The FReeper Foxhole Revisits The Battle of The Little Big Horn - December 3rd, 2004

http://www.cbhma.org/history.shtml ^ | Joe Sills, Jr.

[snippy_about_it]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.


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The FReeper Foxhole Revisits

BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIG HORN




Summary of the Battle

The Little Big Horn battle was easily the worst defeat ever sustained by the U.S. Army in Plains Indian warfare with the 7th Cavalry suffering 268 killed or dying of wounds, and 60 wounded. The news shocked the nation and gave rise to an endless debate about the facts, strategy and tactics of the battle which continues to the present day.


Col. Custer

May 17th, 1876

On May 17, 1876, the 7th United States Cavalry Regiment under Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer left Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, as part of a column commanded by Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry. This column, with two others already in the field led by Brigadier General George Crook and Colonel John Gibbon, was to participate in the effort to force all Sioux and Northern Cheyenne in the unceded territory back to their reservations.

When the 7th Cavalry left on the expedition, it did so divided into two wings, the right under Major Marcus A. Reno and the left under Captain Frederick W. Benteen. Within the right wing were the battalions of Captain Myles W. Keogh (Companies B, C and I) and Captain George W. Yates (Companies E, F and L). The left wing was comprised of battalions under Captain Thomas B. Weir (Companies A, D and H) and Captain Thomas H. French (Companies G, K and M). The regiment consisted of approximately 750 officers and enlisted men, although the exact number is open to question, and was accompanied by a contingent of about forty Arikara Indian scouts. Also in the column were three companies of infantry and a Gatling gun platoon, all supported by wagons carrying supplies.

June 7th

On June 7, Terry's column reached the confluence of the Powder and Yellowstone Rivers from which point he left to confer with Gibbon on June 9, and then returned. The right wing of the 7th Cavalry, along with one Gatling gun, was then ordered on a scout intended to take the unit up the Powder River, then over to the Tongue River, and back to the Yellowstone. Reno exceeded, or disobeyed, those orders by proceeding further west to Rosebud Creek where he found an Indian trail. He followed the trail upstream for perhaps 45 miles before returning to the Yellowstone.


Maj. Reno

June 21st

On June 21, the remainder of the 7th Cavalry joined Reno below the mouth of the Rosebud and the whole regiment moved to the junction of that stream and the Yellowstone. On the same day, Terry, Gibbon, Custer and Major James Brisbin held a conference on board the steamer Far West. The decision reached was that Gibbon's infantry and Brisbin's 2nd Cavalry would proceed up the Yellowstone, cross and go south up the Big Horn. Custer and the 7th Cavalry were to move south along the Rosebud, then cross to the Little Big Horn, and return along that stream.

The obvious hope was that the Indians would be found in the area of the Little Big Horn and be trapped between the two columns. During the course of the meeting, Custer declined the offer of the Gatling gun battery on the grounds that it could hinder his progress. He also refused the four companies of the 2nd Cavalry under Brisbin, saying that the 7th Cavalry could handle anything it met. To assist Custer, six Crow scouts from Gibbon's command were assigned along with the famous civilian guide and scout Mitch Bouyer. George Herendeen was attached to Custer for the purpose of scouting the upper reaches of Tulloch's Fork and carrying the results of that scout to Terry. The conference resulted in the now famous "Orders" dated June 22, to Custer from Terry. The verbal and written battles waged over the meaning, force and effect of these orders began soon after the actual battle ended, and persist even today.

June 22nd

At noon on June 22, the 7th Cavalry proceeded up the Rosebud about 12 miles. While at the Yellowstone, Custer had abolished the wing/battalion assignments for reasons unknown, informing Reno that command assignments would be made on the march. That evening, Custer told his assembled officers that he expected they might face a warrior force of up to 1500, and if he got on their trail he would pursue, even if beyond the fifteen days for which they were rationed.

The regimental supplies were carried by a make-shift mule train of twelve mules per company with some additional animals to transport headquarters and miscellaneous equipment. Twelve mules each carried two 1000-round ammunition boxes, or 2000 rounds per company. Each soldier was armed with the single-shot, .45 caliber, Model 1873 Springfield carbine, and was ordered to carry 100 rounds of 45-55 carbine ammunition of which fifty rounds was to be on his person. The troopers also carried the Model 1873 Colt .45 caliber, single-action revolver with twenty four rounds of ammunition.

Despite artwork to the contrary, no sabres were carried after the expedition left the Powder River camp. It further appears from recent archeological surveys that some of the soldiers may have carried weapons other than those mentioned, and that some men and officers had "personal" weapons with them.


