Who Is To Blame
For The USS Cole Bombing
An Editorial
The real tragedy of the attack on the USS Cole will inevitably lead to a rash of speculation, criticism, sound bites, second-guessing and general Monday morning quarter backing. How could the Navy allow this to happen? Why didn’t the captain of the USS Cole take better security precautions? These will be the questions stated in various forms by a number of people from the media to Congress. I will not join the game of piling on the commander in the field. I have not second-guessed the commander at the front and I never will—especially since I served in the Army not the Navy and particularly when I sit here safe at home in Florida. I will however contribute a few general thoughts and observations based on my time in uniform; thoughts that may help those who have never been there to better understand what it may be like at the tip of the spear. Those thoughts and comments, I believe, will describe some general conditions/circumstances that can lead or contribute to such unfortunate incidents like the Cole disaster.
USS COLE (DDG 67)
Our military forces are given numerous missions as an extension of America’s political policies throughout the world--regardless of the genesis of that policy--whether to defend America’s vital interests or divert attention from a scandal-ridden administration. I can’t say what the Cole’s mission was but I can tell you from my chair here in Florida, they conducted that mission to the utmost of their ability. How do I know that? I know soldiers—and I include members of all services in the term "soldier".
When our forces are in any area of the world, the level of security is based on the potential threat. Some areas and times are far more threatening than others so you cannot logically treat all areas and times the same and you can’t remain on high alert 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We have a system in place to alert those around the world of the level of threat at that particular time in their area. We call it Threat Condition or THREATCON for short and the level is ultimately determined by the chain of command—starting at the Pentagon. The levels are:
THREATCON NORMAL- No threat of terrorist activity is present.
THREATCON ALPHA - There is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations, building locations, and/or personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.
THREATCON BRAVO - There is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.
THREATCON CHARLIE - An incident has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.
THREATCON DELTA - A terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received that action against a specific location is likely.
Our troops respond and set their security levels based on messages from their chain of command with regard to the potential threat and the THREATCON level in place at that time based on the intelligence we have or the specific situation. Now obviously any commander can, and should if necessary, increase his security levels to meet his own situation, but he should never reduce his level below that ordered by his chain of command.
At the time of the attack, the USS Cole was at THREATCON BRAVO per this Pentagon Briefing:
DoD News Briefing
Thursday, October 12, 2000 - 3 p.m. EDT
Presenter: Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen (Special briefing on the incident involving USS Cole. Also participating in this briefing was Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark)
Q: What kind of security procedures were followed? Were there armed security personnel on the deck? And did they have any of the fleet anti-terrorism support teams that normally go with ships?
Clark: I described earlier the requirement to have an approved force protection plan. Then there are a series of threat conditions in every theater in the world. Their threat condition posture was threat condition Bravo. I have talked to the commander a number of times today and reviewed the bidding on this, and they were in the posture that they were required to be in for this threat condition and entering this port, which would include armed personnel topside.
Seventeen Sailors aboard USS Cole (DDG 67) were killed as a result of an explosion Oct. 12 which left a 40 foot by 40 foot hole in the port side of the Norfolk, Va.,-based destroyer. U.S. Navy photo.
What is not mentioned, at least that I could find, is the ROE for the Cole—Rules of Engagement. Not only must commanders respond to the THREATCON level, they have ROE that dictate the conditions under which they can engage and place fire on anyone. I have seen ROE that are at times so complex and detailed as to be utterly useless to the man on the ground with the rifle. These ROE are often times politically driven and, in an attempt to cover every conceivable situation, become so bogged down in double talk and detail, the poor soldier is reluctant to use his weapon at all for fear of violating some rule or shooting some innocent bystander. He must make the decision whether the man in front of him is a real threat or an innocent civilian in a split second. If he guesses wrong- he and America pay a very heavy price. In reality, he is working under conditions of threat from both sides. He could be damned either way he goes. This causes real internal turmoil for the man with the rifle. Do I know that this was the case on the Cole? No and again, I will not second-guess the captain of the Cole. I just present this as a factor in any situation of this nature.
The successful application of practical damage control is evident in the wrapping and plugging of a propeller shaft hull penetration on the damaged destroyer USS Cole (DDG 67) following the Oct. 12, 2000 terrorist bombing attack on the ship in the port of Aden, Yemen. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson
Compounding the problem for the man at the tip of that spear besides THREATCON Levels and sometimes confusing ROE is the support arrangements our government makes with host governments around the world. Most times, those that are providing some of our maintenance support, like refueling services, are indigenous personnel, not Americans. In Korea for example, we have Koreans doing any number of maintenance functions and they are all over the post at any given time. If pressed, could I have told you who was friendly and who might be a North Korean terrorist? The answer is plainly No.
The situation was apparently similar at the refueling point for the USS Cole. Again per Admiral Clark in that same briefing:
Q: Admiral, you talk about the force protection plan, and you said that force protection plans are in place. But wouldn't it make sense to send Navy personnel out to make sure that these boats coming toward you are actually part of the tender operations and not some sort of a threat? Is that a lapse, that you let these people come up so close to the boat without knowing, really, exactly who they are?
