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Posted on 09/14/2004 11:05:41 PM PDT by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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Defense of Bastogne The defense of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II is one of the supreme achievements of American arms. Bastogne is deservedly identified with the finest characteristics of the American soldier, and the name Bastogne symbolizes a heroic battle. Bastogne has long held the attention of students of war, yet the battle offers new insights for soldiers with modern concerns.  101st Division Patch Colonel Ralph M. Mitchell's study, The 101st Airborne Division's Defense of Bastogne, reveals how a light infantry division, complemented by key attachments, stopped an armor-heavy German corps. Using original documents and reports, Colonel Mitchell traces the fight at Bastogne with emphasis on the organization, movement and, employment of the 101st Airborne Division. Although a variety of factors influenced the outcome at Bastogne, the flexibility of the 101st to reconfigure for sustained operations and to defeat strong opposition forces even when surrounded shows how properly augmented light infantry can fight and win. LOUIS D. F. FRASCHÉ Colonel, Infantry Director, Combat Studies Institute By October 1944, the rapid Allied advance into Germany that followed the breakout from the Normandy beaches had slowed to a crawl. Stiffening German resistance and Allied logistical and communications problems exerted a significant influence on the Allied advance. In the American sector, Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group occupied an extended front, with the First and Third Armies along the Siegfried Line and the Ninth Army facing the Roer River. There would be little change in these positions in October and November. The First Army had an extensive line of defense near Aachen, Germany. Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton's VIII Corps occupied that army's southern sector. Its 88-mile front extended from Losheim, Germany, north through eastern Belgium and Luxembourg to where the Our River crosses the Franco-German border. The corps' mission was to defend in place in a relatively quiet sector. There, new divisions could receive a safe indoctrination, and battle-weary ones could rest and reconstitute for future operations. Headquarters, VIII Corps, was located in the small Belgian town of Bastogne. The area around Bastogne was characterized by rugged hills, high plateaus, deep-cut valleys, and restricted road nets. Bastogne itself was the hub for seven roads and a railroad. Both sides understood the significance of that fact .  Upon receiving word of the German's Ardennes offensive, men of the 101st Airborne were given 24 hours notice to move to the Bastogne area in Belgium. This print commemorates the efforts of the Artillery of the 101st in stopping the German offensive cold. Alarmed by the continuing grave situation in the east, Adolph Hitler saw an opportunity for a decisive offensive in the west as the Allied offensive stalled there. Without complete support from his closest advisers, he directed the launching of a winter offensive against the western Allies through the Aisne-Ardennes sector of the front. The purpose was to recapture the important port of Antwerp while encircling and destroying the 21st Army Group. In so doing, Hitler would turn the fate of the war in Germany's favor. Middleton's VIII Corps, however, was directly astride the main avenue of advance of the Fifth Panzer Army. Few German officers were privy to the plans for this offensive, called Watch on Rhine. Most Germans thought preparations were for defensive measures until a few days before the attack began. Operating with little insight as to the ultimate objectives of their own units, many commanders had insufficient opportunity for reconnaissance and failed to consider the numerous contingencies that might soon arise. They remained unaware of the tactical implications of their situations, while Hitler's intuition was allowed to prevail. The Germans, however, had identified Bastogne as a possible point of major difficulty and had considered the control of the vital crossroads through that town to be absolutely necessary to maintain their rear area lines of communication. Hitler had expressly ordered Bastogne's capture, and that mission had been passed through Army Group (Heeresgruppe) and Fifth Army to XLVII Panzer Corps, which would be attacking through the Bastogne sector. Specifically, the corps was to cross the Our River on a wide front, bypass the Clerf sector, take Bastogne, and move to and cross the Meuse River south of Namur. The corps' commander, General Baron Heinrich von Luettwitz, had specifically asked about Bastogne at a conference in Kyllburg prior to the offensive. In the presence of General von Manteuffel, the Fifth Army commander, von Luettwitz was told that Bastogne would definitely have to be taken. Accordingly, in instructions to his subordinates, he stated: "Bastogne must be captured, if necessary from the rear. Otherwise it will be an abscess in the route of advance and tie up too many forces. Bastogne is to be mopped up first, then the bulk of the corps continues its advance."  In light of such specific guidance prior to the operation, it is curious that the Fifth Panzer Army staff did not interpret those instructions the same way. Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carl Wagener, stated, "Bastogne would not necessarily have to be taken but merely encircled. This would avoid any loss of time east of the Maas [Meuse]." The Germans expected that the advance to the Meuse would not be delayed by any attack on Bastogne because both would be accomplished simultaneously. Luettwitz also differed with Fifth Panzer Army about the amount of time it would take his men to reach the Meuse. The Fifth Panzer's staff expected the attack to take four days; the commander of XLVII Panzer Corps thought it would take six days and had doubts about taking Bastogne by the end of the second day as Fifth Army had projected. Luettwitz had good reason to be pessimistic. In the midst of general confusion about the forthcoming operation, pessimism seemed the order of the day, and vital planning went awry. Luettwitz himself doubted whether the offensive would succeed. The Germans had to achieve surprise, and the Allied air forces somehow had to be neutralized. Hitler would have to deliver both a sufficient quantity of fuel and the 3,000 German aircraft he had promised on 11 December 1944. Perhaps the attacking German columns could reach the Meuse, but without divisions to cover their extended flanks and without adequate bridging equipment, there was little hope that they could push farther. With the attack scheduled for 16 December 1944, there was good reason for German concern. The number of their soldiers available had steadily decreased, most units had not been rested, and all units encountered significant shortages of organic weapons, tanks, trucks, spare parts, ammunition, and fuel. Moreover, there were no plans to capture enemy supplies, and the success of the operation did not hinge on that possibility. German general staffs at all echelons also believed that the enemy had no strategic reserves available on the Continent and that there would be little Allied resistance in the Bastogne area. Both assumptions proved fatally incorrect.  The XLVII Panzer Corps consisted of the 2d Panzer Division, Panzer Lehr Division, and the 26th Volksgrenadier Division, all reinforced by one volks mortar brigade, one volks artillery corps, and the 600th Army Engineer Battalion for bridging purposes. None was at full strength. The 2d Panzer Division had been in the rear area for four weeks to rest and refit. It had only 80 percent of its authorized personnel and equipment, but its commanders were seasoned veterans. One panzergrenadier battalion was on bicycles to save fuel and vehicles. It would be totally unfit for combat in the hilly roads of the rugged Ardennes and ultimately would have to be used only for replacement troops. The Panzer Lehr Division had just returned from the Saar area. It had 60 percent of its troops, 40 percent of its tanks and tank destroyers, 60 percent of its guns, and 40 percent of its other types of weapons. One tank battalion had no tanks and, thus, was unavailable for the attack. In its place, the division received the 539th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion equipped with 30 percent of its authorized Panther tank destroyers. Due to previous battle losses, the 26th Volksgrenadier Division was without one regiment. But the remainder of the division was at full strength and had several seasoned senior commanders. Many subordinate commanders, however, were without previous combat experience, and the division had not been trained in offensive operations. Organizations later assigned to the XLVII Panzer Corps in operations around Bastogne would arrive in poor condition, with strengths ranging from 50 to 70 percent. These included the 9th and 116th Panzer Divisions, the 3d and 15th Panzergrenadier Divisions, and the Führer Begleit (Escort) Brigade.  Following a heavy artillery bombardment at 0500 on 16 December 1944, the Germans launched their offensive, gaining surprise and immediate local successes in all sectors. In the American VIII Corps sector alone, twenty-five German divisions were attacking. They struck and advanced through the veteran, but weary, 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions as well as the green 106th Infantry Division and the equally inexperienced 14th Cavalry Group. Only in the 4th Division sector was action light. The only U.S. corps reserve consisted of an armored combat command and four battalions of combat engineers. Amid much confusion and disorganization in the American units, the Germans advanced steadily, but not as rapidly as they had hoped. Poor roads became overcrowded, and small pockets of determined resistance waged by American infantry and armored units slowed, but did not stop, the German advance. The Allied high command realized that Bastogne was threatened and reserves were needed immediately. Accordingly, on 17 December 1944, the 101st Airborne Division, then in Camp Mourmelon, France, resting and refitting after operations in Holland, was alerted to move to the vicinity of Bastogne. Bastogne, if held, could interrupt lines of communication as the Germans continued their attack westward. But, meanwhile, VIII Corps' defenses were crumbling, and the Germans, who averaged four to eight miles advance on the first day, were within eleven miles of Bastogne. Time had become a critical factor. The race was on! The 101st Airborne Division, the unit chosen to stem the advance, was a well-trained, veteran outfit. Prior to and during its deployment in Europe, the unit had placed special training emphasis on decentralizing and massing artillery, the repair and operation of enemy equipment, air-ground liaison, signal security, night operations, and defense against mechanized, aerial, and infantry infiltration. Its strength at the time of the alert was 805 officers and 11,035 enlisted men. Included in its organization were four infantry regiments and all supporting arms, though there were shortages of personnel and equipment. Its commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, was in the United States. His deputy, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, was in England with five senior and sixteen junior officers. Command of the division for operations around Bastogne, therefore, fell to Brig. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, the division's artillery commmander. In record time, he got the division on the road moving toward the town of Werbomont, twenty-five miles north of Bastogne, where he was originally ordered to report. In an oversight that could have led to catastrophe, however, no one had informed the division that it was now attached to VIII Corps. The advance party that reached Werbomont on the night of 18 December only then discovered they were meant to report to Bastogne.  Brigadier General Anthony Mc Auliffe General McAuliffe's fortuitous stop in Bastogne to confer with Middleton in late afternoon that day saved the rest of the division the same fate. Learning of his attachment to VIII Corps and receiving orders from Middleton to defend Bastogne, McAuliffe made immediate preparations to reroute and receive the division. This was accomplished superbly by a few staff officers without the help of any advance party. As McAuliffe's columns moved through heavy traffic toward Bastogne, forty tanks from Combat Command B (CCB), the 10th Armored Division, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion (with 76-mm self-propelled guns), and two battalions of 155-mm artillery were ordered to Bastogne to be attached to the 101st. These organizations and a makeshift replacement pool of stragglers-Team Snafu-from U.S. elements withdrawing near Bastogne, would bolster the defense of the 101st Airborne Division throughout the critical period in the battle for Bastogne. Even as the 101st and its attachments were moving into Bastogne during the night of 18 December, the German advance had moved rapidly down the Wiltz-Bastogne road to a point just three kilometers from the town. There they collided with the first elements of the 101st. With VIII Corps evacuating the area, the defense of Bastogne became the division's task. The paratroopers had barely won the race for the town; now the problem was to hold it. In the early stages of the German advance, supply difficulties had not been a particularly critical issue. While, some German division commanders had hoped to capture American supplies, none relied on that possibility for a primary source of resupply. Fuel, however, was immediately in short supply because only half the promised initial issue was delivered. Furthermore, unusually heavy consumption rates, brought about by rough terrain and poor weather near Bastogne, further drained the meager fuel supplies. Throughout the operation, the fuel situation would only worsen for the Germans. But until 18 December, the XLVII Corps heading for Bastogne was still in good fighting shape: there was good cooperation throughout the corps; reports were timely; communications were good; troop morale was reasonably high; the attack had begun on time on the 16th; and the U.S. 28th Infantry Division's first line of defense had been broken.  Refugees evacuating the Belgian town of Bastogne. National Archives Photo Even so, there had been some serious problems that threw the XLVII Corps off its timetable. Unanticipated high water across the Our River caused delays while engineers extended and bolstered bridges for tanks to cross. Elimination of abatis (constructed by both Americans and Germans while on the defensive) and the filling in of craters caused additional delays. Because of poor roads and few bridges, two assault divisions were involved in a bottleneck at one vital bridge. These hindrances, combined with a stiffening American resistance that was in greater depth than the Germans expected, prevented the Panzer Lehr Division from arriving in Bastogne at the appointed time-1800, 18 December 1944. Had the Germans arrived on schedule, the 101st would have been five kilometers west of the town. After the Germans intercepted an alert message by the 101st on 17 December and discovered the paratroopers' projected 18 December arrival time in Bastogne, greater pressure was placed on the XLVII Corps for a more rapid advance. However, there was no advice on how the corps should overcome the obstacles it faced nor was there any offer of assistance. As the 101st and its attachments, practically on the run, formed a perimeter in the villages around Bastogne on the night of 18 December, the tide of events had begun to turn. German troops, pressed by their commanders for a faster rate of advance, were near exhaustion. Previous losses of men and equipment and the prospects for more of the same sapped their will to fight. The American units they now faced were fresh, motivated, and in control of Bastogne. But Bastogne would be hotly contested in the week ahead. By any comparison, the Americans, with a light infantry (paratroop) division, some additional artillery, forty tanks, and a tank destroyer battalion, should not have been a match for the superior German forces, which consisted of two panzer divisions and a volksgrenadier division; yet they were. Their ability to resist the Germans at Bastogne was enhanced by their timely occupation of the town. Low German morale also strengthened U.S. resolve. The Germans of Army Group West and the Fifth Panzer Army had no choice but to sustain the momentum of the offensive at all costs in accordance with Hitler's demands. Ultimately, German commanders who were too far removed from the action would make fateful decisions that would allow the lightly equipped defenders of Bastogne to survive.