Capt. Benteen

June 24th

Saturday, June 24, found the regiment on the march by 5 a.m. Indian campsites were passed and examined and, after a march of some 28 miles, the command went into camp. That evening Custer called First Lieutenant Charles A. Varnum to him and stated that the Crow scouts believed the Sioux were in the Little Big Horn valley. Custer wanted someone to accompany the Crows scouts to a spot, later to become famous as the "Crow's Nest," from which the scouts said they could see the Sioux and Northern Cheyenne camp fires when started in the early morning. Custer wanted a messenger to be sent back with information as soon as possible. Varnum was to leave about 9 p.m. and Custer would follow with the regiment at 11 p.m. and thought he could be at the base of the divide between the Rosebud and Little Big Horn before morning. Varnum along with Charlie Reynolds, a white scout, some Crow and Arikara scouts left as ordered.

Custer turned the regiment westward toward the divide and marched about four hours until the weary unit halted. At this point, a message was received from Varnum stating that the scouts had seen camp fire smoke and a pony herd in the valley, and the regiment again moved out about 8 a.m. Later that morning Custer arrived at the Crow's Nest, looked through field glasses at the indicated site but, like Varnum earlier, was unable to see what the Crow scouts had seen. Although Benteen later claimed Custer did not believe the scouts' report, Custer's subsequent actions were those of a commander taking his command toward a scene of action.

Upon his return to the regiment, Custer was told that a detail of troopers, led by Sergeant William A. Curtis of F Company, had come upon an Indian trying to open a lost box or bundle of clothing. There were other reports from Herendeen and Bouyer of sightings of Indians who, it was assumed, had also discovered the regiment. Since it was the Indians' custom to scatter in the presence of troops, Custer decided to strike immediately, rather than lay concealed during June 25 and attack on the morning of the 26th.

June 25th



At about noon on June 25, at the Rosebud-Little Big Horn divide, Custer halted the regiment and proceeded to assign commands. Reno received Companies A, G and M, and Benteen, Companies D, H and K. It is probable that Captain Keogh was given Companies I, L and C, and Captain Yates, Companies E and F. Captain Thomas McDougall's Company B was assigned as packtrain guard. Furthermore, a noncommissioned officer and six privates were detailed from each company to help with company pack mules.

Benteen was ordered to scout toward a line of hills to the left front. After his departure, two messengers were sent directing him to go beyond the line of hills in view. This scout is sometimes characterized as Custer's way of appearing to comply with Terry's directive that he feel "... constantly to your left ..," but more likely represents Custer's reaction to his experience at the Washita, when he found that Indian villages camped separately along the same stream.

The balance of the regiment proceeded down Reno (or Sundance, or Ash) Creek toward the Little Big Horn, Reno's command on the left bank and Custer's two battalions on the right, with the pack train bringing up the rear. Around 2 p.m. Reno's battalion crossed over the creek to join Custer's command on the right bank. Shortly after, the combined columns arrived in the vicinity of the Lone Tepee, the location of which is still a matter of dispute.

Near this point, Fred Girard, civilian interpreter for the Arikara scouts, spotted a group of Indians fleeing toward the river, and heavy dust clouds were seen in the valley. Riding to the top of a small knoll, Girard called out to Custer, "Here are your Indians, running like devils."

Custer sent his adjutant, First Lieutenant William W. Cooke, to Reno with the order, "Custer says to move at as rapid a gait as you think prudent and to charge afterwards, and you will be supported by the whole outfit." This was the last and only order Reno ever received and, in fact, was the last communication from Custer's command.

In obedience to the order, Reno proceeded to the Little Big Horn River at a fast trot, crossed and halted on the far side of some timber to gather the companies which had lost formation in the crossing. Meanwhile, Girard still on the right bank had heard the Crow and Arikara call out that the Sioux, in large numbers, were coming up to meet Reno, an observation also made by the scout Herendeen. Thinking that Custer should know of this development, he turned back and quickly came upon Cooke who was riding toward the river. After Girard relayed his information, Cooke stated he would report to Custer and turned back immediately.

Reno advanced down the valley toward the Indian village which was about two miles from the river crossing. During this movement Reno sent two separate messages, carried by Privates Archibald McIlhargey and John Mitchell, to Custer, each with the same information that the Indians were in force in front of him.