Clark: Well, in my view -- and you can accuse me of 31 years of experience in this and being involved in this activity and then just sort of taking it for granted. But the reality is, is that when you enter a port like this, you make contact with the port officials, you always do before you enter; you wouldn't think of going in without having them verbally clear you in. They tell you who -- that the individuals are there to support you. You make assumptions about the credibility of that support. And I think that's appropriate, and that's the way we deal with people all around the world. We don't automatically suspect people that are sent forward to help us in an official way. This kind of support takes the tone of -- the arrangements made -- we send our request to the embassy and they deal with the local people there. And I will tell you that the first report I had from this via Admiral Moore was from an embassy support person.
Q: If you really don't know who's coming towards you, wouldn't it be wise to send some Navy personnel out before it gets close to the ship to make sure that these are in fact --
Clark: Well, I think that's the same question, and the answer I just gave you would be the same.
A Navy diver, assigned to Mobile Diving and Salvage Unit Two (MDSU 2), prepares to work below decks aboard USS Cole (DDG 67) during repair and recovery efforts following the Oct. 12 terrorist bombing attack on the destroyer in the port of Aden, Yemen. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Engineman Lyle G. Becker
The question then becomes, did the guards on the Cole know who was coming at them? They were at THREATCON BRAVO so I will assume they had guards. What were the ROE imposed by our government? That I don’t know at this point. How could they distinguish between those terrorists and the indigenous support personnel our government arranged to do the refueling? You tell me. I could never be sure when I was in Korea or Germany.
Another question. What responsibility should the Clinton administration assume because the cut backs that reduced the number of oil tankers in our Navy may have forced the Cole to refuel in port rather than at sea? How much responsibility should they accept because of the lack of personnel that may have prevented the ship’s captain from having sufficient resources necessary to accomplish all the tasks he had to accomplish during this operation? All this is related and don’t think it isn’t.
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps security personnel patrol past the damaged USS Cole (DDG 67) following the Oct. 12, 2000 terrorist bombing attack on the ship in Aden, Yemen. Security personnel established checkpoints and searched incoming vehicles for contraband and explosives while the ship prepares for its journey back to the United States. U.S. Navy photo by Senior Chief Engineman Lyle G. Becker.
As for the WABC report where we were shown two men in a rented little boat getting right up to some of our ships, keep in mind that this piece of investigative reporting began before the events with the Cole. Our ships were at home and although I don’t know for certain, probably under THREATCON NORMAL or THREATCON ALPHA.
Also keep in mind that if you have ever been to Norfolk and watched the number of ships and civilian boats running all around there, such a little boat in the harbor is not out of the ordinary.
Should we be on high alert at home port? Are you on high alert against burglars in your own living room all the time? Should we permit civilians to approach our ships the way those WABC reporters did? I personally would say no and I would be willing to take the criticism when WABC starts protesting like they always do about being held away and prevented from reporting to the American people—and you know that would be their reaction. I’ve seen that response from the media too many times. In fact, it was one of my daily chores during the Gulf War to avoid as many reporters as possible.
According to some very good Navy friends of mine, time in port is not "kick back" time. There is a tremendous amount of work to be done and it takes a full crew to do it. Do we have the personnel necessary to do all the tasks under current manning levels? My guess is no given all the cut backs we’ve had to endure these past 8 years. Do all these maintenance jobs have to get done anyway? Most definitely, the answer is yes. Can we get them all accomplished and remain on high alert while in homeport? The answer I would give is no.
USS Cole (DDG 67), showing the results of an attack that killed 17 of her crew and injured 39 others, is towed away from the port city of Aden, Yemen, into open sea by the Military Sealift Command fleet ocean tug USNS Catawba (T-ATF 168) today. Cole will be lifted aboard the Norwegian heavy transport ship M/V Blue Marlin, and transported back to the United States, a trip expected to last approximately five weeks. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Don L. Maes
Humans can only do so much with what they have. When resources are continually cut and expectations and missions continually expanded, nobody can do it all—something has to give. The role of a leader is to recognize when that starts to occur and make adjustments to prevent it. He must make sure his troops are well equipped, his units well manned, well trained, well motivated and ready for the task ahead. The buck stops in the Oval Office and with the Commander in Chief for this preparedness. During the last 8 years, that buck has lost virtually all its value.
What will be the result of all this national publicity on our men and women in the Navy because of this WABC report on top of the Cole incident? They will once again be asked to do even more with the less handed them by an uncaring, incompetent administration that has never and will never take any of the responsibility for tragedy but is always there to take the lion’s share of the glory for our military’s sacrifices and victories.
My take on this: Military service is a very risky business. We all knew that going in and we all accept that while we’re there. Does our government compound that risk when it cuts resources to include equipment, personnel, training time and funding while at the same time expanding the number of deployments and missions, at times providing confusing ROE and making support arrangements with host countries to service our equipment? The answer is obviously and most definitely yes.
Can the troops sense when their commander in chief doesn’t care about their plight? Yes. Does it adversely impact their morale when our troops know we are at a reduced state of readiness because of the administration’s policies and priorities? Yes. Does morale have an impact on the job we all do? Yes. Will things like this happen as a result of a reduced state of readiness? Absolutely, and we’ve been witness to it. What then is the cure? A new Commander in Chief is the most important answer in my view. An administration that puts America first, brings our troops home, only deploying them in defense of our vital national interests and adequately resources the force to do the job they are called upon to do in defense of that vital interest.
One last word--In the job of defending America, there is no room whatsoever for a Commander in Chief like Bill Clinton or his echo, Al Gore.
Just the view from my saddle…
The Colonel
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