The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Eisenhower, Berlin, & the National Redoubt(Part II) - Oct. 7th, 2003

http://grad.usask.ca/gateway/archive22.html ^ | Jeff Korte

[SAMWolf]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

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for all those serving their country at this time.

...................................................................................... ...........................................

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The Allies and the National Redoubt

During the final months of the Second World War, the belief that Hitler might flee the German capital of Berlin to a fortified Alpine position in the south was a serious consideration within SHAEF. This position became known as the German National Redoubt, or Alpenfestung (Alpine Fortress) as it was called by those Germans involved. According to Allied Intelligence, this Redoubt would hold considerable foodstuffs and military supplies built up over the preceding months and would even include entire weapon production facilities. Hitler would rely upon his personal guard, the fanatical Shutzstaffel (SS), and chosen Wehrmacht units, to man the carefully prepared defensive positions. Within this fortified terrain, Hitler would be able to forestall any Allied victory and cause tremendous difficulties for the occupying Allied forces throughout Germany.

General Dwight Eisenhower

While the German capital was considered the natural and expected target for the Allied armed forces since their arrival on the beaches of Normandy in June of 1944, Berlin was relegated to secondary status in the closing months of the war. Eisenhower instead sent the bulk of his forces through the centre of Germany, and cut the remaining German territory in half to prevent further German forces from withdrawing into this allegedly fortified alpine zone, before ordering his armies to swing south and overrun the Redoubt zone itself. While the Russian Red Army was waging its historic battle for Berlin in late April and May of 1945, the Allied armies were sent charging into southern Germany, attacking a Redoubt that simply did not exist.

This last statement obviously requires some explanation. The National Redoubt, specifically as early Allied intelligence described it, filled with crack SS units and complete with hundreds of defensive positions linked by a maze of tunnels, did not exist. Bradley stated in his postwar memoirs that the Redoubt "grew into so exaggerated a scheme that I am astonished we could have believed it as innocently as we did. But while it persisted, this legend of the Redoubt was too ominous a threat to be ignored." During his postwar interrogation, the German officer placed in charge of the Redoubt defences, General Georg von Hengl, believed that the Allies suffered from what he termed as "Redoubt psychosis." Eisenhower had pointed out after the war that his staff was soundly professional and not a "group of people that gives way to hysterical emotion." Yet SHAEF was concerned enough about the Redoubt to give this possible threat as one of three reasons to shift their main thrust away from Berlin to Southern Germany in April 1945. Eisenhower, in his final report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, stated that although the Redoubt was ultimately not to be the final seat of the Nazi government;

. . . the possibility remained that it would still be the scene of a desperate stand by the fanatical elements of the armies [once Germany had been cut in two by the Allies] together with those which might retreat northward out of Italy . . . The conquest of the Redoubt area thus remained as an important objective of the Allies, despite the collapse of the rest of Germany . . . In the event of determined resistance, its reduction would constitute a formidable problem . . .


The "National Redoubt", or Alpenfestung, extending some 240 miles in length and 80 miles in depth, comprised the western half of Austria, with small portions of Germany to the north and Italy to the south. It was bounded on the north by the Bavarian Plains, on the south by the Dolomites and Carnic Alps, on the west by the Swiss frontier and the Rhine Valley, and on the east by the Lageneurt Basin and the eastern extremity of the Niedere Tauern. Within it lay Berchtesgaden and Hitler's "Eagle's Nest" that was to serve as the command post.



It is also interesting to note the reaction of SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, British General Kenneth Strong, whose post-war comments are key to understanding the hold the Redoubt would come to have on the Allied intelligence network. Strong was considered one of the best intelligence officers in the Allied forces, yet even he stated that considering the complete shock achieved by the Germans with the Ardennes Offensive, he was loathe to take any more chances with the Germans, even if the Redoubt proved a myth.66 Stephen E. Ambrose, a historian with a long and scholarly interest in Eisenhower and the Second World War, described some of the early intelligence produced by SHAEF concerning the Redoubt to be "the worst intelligence reports of all time, but no one knew that in March of 1945, and few even suspected it." Bearing in mind the advanced state of collapse within the German Reich during the final months of the war, the question of why SHAEF considered the Redoubt a more pressing concern than capturing the German capital remains.


Berchtesgaden

Eisenhower's decision to abandon a northern advance to Berlin and instead target those remaining German forces in the south was explained in a variety of ways. Many of the reasons supplied by SHAEF are identical to those given for targeting the Redoubt zone in the south. For example, the capture of the Remagen bridge and the subsequent capture of the Ruhr, which gave the Allies a considerable beachhead into central, not northern, Germany, while removing a significant number of divisions from the German Order-of-Battle from the north. As well, the future zones of occupation, which placed Berlin deep in the future Russian zone, also placed the remaining German forces massing in the Redoubt area in the future American zone. Thus, if the Redoubt were to become operational, it would be primarily an American problem. Bradley pointed out after the war that leaving Berlin to the Russians should never have been an issue. The Americans wanted to clear out their zone of occupation, not the Russian zone. Also in Part One, Eisenhower appeared convinced that the Germans had only three remaining avenues of resistance available; a falling out among the Allies, the Werwolf-Guerrilla movement, and the National Redoubt. The National Redoubt, also rumoured to be the base of operations for the Werwolf movement, was also to be in the south. Thus, Eisenhower was able to address all three of these remaining avenues of resistance by shifting his forces south.

While the Redoubt did not take the form SHAEF was expecting, this is not to say there was nothing in the area at all, and most certainly the Redoubt zone itself did pose a particular military threat. The natural terrain of the area heavily favoured the defender. There were some defensive positions completed on the northern approaches and the southern defences, originally designed for the Italian theatre, were complete. Thus, with a determined force and a little time to prepare, the Redoubt zone would be a significant problem for attacking forces.


Berchtesgaden

Indeed, the Wehrmacht had made extensive surveys of the Alpine area. Most were done in 1943 as Italy was knocked out of the war and the Allies were landing forces in southern Italy. The Wehrmacht was ordered to do extensive planning for a defence in depth of the southern Italian Alps, believing that the Allies would move swiftly up the Italian nation. The Allies faltered, however, and Hitler was able to rush considerable German forces into Italy, holding the Allied armies far away from the alpine approaches. As the Allies slowly inched their way up the Italian peninsula between 1943-1944 these original plans for such defences began to once again gain credence. As a result, the construction of a defence in depth with fortified positions and stores of equipment was begun in early 1944. These positions were completed and ready for use that same year. Although they originally had no relation to the Redoubt plan as a whole, both the Germans and the Allies would later see their existence as perfectly fitting in with the feared Redoubt. By 1945, the Italian campaign forced the Allied troops to fight in increasingly mountainous terrain, where their superiority in material and equipment was largely negated. During the Allied Chiefs of Staff Conference on February 5th, 1945, it was concluded that the terrain so favoured the defending Wehrmacht forces that it would be possible for the Germans to withdraw ten divisions to other fronts (approximately one-third of their forces) and it would not give the Allies a significant advantage.