Sitting Bull

Indians poured across Reno's front, many moving to the bluffs on his left. Reno halted and dismounted his command of 128 soldiers to fight in a skirmish line formation, with his right resting on the timber near the river, and extending to his left toward the bluffs. The line advanced about 100 yards toward the village, but no further. Reno sent the horses and G Company into the timber. Out on the valley floor the battle continued, and as the Indians moved to Reno's left, he withdrew the skirmish line to the edge of the timber. The length of the fight until the line withdrew is a matter of argument with opinions ranging from five minutes to a half-hour.

Once in the timber, the fight continued until Reno, not receiving the promised support of "the whole outfit," and concerned about the expenditure of non-replaceable ammunition, decided to withdraw to the bluffs on the east side of the river. Varnum, Lieutenant Charles C. DeRudio, and the scout Herendeen, all saw Custer and/or his command moving north along the bluffs to the east of the Little Big Horn, but no one informed Reno of Custer's movements!

Reno was able to mount most, but clearly not all, of his command in a clearing in the timber. A volley of shots rang out and the Arikara scout, Bloody Knife, at Reno's side, died from a bullet in the head, spattering blood and brains over Reno. Orders to dismount, then mount were given, and the command left the timber for the eastern heights. No organized resistance to the onslaught of the warriors took place either during the retreat or at the river crossing. This retreat, called a charge by Reno, resulted in the reported loss of three officers, at least twenty nine enlisted men, three civilians and two Arikara scouts. It terminated on the bluffs near the current Reno-Benteen battle site, and the result at the time must have appeared even worse, for in addition to those ultimately found dead, there were an officer, three civilians and fifteen soldiers missing, all but four of whom rejoined later that afternoon.

Shortly after reaching the bluffs, Reno was joined by Benteen's battalion which had returned to the trail some distance above the Lone Tepee. On his way to the river, Benteen was passed by Sergeant Daniel Kanipe of Company C who carried a message to the pack train. The message was for the train to come on across country and, in essence, not to worry about the loss of packs unless they contained ammunition.

Benteen was next met by Trumpeter John Martin of Benteen's own Company H with the now famous, and disputed, message, "Benteen, Come on. Big village, Be quick. Bring packs. W.W. Cooke. P. S. Bring Packs." The dispute over this latter message is whether or not its intent was to have Benteen bring forward only the twelve mules with all the reserve ammunition. Proponents of the "ammunition packs" theory assert that Custer intended to make a stand and would need the reserve ammunition. Opponents point out that the word "ammunition" is not used, that Custer had not yet even become engaged, and that to sequester all the ammunition implies an indifference to the fate of Reno and the pack train.

In any event, Benteen reached the river in time to see the last of Reno's "charge" to the bluffs. He joined the shattered unit and Lieutenant Luther Hare was swiftly dispatched to the pack train to bring up several mules with ammunition. At about the same time, firing down river was heard indicating that Custer was engaged. In response to this, Weir, on his own, started down river perhaps thirty- five minutes after arrival at Reno's position. Lieutenant Winfield S. Edgerly, believing Weir had permission to advance, ordered Company D to mount and follow.

This precipitated the disjointed movement by Reno's command. Upon arrival of McDougall and the pack train, Companies H, K and M followed D to a prominent point along the bluffs (today known as Weir Point) and the remainder of the command started in that direction but made little progress. The units on Weir Point abandoned that position and, again in a rather uncontrolled manner, moved back to the area occupied during the siege. The movement was prevented from becoming a disaster by Lieutenant Edward S. Godfrey, who on his own authority, dismounted K Company and covered the retreat.

Reno's command was quickly surrounded and came under heavy fire. Earlier that afternoon, when Custer gave his last order to Reno, he probably had no plan for an enveloping maneuver. However, as he approached the river he was met by Adjutant Cooke bringing Girard's information that the Indians were coming up to meet Reno. This was almost immediately reinforced by the arrival of the first of the soldiers sent by Reno with a message to the same effect. The arrival of the second soldier added emphasis to the fact that a large number of Indians were in the valley. The dust in the valley probably indicated to Custer that the noncombatants were fleeing north. A flanking maneuver to get to the women and children and, at the same time, placing the warriors between him and Reno must have seemed appropriate. In any event, Custer turned north.


Crazy Horse

Then What?

From this point on, there are few absolutes about Custer's action except its outcome. Theories abound. The last soldiers to see him were Kanipe, sent back when Custer first reached a bluff overlooking the river, and Trumpeter Martin, whose point of departure is disputed. Some writers place it in Cedar Coulee and others at the junction of Custer's northward approach and Medicine Tail Coulee, for Martin himself said they had reached a ravine which ran toward the river. There is controversy whether Custer moved along the bluffs next to the river or behind Sharpshooter's Ridge, a prominence north of the Reno-Benteen defense site. Likewise, there are differences of opinion about whether or not Custer personally went to Weir Point, the highest point nearest the river. This would have afforded Custer an unlimited view of the village had he gone there.

