The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Red Ball Express (Aug-Nov, 1944) - Sep. 30th, 2003

Quartermaster Professional Bulletin ^ | Spring 1989 | Dr. Steven E. Anders

[SAMWolf]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.

...................................................................................... ...........................................

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POL on the Red Ball Express
Getting fuel from the beach
to the front lines
as U.S. Divisions raced across France in 1944.

The introduction of motorized vehicles and equipment at the beginning of the twentieth century has changed forever the face of battle. Since the time of Alexander the Great large armies have crossed the world's military landscape with ponderous difficulty, their seemingly endless lines of animal-drawn carts and wagons trailing far behind. How different this is from the pace and dimension of modern warfare.

Today's mechanized Army has the ability to cover vast distances at speeds unimagined by even the greatest of the Great Captains of old. That speed brought with it a need for new forms of fuel - in prodigious amounts to keep the engines of war running. Quartermasters who for centuries gathered huge stockpiles of hay, barley and oats to "fuel" past armies on the move, are now required to supply the petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) that make up the U.S. Army's contemporary lifeblood.

"THE RED BLOOD OF WAR"

The Army had begun serious experimentation with gasoline driven trucks and automobiles as early as 1911. In 1916, during the "Punitive Expedition" to Mexico, trucks were first used in a tactical setting by American troops abroad.



When the United States declared war on Germany the following year, Pershing took hundreds of motorized vehicles and equipment with him to France. This action spawned a huge, new appetite for POL.

Though fighting on the western front was relatively static, petroleum played a decisive role. It was, according to Clemenceau, "as necessary as blood." The French expression "le sang rouge de guerre" "the red blood of war," captures the significance of gasoline in modern war fighting. Said Churchill afterwards, we (the Allies) floated to victory "on a sea of oil." All told, the American Expeditionary Force consumed nearly 40 million gallons of gasoline in World War I. This was an immense amount for the time, a mere fraction of what it would take to defeat Hitler's Germany a generation later.


Fuel is gravity fed from rail tankers to fill thousands of jerry cans at a dump on the Red Ball Express route (Normandy August 1944). Average 945,000 litres loaded per 24 hours.

World War II was the first truly mechanized war, or as one observer put it, a "100 percent internal combustion engine war." It placed unprecedented demand on Army Quartermasters for POL support around the world. Even the relatively small North African campaign of (code-named Operation TORCH) required no less than 10 million gallons of gasoline. Allied logisticians pushed the red stuff forward over the beaches and across parched deserts using 5-gallon "blitz" cans, tanker trucks, and miles of newly designed portable pipelines. This experience, coupled with the Sicilian and Italian campaigns that followed, served as a warm-up for the Normandy Invasion of June1944.

"POL SUPPORT FOR OVERLORD"

The cross-channel invasion known as Operation OVERLORD followed months of intensive preparation. During that time Allied logisticians in England worked out a detailed plan for POL support on the continent. All vehicles in the assault were to arrive on the beachhead with full tanks, carrying extra gasoline in 5 gallon jerrican. Packaged distribution was to continue throughout the operation's initial phase (D-Day to D+41). Planners predicted a fairly slow-paced offensive thereafter, allowing for systematic construction of base, intermediate, and forward area depots. In the meantime, it was hoped that the early capture and development of Cherbourg's port facilities (by around D + 15) would enable combat engineers to begin laying three 6-inch pipelines inland toward Paris.



Much depended upon the success of this operation. Pipelines were expected to eventually move about 90 percent of all POL entering the European Theater quickly and efficiently to forward area terminals or transfer points. Operation OVERLORD was officially scheduled to terminate on D + 90 with the forward line hopefully anchored on the banks of the Seine. The post-OVERLORD period (D + 91 to D + 360) would have the Army pushing steadily eastward to the Rhine, where it was assumed a final showdown would take place. From start to finish, planners expected well-placed bulk maintenance facilities to carry the lion's share of POL support.