Any discussion of the Redoubt must take into consideration where Eisenhower was getting his information about the proposed Alpine Fortress, and it is here that the most serious miscalculations lie. The various intelligence services that provided the Allied commanders with their data regarding German intentions have become, in the post-war decades, the favoured target for any discussion regarding the Redoubt. Both the military and civilian intelligence sections failed to properly recognize the Redoubt for the chimera it truly was. It should be noted that the failure of the intelligence systems was not that they were reporting the Redoubt threat, as all information on the enemy's situation and possible future actions was important, but that they should have been able to prove that it did not exist in the manner that was feared. As late as May 1st, 1945, less than a week before the unconditional surrender of the German forces, some of the Allied intelligence summaries were concerned that activity was increasing in the Redoubt zone, yet admitted that the reports coming in were still inconclusive and unconfirmed.


Berchtesgaden

The Allied intelligence system during the war, according to some involved, was flawed. Some of the more spectacular failings include, for example, the hedgerows of Normandy. Here the Germans slowed the Allies to a crawl even after the British warned the Americans that this unique terrain had been used to great effect by the British and French forces in their evacuation from France in 1940, and these warnings went largely unheeded. As well, there was also the failure of intelligence officers to warn the Allied forces during Operation Market-Garden that considerable German armoured forces were in the area undergoing re-fitting. Also, there was the failure in intelligence to foresee the German Offensive through the Ardennes during the months of December 1944 and January 1945. In every instance it was later discovered that enough evidence existed to show the German intentions, particularly in the Ardennes, but was simply not properly seen for what it was. The blame for such failures certainly cannot be placed upon any specific individual, but possibly on the inexperience of the Allied system when dealing with such problems. The fog of war notwithstanding, it should be noted that such criticisms come not only from historians with the luxury of hindsight, but several key individuals involved with Allied Intelligence writing after the war.

So voluminous was the intelligence provided, that one former intelligence officer stated that its quantity eventually spoiled the Allied Command. The shock of the Ardennes Offensive, however, coming when the Germans were considered incapable of carrying out such an attack, appeared to have prepared the Allied command and their intelligence networks for the Redoubt myth. As stated, Strong later wrote in his memoirs that his own "view about the National Redoubt, was that it might not be there, but that we nevertheless had to take steps to prevent it being established. After the Ardennes, I was taking no more chances with the Germans." Considering the complete surprise achieved by the Germans, it is perhaps more easily explainable that the Allies would believe the Germans capable of another logistical miracle, this time in the Alps.


Berchtesgaden

As early as February 18th, 1945, SHAEF also concluded that "there [was] some slight evidence of a determination to hold an inner fortress in the Austrian Alpine provinces." Included in this early report is the determination to track certain German units, specifically:

[w]here panzer, panzer grenadier, parachute, and especially SS divisions are concentrated, however, fanatical resistance will undoubtedly be met with. Indeed, any abnormal concentration of divisions should provide good evidence of the area where Nazi leaders plan to make a stand.

This tracking of specific German units in order to determine where the Nazi leadership may force a final stand would become key to the Redoubt. This report also makes clear that, in the opinion of SHAEF, the capture of Berlin itself would not lead to a collapse of German resistance. Finally, they stated that while the actual readiness of the Redoubt was not known, "[t]he extent of the area held and the duration of German resistance would depend on how swiftly the Allies could penetrate this difficult country."


Churchhill at the Fuhrerbunker

In their own intelligence report of March 20th, Bradley's 12th Army Group stated that "[f]ield fortifications are reported in progress . . . [with] artillery depots [also being] reported," along with a wide variety of other supplies being sent into the alpine zone. One week later, the 12th Army went into even greater detail, and stated that:

the [fortifications included] numerous vaults embedded in the natural elevations of the ground. Since April 1944 an increasing amount of ammunition has been coming into the vaults, with nothing leaving . . . A considerable amount of ammunition has also been stored above ground. . . Ground sources report an underground factory . . . (possibly for making flying bombs), [and another] underground factory . . . for the production of Messerschmidt engines and possibly for V-weapons . . . Ground sources report food supplies for 20,000 persons for 18 months, with arms and ammunition for an even longer period are stored in the erchtesgaden area. Each day about 450 trucks with supplies [were] going towards Berchtesgaden.

One of the worst intelligence summaries concerning the Redoubt was submitted by SHAEF in their Weekly Intelligence Summary of March 11th, 1945. Within this report, Allied intelligence laid out the physical description of the proposed Redoubt, which they believed consisted of most of Austria, parts of Southern Germany and Northern Italy. Here, they stated that:

defended both by nature and by the most efficient secret weapons yet invented, the powers that have hitherto guided Germany will survive to organize [their] resurrection; here armaments will be manufactured in bombproof factories, food and equipment will be stored in vast underground caverns and specially selected corps of young men will be trained in guerrilla warfare, so that a whole underground army can be fitted and directed to liberate Germany from the occupying forces.


Heinrich Himmler

This report expressed concern that "the main trend of German defence policy does seem directed primarily to the safeguarding of the alpine zone." As well, it stated specifically that air reconnaissance showed at least twenty sites of activity within the proposed Redoubt zone that appeared suspicious in nature, including fortifications and other preparations. SHAEF also continued to track German troop deployments, specifically that:

considerable numbers of SS and specially chosen units are being systematically withdrawn to Austria; that a definite allocation of each day's production of food, equipment and armaments is sent there; and that engineer units are being engaged on some type of defence activity at the most vital strategic points . . . It seems reasonably certain that some of the most important ministries and personalities of the Nazi regime are already established in the Redoubt area.

This report is fascinating considering the complete overreaction to the Redoubt myth as seen in post-war light. While many of these suspected Redoubt facilities were not found in photoreconnaissance missions, some others were, thus adding to the confusion at SHAEF.

Eisenhower, Berlin, and the National Redoubt (Part I)

[SAMWolf]

Allen Dulles, Head of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) station in Switzerland, agreed that the area should be overrun as soon as possible. Dulles pointed out a crucial factor that he felt must be taken into consideration, specifically that while the Redoubt preparations are apparently increasing, it would not be necessary to complete the fortifications to make the Redoubt a threat. He stated that:

elaborate fortifications are not in themselves necessary to make a mountain area . . . a formidable fortress if defended by resolute men with training in mountain warfare [and] . . . fanatical SS divisions. The forces which are defending the Rhine and Berlin are very possibly being sacrificed to gain a few weeks more for the gathering together of the chosen forces in the reduit.


Heinrich Himmler

Due to the rapid advance of the Allied armies from both east and west, any planned defensive position in the Alps would need to be given time to prepare, and for SHAEF, Germany appeared to be taking specific concrete steps to protect the Redoubt zone. As the intelligence units were tracking the movement of the German forces, the German strategy appeared to be shielding the Redoubt area, with distinct patterns taking shape among the German defenders since the failure of the Ardennes Offensive, specifically, the location of some SS units and the concentration of German forces in the south. In the early Redoubt reports, it was thought that the SS would be taking their places within the Redoubt and their absence from the fighting was suspect. Allied Intelligence believed that it was possible that these forces were being held back while the Wehrmacht fought off the Allies long enough for the Redoubt to become operational. It was noticed prior to the Ardennes Offensive that several key SS divisions appeared to be missing. Their location was made very clear to the west when they attacked through the Ardennes. After this attack, however, the Allies again became suspicious when these divisions were absent from the front lines. And it is here that one of the major Redoubt mysteries came into play.