In opposition, there is the unquestioned fact that at least four Crow scouts were definitely on Weir Point and not one of them places Custer, or any other soldier, there at any time. Additionally, Martin testified that only the Crow scouts went to Weir Point and that Custer was never there. No matter the route, from there we know, with reasonable certainty, the location of the dead, though the theories of Custer's final actions are numerous.

Passing Sharpshooter's Ridge and proceeding down Cedar Coulee, Custer and his men arrived and halted at the junction of Cedar and South Medicine Tail Coulees. One part of Custer's command, probably Keogh's battalion, with three companies, moved north and occupied areason what is known as Nye-Cartwright Ridge. This ridge divides South Medicine Tail Coulee and North Medicine Tail Coulee, sometimes called Deep Coulee. The latter is the deep ravine at the base of the ridge which runs from Calhoun Hill toward the Little Big Horn where it joins the mouth of South Medicine Tail. Cartridge casing finds clearly indicate troops firing from that point, and any concept of Custer's final battle must include that action if it is to have any validity.

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FReeper Foxhole Armed Services Links

[CholeraJoe]

Been there, done that. Garryowen!

[colorado tanker]

Lt. Colonel Hal Moore: I wonder what was going through Custer's mind when he realized that he'd led his men into a slaughter?

Sergeant Major Basil Plumley: Sir, Custer was a pussy. You ain't.

I just loved the SMG in We Were Soldiers.

I hope everyone has a great weekend. We'll be decorating for Christmas; I guess that's still OK to say in Denver.

[SAMWolf]

Evening CholeraJoe.

[SAMWolf]

Sam Elliott was great as Sergeant Major Plumley!

[snippy_about_it]

I hope everyone has a great weekend. We'll be decorating for Christmas; I guess that's still OK to say in Denver.

Well, we know it's still okay to say at the Foxhole. Have fun.

[snippy_about_it]

Hiya CJ.

[snippy_about_it]

I hate running in circles.

[investigateworld]

He was also looking for a victory to cinch up his nomination for Democratic candidate for POTUS.

[Professional Engineer]

Did the inzpektor ever show up?

[Valin]

Units of Action
Branch Indeterminate Generic Combat Modules

Now there's two terms only a military bureaucrat could love.

[Valin]

Bitty Girl is cutting her first tooth. And she's mobile

And life as you knew it is over.

[Valin]

He(Custer)divided his command

Never a good idea. Lee got away with it a couple of times, but then look at who he was fighting, McClellan.

[snippy_about_it]

Ya. He showed, the building passed. Now we wait for the county fire marshall, then the city to give us our license to operate.

Meanwhile home office called and said it was okay to open before the fixtures arrive if we want to get in some Christmas sales. We're against it, especially Sam but we could make it fun and just let everyone know there is more 'decorating' to come. We're thinking real hard about it.

[PhilDragoo]

The Battle of the Little Big Horn
Ron Wild relates the story of Custer’s Last Stand.

LATE IN 1875 an order went out from President Ulysses S. Grant in Washington to the various hostile Indian tribes that they were to report to reservations and Indian agencies no later than 31 January 1876. The Cheyenne and Sioux tribes disregarded the order and as a result the Yellowstone Expedition set out on 17 May 1876 from Fort Abraham Lincoln in the Dakota Territory under the command of Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry. The purpose of the expeditionary force was to find Chief Sitting Bull’s encampment and to bring him to heel. Normally Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer would have led the entire expedition himself but he had incurred the displeasure of President Grant and was only allowed to accompany the expedition at the insistence of General Terry.

General Terry’s force planned to meet up with a force from Fort Ellis, Montana under Col. John Gibbon and a second force from Fort Fetterman, Wyoming commanded by General George Crook. The overall plan was to trap the Indians in a three-way pincer. General Crook became involved in a disastrous battle of his own and failed to appear at the pre-arranged meeting place. General Terry decided to ride with Col. Gibbon who was in charge of a heavy Gatling gun (an early machine-gun) division. He gave Lt. Col. Custer explicit instructions to lead the Seventh Cavalry up the nearby Rosebud River to arrive no sooner than 26 June to allow Gibbon’s troops, slowed by the Gatling Gun Division, time to take up their positions.

