Posted on 07/29/2003 12:00:09 AM PDT by SAMWolf
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are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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The Battle for Saipan Plans to launch an offensive against the Japanese in the islands of the Pacific were initiated in 1943 at the Quadrant Conference held in Quebec. President Franklin Roosevelt received the proposal that the Allied effort in the Pacific should be directed first toward the Gilbert Islands, then the Marshalls, followed by Wake, the Eastern Carolines, and finally the Marianas. It was at Saipan that American military planners were presented with the problem of how to cope with a dense civilian population, the first to be encountered in the Pacific war. American forces were to be under the overall command of Admiral Chester Nimitz. Aerial view of Saipan, July 1944. (National Archives) The American drive across the Pacific would be two-pronged. While Nimitz fought his way across the central Pacific, General MacArthur would advance across the southwest Pacific to the Philippines. The islands of the central Pacific either succumbed one by one under the sheer weight of American forces or were bombed, neutralized and bypassed. With their supply lines cut, the defenders of by-passed islands were left to starve. After the fall of the Marshall islands, no other island in the central Pacific would be invaded by American ground forces until the American armada reached the waters off the Marianas and the island of Saipan. American war strategy in the western Pacific was developed around the premise that Japan would never surrender and that the nation would fight to the last man, woman, and child, particularly if the home islands were invaded. It was anticipated that such an invasion, if it were to occur, would result in the loss of one million American lives. In planning for this eventuality, air bases in the Marianas were essential in order to accommodate the new B-29 Superfortress, a U.S. bomber that was just beginning to be mass-produced in early 1944 and which had a flying range equal to the distance from Saipan, Tinian and Guam to Japan and back. The B-29's normal range was 2,850 miles at 358 m.p.h. with a 20,000 ton carrying capacity at 32,000 feet. The capture of the island of Saipan thus became crucial in the preparations for this massive invasion. The assault on Saipan began on June 15,1944, almost a week after the invasion of Europe. An armada of 535 ships carrying 127,570 U. S. military personnel (two-thirds of whom were Marines of the 2nd and 4th Divisions) converged on the island. The ships of the invasion force carried 40,000 different items to support the assault - everything from toilet paper to government-issue coffins. A single supply ship carried enough food to feed 90,000 troops for one month. Navy tankers transported the gigantic quantity of petroleum products required to support the invasion. Aircraft alone consumed over 8 million gallons of aviation fuel during the battle, while the aircraft carriers burned more than 4 million barrels of fuel. Seven American battleships and 11 destroyers shelled Saipan and Tinian for 2 days before the landings, firing 15,000 16-inch and 5-inch shells at the islands along with 165,000 other shells of other caliber. To even begin to comprehend the magnitude of this onslaught, one needs to realize that a single 16-inch round weighs slightly more than a Volkswagen Beetle, besides being packed with high explosives. On the second day of the bombardment, this force was joined by 8 more battleships, 6 heavy cruisers and 5 light cruisers. The islands were ringed by American warships with their guns blazing. Shells rained down on the island, its villages, inhabitants, and defenders, gouging huge craters in the sand and coral. The earth trembled under the tremendous explosions of naval bombardment and simultaneous air attacks. The main attack of the Marine Divisions was centered near Chalan Kanoa, just as planned. The 2nd Marine Division was to land at Red and Green Beaches north of the town while the 4th marine Division would land on Blue (opposite the town) and Yellow Beaches. As with most amphibious operations, not everything went as planned. The tractors moved faster than the tanks and in several cases blocked the ability of tank to fire. 2nd Marine Division's landings in the south were made slightly to the north of their planned objectives, this caused a gap to occur between the flanks of the two divisions. Although the original plan had allowed for a small gap between the two divisions, the northward landing of the 2nd Battatlion, 8th Marines more than doubled the size of this gap. By 0907, the first wave had reached the beach with only minimal losses and 8,000 marines were ashore. Besides the large gap between the two divisions, another problem that occurred during the landing was in the use of the amphibious tanks and tractors. In the 2nd Marine