The absence of the various SS divisions immediately following the failed Ardennes Offensive is now clear. Badly mauled during the offensive, they were pulled back deep behind German lines. Unable to make up their losses in both manpower and equipment as quickly as in the past due to Germany's limited resources, they were effectively out of action for some time. It was not until March 6th that these forces were again to see action, being sent to southern Germany to attempt a relief of the German forces surrounded by the Red Army in the Hungarian capital of Budapest, which was also unsuccessful. This may appear as a standard and sound military tactic to send reinforcements to attempt a breakout of some of Germany's troops trapped by the Red Army. Yet from a strict military sense, sending them to relieve Budapest made absolutely no sense.

Joseph Goebbels

The SS divisions sent to relieve Budapest were among the best-equipped Panzer forces Hitler had at his disposal at this stage of the war. While the Italian front was holding, the western front was collapsing from the weight of the Allied onslaught. Worse, the Soviet Army was perched only thirty-five miles from Berlin and was expected at any time to launch a massive and final offensive to capture the German capital. Horribly outnumbered, the German forces facing the Red Army were desperate for any reinforcements that could be spared. Hitler's decision to send some of his best remaining forces to relieve the capital of Hungary while his own was on the verge of attack made absolutely no military sense at all, unless Hitler was looking to protect the Alpine region.

This decision remained one of the most persuasive for the existence of a final German stand in the Redoubt, as Allied intelligence considered the Redoubt zone only 200 kilometres directly west from Budapest, although it would appear in hindsight that Hitler had little idea of the consequences of his decision. The inability of the Allies in explaining the SS deployment to Budapest was largely the same as their failure to predict an attack by these same forces in the Ardennes. This hinged upon the Allied estimation of "what the enemy would do on the basis of what skilled professional generals would do under such circumstances, and not what Adolf Hitler might do." Both the Allies and the Soviets could see absolutely no sense in the fighting in Budapest, unless the Redoubt was taken into consideration. The Allies might have reconsidered their position had they been aware of the position of the German General Staff, who apparently also saw Hitler's decision as horribly and utterly wrong.

Joseph Goebbels

Regardless, after the failure of their attempt to relieve Budapest, and as still one of the best SS forces remaining, their movement in March and April showed a withdrawal westward into the Redoubt zone. It is understandable that the Allies would not realize that this force was not moving to the Redoubt for a final stand, but were attempting to save themselves from Soviet captivity by heading west. It was a simple coincidence that the Redoubt zone was in their path.

On April 11th, the same day that advance forces of the 12th Army Group reached the Elbe River, they reaffirmed the threat that the Redoubt could hold if the Allies did not overrun the area as soon as possible, as "[a]ll reports indicate that the Nazi Redoubt is rapidly becoming a reality." The Germans were believed to be making a last-ditch effort to supply the region. While they also admitted the Redoubt was apparently not yet fully operational, they reported that:

[g]round sources indicate that the guard detachment at Berchtesgaden has been doubled, possibly indicating the arrival of high-ranking personages. Large quantities of supplies are reportedly being accumulated. . . . Confirming the fact that the Redoubt may actually be in the process of activation, are tactical reconnaissance reports of April 10 showing approximately 2,000 vehicles headed towards Berchtesgaden.

SHAEF was concerned with the apparent massing of the remaining German forces in the south, and by mid-April, they were able to see precisely where the German disposition was. As feared, there were only approximately twenty-nine Divisions in North-east Germany, of which "eight are panzer type divisions of low quality. No firm estimate of tank strength can be made but there might be as many as 500 tanks and assault guns in NW and NE Germany"

However, there remained a total of 103 German divisions in the south, and the report was clear that this number did not include the twenty to twenty-five divisions still fighting in the Italian theatre. The trend of German defence that SHAEF had feared in March was now a certainty, with:

the greater part of the German Army to the south of the Allied wedge. Two thirds of the SS divisions and three quarters of the enemy armour are already there. Excluding the German Armies in Italy, the following approximate number of nominal divisions will be facing the Allied and Russian forces in the South:

Central and SW Germany 25
Protectorate and Austria 64
Jugoslavia 14
103 Divisions

Of these thirty are panzer type divisions, which might possibly dispose 2000 tanks and guns . . . If the Germans withdraw in Italy additional divisions will be available for the defence of Austria and the Redoubt area.

This final massing of forces in the south, along with the bulk of the remaining SS and panzer forces, appeared as proof that the Nazis would attempt a final stand in the Redoubt area.

Allied Intelligence was still not clear as too precisely what was happening within the Redoubt zone, particularly from high-level signal intelligence such as ULTRA, the codename given to the decrypts of the German enigma machine. While decrypts indicating supplies and troops transfers to the alpine zone were intercepted, there was simply not enough signal traffic specifically concerning the alpine zone or mention of any Redoubt. As the Germans were still sending other high level signals, it could be logical for Allied intelligence to assume that the Redoubt plans were in fact a hoax. The Redoubt myth might have ended then and there, but apparently some Allied analysts apparently noticed a pattern.

The Ardennes Offensive was managed by Hitler while keeping the Allies largely in the dark. Although after this attack it was found that intelligence decrypts had information on the impending offensive, it was simply not seen at the time for what it was. Hitler had ordered a complete radio blackout for the German forces involved, and these forces were assembling within Germany proper, making the use of simple landlines possible.

After the Ardennes, some Allied officers at SHAEF were now apparently unwilling to take any more chances. As a result, while some apparently believed that since signal intelligence was making no specific mention of a German Redoubt that it could not possibly exist, others pointed out the Ardennes Offensive, and believed that a lack of confirmation was suspicious on its own. As a former Allied Intelligence Analyst conducting research after the war, Ralph Bennett argued that such a case could be made. In his opinion, it was possible that intelligence staffs had by now "come to rely so heavily on high-level decrypts that they took the absence of unequivocal evidence that an attack was planned to be proof of the contrary."

Regardless, the OSS, which relied more on human intelligence than signal decrypts, concurred on the Redoubt threat. By April, Dulles summarized the Redoubt intelligence in detail, and stated the OSS believed:

. . . there is evidence that considerable activity has recently developed . . .and that sufficient supplies and weapons have been stored in inner reduit to equip with light arms and feed approximately 25,000 men for period of year. Work on defence of important passes into reduit and on certain underground plants for light arms and on hidden depots has also been pushed . . . Hitler apparently not yet retired to reduit . . . Undoubtedly, many high Nazis have already decided in favour of reduit as evidenced by movement of their families to this area.