Custer paid little heed to General Terry’s instructions and soon after departing up the Rosebud, headed directly for the valley of the Little Big Horn making forced marches late into the night and starting again before dawn. With his Seventh Cavalry troopers trail-weary and his horses exhausted, Custer reached the valley early in the afternoon of 25 June and made plans to attack the Indians immediately. Custer’s Indian scouts warned him that Sitting Bull’s camp was too large for him to take on with his small troop but Custer thought that his Seventh Cavalry could whip any Indian war party. Custer divided his troops into three separate commands placing 125 men under Captain Benteen with instructions to move towards the foothills and fight any Indians that he found. A second battalion under Major Marcus Reno was sent to engage the Indians in the village across the Little Big Horn with Custer to follow up with his battalion and provide whatever support was needed.

Custer received confirmation that the Indian camp was indeed very large and stretched for three miles along the banks of the Little Big Horn. When Captain Reno’s battalion engaged the Indians across the river, Custer received intelligence that the Indians were escaping towards the other end of the valley and rode his battalion hard to head them off. Approaching the other end of the Indian village on the banks of the Little Big Horn, Custer’s 264 troopers ran headlong into Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull’s forces, estimated at 3,000 strong.

Sitting Bull himself did not fight but directed the Indian forces, many of whom were equipped with repeating Winchesters while the Seventh Cavalry troopers only had single shot carbines. The Indian forces charged head on and then flanked Custer’s battalion and slaughtered them to a man. The troopers became so desperate during the fierce half-hour engagement that they shot their own horses to act as shelters. They were however able to inflict severe casualties on the Indians. George Armstrong Custer’s body was found on the pinnacle of a hill where he had made his last stand, the flag of the Seventh Cavalry flying over him.

Part of the above account of the battle of the Little Big Horn is from an article appearing in the Leavenworth Weekly Times of 18 August 1881 and is a rare eyewitness account by Sioux Chief Crow King.

~~~

Custer behaved as an Army of One and consequently got himself and over two hundred others killed.

Webster's suggests hubris was first used in 1884 but the Oxford Unabridged shows Gladstone's use of "hubristic" in 1831. The definition in Webster's is fascinating for its hook: "exaggerated pride or self-confidence often resulting in retribution".

Custer ignored his orders (though the issue has been and will be debated past all caring).

He declined the 2d cavalry and the Gatling guns, the former was superfluous, the latter would be impediment.

He was informed of the 3,000 opposing his 264--so he was simply mad in his persistence.

General Douglas MacArthur may have dismissed intelligence reports of massing ChiCom troops, but he knew a hawk from a handsaw. He wanted to provoke them and nuke them--Truman wanted to "contain" them.

RECALL OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR (1951)

I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot -- and will not -- sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one....

This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And since the end of World War II we have been putting that lesson into practice -- we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency....

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task.

But so far it has been successful.

So far, we have prevented World War III.

So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest....

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war -- not to start one. The best way to do this is to make plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China? ...

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow....

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: the fighting must stop.

Two: concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: there must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces. This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective -- to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

Source: Department of State Bulletin, 16 April 1951.

MacArthur wanted to nuke them. He claimed Truman was too cozy with Acheson and Hiss. Now we know Hiss was indeed a Soviet agent.

As for Truman's "containment" of North Korea and Communist China--we've got them right where we want them--fifty years later Clinton allowed DPRK to make nukes and Nodongs, and his Bernie Schwartz and Mike Armstrong gave PRC our missile guidance (with Wen Ho Lee's legacy code and warhead design downloads thrown in for good measure).

Truman's love of the UN has also worked well--Kofi helped Jacque and Saddam with the arms trade still used against our troops.

~~~

[Valin]

Exciting Times!


Speaking of time, it's bedtime for Bonzo.

[SAMWolf]

Yep. We're "officially" in occupancy now. Bank is coming Monday to set up the Credit Card processing system and as soon as The Fire Dept signs off we get our business license. :-)

[SAMWolf]

Evening Phil Dragoo

Custer behaved as an Army of One and consequently got himself and over two hundred others killed.

Excellent! I hate that slogan.

Thanks for posting Truman's "reason" for recalling MacArthur. Containment doesn't work, defeat your enemies when you get the chance and end it early. It'll cost less in the long run rather than leting a situation fester for decades.

[snippy_about_it]

As for Truman's "containment" of North Korea and Communist China--we've got them right where we want them--fifty years later Clinton allowed DPRK to make nukes and Nodongs, and his Bernie Schwartz and Mike Armstrong gave PRC our missile guidance (with Wen Ho Lee's legacy code and warhead design downloads thrown in for good measure).

A legacy they should pay for.

[snippy_about_it]

Goodnight Bonzo.

[E.G.C.]

BTTT!!!!!!!