Division's area, the tanks were to move ahead of the tractors and advance inland about 1,500 yards and then set up defensive positions and lay down defensive fire while the initial wave of tractors moved up to this defensive line and the troops off loaded. The second - fourth waves were to unload their troops on the beach. In the 4th Marine Division area, the tanks were to lead the first two waves of tractors all the way to the objective, about a mile inland on some high ground. These tanks would then support the troops as they moved inland. The follow-on would be unloaded at the beaches. In general, although most of the tanks and tractors made it to the beaches unharmed, the combination of their thin armor and slow movement made them easy targets for the Japanese artillery once ashore. The amphibious vehicles were under-powered and were easily stopped by obstacles (loose sand, trenches, holes, and trees) that normal tanks would not have had a problem with. This significantly slowed the movement of the amphibious vehicles. The lack of suitable paths inland from the beaches also inhibited the inward movement of the marines. By nightfall, despite the various delays, both divisions were fully ashore and had established a defensive belt over 1,000 yards deep and over 10,000 yards long. Seven battalions of artillery had also landed and so had two heavy tank battalions. Division command posts were also established ashore. One of the benefits of using the troop carrying amphibious tractors was that it allowed the men to be carried ashore in armored vehicles, rather than having to wade ashore as at Tarawa. The Japanese had killed or wounded many Americans during the invasion, but the exact numbers for D-Day are unknown. The Marines had landed against the strength of the Japanese defensive area and at a time when four battalions of men who had not had time to move to their assigned positions elsewhere on the islands were located in vicinity of the beaches! The landing area was well registered for artillery and the Japanese had sixteen 105-mm, thirty 75-mm, and eight 150-mm guns on the high ground overlooking the beaches and were extremely accurate due to the pre-registration of the guns and the use of the bamboo sticks to help in adjusting fire. Yet, the Japanese artillery could have been more effective if they would have practiced concentrating their fire and not simply firing each weapon individually wherever the commander of the gun wanted to fire. On the first day, the Japanese relied almost solely on artillery, heavy weapons, and a few tanks to defeat the marines on the beaches. The infantryman rarely saw battle on D-Day. To H. Smith's G-3, the most critical phase of the Battle for Saipan was the fight on the beaches. To succeed the marines had to establish a beachhead into which sufficient troops, heavy equipment, and supplies could be brought ashore. On the first day, the marines gained control of the beaches, but they were not secure since artillery and heavy weapons were still able to attack men and equipment on the beach. It would take six days before the beachhead was actually secure. One of the major problems was the gap between the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions at Afetua Point and on the outward flanks of each division. This gap, which should have been closed the first day, took three days to close due to it being larger that originally planned thereby allowing the Japanese to defend this area in greater strength than expected. By the night of the 15th, the Japanese knew that they had to drive the Marines back to the sea. Yet, Saito believed that the landings might be a feint and only ordered minor counterattacks against the marines. He wanted to save his major forces in case the Americans did launch an invasion near Magicienne Bay. At 2000, a large force of Japanese infantry, supported by tanks, attacked the left flank of the 6th Marines of the 2nd Marine Division. Fortunately for the marines, naval gunfire firing illumination rounds were able to light up the sky enough to allow the defending marines to see the outlines of the Japanese soldiers as they attacked. The marine's machineguns and heavy rifle fire, along with the assistance of a battalion of 75-mm howitzers, were able to stop the Japanese counterattack. At 0300, another attack was launched against the same area, but it also failed. Before daylight, tanks and infantry again attacked the defending marines. By this time, a few of the medium tanks were ashore and able to help the marines stop the Japanese third counterattack against the 2nd Marine Division. The attack on Saipan, originally designed to overwhelm the Japanese with naval gunfire and rapid landings, failed on the first day. On this one day, the Marines failed to advance inland to their initial objective and were generally only 2/3 of the way to their objectives. An estimated 2,000 men were either killed or wounded and over 25% of the tractors and tanks were