with their huge preponderance of firepower, did it take the Russians so long to capture the Presidential Palace, the symbolic centre of Chechen resistance? Why, before the Palace fell, were its Chechen defenders, according to their own accounts, allowed to leave, taking their Russian prisoners with them, so that they were free to continue the struggle elsewhere? Why was the bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny conducted with what Chancellor Kohl described as ‘senseless madness’? And why, as the Chechen fighters ‘took to the hills’, was a local guerrilla leader willing to receive a Western journalist in his own home in a mountain village without disguise, providing his full name and a history of his family? [The New York Times, 20 January 1995].

I am skeptical about much of the Western press and television coverage of Chechnya. In the first place, coverage was restricted by various factors. For example, Western access to Russian troops engaged in the operation was severely limited according to John Dancey, the NBC News correspondent in Moscow, speaking on the Donahue-Pozner Program on 12 January 1995. The bombardment itself was a powerful disincentive to intrusive journalism, and reporters obviously cannot be blamed for their inability to provide a coherent account of the fighting which took place in the centre of Grozny.

The important general point is the Western press and TV representatives reported the events as Westerners observing what they took to be a real conflict in a free society. It is not their fault that they were not briefed concerning the possibilities of provocation along Communist lines. Hence they were not looking for evidence of mock confrontations, faked casualties of planted information. The prominent Western reporters themselves, though courageous, appeared young and lacking in experience as war correspondents.

Nevertheless, some revealing items surfaced in the coverage. For example, the New York Times reported on 15 January that ‘some of the least serious’ of the Chechen fighters ‘would parade before the cameras’ at the Minutka traffic circle. That report prompted questions as to how many serious Chechen fighters were actually involved in action against Russian troops. Another report insisted that ‘ the last Western reporters’ had left the area of the Presidential Palace, where the ‘murderous fighting’ was concentrated and that Chechen fighters were no longer able to move easily to the south of the city in order to brief journalists about what was happening. It seems therefore that there were no Western eyewitnesses of the ‘final battle’ for the Palace, and that much of the evidence on the fighting was derived from Chechen fighters, whose reliability the reporters were no position to assess.

Two Western reporters were killed during these events. Though these deaths were reported as accidental, the fact is that the Russians would have no compunction about eliminating Western journalists if they thought they might be liable to expose their provocation. It was no coincidence that 40 Russian rockets were targeted at, and hit, Minutka Circle—which up to that moment had been favoured for meetings between journalists and fighters. Almost certainly, Russian officers who told journalists that they had arrived in Grozny without maps were briefed to tell this tall story. A Russian General who was shown on television going through photographs taken by reporters, said the pictures they had taken were useful because they helped him to assess what was going on in Grozny. In all likelihood, he was checking to make sure that the photographs taken by the reporters conveyed the images the Russian wanted conveyed for international public consumption.

The spectacular and continuous bombardment of buildings in the centre of Grozny, many of them probably empty, struck me as deliberately designed to monopolise television cameras, replicating in many ways the ‘Reichstag Fire’ bombardment of the ‘White House’ in Moscow in October 1993.

Inevitably, the detonation of so much high explosive was accompanied by casualties. But the actual number of casualties was probably limited by the departure of many inhabitants of the centre of Grozny before the bombardment started in earnest. As early as 7 January 1995, the Red Cross reported that 350,000 people had fled from the fighting, a figure equivalent to over 80% of the population of Grozny. It would be interesting to know to what extent the authorities encouraged or arranged the evacuation of central Grozny before the bombardment began.

Verification of casualty number is the most difficult problem. According to Dudayev, cited in The New York Times of 12 January, 18,000 Chechens had already died, a figure which the reporter said ‘seems exaggerated’. Casualty figures for the Russian army quoted in The New York Times of 17 January varied from 400 to 800 killed. Again there is no knowing whether these figures were exaggerated or minimized. The Russian authorities are reported to have delayed the admission of European observers interested in verifying numbers. Even if they were eventually to arrive on the scene, such observers would be unlikely to be able to check the numbers allegedly buried in mass graves. Total casualties will probably never be known with any certainty. From the Kremlin strategists’ point of view, casualties are inevitable during this kind of operation and a necessary price to pay of the attainment of defined strategic objectives.

THE KREMLIN’S OBJECTIVES AND THE CHECHNYA CRISIS

The timing of the Chechnyan crisis is an essential key to understanding the strategic objectives which underlie it. The crisis followed closely on the Republican Congressional victory, with its possible consequence of a reversal in the US military rundown. Contrived and televised Russian military bungling during the Chechnyan campaign has sent a strong message to the West that Russian military leaders are divided amongst themselves and that there is widespread incompetence and low morale in the army—factors which demonstrate that it can be discounted as a serious military adversary for the foreseeable future.

This message is intended to influence US Congressional debate on the subject of Russia’s military potential and the size of US forces required to maintain a balance with it. The message can also be used as a pretext for deepening the partnership between the US and Russian armed forces by seeking American advice and help in ‘reforming’, reorganizing and retraining the Russian army in order to enable it to serve as a ‘democratic’ system.