RED BALL EXPRESS TRUCKS MOVING THROUGH A REGULATING POINT

On D-Day itself events occurred much as planned from a POL perspective. The first assault vehicles rolled ashore and immediately began stacking their cargoes of 5-gallon cans. They were placed in small, widely scattered dump sites throughout the lodgment area. This simple method of open storage made Class III supply easily accessible. At the same time, this storage method rendered Class III supplies less vulnerable to enemy attack. By the end of the first week (D + 6) Quartermaster petroleum supply companies were on hand to begin moving these stores away from Omaha beach as the buildup continued.



German defenders fought tenaciously but failed to turn back the allied assault. By the end of June, the beachhead had expanded considerably. Allied combat units were rushing headlong in the infamous hedgerows some 25 miles beyond-there to engage in a bloody slugfest that lasted several weeks. The Allies' inability to score a quick breakthrough anywhere along the line had both positive and negative effects on the supply situation. Since there was so little forward movement, reserve stockpiles grew at an accelerated pace. Approximately 177,000 vehicles and more than half of a million tons of supplies came ashore by D + 21. POL reserves at that time topped 7.5 million gallons. On the other hand, failure to capture Cherbourg as early as planned meant that the proposed pipeline schedule had to be voided. For weeks to come, all POL requirements would have to be met solely by packaged distribution.

"BREAKOUT AND PURSUIT"

A breakout finally occurred the last week of July. Following a massive aerial bombardment on the 25th, General Bradley's First Army managed to rupture German lines to the right of St. Lo. The next day, three armored divisions poured rapidly through the gap and moved 25 miles south near the base of the Contentin peninsula. With the door forced wide open, new opportunities for early tactical success abounded. There was a chance that if the Allies moved fast, struck hard and pressed the fight, they might quickly defeat the entire German Army in France. In light of this largely unforeseen possibility, many of the preinvasion plans were summarily scrapped. First and Third Armies joined forces on 1 August (to form the U.S. 12th Army Group) and at once began exploiting the principle of maneuver warfare to the fullest.


A Diamond T chassis and a Holmes W-45 wrecker were matched to create this workhorse of General Patton's Red Ball Express, a tow truck rated to pull 15 tons.

The Germans offered even lighter resistance than expected. Success followed success in the Allied pursuit across France. As Patton's Third Army swept westward into Brittany and south to Le Mans, it burned up an average of more than 380,000 gallons of gasoline per day. By 7 August (a week after becoming operational) its reserves were completely exhausted. Patton had to rely on daily truck loads of packaged POL from the rear. Nevertheless, he managed to continue this highly mobile type of warfare, driving eastward for another three weeks, before being halted by critical shortages of gasoline.



Logistically speaking, the real turning point in the campaign came during the week of 20-26 August. At that time, elements of both the First and Third Armies were simultaneously engaged in rapid pursuit. They developed an insatiable thirst for gasoline, and consumed more during this one week than any time previously. Average consumption was well over 800,000 gallons per day. The First Army alone (with about 60 percent of its total supply allocations made up of Class III type items) used 782,000 gallons of motor fuel on 24 August. The next day Allied forces closed in on the Seine and columns of U.S. And French troops entered Paris.



The decision to cross the Seine and immediately continue eastward, without waiting to more fully develop lines of communication, constituted a major departure from the OVERLORD plan. It posed serious difficulties for the theater logisticians, but was a gamble senior commanders were willing to risk. "The armies, said General Bradley, on 27 August, "will go as far as practicable and then wait until the supply system in rear will permit further advance." Once across the Seine, forward divisions not only extended their lines, but fanned out in every direction creating a front twice as broad as previously. The strain on the supply system was immediately noticed as deliveries slowed to a trickle. The late August-early September operations were described by war correspondent Ernie Pyle as "a tactician's hell and a quartermaster's purgatory."