The OSS were also able to follow the movement of German governmental, military and Nazi Party ministries and staffs into the region, and continued to report that the number of high-level command posts were increasing during March and April.

[SAMWolf]

Bradley's 12th Army group also saw the Redoubt as a growing threat, and believed that the forces in their direct path will continue to fall back, under pressure, towards the Redoubt, to mount a last-ditch effort there. They did, however, realize that there did not appear to be much time remaining for these German forces to move into position in order to man the Redoubt. They summed up the danger of allowing German forces into the area unmolested, regardless of amount of supply completed at this date, and stated that the:


General Alexander M. Patch

terrain in this area is truly the most rugged section of Europe, and is ideal for defence . . . In addition, 20,000 to 30,000 workers are said to be employed-presumably on defences. [However,] supply appears to be receiving more attention than defence. The Redoubt area is supposed to contain numerous underground factories, arsenals, airdromes and dumps. It has been suggested that these installations will make the area militarily self-sufficient. Aircraft factories are reported to exist capable of producing complete Messerschmitts. V-weapon factories, chemical warfare factories, aluminium refining plants and many other types of installation have been reported.

SHAEF was apparently convinced that the German forces might fall back into this area and use the natural terrain and the supplies stockpiled thus far to continue the fight. At SHAEF headquarters, it would slowly emerge in April that the Redoubt was indeed largely unmanned, and the question of the Redoubt's operational level depended entirely on who would get to this area first, the remnants of the German forces, or the Allied armies. Considering that the Redoubt, as the Allies expected it, was simply not in existence, it is important to see how some of the Nazi elite were deliberately feeding Allied intelligence with false information.



The Redoubt offered up an intriguing opportunity for Joseph Goebbels, German Minister for Propaganda. Goebbels set up a special unit within his ministry to invent and spread rumours about an Alpenfestung, particularly how vast, prepared, and filled with food and equipment the rumoured fortress was. This unit was entirely self-contained and thus had little factual information, but Goebbels apparently delighted in making up entire stories about the Redoubt's existence just to confuse and annoy the Allies. By controlling the regular German press to say nothing about a Redoubt position while simultaneously sending out rumours to neutral governments and leaking plans himself, Goebbels was key in keeping the Redoubt myth alive and its purpose and state of readiness unclear. He also encouraged these rumours among his own countrymen, and by making the Redoubt an object of discussion among the regular troops, Goebbels was able to provide the Allies with further evidence of the Redoubt's existence when these soldiers were interrogated upon capture. Thus, he was able to use one of the finest sources of military intelligence, the POW, against the Allies because:

[s]oldiers of every army are enjoined to tell their captives only their name, rank and military number . . . under the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners. But capture is a traumatic experience; when a man suddenly finds himself in the hands of people who have been doing their best to kill him and who have been described to him in the most horrifying terms, the vow of silence may well seem less important than placating a captor who has him completely under his control. Soldiers do talk, and when they discover that their captors know as much or more about their own units than they themselves do, they see even less reason to keep quiet.


Albert Kesselring

Even worse for Allied Intelligence, Goebbels enlisted the assistance of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst) in his grand illusion. With their help, he was able to produce bogus blueprints, false reports on construction supplies and timetables, expected armament production schedules and troop transfers to the Redoubt. By recognizing how an army collects their information on the enemy's intentions, Goebbels was instrumental in keeping the Redoubt alive not only among the Allies, but among his own countrymen as well. The Redoubt became part fantasy and part official deception plan.

Regardless of Goebbels theatrics, the cause for the failure of the Redoubt plan was the apparent lack of interest on Hitler's part. The required order from Hitler for construction and supply of a Redoubt was not given until April 24th, far too late to organize any effective resistance. Without Hitler's early approval, the Redoubt never stood a chance of being the threat the Allies expected. Hitler had two choices before him: either remain in Berlin or move to his summer retreat in Berchtesgaden to lead the Redoubt forces. Having finally admitted to himself and his staff that the war was truly lost, Hitler decided to remain in his Berlin bunker.


General George S. Patton, Jr.

Yet Hitler had planned to leave Berlin for Berchtesgaden. The movement of the various German government ministries was merely the beginning, and SHAEF believed that Hitler would follow. In this regard the intelligence was absolutely correct, Hitler was planning a move to the Redoubt zone, yet at the last minute decided to remain in Berlin, after sending the bulk of his staff and command structure to the Redoubt area to prepare for his arrival. It also appeared, from postwar interrogations and memoirs, that most of those in Hitler's entourage assumed that he would follow. For example, German General Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command, stated that the move to Berchtesgaden from Berlin was not only expected, but was the only option he still saw open to Hitler. Keitel stated that it was his:

own absolutely firm belief at that time that the Fuehrer and the OKW operations staff would also be transferring their supreme command to Berchtesgaden . . . [t]he aircraft for this were standing by, and everybody not absolutely vital to the Fuehrer's headquarters in Berlin had already been sent off to Berchtesgaden by special trains and convoys of lorries. The same went for the OKW and the War Office . . . Hitler himself had signed the orders for this, as he himself planned to take over in the south . . . All this was done to prepare the way for the imminent migration of the Fuehrer's headquarters to Berchtesgaden, a move which at that time was beyond any question.



Goebbels and some others would eventually convince Hitler to stay. Thus, the information that the Allies were intercepting concerning the movement of important Nazi, military and government ministries and officials from Berlin into the Redoubt zone was true.

Regardless of the intelligence they had been receiving, the actual state of preparation within the Redoubt was entirely different than what SHAEF had been led to believe. In mid-April, German Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring was given orders to defend the Alpenfestung. Upon arrival, however, Kesselring was shocked to discover the lack of preparations for such a stand. By April 24th, he was reasonably sure that he had no mountain-trained troops, who would be absolutely vital to defend the area. He was unable to locate the vast stores of weapons and foodstuffs that were rumoured to be in the Redoubt, and was having tremendous difficulty organizing any effective air cover. While he had himself oversaw the completed positions in Italy in 1944, he was unable to locate any effective defences along the entire northern front of the Redoubt, as most were sporadic and without any permanent troops stationed to defend them. Kesselring would be forced to coordinate some type of defence, all the while trying to discover the vast stores of weapons and other supplies he had been told to expect. The flow of convoys into the area that may have been considered by SHAEF to be supplies for a final stand were in reality military and governmental staffs, rather than combatants, who would continue to transfer files, equipment and Nazi loot into the area right until the end. The coordination was so poor that Kesselring had been told a certain SS General was in charge of the storing of food and equipment, yet Kesselring was unable to even locate this man, much less any of the expected stores. Kesselring was left with using the Redoubt as a rallying point, not as a defensive position. Writing in his memoirs after the war, Kesselring found the idea of using the Redoubt as a fortress almost laughable, but he was prepared to use the terrain as a delaying feature, which would allow the German forces still in the east a chance to fight their way west.



