|
Posted on 08/10/2004 10:55:10 PM PDT by SAMWolf
|
|
 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
|
| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
|
|
Strategic Background On 4 March 1864 Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge moved from Tennessee to take command of the Confederate Department of Western Virginia. This huge command consisted of nearly 18,000 square miles of rugged terrain. It included all of Virginia west of the Blue Ridge and south of Staunton; the southern part of modern West Virginia from Greenbriar County to Kentucky; and as much of the last state as was under Confederate control. The dynamic commander's mission was to defend along a 400-mile front to assure retention of the region's assets and resources for the Confederacy.  Breckinridge's district was of vital economic and strategic importance to the Confederate war effort. Wythe County at its center contained some of the largest lead mines in the South. Almost all the Confederacy's salt was produced in nearby Saltville. The upper Shenandoah Valley was a prime source of produce and livestock. These were essential to the sustenance of Robert E. Lee's army east of the Blue Ridge, poised to defend Richmond against an expected Federal onslaught. The region further contained important railroads running through Staunton or Lynchburg. The latter line, the Virginia and Tennessee, linked the two sections of the embattled Confederacy and were of great strategic significance. The presence of Federal raiders and a partially disaffected population compounded the difficulties in assuring the security of the district. The point to which Confederate arms had declined by the spring of 1864 may be seen in Breckinridge's being given fewer than 5,000 troops to protect this important area. Colonel John McCausland's Brigade, 1,268 strong, was at New River Narrows while Brig. Gen. John Echols with 1,769 men was based at Monroe Draught. Breckinridge further inherited two poorly organized cavalry brigades with a combined strength of about 1,800. Two artillery batteries and a staff of couriers and signalers rounded out his forces. Other troops assigned to his command were on temporary duty elsewhere. Both Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. Wharton's infantry brigade and Brig. Gen. W. E. "Grumble" Jones' cavalry brigade were absent in Tennessee. One other unit, the 45th Virginia Infantry, was at Saltville, but at first was not under Breckinridge's jurisdiction.  General John Breckinridge - CSA Undaunted, the vigorous commander immediately embarked upon a 400-mile tour of his district to assess the situation for himself. This was the first time such a tour had been carried out by any senior official and in itself was a tonic for his troops and sympathetic civilians. He recognized manpower as his first concern. Within two weeks he increased the number of effectives through better organization, reduction of details and furloughs, and enforcement of desertion and absent-without-leave policies. By the end of March, he was able to organize an additional cavalry brigade, which he placed under the command of Brig. Gen. Albert Jenkins. His tour allowed him to gain a first-hand impression of the geographic vulnerabilities of his district. He thus revised old defense plans and prepared contingencies to cover all the possible avenues of approach to the district's vitals. Breckinridge's description of the scope of the problems facing him persuaded General Lee to order the return of Wharton's and Jones' brigades to the district and the transfer of the 45th Virginia to Breckinridge's control. He had these units in hand by mid-April, generally deployed to protect the assets of Wythe County. The former politician worked to ease the tensions further between the government and the population. Richmond had become very high-handed in its procurement practices. The district commanders often had been directed to impress produce and goods with little compensation. Also, huge quantities had been sent east with little thought for the needs of Breckinridge's district. As a result, he often found hungry units amidst plenty, with many disenchanted farmers. He ended these practices by ordering fair requisitions and by telling Richmond that his district had priority before anything would be shipped out of it. This new policy marked another improvement in morale for the troops, while it stabilized relations with the civilian populace.  