damaged or destroyed. H. Smith, knew that a naval battle between the Japanese Mobile Fleet and the American 5th Fleet was most likely going to occur in the near future. Realizing this, he was determined to get as many supplies and men ashore as possible before the protective battleships, cruisers, and destroyers departed with the carriers to met the Japanese fleet. On the evening of the 16th, the 27th Infantry Division landed on Saipan. Their mission was to capture Aslito airfield and to cut off the Japanese in the southeast corner of the island. Meanwhile, the 2nd and 4th marine Divisions would continue their attack inland. By the fourth day the Japanese had given up on trying to defend the beaches and had moved inland to set up defenses in the hilly and mountainous terrain. In the meantime, after the landing of the 27th Infantry Division, the majority of the 5th Fleet departed the Saipan area as H. Smith had figured they would. On 19 June to 21 June the 5th Fleet met the Japanese Mobile Fleet and defeated the Japanese fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Because of this naval battle, the Japanese on Saipan could expect to receive no further assistance. They were cut off from Japan and would have to fight out the battle for Saipan on their own. From this point onwards, it was believed by both sides that the American forces would defeat the Japanese on Saipan, the only question was how long would it take and how many men would die.
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After two days of fighting, the division attack against the main Japanese defensive belt had stalled. The 2nd Marine Division was on the outskirts of Garapan and near the summit of Mount Tapotchau. The 27th Infantry Division had made very little progress against the stiff Japanese defense amongst the rugged terrain. The 4th Marine Division had overrun the majority of the Peninsula and was nearing the eastern side of the island. However, the main Japanese defense on Mount Tapotchau remained. The American forces were now bent into a U-shape, with the 27th Infantry Division at the center of the U with the two marine divisions at each end. This bend was over 1,500 yards deep and exposed the flanks of the marine divisions to attacks by the Japanese. During these two days of fighting the 2nd Marine Division lost 333 men, the 27th Infantry Division lost 277 men, and the 4th Marine Division lost 812 men. During this battle, the American artillery and tanks were generally useless in a jungle environment filled with broken terrain. The fighting was mainly man-to-man with mortars and machineguns providing the heavy firepower. Close air support was not overly present due to the Battle of the Philippine Sea and was of limited use against the Japanese infantry in any case. Only direct fire and small assaults could defeat the Japanese soldiers who were hiding in caves, ravines, and gullies.
The relief of R. Smith probably did not make any real difference in the aggressiveness of the 27th Infantry Division. However, it did stir up a Marine Corps / Army controversy. On Saipan itself, marines began to look down on the 27th Infantry Division soldiers and the army soldiers resented H. Smith for relieving their commander and the implications made on the fighting capability of the division. Off of the island the controversy grew much greater, with several Army generals going so far as to recommending to Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, commander of all Army forces in the Pacific, that H. Smith was extremely prejudiced against army forces and that no Army forces should ever be put under his command again!
Earlier, on 22 June, the governor of Saipan had received a message from the Imperial Palace informing him that any civilian that died fighting the Americans would be granted the same afterlife privileges of the soldiers who died for the Emperor. Saipan was the first island encountered by the Americans that had a large number of Japanese civilians on it. The Japanese Government used propaganda that often showed the Americans as monsters. The naval and air bombardment, followed by three weeks of tough fighting did not dispel the fears of the Japanese civilians. Of the twenty-two thousand civilians on Saipan, thousands these civilians fought against the Americans during the battle for the island. As the Americans pushed northward, the civilians fled before them. By the time the Americans reached the northern end of Saipan on 9 July, thousands of Japanese men, women, and children were at the top of the cliffs overlooking the shark-infested waters. Once there, many of these civilians realized that they were cornered, and rather than surrender to the Americans, they dove off the cliffs into sure death in the water below. Out of the twenty-two thousand civilians, approximately eight thousand died in this lemming-like act. However, marine interpreters with loudspeakers did convince many of the Japanese civilians to surrender.