Proving that the Redoubt was, in fact, a completely uncoordinated and not officially planned affair, the OKW War Diary confirmed that they did not receive official instructions from Hitler to prepare the Redoubt until 29 April, one week prior to capitulation. Placed in charge of the Redoubt defences in the final weeks of April, General Georg von Hengl shared Kesselring's appraisal of the Redoubt situation. Von Hengl was astonished at the complete lack of prepared combat troops in the area. In his postwar interrogation, von Hengl believed that when he arrived, the Redoubt contained over 250,000 men, yet he also believed that, by his own estimate, a full ninety percent of these were non-combatants, or military and government support staff. To the best of his knowledge, there had never been any army divisions transferred to the Alps, and only the "already utterly drained local garrisons of the replacement army, the fighting qualities of which were limited, were at [his] disposal for employment in the north." Allied intelligence had been unable to make any sense of the defences and movement of military and government assets and staff during April, and perhaps rightfully so.

While SHAEF may have been uncertain as to precisely what they were going to find in the Redoubt zone even at the beginning of May, they were certain that the Germans had absolutely no more time to ready their Alpenfestung. By the final days of April, Dever's Army Group was at the outskirts of the Redoubt, and taking prisoners at a rate of approximately seven battalions per day. Advances would average thirty or more miles per day, with the Allied armies outracing not only their supply lines, but even some of their heavier motorized guns and armour. The collapse of German resistance in Northern and Central Germany was so great, the official history of the United States Army stated that the fighting was no longer an offensive or even pursuit warfare, but "more of a motor march under tactical conditions." If the Redoubt was going to defend itself, it would have to do so with the forces and supplies currently at its disposal. Speed, therefore, became the essence of defeating the Redoubt threat.



By May, however, the German armies remaining were so shattered that any type of organized withdrawal was practically impossible. Still pouring in from the Balkans, Italy and the east, those units that did survive the move were broken, completely disorganized and often weaponless. Regardless of some hastily made obstacles, by the night of May 4th, the Allied armies entering the Redoubt from the north had managed to capture over 60,000 German troops, and had effectively destroyed the remnants of the German First Army in their path. So rapid was the advance that in some cases, the German troops garrisoned in the area were shocked to find Allied advance units were "on them, among them, and through them, before they realized what was happening."

On May 3rd, advance units of the American Fifth Army from Italy managed to link up with their counterparts from the north and seize control of the Brenner Pass connecting Austria and Italy. With the capture of this major roadway through the Alps, any hope of the Germans mounting a last-ditch defence was gone. The American forces who entered the Austrian city of Innsbruck the same day apparently expected thousands of dug in German defenders, but were shocked to discover members of an Austrian resistance group had seized the city and anxiously awaited the Allies. By May 4th the city of Salzburg also fell, with Berchtesgaden, long thought to be the final command centre for Hitler and the Nazi elite, falling into Allied hands on May 5th. German Army Group G, which had been badly mauled by the Allies for the past month, was being pushed further and further back into the Redoubt and was ready to capitulate. By May 5th, the German commander of this force, General Friedrich Schultz, had set up a meeting with General Devers and sent his deputy, General Hermann Foertsch, to surrender unconditionally.



Devers apparently did not consider that the Germans would be able to continue for much longer, as his forces had managed to capture over 600,000 German soldiers from Army Group G in the final month alone, which were far greater numbers than existed in his own forces, and he expected that the Germans had reached the end of their manpower. Devers thus believed the surrender to have only symbolic significance, perhaps the remaining administration and command staff, along with the few remaining remnants of the German fighting forces. During the meeting while the terms of surrender were being delivered to Foertsch, he inquired what plans had been made to feed his forces after their surrender, as Army Group G had only approximately six days of food remaining. Considering that Allied intelligence had for months been concerned of the flow of supplies to the region, this question appeared to have surprised Devers. When he inquired what number of men were now surrendering in the Redoubt, he was doubly shocked when Foertsch replied approximately 250,000 to 350,000 of Army Group G alone, spread throughout the Redoubt zone.

So surprised was the assembled Allied staff that they questioned Foertsch about the surrender, making sure that he understood that they were requiring him to surrender unconditionally. Foertsch assured them that he understood, and that he was simply not in a position to do otherwise. The fact that the German Redoubt was holding over 250,000 German soldiers in Army Group G alone and yet was still willing to surrender so readily was a shock. From the German perspective, with the southern front of the Redoubt wide open due to the surrender of the German forces in Italy on May 2nd, the rapid movement of the Allies from both the south and the north, the complete failure to coordinate the few supplies flowing into the region in the months prior to the German surrender, and finally the death of Hitler, the feared German Redoubt had no reason to resist.



So swift was the advance that the vast majority of the SS and mountain troops the Allies expected to defend the Redoubt never even made the withdrawal. Two-thirds of the remaining German forces along the northern edge of the Alps were wiped out. The remaining soldiers, numbering as many as 300,000, fell back into the Redoubt zone as disorganized rabble, rather than a coherent group. With the Allies driving forward with such haste, there was never time to organize these men into a functional force. Thus, the National Redoubt, an alpine fortress that so concerned SHAEF for months and even days prior to the German surrender on May 8th, surrendered unconditionally after only five days. The Allied intelligence networks failed to recognize that the Redoubt was a totally uncoordinated affair until it was too late. Hitler, despite having ordered the fortifications and stocking of the Redoubt on April 24th, did not give the OKW specific instructions to do so until April 29th. Most of all, the Redoubt was a refuge, not a fortress.

Additional Sources:

www.art.com
www.usfava.com
www.army.mil
www.kwanah.com
www.warfoto.com
dsc.discovery.com
www.mladina.si/tednik/200129
www.smh.com.au
www.webpolitik.de
www.dhm.de
www.scrapbookpages.com/DachauScrapbook
www.mazury.info.pl
ntap.k12.ca.us
www.utlpr.univ-rennes1.fr
www.stenbergaa.com
www.greendevils.pl
www.futura-dtp.dk

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[SAMWolf]

The Allies appeared, at first glance, to be poorly served by their intelligence. Yet the intelligence received was certainly not of bad quality, it was perhaps just excessive and overwhelming. Given more time, the Allies would have most certainly have broken the Redoubt myth. The Allies appeared to be looking for patterns and thus provided the collapsing German government with capabilities that it was not able to muster at this late stage of the war. The Allies sadly failed to realize that, in the final months, the Germans were reporting on what they would like to do, not on what they were going to do, or able to do. Allied Intelligence during the war suffered from several shortcomings. Eisenhower had developed a close relationship with Allied intelligence and insisted that commanders should never rely on a single source, a lesson he learned during his command in Africa. Prior to the Ardennes, SHAEF was able to rely on signal decrypts, specifically ULTRA, but also Army intelligence such as captured documents and POWs, and OSS intelligence through agents and informers in place. As well, a considerable amount of information came from resistance groups in the occupied territories.



