The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Gen. Richard Ewell at Gettysburg (7/1/1863) - Mar. 17th, 2005

America's Civil War Magazine | Samuel J. Martin

[SAMWolf]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

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for all those serving their country at this time.

.................................................................. .................... ...........................................

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Did Baldy Ewell Lose Gettysburg?

After disobeying Robert E. Lee's orders to avoid a general engagement at Gettysburg, Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell received an order to 'press those people.' His failure to do so created a controversy that survives to this day.

Lt. Gen. Richard Ewell

Late in the afternoon of July 1, 1863, after a full day of fierce fighting, Confederate troops finally drove the Union defenders from the fields west of Gettysburg. As the Union troops fled east toward the haven of Cemetery Hill, General Robert E. Lee sent the following order to Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell, commander of the II Corps, whose men had gained victory that day: "The enemy [is] retreating over those hills ... in great confusion. You only need press those people to secure possession of the heights ... .Do this, if possible." Legend tells us that, at that crucial moment, "Old Bald Head" lost his nerve. Instead of pursuing the fleeing Union soldiers, who were so panicked they could not defend themselves, Ewell held back, allowing the Federals to entrench atop Cemetery Hill. The advantage of holding the heights led to the Union victory at Gettysburg. Ewell's indecision supposedly cost the South the battle.

While this is an interesting story -- and one that has been repeated again and again in many books about the Civil War -- it is also a lie that libels Ewell. The story was concocted by Lee's apologists in a postwar attempt to shift the blame for losing the battle from their hero onto Ewell. In truth, Lee sent no definitive orders directing Ewell to pursue the enemy when the Union lines broke at Gettysburg, and Ewell was not benumbed by indecision when he should have been chasing the Federals to prevent them from establishing an impregnable position on top of Cemetery Hill. The proof of this lies in a close study of the battle, including the location and strength of the opposing forces once the first day's fighting had ended, and in how the key participants reacted to the changing events of the day.



It all began because too many Rebels were barefoot. "A large supply of shoes were stored in Gettysburg, but there was evidently a [Union] cavalry force occupying the town," Confederate Maj. Gen. Henry Heth stated, "and [my] men reported the beat of drums, indicating infantry." There was always the risk of battle, but Heth went to his superior, Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill, chief of the III Corps in Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. "If there is no objection, I will march my division ... to Gettysburg, and secure those shoes," Heth requested. "Do so!" Hill replied.

Heth started his column of 7,500 troops, including the infantry brigades led by Brig. Gens. James J. Archer, Joseph R. Davis, John M. Brockenbrough and James J. Pettigrew, down Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg at 5 a.m. on July 1. About three miles west of the small crossroads village, Heth's advance was met by Federal skirmishers from Colonel William Gamble's brigade of Maj. Gen. John Buford's cavalry division. This confrontation started about 5:30 a.m.

Gamble's objective was to delay the Rebels until Union infantry reached the field. The Union Army of the Potomac, under Maj. Gen. George C. Meade, was hurrying through Maryland to intercept the Confederates, who were concentrating just north of the border.


McPherson Ridge and Woods, the Federal position on July 1. In the woods at the right, General Reynolds was killed. The cupola of the Theological Seminary appears in the background.

When the Union pickets opened fire, Heth halted, formed into battle line and began to slowly probe his front to test the strength of the force that was blocking his way into Gettysburg. Two hours passed. When the Confederates finally climbed Herr Ridge, they saw ahead a meandering creek, Willoughby Run. On the opposite bank, the ground sloped upward to McPherson's Ridge, where Gamble's 1,600 men were posted. Heth sent Archer's and Davis' brigades, totaling 3,800 troops, ahead to face the Union line. They exchanged fire from a distance with the Federal cavalry for two more hours.

At about 10 a.m., Union Maj. Gen. John Reynolds' infantry corps came marching into Gettysburg. Brigadier General James A. Wadsworth's division, including the brigades led by Brig. Gens. Lysander Cutler and Solomon Meredith, arrived first and pressed forward to relieve Gamble's exhausted troops, who were still aligned along McPherson's Ridge. The cavalry withdrew to the left, below the slope, as a reserve force. Just as Wadsworth's men took their post, the Confederates under Archer and Davis charged. Both sides absorbed terrible losses in the one-hour melee. At first the Southerners prevailed, but a Northern counterattack pushed them back.


Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds.

The two sides then resumed their original positions, content to continue the battle by exchanging artillery fire. During the clash, Archer was captured and taken to the rear, where he was warmly greeted by Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday, an old friend from prewar days, who had just taken command of I Corps after Reynolds had been killed by a sniper.

"Archer!" Doubleday exclaimed on seeing him. "I am glad to see you."

"Well, I am not glad to see you," Archer snarled, "not by a damned sight, Doubleday!"

When the I Corps' remaining divisions, led by Brig. Gens. John C. Robinson and Thomas Rowley, arrived at Gettysburg at 11 a.m., the latter's two brigades pushed ahead to reinforce Wadsworth; Robinson's brigades were held in reserve in Gettysburg to face the enemy's II Corps, reported to be approaching from the north.