On 20 July, after engineers had made extensive repairs to and lengthened the runway of Asltio airfield, now renamed Isley Field, it received its first American plane. By early September B-24s were conducting missions against the Bonin Islands from Saipan. A second airfield was constructed to handle the larger B-29s. In October, the first B-29 raid from Saipan was flown against Truk. Saipan not only served as an airbase for attacks against other Japanese islands, but it also became an important naval base, particularly for submarines that would ultimately operate in the Japanese home waters.
www.geocities.com/Heartland/Plains/5850/saipan3.html
members.tripod.com/~Brian_Blodgett/Saipan.html#Invasion
www.skylighters.org
bingaman.senate.gov
www.libraries.psu.edu
www.photoman.co.kr
www.hopetribute.org
www.bluejacket.com
rjs.org
images.webshots.com
www.pbs.org
www.army.mil
www.grunts.net
Our medical officer aboard ship described the following hazards on Saipan: "In the surf, beware of sharks, barracuda, sea snakes, anemones, razor-sharp coral, polluted water, poison fish, and great clams. Ashore, there is leprosy, typhus, filariasis, yaws, typhoid, dengue fever, dysentery, saber grass, insects, snakes, and giant lizards. Eat nothing growing on the island; don't drink the water, and don't approach the inhabitants!" At the conclusion of his lecture, the medical officer asked for questions. A PFC raised his hand. "Sir," he asked, "why don't we just let the Japs keep the island?" Bob Hope visiting with wounded soldiers being evacuated from Saipan 2,385 Marines killed or missing 1,041 Army soldiers killed or missing 10,549 Marines wounded 2,550 soldiers wounded ______ 16,525 total casualties |
Today's classic warship, USS Canberra (CA-70)
Baltimore class heavy cruiser
Displacement: 13,600 t.
Length: 6735
Beam: 7010
Draft: 206
Speed: 33 k.
Complement: 1,142
Armament: 9 8; 12 5; 48 40mm; 24 20mm; 4 Aircraft
USS CANBERRA (CA-70) was launched 19 April 1943 by Bethlehem Steel Co., Quincy, Mass.; sponsored by Lady Alice C. Dixon; and commissioned 14 October 1943, Captain A. R. Early in command.
CANBERRA departed Boston 14 January 1944 and sailed via San Diego to embark passengers for Pearl Harbor, arriving 1 February. She rendezvoused with TF 58 on 14 February and took part in the capture of Eniwetok. The cruiser steamed from her base at Majuro to join the YORKTOWN (CV-10) task group for the raids on the Palaus, Yap, Ulithi, and Woleai (30 March-l April), then got underway from the same base 13 April for air strikes against Hollandia and Wakde in support of the Army landings on New Guinea. CANBERRA joined with the ENTERPRISE (CV-6) task group for fighter sweeps against Truk, then bombarded Satawan, rejoining the carriers for further strikes on Truk (29 April-1 May).
After a raid against Marcus and Wake Islands in May 1944, CANBERRA sailed from Majuro 6 June to participate in the Marianas operation, including the far-flung Battle of the Philippine Sea, and the supporting air strikes and bombardment to neutralize bases in the Bonins. Following replenishment at Eniwetok, CANBERRA sailed 29 August for raids on the Palaus and the Philippines, and to back up the Morotai landings (15-16 September).