The events in Chechnya have enabled the Russians to play especially on European fears of destabilization in Russia and the development there of an internal ‘Bosnian situation’. These fears have injected a further boost to the European desire for partnership with the ‘democratic forces’ in Russia in developing democratic solutions to Russian problems. European hopes of promoting real democracy in Russian will of course prove illusory. The Russians will use the partnership to ease their entry into European institutions as a rightful member of the ‘European house’, a house which over the longer term they intend to dominate.

Given continuing Russian influence and leverage in Eastern Europe, East European and eventually Russian involvement in NATO are in the long term Russian strategic interest in accordance with Sun Tzu’s principle of ‘entering the enemy’s camp unopposed’. Though for different reasons, I share the view expressed by a writer in The New York Times of 11 January 1995 that East European membership would mean the ruin of NATO. The ruin of NATO is a long-term Russian objective, towards the achievement of which much progress has already been made. The televised spectacle of Russian barbarity in Chechnya has aroused apprehension in neighboring states of comparable Russian military operations against themselves, thereby strengthening the argument that former members of the Warsaw Pact should be admitted to membership of NATO. Yeltsin’s firmly expressed opposition to their membership and his Foreign Minister’s ambivalence (see, for instance, The New York Times of 20 January 1995) can be read as possible preludes to dramatic ‘change’ in Russian policy, perhaps under a new government.

Furthermore, the reassertion of Kremlin control over Chechnya through massive military intervention (which, despite the calculated impression of bungling, achieved its objective, thereby itself revealing the contrived nature of the televised ‘bungling’), the spectacular, televised destruction of buildings in Gozny and the publicity surrounding the level of casualties, have sent the strongest possible signals to genuine would-be Muslim and non-Muslim secessionists in Chechnya and other Republics that secessionism is a very dangerous game. The strategists may well have chosen Chechnya for their demonstration of force specifically because real secessionism can be more easily contained in that territory than in others.

It would also be consistent with the strategists’ method that the publicized impression of Yeltsin’s inept handling of the Chechnyan situation was intended in part to help destroy suspicions that Russian leaders are capable of implementing a long-range strategy, as this Author has consistently contended that they do. For the strategists, it is particularly important to keep obscuring this fact, even though it is largely beyond Western comprehension, since belated Western understanding of strategic continuity would inevitably lead to the far-reaching reassessment of Soviet-Chinese strategy and objectives which they seek to preclude.

Just as consistently, the Russian scenario for Chechnya provides for a peaceful solution of the Chechnyan problem under either Yeltsin or his successor. Khasbulatov might emerge as a new Chechnyan leader just as Shevardnadze and Aliyev emerged in Georgia and Azerbaijan respectively. Although at present there is obvious European revulsion against Russian brutality in Chechnya, given a peaceful solution and the associated psychological sense of ‘relief’, European and Arab capital could be attracted to help finance the reconstruction of Grozny and to undertake investment in the Caucasian oil industry.

In my letter of 12 October 1993 I referred to the military/nationalist option as the third course upon which the Kremlin strategists might embark in future to adjust the style and leadership of a new government if, for example, Yeltsin was considered to have exhausted his usefulness in extracting concessions from the West. In this context, the Chechnyan ‘crisis’ can be seen not as a likely cause of a military coup, but as a possible planned prelude to a change of government. The new government might be military of nationalistic. Certain indications that this is envisaged, are apparent.

It should be remembered, too, that the emergence of ‘perestroika’ in Russia was accompanied by the tightening of military and political control in China, starting with the Tienanmen Square episode. Far from being coincidental, this was the result of a joint Sino-Soviet decision—confirmed during Gorbachev’s visit immediately ahead of the Tienanmen Square provocation—that, while one main pillar of the Leninist world was engaged in ‘perestroika’, the other should be held under firm control. Similarly, the introduction of a Chinese version of ‘perestroika’, which may be expected in China after the death of Deng, would be a probable reason for a tightening of control in Russia.

Since an outright military or nationalist government might prejudice the flow of Western aid and the continued ‘cooperation’ with the West which furthers the strategists’ interests, it is more likely that the Kremlin stategists will opt for a hybrid solution involving, for example, a new President and Commander-in-Chief with a military background and a ‘reformist’ Prime Minister, in the context of overtly tighter KGB control. The President would be presented as a guarantee of Russian stability while the Prime Minister’s task would be to ensure the continued flow of Western aid and the continuation of cooperative operations. The transition might be brought about, for example, by the resignation of Yeltsin on health grounds and/or through elections, due anyway in 1996, for which the strategists would have chosen and groomed their presidential candidate. In this way, ‘legitimacy’ could be preserved and the election could be used as further ‘proof’ that democracy, cherished by the West, was ‘working’ in Russia (albeit in step with increasing authoritarianism).

New Lies for Old
by Anatoliy Golitsyn

Now why didnt I think of that! Thanks--TTS

==Are you an over due book? Because you've got FINE written all over you!"

Nice!!!

Ping!

Thanks, I ripped it off the other day from some online quiz, and figured it was about time I changed my tagline again. :') You're the second to notice. (':

Yamantau Mountain--Theme Park or Bunker Complex Big as D.C. Inside the Beltway?

This article makes my brain wrinkle.

James Angleton's "thinking" will do that to ya.

Quinn & Rose, Warroom.com ping.