Ewell, with only Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes' division in hand, arrived at Gettysburg at about noon. As he came out of the woods that crowned Oak Hill, Ewell saw the exposed Union flank below him and knew he had an unparalleled opportunity to rout the enemy.


Scene north of Gettysburg from Oak Ridge. The Federal position may he seen near the edge of the open fields in the middle distance.

After giving Rodes orders to deploy his 8,125 soldiers for battle, Ewell sent Major Campbell Brown, his stepson and principal aide, to find Lee and tell him that Ewell meant to join the fray. Brown found Lee on Herr Ridge, where both he and Hill had come after hearing the bark of muskets and bellow of cannons. Lee sent Campbell back to Ewell with an astounding order: "Do not charge; I want to avoid a general engagement."



Had Stonewall Jackson sent Ewell those instructions, he would have meekly complied without question. Jackson, who had died in May, never granted his subordinates any discretion. Lee, however, was a different type of commander, one who expected his leaders to use their own judgment. He had, for example, told Ewell to bypass Winchester while heading through the Shenandoah Valley to Pennsylvania. When Ewell saw that he could rout the Yankees occupying the small village, he decided to disobey Lee's orders, attacked the enemy and won a decisive victory over the Northern defenders. Lee did not reprove Ewell for disregarding his instructions at Winchester. Now Ewell saw a similar chance for glory at Gettysburg, and he again elected to flout Lee's directive.

Brown advised that now was not the time to disobey Lee. He described Lee as seething with anger, "showing a querulous impatience ... I never saw before." Lee's ire was the result of cavalry head Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's disregarding his instructions. "He's gone off around the Federal Army," Lee groused, "failing to keep in constant communication with me."

Despite Brown's warning that Lee was in no mood to see his orders ignored, Ewell could not pass up the opportunity to assault the open Union flank. The enemy troops were so vulnerable that they could be quickly routed, which would not be a "general engagement," Ewell reasoned. He decided to gamble his rank and career by proceeding with a charge. In giving the written order to his division commanders, Rodes and Maj. Gen. Jubal Early, Ewell stressed that, after driving the enemy from the ground, they must break off their engagement. This point was also verbally emphasized by the messengers dispatched to both Rodes and Early.


Earthworks at Culp's Hill constructed by soldiers of the Iron Brigade.

Before he could launch his attack, Rodes had to switch from column into battle formation. He moved Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel's brigade west to flank the Federals along McPherson's Ridge; Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson's men would slip behind the Union forces on the hill to take the enemy from the rear. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Edward A. O'Neal's troops would come down Oak Ridge, where they would be in a position to block a Union retreat. Brigadier General George Doles would guard Rodes' left flank; Brig. Gen. Stephen Ramseur's brigade would be his reserve.

As the Confederates filed into position, the Federals hastened to meet the enemy threat. Brigadier Generals Gabriel Paul and Henry Baxter rushed their troops, 2,600 men in all, out of Gettysburg and into a line facing northwest along Oak Ridge.

[Valin]

http://www.gdg.org/Research/OOB/Confederate/July1-3/itrimble.html

From the Bachelder Papers, Vol 2 p. 921:

Letter from Maj. Gen Issac R. Trimble to J. B. Bachelder dated Feb. 8th, 1883:

J. B. Bachelder
Dear Sir:
I enclose you a brief account of what I saw and what I did at Gettysburg -the 1st and 3rd day.

On reporting to General Hill for orders the 3d day, I read General Lee's order of Battle, and give it to you almost word for word -this- "General Longstreet will make a vigorous attack on our right, Genl. Ewell will make a demonstration on our left; to be converted into a vigorous attack if circumstances justify it. general Hill will hold the center at all hazards."

R. E. Lee

If you have not obtained this order, it may be of value.


Yours
I.R. Trimble

---

(footnote 153: Original letter in file ends here. Balance of this report is from typed transcript attached to Trimble's letter. Writer not identified and original version not in the file) The following is extracted from the narrative on p930ff:)

As nothing in Gen'l Ewell's department indicated a design to advance against the enemy, Gen'l Trimble remembering Gen'l Lee's impressive words a few days before to "crush the advance of the enemy and attack him vigorously in detail", or words t to that effect, he approached Gen'l Ewell and said, "General don't you intend t to pursue our sweep and push the enemy vigorously?" His reply as "No, I have orders form Gen' Lee not to bring on a general engagement." to which Gen'l Trimble rejoined, "But Gen'l that order cannot have reference to the present situation, for we have had a general engagement and gained a great victory, and by all military rules we ought to follow up our success, and we are losing golden moments," to which appeal there was no reply. Gen'l Ewell turned and walked slowly about, his whole manner indicating [ir]resolution and that kind of impatience which springs from mutual indecision, or a feeling that three was a momentous crisis, and he did not see clearly what course t to take. His manner separated him from his staff and the approach of others.

NOTE: (Gen' Lee had issued orders to Gen'l Ewell about June 26th when directed him to march into Penn. "not to bring on a general engagement with the Federal army, with his corps.")