As the Germans were pushed back into Germany over the Rhine, however, many of these sources dried up. The resistance groups in the occupied territories were no longer available, and the ULTRA messages began to wane as the Germans were able to use landlines and runners to carry messages to their forces in the field. The number of captured documents and POWs also declined, as the Allies halted on the Rhine to bring up supplies. The redundancy of information sources that were crucial to SHAEF Intelligence was thus limited to a degree not seen in the battles across France and Belgium. Some analysts, writing after the war, believed that ULTRA eventually spoiled the allies, specifically that SHAEF relied too heavily on signal decrypts prior to the Ardennes. As mentioned, Hitler had ordered a complete radio blackout and kept the planning to select personnel for the Ardennes Offensive, which negated ULTRA. Worse, the Allied Intelligence staff had based their estimates of future German activity on what trained professional officers would do, not on what Adolf Hitler would do.

Strong, writing after the war, admitted that there was information on the build-up of German forces opposite the allies in the Ardennes area, and that he did mention this to Eisenhower in his report. However, he also admitted that he believed it was a strategic reserve for a defense of the Rhine, although he did offer an offensive as an option, as was his duty to do. He simply did not believe it likely. His American counterparts would believe it even more unlikely. The Americans had never witnessed a full German offensive, and apparently never considered the possibility of a full German attack as at this stage of the war as it appeared to make little military sense. Thus, even though the German professional officers shared this appraisal of the situation, it was Hitler that had planned and was in control of the entire affair.



The Ardennes Offensive and the resulting Battle of the Bulge are, in my opinion, key to understanding the failure of Allied Intelligence and SHAEF to properly see the Redoubt for the chimera it was. After the failure of ULTRA to provide timely warning for this attack, its spell had been broken for many Allied commanders who had previously viewed ULTRA as infallible. As stated, Strong later wrote in his memoirs that his he was taking no more chances with the Germans after the Ardennes. Hitler's ability to order and carry out a radio blackout provided a precedent to the lack of ULTRA and other signal decrypts over the Redoubt. ULTRA's silence spoke volumes.

Thus, while the Allies had underestimated the offensive power remaining to Germany in December 1944, SHAEF then appeared to overestimate the German logistical capability in March and April 1945. The Intelligence estimates for the end of hostilities in the European Theatre bear this out. In September of 1944, Allied Intelligence believed Germany would be out of the war by December 1944. In January 1945, these same estimates gave the earliest possible date as July 1945, with hostilities unlikely to continue past December 1945.



The Allied sweep into Germany proper during March and April created a flood of information for SHAEF intelligence to handle. Signal decrypts once again increased and the Allies were capturing countless scores of German POWs. This flood of information is generally referred to as 'noise' that could have the ability to drown out more crucial pieces of information. As Germany collapsed, the amount of information simply began to overwhelm the Allied intelligence system.

Worse, much of the redundancy built into the system was defeated. The POW, one of the most effective sources of intelligence to any army, was being systematically used by Goebbels. The SD was providing a vast array of bogus blueprints and other documents to assist in the illusion. With the OSS and G-2 being flooded by such reports, captured documents, and agents in place reporting the Redoubt as possibility, ULTRA was damning by its silence, actually lending some support. The one source that could not be turned against the Allies, and should have balanced out the other intelligence sources, was effectively negated. Allied Intelligence apparently became so convinced that something was happening in the Redoubt zone that the capture of Wehrmacht officers who denied knowing anything about the Redoubt was seen as further verification. Allied Intelligence believed that only SS and other specialty forces were involved in the Redoubt, thus keeping it from their regular army counterparts. Considering the complete surprise achieved by the Germans in the Ardennes, it is perhaps more easily explainable that the Allies would believe the Germans capable of another logistical miracle, this time in the Alps.



For example, the countless convoys that were apparently correctly reported in Allied intelligence were still flooding into the Redoubt zone even during the final days. However, these were later found to be more often government and personal valuables, rather than needed military supplies and foodstuffs. For example, Hitler ordered the entire collection of seized artworks from their storage sites around the Reich into the mountains near Salzburg. Hundreds of thousands of pieces of priceless artwork, looted from all over Europe, were transferred to the Berchtesgaden area. These artworks, which had arrived in Germany from 1940 until 1944 by the trainload, were suddenly moved overland by truck in late 1944 and continued into late spring 1945. The convoys were reportedly so long they often stretched out of sight in both directions.

The Redoubt, as SHAEF expected it to exist, was a chimera. From a military standpoint it was started far too late, but it did have the potential to be a serious problem for the Allies if they did not overrun the area as soon as possible. Eisenhower's decision to swing his Allied armies south against the Redoubt effectively ended any possible threat the remaining German troops were able to offer. While the Redoubt was ultimately not the military fortress that the Allies expected, the choice of ignoring it completely was simply not an option with the intelligence provided. Considering his other options, I believe Eisenhower made the correct decision regarding the National Redoubt based on the information he had at the time. Unfortunately, some of the information he had was being fed to his intelligence organization by the Germans. The National Redoubt is generally considered to be one of the final intelligence failures by the Allies during the war, yet this conclusion is somewhat unsatisfactory. The Allies appeared to be not the victim of poor intelligence, but rather being somewhat over-cautious and overwhelmed by it's sheer volume.

[SAMWolf]

[snippy_about_it]

.......FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole!

.......Good Tuesday Morning Everyone!


If you would like added to our ping list let us know.

[E.G.C.]

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Fxohole.

It's the day of the recall election in California. Everybody's watching to see what happens:-D

[The Mayor]

[snippy_about_it]

Good morning EGC.

I hope California comes through and throws Davis out. Perhaps they will show us there is still hope for that left coast of ours.

[snippy_about_it]

Good morning and thank you for the coffee, I really need it today!

[The Mayor]

me too !

[E.G.C.]

I hope they throw Davis out too. He has really ruined this once great state with his tax and spend mentality. We'll see what happens.

[aomagrat]

Today's classic warship, USS Iowa (BB-4)

Iowa class battleship
displacement. 11,346 t.
length 360'
beam. 72'2"
draft. 24'
speed. 17 k.
complement. 727
armament. 4 12", 8 8", 6 4", 20 6-pdrs., 4 1-pdrs., 4 14" tt.

The USS Iowa (BB-4) was laid down by William Cramp & Sons, Philadelphia, 5 August 1893; launched 28 March 1896; sponsored by Miss M. L. Drake, daughter of the governor of Iowa; and commissioned 16 June 1897, Captain W. T. Sampson in command.

After shakedown off the Atlantic Coast, Iowa was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet and was ordered to blockade duty, 28 May 1898, off Santiago de Cuba. On 3 July 1898, she was the first to sight the Spanish ships approaching and fired the first shot in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. In a 20-minute battle with Spanish cruisers Maria Teresa (flagship) and Oquendo, her effective fire set both ships aflame and drove them on the beach. Iowa continuing the battle in company with converted yacht Gloucester, sank the Spanish destroyer Pluton and so damaged destroyer Furor that she ran upon the rocks. Iowa then turned her attention to the Spanish cruiser Viscaya which she pursued until Viscaya ran aground. Upon the conclusion of the battle, Iowa received on board Spanish Admiral Cervera and the officers and crews of the Viscaya, Furor and Pluton.