Indeed It was both. Believing victory to be firmly within their grasp, the fast-moving armies had outrun their supply lines and were forced to live hand-to-mouth for several days. Ninety to ninety-five percent of all supplies on the continent still lay in base depots. In the vicinity of Normandy the First Army had in effect "leaped" more than 300 miles from Omaha beach in a month's time. Third Army had done likewise. With the situation becoming daily more critical, it was time to begin what one historian labeled 'frantic supply."

Thanks to FReeper Colorado Tanker for suggesting this thread

[SAMWolf]

"RED BALL TO THE RESCUE"

In a desperate effort to bridge the gap between user units at the front and mounting stockpiles back at Normandy a long distance, one-way, "loop-run" highway system -the famed Red Ball Express-was born. Since circumstances allowed little time for advance planning or preparation, Red Ball was, as one observer noted, "largely an impromptu affair." It began on 25 August, with 67 truck companies running along a restricted route from St Lo to Chartres, just south of Paris; and reached a peak four days later with 132 companies (nearly 6,000 vehicles) assigned to the project. Communications Zone (COMMZ) and Advance Section (ADSEC) transportation officials were responsible for overseeing Red Ball activities, but it required the support and coordination of many branches to succeed. While the Engineers were busy maintaining roads and bridges, MPs were on hand at each of the major check points to direct traffic and record pertinent data. Colorful signs and markers along the way - not unlike the old Burma-Shave signs that covered America's own countryside- kept drivers from getting lost, and at the same time publicized daily goals and achievements. Quartermasters truck drivers, materiel handlers and petroleum specialists were ever present both along the route and at the forward area truck-heads. Disabled vehicles moved to the side of the road, where they were either repaired on the spot by roving Ordnance units or evacuated to rear area depots.

Round-the-clock movement of traffic required adherence to a strict set of rules. For instance, all vehicles had to travel in convoys and maintain 60-yard intervals. They were not to exceed the maximum speed of 25 mph and no passing was allowed. After dark Red Ball drivers were permitted the luxury of using full headlights instead of "cat eyes" for safety reasons. At exactly ten minutes before the hour each vehicle stopped in place for a 10-minute break

Bivouac areas were set up midway on the roads so exhausted drivers could get some rest and a hot meal. (Incidentally, most drivers soon picked up on handy tricks that come from living on the road, such as how to heat C-rations on the manifold or make hot coffee in a number-10 can using a bit of gasoline.) At its height the Red Ball saga captured the media's attention, and had the effect of placing supply and service personnel in the spotlight for a change. Still, the job was hardly glamorous, involving as it did endless hours of dull, hard, and sometimes dangerous work, POL occupied prominent space on the Red Ball Express.

Soldiers load trucks with rations bound for frontline troops. From left to right are Pvt. Harold Hendricks, Staff Sgt. Carl Haines, Sgt. Theodore Cutright, Pvt. Lawrence Buckhalter, Pfc. Horace Deahl and Pvt. David N. Hatcher. The troops were assigned to the 4185th Quartermaster Service Company, Liege, Belgium.

In late August, Eisenhower decided to forward most petroleum supplies to the First Army (Hodges) and the British 21st Army Group (Montgomery). This action was to come at the expense of Patton's Third Army to the South. On 31 August, Patton's daily allotment of gasoline dropped off sharply from 400,000 to 31,000 gallons. This placed a virtual strangle hold on the fiery commander, who fumed, pleaded, begged, bellowed and cursed accordingly - but to no avail. "My men can eat their belts," he was overhead telling Ike at a meeting on 2 September, "but my tanks gotta have gas." The logistical crisis threatened to halt the Allies where the enemy could not.

Fortunately, that crisis proved to be shortlived. It would only be a slight exaggeration to say that Red Ball saved the day. The hastily conceived system served as a useful expedient for bringing class III items, especially gasoline, quickly to the fuel starved front. Even though First and Third Army supply officers would continue bemoaning the gas shortage, the situation got markedly better. By the end of the first week in September, forward area truckheads were issuing POL as soon as it came in, and consumption rates were once again hitting the 800,000 gallons a day mark. The worst of Patton's gasoline woes ended almost as quickly as they had begun. Mid-September saw the two American Armies issuing in excess of one million gallons of gasoline daily--enough to meet the immediate needs and begin building slight reserves.