Deeply regretting the indecision of Gen'l Ewell, Gen'l Trimble left him, and rode around the outskirts of the city on the northern and north eastern side to learn the topography of the security. ..... Returning in half an hour he spoke t Gen'l Ewell and said, "Gen'l if you have decided not to advance against the enemy and we are only to hold our ground, I want to advise that you send a brigade with artillery to take possession of that hill (Culp's Hill). It commands Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill." "How do you know that?" said he. "I have been round there," was the reply, "and you know I am not often mistaken in judging of topography, and if we don't hold that hill, the enemy will certainly occupy it, as it is the key to the whole position about here and I beg you to send a force at once to secure it. "When I need advice from a junior officer, I generally ask it, " was Gen'l Ewell's ungracious reply. when Gen'l Trimble terminated the interview by saying, "Gen'l Ewell I am sorry you don't appreciate my suggestions, you will regret it as long as you live."

(Footnote 166: The following is from the original letter.) [as continued on page 932]

Gettysburg When the contest was ended, the first day, about 3:30; I and others urged Gen. Ewell to pursue our success and attack the enemy. This he did not do, on the plea that his troops were not in a condition to do so. Now Rhodes' division, which was the only one that began the fight on our left, had not been seriously injured and was in the finest spirits at the end of the fight. Early's div. came into action late in the contest on our extreme left, and was hardly injured at all; Johnson's division was but a few miles off, and came up about sundown.

Then, on the maxim of war, that "a routed enemy should be pursued, it seemed plain, that Ewell should have pressed forward, informing Gen. Lee and Gen Hill that he intended to pursue the enemy, and send express to Johnson to hasten forward, and follow him.

Whether successful or not; that, was the game play and Ewell ought to have taken the responsibility.

Finding he did not intend to do so, I strongly advised the occupation of Culps Hill at once. This was about half past 3 o'clock, not later than 4 o'clock I am sure. I said to him "that is the key of the position on Cemetery Hill." He answered, "How do you know," I said "I have been round, to north of the town and can see plainly that it commands Cemetery hill - and ought to be occupied by us, or the enemy as soon as possible" - General Ewell did not take any steps to occupy the hill, at once, and on after reflection decided not to attempt it. I think from reports of Federal Officers, Culp Hill was not occupied by any force of Meade's until about 5 to 5:30 P.M.

[Valin]

You DO realize that you are the only person in the history of FReeRepublic that's ever done anything like that.
We're all pretty shocked, and...saddened.

[Professional Engineer]

0461 St Patrick patron St of ENGINEERS, all else is of no importance.

[Soaring Feather]

Do I get a blonde prize??

[Valin]

The wonderful thing about this country is everyone is entitled to their opinion..no matter how silly. :-)

[stand watie]

GM, snippy, et.al.!

free dixie HUGS,duckie/sw

[SAMWolf]

One of the great "what if's" of gettysburg.

[SAMWolf]

Too much

[SAMWolf]

Morning stand watie.

Free Dixie!

[Iris7]

Thanks for your discourse. Your analysis is nicely compact and accurate in my opinion.

Lee was operating with (to me) shockingly bad logistics, his troops on foot, barefoot, with almost no transport, against the Army of the Potomac which was well equipped indeed. Lee's retreat was a disaster of bad logistics. I think that if McClellan was excessive in his logistic demands then Lee was complaisant in his.

When I get to the battleground one day I want to examine the terrain to the Federal right on the third day. It is possible but unlikely that something could have been done there by Lee, but I doubt it because of the Federal extreme interior lines situation. The Federal left, the Longstreet argument, etc., is pretty clear.

Another criticism of Lee, as I see it, is that he really did not have a handle on the situation at Gettysburg like he did in his defensive battles. (C3I, I hear they call it nowadays.) Lee had the resources, as you point out. Perhaps he lacked the extreme physical vigor required back then, the ability to live in the saddle and wear out ten horses a day that Custer had.

I have a lot of affection for the Second Day Iron Brigade defense. Those regiments existed in name only after that.

Again, thanks for your essay.

[SAMWolf]

Off to dig up some concrete.

[Iris7]

That is a nice piece, Valin. Interesting and enjoyable.

[stand watie]

GA, sam!

saw the following sign on the rear window of an SUV headed north on I-95 this AM:

"Erin, go braughLESS!"

i lol at that one!

free dixie,sw

[Professional Engineer]

hIYA sAM

[Professional Engineer]

Hey, that's not the Unicorn Song.

[E.G.C.]

Congratulations to OU. They defeated Niagra 84-67 to advance in the NCAA.

[snippy_about_it]

!!!!!

[snippy_about_it]

Top of the afternoon to you feather.

[colorado tanker]

Thanks to both of you. I never tire of reading about this fascinating battle. The generalship may have been poor, but the feats of heroism by the soldiers and line officers were amazing.

[colorado tanker]

Hiya, Sam and Snip. Glad to hear old Ewell is off the hook for the Gettysburg loss. As I recall, the movie Gettysburg leaned toward the Ewell's fault theory. I tend to agree with the post, that it would have been awfully tough for Ewell to seize the heights after fighting all day, when the Union forces were receiving a steady stream of reinforcements.