After the Battle of Santiago, Iowa left Cuban waters for New York, arriving 20 August 1898. On 12 October 1898, she departed for duty in the Pacific, sailed around Cape Horn, and arrived San Francisco 7 February 1899. The battleship then steamed to Bremerton, Wash., where she entered drydock 11 June 1899. After refit, Iowa served in the Pacific Squadron for 2 1/2 years, conducting training cruises, drills, and target practice. Iowa left the Pacific early in February 1902 to become flagship of the South Atlantic Squadron. She sailed for New York 12 February 1903 where she decommissioned 30 June 1903.

Iowa recommissioned 23 December 1903 and joined the North Atlantic Squadron. She participated in the John Paul Jones Commemoration ceremonies, 30 June 1905. Iowa remained In the North Atlantic until she was placed in reserve 6 July 1907. She decommissioned at Philadelphia 23 July 1908.

Iowa recommissioned 2 May 1910 and served as an at sea training ship and as a component of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet. During the next 4 years she made a number of training cruises to Northern Europe and participated in the Naval Review at Philadelphia, 10 to 15 October 1912. She decommissioned at Philadelphia Navy Yard 27 May 1914. At the outbreak of the first World War, Iowa was placed in limited commission 28 April 1917. After serving as Receiving Ship at Philadelphia for 6 months, she was sent to Hampton Roads, Va., and remained there for the duration of the war, training men for other ships of the Fleet, and doing guard duty at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay. She decommissioned for the final time 31 March 1919.

On 30 April 1919, Iowa was renamed Coast Battleship No. 4, and was the first radio controlled target ship to be used in a fleet exercise. She was sunk 23 March 1923 in Panama Bay by a salvo of 14-inch shells from the USS Mississippi.

[manna]

Present!

[snippy_about_it]

Thank aomagrat.

[snippy_about_it]

:)

[SAMWolf]

Good Morning Snippy.

[Valin]

On This Day In History


Birthdates which occurred on October 07:
1573 William Laud, English archbishop of Canterbury (1633-45)
1728 Caesar Rodney Delaware, patriot, signed Declaration of Independence
1746 William Billings Boston Mass, hymn composer (Rose of Sharon)
1849 James Whitcomb Riley US, poet (The Raggedy Man)
1866 Martha McChesney Berry US, founded Berry School for Children
1870 Uncle Dave Macon entertainer
1879 Joe Hill Jevla Sweden, organizer (IWW)/songwriter (Union Scab)/martyr
1879 Leon Trotsky Russian revolutionary leader/writer (Diary in Exile)
1885 Niels Bohr Denmark, physicist, expanded quantum physics (Nobel 1922)
1887 Jack Mulhall Wappinger Falls NY, actor (Ken Murray Show)
1888 Henry A Wallace (D/P) 33rd VP, Progressive pres candidate
1889 Clarence Muse Balt Md, actor (Sam-Casablanca)
1896 Elijah Muhammad famous African
1898 Alfred Wallenstein Chicago Illinois, conductor (Chic Symph 1922-29)
1901 Frank X Boucher Ottawa, All-star NHL center (Ottawa, NY Rangers)
1904 Chuck Klein Indianapolis In, Phila Phillies (43 HRs in 1929)
1905 Andy Devine [Jeremiah Schwartz], Flagstaff Az, actor (Andy's Gang)
1906 James E Webb head of NASA (1961-68)
1911 Vaughn Monroe Akron Oh, singer/orch leader (Vaughn Monroe Show)
1914 Alfred Drake singer/actor (Kiss Me Kate)
1914 Sarah Churchill actress (All Over Town, Royal Wedding)
1916 Walt W Rostow economist (Politics & Stages of Growth)
1917 Helmut Dantine Vienna Austria, actor (Shadow of the Cloak)
1917 June Allyson Bronx, actress (Till the Clouds Roll By, Vegas)
1919 Erik Elms„ter Sweden, 1st to compete in summer & winter Oly (1948)
1919 Gabriel Dell Barbados, actor (Steve Allen Show)
1922 Martha Stewart Bardwell Ky, singer/actress (Daisy Kenyon, Doll Face)
1926 Diana Lynn actress (Annapolis Story, Easy Come Easy Go)
1927 Al Martino Phila, singer (Here in My Heart)/actor (Godfather)
1931 Desmond Tutu Anglican Archbishop of S Afr (Nobel Peace Prize 1982)
1933 Paul B Price Cataret NJ, actor (Busting Loose)
1934 Willie Naulls NBA star (NY Knicks)
1935 Thomas M Keneally Australia, novelist (Blood Red Sister Rose)
1938 Robert Drivas Chicago, actor (Cool Hand Luke, Illustrated Man)
1943 Oliver North military man (contra hearings)
1951 John Cougar Mellencamp Seymour Indiana, rocker (Jack & Diane)
1952 Ludmila Tourischeva USSR, gymnast (Olympic-gold-1972)
1953 Christopher Norris NYC, actress (Summer of '42, Eat My Dust)
1954 Tico Torres drummer (Bon Jovi-You Give Love a Bad Name)
1955 Yo-Yo Ma Paris France, world famous Chinese cellist
1956 James Van Patten Brooklyn NY, actor (Bo-Chisholms)
1958 Kim Morris San Diego Ca, playmate (Mar, 1986)
1961 Judy Landers Phila, actress (Vega$, BJ & the Bear, Madame's Place)
1974 Alexander Polinsky SF Calif, actor (Adam-Charles in Charge)

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Deaths which occurred on October 07:
0290 [Christian] Sergius, Roman soldier/martyred saint, decapitated
336 Marcus, bishop of Rome (336), dies
1780 Patrick Ferguson, English major in SC, dies in battle at 36
1800 Gabriel, slave revolt leader (Virginia), hanged
1849 Edgar Allen Poe poet, dies in Balt at 40
1959 Mario Lanza singer, dies at 38 of a heart attack
1959 PM Kassem of Iraq, assassinated
1988 Billy Daniels singer, dies of cancer at 73
1990 John "Cat" Thompson basketball hall of famer, dies at 84
1991 Leo Durocher baseball coach/manager (Dodgers, Giants), dies at 86

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Reported: MISSING in ACTION

1966 GILCHRIST ROBERT M. LITTLETON CO.
1966 KNIGHT LARRY DALE ALBANY OR.
1966 PABST EUGENE M. NEW YORK NY.
1966 TREECE JAMES A. MEMPHIS TN.
1967 APPLEBY IVAN D. FRESNO CA.
[REMAINS RETURNED 01/95 IDENTIFIED 10/95]
1967 AUSTIN WILLIAM R. SIMPSONVILLE SC.
[03/14/73 RELEASED BY DRV, ALIVE AND WELL 98]
1967 FULLAM WAYNE E. CHATTANOOGA TN.
[REMAINS RETURNED 09/24/87]
1967 HODGES DAVID L. CHEVY CHASE MD.
[REMAINS IDENTIFIED 04/16/99]

POW / MIA Data & Bios supplied by
the P.O.W. NETWORK. Skidmore, MO. USA.