These drivers of the 666th Quartermaster Truck Company, 82nd Airborne Division, given awards for driving 20,000 miles each without an accident since arrival in the ETO

Red Ball was scheduled to run only until 5 September, but continued through mid-November. In all, it transported more than 500,000 tons of supplies. The system moved fuel quickly, if not always efficiently, to where most needed to keep the drive alive. Most importantly, the Red Ball Express brought precious time for the rear echelon support team, allowing it to complete its task of building up the railroads, port facilities, and pipelines needed to sustain the final drive into Germany.

SUMMARY

For over two months, the Red Ball Express did a magnificent job transporting petroleum over distances up to 400 miles. Quartermasters did their part by operating effectively as retailers of this product. However, success came with a price tag. Round-the-clock driving strained personnel and equipment. Continuous use of vehicles, without proper maintenance, led to their rapid deterioration and ultimately to a drain on parts and labor. Tire replacement alone nearly doubled from 29,142 just before Red Ball was launched to 55,059 in September. The situation was aggravated by driver abuse, such as speeding, and habitual overloading. Extreme fatigue also led to increased accidents, and even a few instances of sabotage, where drivers disabled their vehicles in order to rest.

Note the spare fuel carried on this CCKW-353 B2 of the US 7th Army

Red Ball proved beyond a doubt the versatility and convenience of transporting gasoline in small 5 gallon containers. Jerricans required no special handling apparatus and were amenable to open storage without harmful effects.. However, at the very height of Red Ball activities forward movement of POL was threatened by a severe shortage of jerricans. The cans were carelessly discarded from the beachhead area and littered the route all the way to the front. The Chief Quartermaster's highly publicized propaganda blitz and cash incentive program prompted local civilians to help round up "AWOL" jerryicans." Still a jerrican shortage remained in effect until more cans were manufactured on the home front.


Here in a soggy field somewhere outside Versailles, a driver has pulled his disabled truck out of a convoy. Determined nonrepairable by a Red Ball maintenance crew, its cargo is transferred to a replacement vehicle. When this is finished the driver will take a position in another convoy and eventually rejoin his unit at the exchange point in Normandy. The maintenance crew and driver are dressed in winter field uniform consisting of wool "OD" (olive drab) trousers and heavy twill field jackets. All are armed with 1911A1, .45 caliber, semiautomatic pistols.

Finally, the Red Ball Express had an inherent problem in that it was fast approaching a point of diminishing returns. As the route got longer and longer, the Red Ball required more gasoline- ultimately as much as 300,000 gallons per day--just to keep the Red Ball vehicles themselves moving.

[SAMWolf]

Refuel on the Move:
Resupplying Patton’s Third Army

"We held the enemy by the nose and kicked him in the pants." Speaking to a crowd of tired GIs in the French city of Metz in November 1944, LTG George S. Patton, commander of the Third Army, summed up the recently completed World War II offensive. A historic fortress of a city, Metz, had long been a pain in Patton's neck. Along with other areas of French Lorraine, Metz had been among the Third Army's toughest engagements of the entire war.


World War II Red Ball Express driver James Rookard (right) poses with a buddy

Early in the campaign, the nine divisions comprising the Third Army were measuring their daily achievements in quick miles. However, by September, the fast-moving "Lucky Forward" was lucky to be counting its advancements in yards. The key was logistics.

On 28 August, Patton summed it up this way, "At the present time our chief difficulty is not the Germans, but gasoline. If they would give me enough gas, I could go all the way to Berlin!"

Ready to Attack

Not surprisingly, the limitations of logistics weighed heavily on the tactical decisions of commanders on the offensive. By mid-September the Allied armies stood ready to attack on the German border in the north and on the banks of the Moselle River in the south. After successes before this, the armies were stopped short, mainly because of breakdowns in the supply system. Especially frustrating to tactical commanders such as Patton, these shortages took their heaviest toll on the soldiers who thought that the war was finally coming to an end. What went wrong? By studying logistics support to heavy units such as Patton's Third Army, Quartermasters of today will better be able to win on the battlefields of tomorrow.