On 2 October 1944, CANBERRA sailed in company with TF 38 for air strikes on Okinawa and Formosa in anticipation of the forthcoming landings on Leyte. On 13 October, only 90 miles off Formosa, close to the enemy and far from safe harbor, CANBERRA was struck below her armor belt at the engineering spaces by an aerial torpedo which blew a huge, jagged hole in her side and killed 23 of her crew instantly. Before damage control could isolate the compartments, some 4,500 tons of water rushed in to flood her after fireroom and both engine rooms, which brought the cruiser to a stop. Then began one of the most notable achievements of the war in saving wounded ships. CANBERRA was taken in tow by WICHITA (CA-45). The task force reformed to provide escort for her and HOUSTON (CL-81) who had been torpedoed on the morning of the 14th. Retiring toward Ulithi, "Cripple Division 1" fought off an enemy air attack which succeeded in firing another torpedo into HOUSTON. Admiral Halsey (CTF 38) attempted to use the group, now nicknamed "Bait Division 1," to lure the Japanese fleet into the open, but when the enemy sortied from the Inland Sea, air attacks from the rest of TF 38 roused enemy suspicions of the trap, and the Japanese force withdrew. CANBERRA and her group continued unmolested to Ulithi, arriving 27 October, 2 weeks from the day she was hit. The cruiser was towed to Manus for temporary repairs, thence departed for permanent repairs at Boston Navy Yard (16 February-17 October l945). CANBERRA returned to the west coast late in 1945 and was placed out of commission in reserve at Bremerton, Wash., 7 March 1947.
CANBERRA received seven battle stars for World War II service.
Reclassified CAG-2, 4 January 1952, CANBERRA was towed from Bremerton to New York Shipbuilding Corp., Camden, N.J., where she was converted to a guided missile heavy cruiser. Her after 8" turret was replaced by Terrier antiaircraft missile launchers and she was otherwise modernized. CANBERRA was recommissioned 15 June 1956, part of the sweeping revolution that is increasing the United States' seapower for peace. Local operations from her home port of Norfolk and Caribbean exercises were conducted until 14 March 1957 when she carried President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bermuda for a conference with Prime Minister Harold MacMillan of Great Britain. On 12 June, she served as a reviewing ship for the International Naval Review in Hampton Roads, with Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson embarked. After a midshipman training cruise to the Caribbean and Brazil (13 June-5 August), she departed Norfolk 3 September to participate in NATO Operation "Strikeback," sailing on to the Mediterranean for duty with the 6th Fleet before returning home 9 March 1958.
In the spring of 1958, CANBERRA was designated as ceremonial flagship for the selection of the unknown servicemen of World War II and Korea to be buried with honor at the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery. The cruiser rendezvoused off the Virginia Capes 26 May with BLANDY (DD-943) carrying the Unknown of the European Theater, and BOSTON (CAG-1) carrying the unknowns of the Pacific Theater and the Korean War. After BLANDY had transferred her Unknown to BOSTON, all three caskets were highlined to CANBERRA, where the selection between the two Unknowns of World War II was made. The selected casket along with the Korean Unknown was returned to BLANDY for transportation to Washington, D.C., and the unselected Unknown was buried at sea with military honors by CANBERRA.
CANBERRA carried midshipmen on a training cruise to Europe (9 June-7 August 1958), then after a brief visit to New York, entered Norfolk Naval Shipyard for overhaul.
Departing from the normal operating schedule, CANBERRA sailed from Norfolk on 3 March 1960 on a good-will cruise around the globe, flying the flag of Rear Admiral J. McN. Taylor, Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Cruiser Force and Cruiser Division 6. On this cruise, he took his flagship to the South Pacific, where her namesake had sunk, where she had engaged the enemy in 1944 and where he had served. On this cruise CANBERRA operated with both the 7th and 6th Fleets as she sailed across the Pacific, through the Indian Ocean, Suez, the Mediterranean, and across the Atlantic. She arrived home in Norfolk on 24 October. For the remainder of the year she operated on the east coast.
She took part in the Cuban Quarantine in the fall of 1962 and, in October 1963, was transferred to the Pacific Fleet. The Vietnam War soon became the focus of her final half-decade. Conducting her first combat deployment since the World War II, she spent the first several months of 1965 off Southeast Asia. A second Vietnam deployment followed in February-June 1966 and a third lasted from October 1966 until April 1967. During these operations her six remaining eight-inch guns were extensively employed for shelling enemy positions in both North and South Vietnam.