Breckinridge restored leadership and direction to his command just in time. He had barely returned to his headquarters in Dublin when he began to hear rumors of Federal activity. On 27 April-he learned that a Federal column under Brig. Gen. William Averell was gathering at Logan, West Virginia, with the apparent intent of moving on Wytheville. Another Federal force was massing under Brig. Gen. George Crook at Gauley Bridge, West Virginia, which threatened to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad near Dublin. A third Federal column was concentrating farther north at Martinsburg, West Virginia, under Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel, obviously preparing to move up the Valley. Breckinridge knew he had just a few days to assess the situation and to make the correct strategic decision. He had to determine the Federal intentions, identify the greatest threat, and deploy against it to achieve mass at the decisive point. Events were to prove that he made a masterful analysis. Before discussing Breckinridge's decision, a view of the Federal moves in their greater context is necessary. All the blue forces just mentioned were under the command of Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel who had assumed command of the U.S. Department of West Virginia on 10 March. His department's mission was part of a Federal strategy developed by newly appointed General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant. General Grant recognized that superior Federal resources had not been used effectively hitherto and likened the Federal army to a balky team with each mule going in a different direction. He saw his job as getting that mule team to pull together.  Jacob and Sarah Bushong established their home here in 1818. The current home was built in 1825. Three generations of their family found shelter in the basement as the battle raged around them. After the battle, the house would serve as a field hospital for a week, leaving permanent blood stains in the Parlor. The orchard just behind the house is where the fiercest fighting occurred. One of Grant's aides described the situation as it was in March 1864: "Grant inherited mass confusion in the Federal command when we came to Washington. There were a score of discordant armies, half a score of contrary campaigns, confusion and uncertainty in the field, doubt and dejection and sometimes despondency at home. Battles whose object none could perceive, a war whose issues none could foretell. It was chaos itself." An expression of this chaos was that at the time of Grant's assumption the Federals had 19 independent districts, 21 independent corps, and 1 independent army, along with 13 coastal enclaves working separately with the Navy. Grant said, "My primary mission is to achieve system and discipline and consolidate and coordinate these assets and to bring pressure to bear on the Confederacy so no longer could it take advantage of interior lines." Grant thus brought greater cohesiveness to the Northern war effort. He was the first Northern leader to be able to bring the Federal preponderance in strength to bear in a unified effort. He added new dimensions to the struggle by seeing the war as more than a simple military undertaking. He reasoned that in such a thing as an insurrection, the entire population in rebellion had to be persuaded of the folly of continuing the fight. To him the Southern ability and will to fight were as valid objectives as were the Confederate armies. He added economic, political, and psychological aspects to the war that hitherto had been missing. All of them revolved around his intentions to engineer a massive continental-scale assault to overwhelm the Confederacy. As he told Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, "All our armies are to move together toward one common center; and that is the destruction of the other's will to fight."  Map of the Bushong farm General Grant assigned General Meade's 100,000-man Army of the Potomac to attack General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in eastern Virginia, destroy it, and capture Richmond. Meade's force would serve also as the strategic hinge for a great pivot through Georgia by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman's army group. Each of these units had military, economic, and psychological objectives. Their strategic flanks were to be protected by other forces: Major General Nathaniel Banks was to sally from New Orleans against Mobile Bay. In the east, Maj. Gen. Benjamin R. Butler's Army of the James was to move from Fort Monroe to Bermuda Hundred against Richmond. Meade's western flank was to be secured by Franz Sigel's activities in the Valley. Sigel was to coordinate Crook's and Averell's moves against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad and Wytheville and to prevent Confederate reinforcements from reaching Lee. Further, Sigel planned to lead a force up the Valley to resupply the raiders and to draw off Confederates from the threatened area. The Valley was as important to the Federals as it was to the Confederates. A corresponding communications system graced its northern parts. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal were critically important strategic routes for the Federals. Huge efforts were expended throughout the war to provide security for them. The road net in the Valley was exceptionally good; it was based on the Valley Pike, macadamized since 1840, linked with an infrastructure of good secondary roads. Not only was the place a prosperous economic unit, but also its development accommodated high-speed movement. The Blue Ridge shielded the Valley from eastern Virginia; however, ample gaps allowed easy egress and entry. Its northeastern orientation made it a natural avenue of approach into Pennsylvania or the Washington-Baltimore area. One has only to recognize that Harpers Ferry is on a parallel with Baltimore to see the significance of this topography. Conversely, Federals in the Valley threatened Lee's strategic flank through New Market Gap as well as the strategic targets of the railroads and access to the Valley's bounty.  