African American members of the World War II Red Ball Express repair a 2.5-ton truck while a crewman at a machine gun keeps watch for the enemy.

After becoming operational on 1 Aug 44, Patton's Third Army moved quickly and struck hard into the German defenses. After racing past the German Seventh Army and tearing into the German forces from all four directions at once, Patton’s ruthless and reckless style earned him a reputation by both Allied and Axis forces.

German Army Group B Commander, Guenther von Kluge, reported the success of Patton: "As a result of the breakthrough of the enemy armored spearheads, the whole Western Front has been ripped wide open."



By mid-August Patton was driving virtually unopposed through France and had his sights set firmly on the Rhine. "We have been going so fast." Patton wrote, "that our chief difficulty consists in our inability to keep our spiderweb behind us. Our supply people, however, have really done marvels, and we always have sufficient of everything...."

Red Ball Express

While Patton was racing through France consuming an average of 350,000 gallons of gasoline each day, the famous Red Ball Express was organized to meet his growing demands as well as those of the First Army. Essentially a nonstop convoy of trucks connecting supply depots in Normandy to the armies in the field, the Red Ball at its peak used 6,000 trucks to complete its missions. As Patton advanced deeper, the demands placed upon the Red Ball grew faster than it was able to supply. Using 300,000 gallons of fuel each day itself, the Express pointed out what was becoming grossly obvious to tactical commanders, the Allies were running out of gas. On 28 August, Patton's army was forced to ease up when its fuel allocation fell 100,000 gallons short. Even though gasoline was in abundance in Normandy, the Red Ball could not transport it in sufficient quantities to the Third's forward units. On 31 August, after receiving no fuel at all, Patton's spearheads came to a halt.


A truck driver fills a tire with air along the Red Ball Express highway during World War II.

During the next week, as Patton idled in park, General Dwight D. Eisenhower gave logistics priority and fuel allocations to units farther north. By the time normal fuel allocations resumed in the Third Army, the opportunity to sweep through Lorraine freely had passed by Patton.

Concurrently with his fuel problems, Patton experienced two other situations which began to jab at his side during this first part of September. First, as the Third Army became more stationary, it began to use its larger caliber artillery weapons, causing an ammunition shortage. There was no way to build up ammunition stockage because all available trucks were transporting fuel. As the Lorraine campaign continued, shortages would also be felt in clothing, rations, tires and antifreeze for the quickly approaching winter months.

Massing Forces

Secondly, as Patton's armies waited for the supply train to catch up, the Germans were massing forces throughout Lorraine. Hitler ordered soldiers into the area at once and their numbers would increase greatly. Even though still outnumbered by Patton's forces and superior firepower (estimated at 20 to 1 in tanks), these German forces, made up of many sick, deaf and garrison soldiers, would contest every inch of ground. This resistance caused the Third Army to fight considerably harder than they were accustomed during the first months of the campaign. Patton's two Corps, the XX and the XII, made up of four to six infantry divisions and two or three armor divisions, would be responsible for most fighting during the next bloody months in France.


Red Ball Express troops stack "jerry cans" used to transport gas to front-line units during World War II.

In 1944, an armor division was relatively small compared to today. With 11,000 men and 263 tanks, it had three tank battalions, three battalions of armored infantry and three battalions of self- propelled artillery. Tactical doctrine of the day said that the armor division was primarily a weapon of exploitation to be used after the infantry achieved initial penetration into enemy defenses. This doctrine suited Patton to a tee, as he employed the mobile, quick-moving M-4 Sherman tank with its multipurpose 75mm gun. Patton's success, largely due to his understanding and use of heavy armored vehicles, made him the chief concern of the German armies of the time.