Bombardment duty dominated Canberra's next two war tours, in October 1967-April 1968 and from September 1968 to January 1969. This gunnery emphasis, plus the outdated nature of her "Terrier" guided missile system, caused her reclassification back to a heavy cruiser in May 1968, when she regained her original hull number, CA-70. Canberra's missile launchers and guidance radars were removed in 1969, following the end of her last Vietnam cruise. Soon thereafter, in October 1969, she arrived at San Francisco, California, to begin inactivation work. Decommissioned in early February 1970, USS Canberra was stricken from the Naval Vessel Regiser in July 1978 and sold for scrapping in July 1980.
Big guns in action! (The navy spent all that money converting her to missiles, only to have her to use her original WWII guns in Vietnam. Big guns rule!)
Air Power |
The B-29 bomber, produced by the Boeing Aircraft Company during the war, was the first long-range heavy bomber employed by the United States. It was primarily used in the wars Pacific Theater, and became notorious as the plane used to drop the worlds first atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, Aug. 6 and 9, 1945.
The Boeing B-29 was designed in 1940 as an eventual replacement for the B-17 and B-24. The first one built made its maiden flight on Sept. 21, 1942. Developing the Boeing B-29 was a program which rivaled the Manhattan Project in size and expense. Technically a generation ahead of all other heavy bomber types in World War II, the Superfortress was pressurized for high altitudes and featured remotely-controlled gun turrets. Most important, its four supercharged Wright R-3350-23 engines gave it the range to carry large bomb loads across the vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean.
A test flight of the planes XB-29 prototype ended in tragedy Feb. 18, 1943, when an engine caught fire and the plane crashed. The pilot, crew and 19 people on the ground were killed. The Boeing Company declared that it was not going to build this airplane. Its no good. It has too many problems. Gen. Henry Hap Arnold, the Air Forces first general officer, argued with Boeing and threatened to force them to repay the $200 million that they had been given to build the planes. Faced with having to pay back money already received, Boeing agreed to operate the factories, but they would not take any responsibility for the airplane. The Army took over the test program after the crash. Development continued that summer with flight testing of the YB-29 even as hurried production versions of the B-29 were being turned out.
In December 1943, it was decided not to use the B-29 in the European Theater, thereby permitting the airplane to be sent to the Pacific area where its great range made it particularly suited for the long over water flight required to attack the Japanese homeland from bases in China. As it came into the AAF inventory in mid-1944, the B-29 weighed 140,000 pounds loaded, with an effective range of 3,250 miles. Pavements failed, and at their best, behaved erratically. No airfield pavement had been designed for more than 120,000 pounds gross weight. The Corps of Engineers began experiments anew with pavement overlays at Hamilton Field north of San Francisco.
As the powerful B-29 "Superfortress" rolled off Americas production lines in the midst of World War II, General "Hap" Arnold, then Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, understood the need to bring the B-29s unique strategic bombing capabilities to bear against the Japanese homeland. Thus, in April 1944, he created Twentieth Air Force and gave it the daunting mission of conducting one of the largest--and ultimately most successful--air campaigns in history. Arnolds B-29s first flew in Operation MATTERHORN, which called for India-based Superfortresses to bomb Japan from forward bases in China. However, as allied forces advanced in the South Pacific "Island Hopping" campaign, Twentieth Air Force expanded its B-29 operations to bases in the Marianas Islands. During the last two months of 1944, B-29s began operating against Japan from the islands of Saipan, Guam and Tinian. Flying more than 1,500 miles one way, more than 1,000 bombers and 250 fighters conducted 28,000 combat sorties against Japan in the brief span of 16 months.
In early 1944 the Army Air Forces started its program to develop an atomic bomb delivery capability using the B-29 aircraft. The B-29 was the logical choice in view of its long range, superior high-altitude performance, and ability to carry an atomic bomb that was expected to weigh 9000 to 10,000 pounds. In March and again in June dummy atomic bombs were dropped by B-29s at Muroc Army Air Force Base in California to test the release mechanism. In August seventeen B-29s entered a modification program at the Glenn L. Martin plant in Omaha, Nebraska, to apply the lessons learned at Muroc. The "Silver Plate" project was the code name of the pilot and crew training program for the coming World War II atomic missions.
