This persuasive evidence of the approaching end was further confirmed, he said, when soon after midnight a wireless message intercepted from the Eiffel Tower reported: "The Armistice terms had been accepted and...hostilities were going to cease. My recollection is that in that wireless message the hour of 11 o'clock was stated as the time." Sherburne's testimony made clear that the men in the trenches had persuasive information nearly twelve hours in advance that the war's end was at hand, though Pershing had told Congress that he had had no knowledge that the armistice was about to be signed until he was notified at 6 a.m. Brig. Gen. John Sherburne At Ansell's urging, Sherburne went on to describe how he and his operations officer, Captain George Livermore, author of the letter to Congressman Fuller, had then telephoned divisional, corps, and army headquarters to find out, since the armistice had been signed, if an attack by the 92nd from the Bois de Voivrotte set for that morning could be called off. All up and down the chain of command, Sherburne testified, he was informed that the order stood. Ansell asked the effect of this order on the troops. "I cannot express the horror that we all felt," Sherburne said. "The effect of what we all considered an absolutely needless waste of life was such that I do not think any unit that I commanded took any part in any cel-ebration of the armistice, and even failed to rejoice that the war was over."  "Who in your judgment was responsible for this fighting?" Ansell asked. Sherburne hesitated. "It is pretty poor testimony to have gossip," he answered. Ansell pressed him to go on. Sherburne then said: I cannot feel that Gen. Pershing personally ordered or was directly responsible for this attack. If there is any obligation or liability upon him it is from not stopping what had already been planned....Our Army was so run that division and brigade and even corps commanders were piteous in their terror and fear of this all-pervading command by the General Staff which sat in Chaumont....They did not look upon human life as the important thing. In this, to a certain extent, they were right; you cannot stop to weigh in warfare what a thing is going to cost if the thing is worthwhile, if it is essential. But I think on the 9th and the 10th and the 11th they had come pretty near to the end of the War and knew they were pretty near the end. But they were anxious to gain as much ground as possible. They had set up what, in my opinion, is a false standard of excellence of divisions according to the amount of ground gained by each division....It was much like a child who had been given a toy that he is very much interested in and that he knows within a day or two is going to be taken away from him and he wants to use that toy up to the handle while he has it....A great many of the Army officers were very fine in the way that they took care of their men. But there were certain very glaring instances of the opposite condition, and especially among these theorists, these men who were looking upon this whole thing as, perhaps one looks upon a game of chess, or a game of football, and who were removed from actual contact with the troops.  It was, Sherburne went on, difficult for conscientious officers to resist direction from Chaumont, no matter how questionable. He admitted that even in a situation where his own life was at stake, he would have yielded to pressure from the general staff. "I would far rather have been killed," he told the subcommittee, "than to be demoted." The 33rd was another division engaged to the last minute. As the unit's historian later described the final day: Our regimental wireless had picked up sufficient intercepted messages during the early hours of the morning to make it certain that the Armistice had been signed at 5 o'clock that morning; and the fact that the prearranged attack was launched after the Armistice was signed...caused sharp criticism of the high command on the part of the troops engaged, who considered the loss of American lives that morning as useless and little short of murder.  "Last two minutes to fight" Photo taken at 10:58 November 11, 1918 The 81st Division took the severest blow that morning. One of its regimental commanders had told his men to take cover during the last hours, only to have his order countermanded. With forty minutes left in the war, the troops were ordered to "Advance at once." The division reported 461 casualties that morning, including sixty-six killed. The army claimed to have put a hundred clerks to work on the subcommittee's request for the number of AEF casualties that occurred from midnight November 10 to 11 o'clock the next morning. The figures provided by the adjutant general's office were 268 killed in action and 2,769 seriously wounded. These figures, however, failed to include divisions fighting with the British and French north of Paris and do not square with reports from individual units on the ground that day. The official tally for the 28th Division, for example, showed zero men killed in action on November 11, but in individual reports from field officers requested by the subcommittee, the commander of one brigade alone of the 28th reported for that date, "My casualties were 191 killed and wounded." Taking into account the unreported divisions and other underreported information, a conservative total of 320 Americans killed and more than 3,240 seriously wounded in the last hours of the war is closer to the fact.  By the end of January 1920, Subcommittee 3 concluded its hearings. Chairman Johnson drafted the final report, arriving at a verdict that "needless slaughter" had occurred on November 11, 1918. The full Select Committee on Expenditures in the War chaired by Congressman W.J. Graham initially adopted this draft. Subcommittee 3's Democratic member, Flood, however, filed a minority report charging that Johnson's version defamed America's victorious leadership, particularly Pershing, Liggett, and Bullard. Flood saw politics at work. The country had gone to war under a Democratic president. By 1918 the Republicans had won control of Congress, and it was they who had initiated the Armistice Day investigation. By the time the inquiry ended, Wilson's hopes for the United States' entering into the League of Nations were fast sinking and critics were questioning why America had gone to war in the first place. Flood suspected that the Republicans on the subcommittee were inflating the significance of the events of the last day, "trying to find something to criticize in our Army and the conduct of the war by our government." The committee, he claimed, had "reached out for those witnesses who had grievances...." As for Ansell, whom he repeatedly referred to as the "$20,000 counsel," he had "been permitted to browbeat the officers of the Army." Flood also hinted that the lawyer had left the War Department, "with whom he is known to have quarreled," under a cloud. Finally, Flood argued that the select committee had been created to investigate wartime expenditures and not to second-guess generals on "matters beyond the jurisdiction of the committee."  "CALAMITY JANE" AND HER CREW This gun, serial No. 3125, 11th F. A., 6th Div., fired the last shot of the war for the Allies, in the bois de le Haie, on the Laneuville-sur-Meuse, Beauclair Road, France. It is rumored that the gunners' watches were slow. Flood's dissent, with its patriotic ring, found enough sympathy that Chairman Graham took a rare step. He recalled the already approved Johnson report. Three hours of acrimonious debate followed. In the end, Johnson bowed to pressure not to hold up the select committee's report any further, and on March 3 he struck from his draft any imputation that American lives had been needlessly sacrificed on Armistice Day. The New York Times took the Dan Flood view, editorializing that the charge of wasted life "has impressed a great many civilians as being well founded....[But,] the civilian view [that] there should have been no shot fired if the commander of a unit had been notified of the signing is, of course, untenable....Orders are orders."  American forces weren't alone in launching assaults on the last day. The British high command, still stinging from its retreat at Mons during the first days of the war in August 1914, judged that nothing could be more appropriate than to retake the city on the war's final day. British Empire losses on November 11 totaled some twenty-four hundred. The French commander of the 80th Régiment d'Infanterie received two simultaneous orders that morning: one to launch an attack at 9 a.m., the other to cease fire at 11. Total French losses on the final day amounted to an estimated 1,170. The Germans, in the always-perilous posture of retreat, suffered some 4,120 casualties. Losses on all sides that day approached eleven thousand dead, wounded, and missing.  Indeed, Armistice Day exceeded the ten thousand casualties suffered by all sides on D-Day, with this difference: The men storming the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944, were risking their lives to win a war. The men who fell on November 11, 1918, lost their lives in a war that the Allies had already won. Had Marshal Foch heeded the appeal of Matthias Erzberger on November 8 to stop hostilities while the talks went on, some sixty-six hundred lives would likely have been saved. In the end, Congress found no one culpable for the deaths that had occurred during the last day, even the last hours of World War I. The issue turned out much as General Sherburne predicted in his testimony. Soon, except among their families, the men who died for nothing when they might have known long life "would all be forgotten." |