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The Lone Ranger was ambushed and captured by an enemy Indian war party. The Indian Chief proclaims, 'So, you are the great Lone Ranger. In honor of the Harvest Festival, you will be executed in three days. But, before I kill you I will grant you three requests. What is your first request?'
The Lone Ranger responds, 'I'd like to speak to my horse.'
Chief nods and Silver is brought before the Lone Ranger, who whispers in Silver's ear, and the horse gallops away. Later that evening, Silver returns with a beautiful blonde woman on his back. The woman enters the Lone Ranger's tent and spends the night.
The next morning the Indian Chief admits he's impressed. 'You have a very fine and loyal horse, but I will still kill you in two days. What is your second request?'
The Lone Ranger again asks to speak to his horse. Silver is brought to him and he again whispers in the horse's ear. As before, Silver takes off across the plains and disappears over the horizon.
Later that evening, to the Chief's surprise, Silver again returns, this time with a voluptuous brunette, even more attractive than the blonde. She enters the Lone Ranger's tent and spends the night.
The following morning the Indian Chief is again impressed. 'You are indeed a man of many talents, but I will still kill you tomorrow. What is your last request?'
The Lone Ranger responds, 'I'd like to speak to my horse, Alone!'
The Chief is curious, but he agrees and Silver is brought to the Lone Ranger's tent. Once they're alone, the Lone Ranger grabs Silver by both ears looks him square in the eyes and says, 'Listen carefully, for the last time, I said ........BRING POSSE!'
Letter to the editor Mpls (red)Star Tribune
It stands behind the story
Breaking news: CBS has just discovered the original copy of the Ten Commandments. It's on DVD.
James L. Smith, Forest Lake.
LOL!
I hurt myself reading it the other day
The bed is calling and I must answer.
George W. Bush will be reelected by a margin of at least ten per cent
1925 Blues musician B. B. ("Blues Boy") (Riley B.) King. In the mid-1950s, while King was performing in Twist, Arkansas, some audience members got into a fight over a woman named Lucille. They knocked over a kerosene stove and set the place on fire. Everyboy ran outside...but when King realized he left his guitar inside, he rushed back to retrieve it. From then on, King has named all his guitars "Lucille."
Saw B.B. King in Boston in 1970 and Cleveland in 1974; with Lucille. I question the timing.
B.B. King is a Republican.
But what will he sing on November 3?
Righteous. You say the truth.
BTTT!!!!!!
as an old/retired MP, anything that gives us CLOSE air support is GRAND!
free the southland,sw
confused the german officer no end.
free dixie,sw
free dixie,sw
free dixie,sw
free dixie,sw
free dixie,sw
!!!!!!!!!!!
Okay, I'm here. Where's this "Kerry"?
LOL! Nice Patton / Kerry theme. Thanks for the link to the Bastogne Historical Center. I was able to visit the "Nuts Museum" in 1971, I wasn't aware of the Historical Center. The Mardasson Memorial is an impressive memorial
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