On 6 August 1945 the crew of the "Enola Gay" dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. The thirteen-hour mission to Hiroshima began at 0245 Tinian time. By the time they rendezvoused with their accompanying B-29s at 0607 over Iwo Jima, the group was three hours from the target area. The "Enola Gay" flew toward the AiOi T-Bridge in Hiroshima at a speed of 285 mph. After six-and-a-half hours of tough overwater navigation, the B-29 was over target within seventeen seconds of the scheduled drop time of 0915. When the 9,000-pound bomb "Little Boy" fell from the "Enola Gay," pilot Paul Tibbets put the aircraft into a 60-degree diving right turn and headed home. Seconds later, Hiroshima lie in ruins.
Despite widespread destruction, the Japanese still did not surrender. Three days later, Maj. Charles W. Sweeney, commander of the 393rd BMS and piloting "Bockscar" flew over Nagasaki. A few minutes after 9 a.m., bombardier Capt. Kermit K. Beahan toggled the bomb switch. Less than a minute later, Nagasaki became the second city attacked with the devastating weapon. The Japanese surrendered in the following days thereby ending World War II.
Immediately post-World War II, SACs bomber inventory housed the B-29 Superfortress, the plane that had dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1946, the Soviets began design of their long-range bomber, the Tu-4, modeled directly on B-29s captured during 1944. The B-29 was SACs first Cold War aircraft, and even as late as the close of 1948 the Air Force had modified only 60 of the planes to carry the atomic bomb. Its infrastructure, hangars, and ancillaries were reused from World War II facilities. While the B-29 was the long-range aircraft that revolutionized air war, the aircraft could only fly the U.S.-Soviet corridor one way, and could not achieve that distance heavily loaded.
With the advent of the conflict in Korea in June 1950, the B-29 was once again thrust into battle. For the next several years it was effectively used for attacking targets in North Korea. The Warner Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) literally unwrapped and refurbished hundreds of "Cocooned" Boeing B-29 Superfortresses. Understaffed and working around the clock, they made sure that United Nations forces in the Far East had the necessary tools to fight the North Korean invaders. This was particularly true with the key role B-29s played in bombing Communist supply lines and staving off the enemy's assault on Allied forces pinned down inside the Pusan Perimeter. B-29s detached from Twentieth Air Force continued flying combat missions until the end of the war in 1953. By 1955, with the situation in Korea stabilized and intercontinental-range bombers entering service, the need no longer existed for a B-29 numbered air force in the Pacific.
The B-29 MR [MR standing for Modified Receiver] could refuel in mid-air. The KB-29M was the tanker, using what was called the British 'looped hose' method, a 400 foot length of hose that tethered the two airplanes together. In order to extend the range of the new generation of jet aircraft, a B-29 was also fitted with a flying boom for experiments in air-to-air refueling.
A stop-gap measure to fill the long-range bomber requirement in the Cold War, the Boeing B-29D Washington began entering service with UK Bomber Command Squadrons during August 1950. The type began to be retired in 1953 with the advent of the V-bombers, but the last did not leave the RAF until 1958.
Specifications:
Primary Function: Long range heavy Bomber
Contractor: Boeing
Crew: 10
Unit Cost: $639,000
Powerplants: Four 2,200-horsepower Wright Double Cyclone engines
Dimensions:
Length: 99 feet
Wingspan: 141 feet 3 inches
Height: 27 feet 9 inches
Weights: Empty: 69,610 lb / Maximum Takeoff: 105,000 pounds (140,000 pounds postwar)
Performance :
Speed: 365 mph (mach 0.55)
Ceiling: 31,850 feet
Range: 5,830 miles
Armaments:
Eight .50-cal. machine guns in remote controlled turrets
Two .50-cal. machine guns and one 20mm cannon in tail
20,000 lbs. of bombs.
All photos Copyright of Global Security.Org
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