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On this day...
3761 -BC- Origin of Jewish Mundane Era
336 St Mark ends his reign as Catholic Pope
1492 Columbus misses Florida when he changes course
1520 1st public burning of books in Netherlands, in Louvain
1571 Turkish fleet defeated by Spanish & Italians in Battle of Lepanto
1737 40 foot waves sink 20,000 small craft & kill 300,000 (Bengal, India)
1765 The Stamp Act Congress convenes in NY
1777 Americans beat Brits in 2nd Battle of Saratoga & Battle of Bemis Hts
1780 British defeated by American militia near Kings Mountain, SC
1816 1st double decked steamboat, the Washington, arrived in New Orleans
1826 Granite Railway (1st chartered railway in US) begins operations
1868 Cornell University (Ithaca NY) opens
1871 16-hour fire injures 30 of Chicago's 185 firefighters
1886 Spain abolishes slavery in Cuba
1900 The term "orienteering" is 1st used for an event
1908 Crete revolts against Turkey & aligns with Greece
1916 222 points are scored in a football game between Georgia Tech & Cumberland University of Lebanon, Tennessee
1919 1st London-Amsterdam airline service begins (Brit Aerial Transport)
1924 160 consecutive days of 100ø at Marble Bar, Australia begins
1927 Yank Herb Pennock retires 1st 22 Pirates in world series game (World Series #24)
1931 1st infra-red photograph, Rochester, NY
1933 NY Giants beat Washington Senators, 4 games to 1 in 30th World Series
1935 Himmler/Hess and Reinhard Heydrich agree to build concentration camp Dachau
1935 Detroit Tigers beat Chicago Cubs, 4 games to 2 in 32nd World Series
1938 Germany demands all Jewish passports stamped with the letter J
1944 Fieldmarshal Rommel gets order to return to Berlin
1944 Uprising at Auschwitz, Jews burn down crematoria
1944 Uprising at Birkenau concentration camp
1949 German Dem Rep formed from Russian occupation zone (National Day)
1950 NY Yankees sweep Phila Phillies in 47th World Series
1950 US forces invade Korea by crossing the 38th parallel
1950 The UN General Assembly approved a US-led UN force to advance north of 38th parallel into North Korea.
1951 David Ben-Gurion forms Israeli government
1952 NY Yankees beat Dodgers 4 games to 3 in 49th World Series - Yankees tie their own record of 4 consecutive World Series wins
1957 "American Bandstand" premieres
1958 Potter Stewart appointed to US Supreme Court
1958 US manned space-flight project renamed Project Mercury
1959 Far side of Moon seen for 1st time, compliments of USSR's Luna 3
1960 "Route 66" premieres
1963 Bobby Baker resigns as Senate Democratic secretary
1963 Hurricane Flora hits Haiti & Dominican Republic, kills 7,190
1964 NY Yankees make 14th appearance in last 16 & 29th in 61 World Series
1965 50 mph gust carries 165 lb Robert Mitera's tee shot 447 yards to score the world's longest straight hole-in-one in Omaha
1965 Robert Mitera aces 447-yd 10th hole at Miracle Hills, Omaha, Nebraska
1967 Beatles turn down $1 million NY concert offer by Sid Berstein
1968 Motion Picture Association of America adopts film rating system
1972 1st season game at Nassau Coliseum, Flames-3, Islanders-2
1977 With 2 outs in top of 9th, Dodgers trailing Phillies 5-3 in playoffs, score 3 runs & win 6-5. Dodgers hold 2-1 game lead
1981 Hosni Mubarak became acting-president of Egypt
1981 In 1st Eastern Division championship Yanks beat Brewers 5-3
1984 Walter Payton passes Jim Brown as NFL's career rushing leader
1985 21st Space Shuttle Mission (51-J)-Atlantis 1 lands at Edwards AFB
1985 KHQ-AM in Spokane Wash's final transmission
1985 Lynette Woodward, chosen as 1st woman on the Harlem Globetrotters
1985 PLO terrorists seize Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro
1988 Dallas Green replaces Lou Pinella as NY Yankee manager
1988 Latvian flag raised in Riga for 1st time since annexation by USSR
1988 Robin Givens files for divorce after 8-month marriage to Mike Tyson
1988 WNBC 660 final transmission, WFAN moves from 1050 to 660 & WUKQ begins on 1050 at 5:30 PM (NYC radio)
1989 Radio talk show host Larry King weds Julie Alexander
1989 Rickey Henderson steals a record 8 bases in a play off (5 games)
1990 Israel begins handing out gas masks to its citizens
1991 Child star Adam Rich arrested for stealing hypodermics
1991 Slovenia and Croatia formally declared seccession from Yugoslavia.

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Holidays
Note: Some Holidays are only applicable on a given "day of the week"

Fiji : Deed of Cession (1874)
German Dem Rep : Constitution Day (1949)
Libya : Evacuation Day
Massachusetts : Grandparents Day (Sunday)
Missouri : Missouri Day (Monday)
World : Child Health Day, Universal Children's Day (1928) (Monday)
USA : Fire Prevention Week (Day 3)
National Spinning and Weaving Week (Day 3)
Get Organized Week (Day 3)
Co-op Awareness Month
Computer Learning Month
National Dollhouse and Minatures Month

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Religious Observances
RC : Memorial of Our Lady of the Rosary
Christian : Commemoration of St Osith, Saxon virgin/martyr
Luth : Commemoration of Henry Mhlenberg, missionary to America

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Religious History
1810 Birth of Henry Alford, Anglican scholar. He was a member of the 1881 ERV Bible translation committee, but is better remembered today for writing the hymn "Come, Ye Thankful People, Come."
1832 Birth of Charles Converse, American lawyer and sacred composer. Converse penned the hymn tune CONVERSE, to which we sing today "What a Friend We Have in Jesus."
1930 Missionary linguist Frank C. Laubach wrote in a letter: 'Beside Jesus, the whole lot of us are so contemptible.... But God is like Jesus, and like Jesus, He will not give up until we, too, are like Jesus.'
1943 While WWII was raging, the American Council of Volunteer Agencies for Foreign Service was formed. It was as an interfaith venture to bring Protestant, Catholic and Jewish agencies involved in international relief together under one roof.
1955 The religious drama 'Crossroads' first aired over ABC television. An anthology which dramatized true experiences of clergymen of all denominations, the program ran for two years.

Source: William D. Blake. ALMANAC OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1987.

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Thought for the day :
"One of the symptoms of an approaching nervous breakdown is the belief that one’s work is terribly important."

---

You might be Italian if...
It is impossible for you to talk with your hands in your pockets.

---

Murphys Law of the day...(McLean's Maxim)
There are only two problems with people. One is that they don't think. The other is that they do.

---

It's a little know fact that...
The last words of Dominique Bouhours, French grammarian, d. 1702
"I am about to -- or I am going to -- die: either expression is correct."

[SAMWolf]

Morning E.G.C. It's gonna be an interesting day.

[SAMWolf]

HI Mayor. Good coffee for a cloudy morning.