On 25 September, Patton was ordered to halt and to hold his ground until the logistical tail could restock itself before continuing. Patton, not being one to sit around and wait, established outposts, while maintaining active reserve contingency forces, and began to restock his own logistical base from within. Strict gasoline rationing and using mortars instead of large caliber weapon rounds lessened the initial two concerns of the Third Army. How do you resupply a heavy armor division in combat? Here's how Patton did it.

Quartermasters Important

First, Patton ordered stringent accountability of all supplies. The Quartermasters, due in large part to the severity of the crisis, were elevated in importance. Patton relied upon them for guidance and expertise. In addition to rationing supplies, he ordered that a supply base of reserves be stored within the Third Army for when they became fully operational again. His intelligence officers provided data on German movements in the area, and Patton wanted to be ready to move out at full speed when told to do so. No stopping the Third Army now, Patton must have thought. He did not realize then that he would basically be stationary until 8 Nov 44.


CCKW-352 crew sort an average daily delivery of 300-900 litres of plasma at a French airstrip. ETO - European Theatre of Operations.

While better managing his own supplies, Patton also used other means of collecting additional assets from the local areas. Supplies and equipment from captured German forces were put to great use replenishing the Allied stocks. Once it was even reported that an artillery barrage from the XX Corps zone came from captured German 105mm howitzers, Russian-made 76.2mm guns, French 155mm howitzers (also captured from the Germans), and German 88mm antitank guns. During one period in October, 80 percent of artillery ammunition used by XX Corps was captured from German units.



Another key factor in resupplying Patton's Third Army was his use of what we now call "host nation support" from the French. As he was chasing the Germans through France, Patton became very familiar with the extensive French railroad network. Fortunately, it was left virtually undamaged by the Germans as they retreated through the country. Working with French civilians, the Third Army operated these railroads themselves, at times bringing supplies farther forward than ever before. In addition to the railroads, French factories provided relief for the Allies in such areas as repairing tank engines, building tank escape hatches and track extenders (which increased the tanks' mobility in the muddy terrain), supplying thousands of gallons of alcohol instead of the scarce Prestone antifreeze, reopening coal mines and dry-cleaning plants, and turning the rubber manufacturing plants over to Patton for the production of much-needed fan belts and tires.

Panzer Divisions

By the time November rolled around and the Third Army was able to start moving again, they had replenished their depleted stocks and had built a substantial reserve. With many of his logistical nightmares behind him for the moment, Patton could concentrate on the tactical campaign at hand and the difficulties that he was experiencing with the feared German panzer divisions. Even though greatly outnumbered, the Germans took advantage of Patton's weaknesses in neglecting to practice economy of force and were able to wage several counterattacks into the Allied forces. Patton believed that he should spread out his Third Army over a vast front so that he would be strong in all areas. This philosophy backfired on him, however, because the forces were spread too thin and were not particularly strong anywhere. As a result of this error, heavy doctrine changed after the war from fighting dispersed to marching dispersed but fighting concentrated and tight. Patton's Third Army suffered many casualties for not realizing this sooner against the German armies.



The campaign through Lorraine. France, in World War II truly demonstrated that logistics is the key to battle. Patton was an aggressive and powerful commander, but logistics controlled his ability to maneuver. At the beginning of the campaign, when he raced through France gambling with tactics and doctrine wherever he went, he achieved great successes. However, by September he realized that eventually in logistics you must repay and restock the hands that are feeding you. His neglect of fuel and ammunition shortages cost the entire army until finally he was forced to stop and regroup. His reliance on the Red Ball Express was too great. Not until he realized that it was consuming more than it was delivering did Patton turn to the more reliable means of rail transport and local requisitioning for resupply.


A Red Ball Express truck gets stuck in the mud during World War II.

Patton's Third Army during the Lorraine campaign could not declare complete victory. In just over three months, the Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties and lost enormous amounts of equipment. The real victory of Lorraine was the soldier's ability to maintain the fight and the logisticians' ability to resupply the force. Fighting seemingly insurmountable odds and harsh weather conditions, Quartermasters of the day came through by using ingenuity, expertise, sheer hard work and determination.