General Franz Sigel - USA Sigel and Grant originally intended the main effort in the Valley to be Crook's and Averell's raids. His force at Martinsburg was to serve as a distraction, with the purpose of luring the Southern defenders away from the raiders. The plan called for a movement south only about as far as Cedar Creek, north of Strasburg. This would seem to threaten Staunton, possibly pulling away its defenders, while still enabling Sigel to protect the eastern half of his department. Sigel altered the plan when he learned that the only force confronting him seemed to be Brig. Gen. John D. Imboden's small Valley District Brigade. He decided to move at least as far south as Woodstock. This, he thought, would have a greater chance of pulling Confederate defenders out of southwestern Virginia, and he intended to go on the defensive at Woodstock while sending out strong patrols. Sigel felt the deeper penetration additionally would disrupt Confederate exploitation of the Valley's resources while increasing the threat to Lee's strategic flank. Federal forces began coming into Martinsburg during April from all over northern Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. On 1 May Sigel deployed his Infantry to Winchester while his cavalry moved even farther south to Strasburg and Cedar Creek. The Federals were to remain in these locations until 9 May. In the meantime General Imboden based at Mt. Crawford began to react to the changing threat. He concentrated his forces in the vicinity of Woodstock and on 2 May called out the Augusta and Rockingham County reserves. He also sent word of the situation with a request for reinforcements to General Breckinridge.  Five Virginia Military Institute Cadets in their dress uniforms Southern response was prompt and decisive. General Lee ordered Brig. Gen. John H. Morgan's Cavalry Brigade from Tennessee to Wytheville, thus giving Breckinridge a bit more depth. He added Imboden's forces and his Valley District to Breckinridge's jurisdiction, assuring unity of command. Lee also placed the VMI Corps of Cadets at his disposal. Breckinridge watched the situation develop and decided that Sigel posed the greatest strategic threat. Therefore, on 6 May he directed Generals Echols and Wharton to concentrate their forces at Staunton; this was achieved by 12 May in a complex logistical operation using road and rail movement and supply coordination. The troops averaged twenty-one miles a day on the march. While this was going on, General Imboden continued to develop the situation. Captain John H. McNeil with sixty men staged a spectacular raid on the Piedmont, West Virginia, rail depot on 5 May. The Georges Creek railroad bridge, 7 big machine shops, 9 locomotives, 80 freight cars, and several miles of telegraph lines were destroyed. Another 3 full freight trains were destroyed at Bloomington. The purpose of this devastation was to make Sigel detach some of his strength away from his main body of troops to protect the B & 0. As a result, he did leave more troops guarding the railroad than he had planned originally. Further, he became so sensitive to the guerrilla threat that thereafter he deployed substantial portions of his strength to protect his trains.  The VMI New Market flag. This shows a reproduction of the flag that was carried by the Corps of Cadets into battle on May 15, 1864. The flag is made of white silk; one side depicts the the seal of Virginia; on the other is symbolism that includes a likeness of George Washington. One of his first reactions was to send Col. Jacob Higgins and 500 men from the 22d Pennsylvania and 15th New York Cavalry Regiments from Winchester to Moorefield to try to capture McNeil. Higgins set out on 6 May, the same day Breckinridge began to concentrate his forces. General Imboden learned of Higgins' expedition, and on 8 May he moved to counter it. Leaving the 62d Virginia Mounted Infantry in Woodstock, he headed for Moorefield with the 18th and 23d Virginia Cavalries. The next day, he ambushed Higgins at Lost River Gap near Moorefield and pursued the fleeing Federals north to Old Town, Maryland. When the pursuit ended on 10 May, Higgins' force was no longer a factor. The same day as Higgins' disaster, Sigel moved his main body from Winchester to Cedar Creek, establishing his headquarters at Belle Grove Mansion. His approach compounded with bad news for Breckinridge. The force under Brig. Gen. Albert Jenkins that he had left to confront Crook's advance was defeated at Cloyd's Mountain. Jenkins was mortally wounded and captured; however, the fighting had been so severe that Crook was not to follow through on his full objectives. Averell's attack was similarly blunted at Crockett's Cove on 10 May by John H. Morgan-Breckinridge could not know this at the time. The situation impelled him late on 10 May to order the VMI cadets to join him at Staunton. They set out the next morning, reaching Staunton late on the twelfth, averaging about seventeen miles a day.  