Fight for Today



Look at the past, look towards the future, fight for today. Logisticians must be able to adapt and overcome, whatever odds may be in their way. The battle must continue for us all to win. Patton summed it up this way:

"You know that I have never asked one of you to go where I have feared to tread. I have been criticized for this, but there are many General Pattons and there is only one Third Army. I can be expended, but the Third Army must and will be victorious."

Leaders come and go, but the Army and the battle will continue. Will you be ready to support?

Captain Daniel G. Grassi

Additional Sources:

www.strandlab.com
www.jodavidsmeyer.com
www.trucktires.com
www.defenselink.mil
www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil
www.darron.net
www.angelfire.com/ma4
remlr.150m.com
www.army.mil

[SAMWolf]

'My men can eat their belts, but my tanks gotta gas.'

General George S. Patton, Jr.
Conversation with General Eisenhower, 2 September 1944

Facts:

• August 1944, Patton's Third Army broke through the German lines, advancing rapidly, moving faster than supply lines. Trucks and drivers from every available unit were pressed into service, with most of the drivers being black, since they were restricted from participating in combat. On Aug. 25, 1944. , the legendary Red Ball Express was born.
  
  
• The first runs in August involved over 3,000 trucks.
  
  
• Drivers on the Red Ball Express picked up freight at St. Lô, near the Normandy beaches, and drove as fast as they could to Chartres to supply the U.S. 1st Army, or to Dreux for the U.S. 3rd Army. This was 700-mile round trip.
  
  
• In the first month, the express delivered 290,000 tons of desperately needed supplies to the front.
  
  
• At its peak, the Red Ball Express operated 5,958 vehicles and carried 12,342 tons of supplies to the front.
  
  
• Trucks rolled 24-hours a day. Any trucks that broke down were shoved to the side of the road, repaired in place by roving repair teams, and re-joined the convoy as soon as they could.
  
  
• "Redball" is an old railroad term meaning "priority freight."
  
  
• Trucks of the RedBall Express displayed a red ball insignia, which gave them right-of-way over other traffic.
  
  
• The Redball Express ran 81 days, until terminated in November 1944.

[SAMWolf]

[SAMWolf]

Happy Birthday, Johnny Gage

[snippy_about_it]

.......FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole!

.......Good Tuesday Morning Everyone!


If you would like added to our ping list let us know.

[E.G.C.]

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole. How's it going?

[snippy_about_it]

Happy Birthday
Johnny!!!

[snippy_about_it]

Good morning EGC. I'm about to head out the door. It was only 40 degrees this morning. Yikes!

[The Mayor]

[GailA]

Morning...From my email this morning: my heroes have always been cowboys graphic heavy.

[manna]

Present!

[snippy_about_it]

Good morning SAM. Thank you and colorado tanker for today's story.

The logistics and statistics are amazing. Seemingly little things stand out. That every truck in the convoy would come to a stop at exactly 10 before the hour. A small but essential tactic in planning.

And still today we can't overlook the Quartermasters or the Engineers for what they do to support the rest of our armies.

[snippy_about_it]

Good morning Mayor.

[snippy_about_it]

Gail this is great. Thanks.

Ping SAM and colorado tanker to your link.


Guys, see Gail's "my heroes have always been cowboys", it's got music too!

[snippy_about_it]

Morning manna.

[Johnny Gage]

Thanks for the Birthday wishes!

Breakfast and Birthday Cake in the station this a.m.
Time Out: 08:27
KMG-365

[snippy_about_it]

Your welcome Johnny.

Thanks for the ping to your poetry on the other thread, if you don't mind I'll answer it from here at the Foxhole.

Well done, good piece of poetry about the last 40 years. Happy Birthday.

[snippy_about_it]

Your = You're!!!!!!


Argghh!

[Johnny Gage]

What a great thread.

While most people think of the war in regards to its battles, the "battle of resupply" of the ETO is one that is always overshadowed.