Eliza Clinedinst Crim A resident of New Market who cared for wounded cadets Meanwhile, on 11 May Sigel resumed his stately passage up the Valley. He reached Woodstock that night and there learned through telegrams captured at the local office that Breckinridge was concentrating his forces against Sigel's at Staunton. This was the first firm intelligence he had received to show that he was facing more than Imboden's little force. Imboden had returned on 12 May from his triumph against Higgins and had set up defensive positions at Rude's Hill between Mt. Jackson and New Market. Sigel reacted to a guerrilla raid on his trains at Strasburg that day by sending out another cavalry force. Two hundred men from the 1st New York Cavalry (Lincoln) under Col. William Boyd departed in a driving rainstorm for Front Royal with instructions to screen the Federal eastern flank into the Page Valley, and then to rejoin the force farther south. This detachment is an example of Sigel's pedantic approach to the situation; what Boyd could achieve away from the main body is difficult to perceive. At the same time, his departure reduced Sigel's reconnaissance capability and the size of the force at his immediate disposal.  "Virginia Mourning Her Dead," commemorating the Battle of New Market, VA Sigel's scouts from the 22d Pennsylvania Cavalry brushed against Imboden's positions south of Mt. Jackson on the rainy morning of 13 May. While the desultory skirmishing went on, Boyd's column had moved from Front Royal east of the Blue Ridge and reentered the Valley through Thornton Gap to Luray. It destroyed Confederate supplies in storage there, along with several wagon trains, and headed for the New Market Gap. When the Federal column reached the Gap, troops could be seen moving on the Pike below, heading south through New Market. Colonel Boyd presumed that what he saw was the head of Sigel's column. Against the advice of several officers, he ordered his column forward into the Valley. Imboden, maintaining his hold on Rude's Hill at 1600, was surprised to see the Federal cavalry coming through the Gap. He sent the 23d Virginia Cavalry dashing through the town to hold the bridge at Smith's Creek at the base of the Gap. Meanwhile, he led the 18th Virginia Cavalry farther south, then east to penetrate the Federals' rear. His maneuver succeeded beyond every expectation. The Federals were caught strung out as they tried to cross one of the creek's meanders, and they were decimated. Within minutes, Boyd's force ceased to exist. Twenty-five men were killed, seventy-five were captured, and the remainder became desperate fugitives wandering on Massanutten Mountain. Sigel had lost another substantial part of his force with no visible gains. While Imboden was performing so effectively, Breckinridge moved his force to Harrisonburg the next day, 14 May, he came fifteen miles farther north to Lacey's Springs.
|
In the meantime, Imboden was becoming fully engaged. Major Timothy Quinn with 500 cavalrymen mainly from the 1st New York (Lincoln) Cavalry had bivouacked the night of 13 May at Edinburg. Early on the fourteenth, another rainy day, he brought his force through Mt. Jackson and repaired the bridge across the Shenandoah. By noon he had forced skirmishers from the 18th Virginia Cavalry across Meem's Bottom and over Rude's Hill. The intensity of the fighting increased south of the hill as the defenders launched several charges against the advancing enemy.
http://www.civilwarhome.com
49thvirginiainfantry.com
www.susanprovostbeller.com
www.mcps.org
www.batteryb.com
www.bigcountry.de
www.skinstotal.com
members.aol.com/ vmicorpsofcadets
www.wvculture.org
New Market unquestionably was what some historians have called the "most important secondary battle of the war." It temporarily unhinged Federal plans for the Valley, preserving its resources longer for the faltering Confederate war effort. Even more significantly, it secured the strategic flank of Robert E. Lee's forces, by then seventy-five miles to the east, locked in mortal combat with Grant's and Meade's men. It is not beyond reason to say that the battle extended the life of the Confederacy by nearly a year. This strategic success was one thing; the inspiring example of the VMI cadets was another. Theirs was one of several decisive contributions to the battle, the absence of any one of which would have been fatal to Confederate success. However, this group of young men averaging eighteen years of age were not hardened troops. They were called from their campus to fight for a cause in which they believed. They faced reality unflinchingly and gallantly carried out what was expected of them. Their performance had a lasting positive effect on Southern morale and still inspires their successors. Breckinridge's masterful performance as both a department commander and tactical leader distinguished him as one of the best of many good Confederate generals. Success was possible at New Market because of his prompt assessment of the situation and the flexibility he had incorporated into his defense plans. His innovative tactical measures including the use of deception and the aggressive use of his artillery combined with his strong personal leadership to offset many disadvantages. His success was virtually assured by his willingness to accept the risks necessary for victory. Thus, his disregard of the odds and his gamble to hold nothing in reserve at the critical moment were proved fully justifiable.  Franz Sigel, on the other hand, was the antithesis of this great Southerner. He displayed excessive caution while failing to think through the purpose or value of many of his decisions. He burdened himself with excessively large trains requiring far too much manpower to guard. His disregard for unit integrity led him to send Colonel Moor forward with a mixed collection of units, few of which had worked together before. His lack of organization led to such things as Captain DuPont's being forgotten in the heat of battle while von Kleiser's short-range Napoleons were disadvantageously deployed. Sigel failed to use his staff, personally conducting minor-level reconnaissances and deployments. At the same time, he thought too much of strategy and not enough of tactics, completely ignoring the effect of his decisions on the physical condition of his men. His Chief of Staff, Col. David H. Strother, said of him, "There is no trace of cowardice in Gen. Sigel, as there was certainly none of generalship. Sigel has the air to me of a military pedagogue, given to technical shams and trifles of military art, but narrow minded and totally wanting in practical capacity." Most would agree with Colonel Strother's conclusion "We can afford to lose such a battle as New Market to get rid of such a mistake as Gen. Sigel." For a moment New Market made it seem as if another Stonewall had come to the Valley. But, although further encouraging moments were experienced in the summer of 1864, the South was inevitably declining. The promise of New Market soon was buried in Federal generalship and numerical and materiel superiority. Thus, by the time of the battle's first anniversary, peace had come to the Valley on Federal terms. The examples of courage and dedication shown in the battle, however, will endure forever. |
Join us at the rally we call:
What: A peaceful remembrance of those with whom we served in Vietnam - those who lived and those who died.
We will tell the story of their virtues and how that contrasts with the lies told by John Kerry.
When: Sunday, Sept. 12, 2004 @ 2:00 PM - 4:00 PM EDT
Where: The West Front of the U.S. Capitol Building, Washington, DC
All Vietnam veterans and their families and supporters are asked to attend. Other veterans are invited as honored guests. This will be a peaceful event--no shouting or contact with others with different opinions. We fought for their rights then, and we respect their rights now. This is NOT a Republican or a pro-Bush rally. Democrats, Republicans and independents alike are warmly invited.
Our gathering is to remember those with whom we served, thereby giving the lie to John Kerry's smear against a generation of fine young men. B.G. "Jug" Burkett, author of "Stolen Valor," will be one of our speakers. Jug has debunked countless impostors who falsely claimed to be Vietnam veterans or who falsely claimed awards for heroism. Jug recommends that we refrain from dragging fatigues out of mothballs. Dress like America, like you do every day.
Dress code: business casual, nice slacks, and shirt and shoes. No uniform remnants, please. Unit hats OK.
Selected members will wear badges identifying them as authorized to speak to the media about our event. Others who speak to the media will speak only for themselves.
The program will be controlled in an attempt to stay on-message. Speakers are encouraged not to engage in speculative criticism of John Kerry but (1) to stick to known and undisputed facts about John Kerry’s lies while (2) reminding America of the true honor and courage of our brothers in battle in Vietnam.
Send this announcement to 10 or more of your brothers! Bring them by car, bus, train or plane! Make this event one of pride in America, an event you would be proud to have your mother or your children attend.
Contact: kerrylied.com
If you are going to the rally in DC one of the game plans is to catch the metro to the Capital Building. Find you a parking spot anywhere on metro line and ride in on the subway.
I don't think I'll be able to make it. :-( I heard taking the Metro is the best bet.
Thanks Snippy. Good Night.
Good night Sam.
Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Foxhole.
Civil War Bump for Foxhole
Off to the land of paradise, and I don't mean IHOP :-)
Regards
alfa6 ;>}
Richard E. Williams' painting of the USAF Academy marching band on the parade field.
Colorado Springs, Colorado is home to one of the most prominent military bands in existence. The United States Air Force Academy Band supports military ceremonies and espirit de corps functions involving the men and women of our nation’s armed forces. The Band also presents free public concerts throughout the United States in support of Air Force recruiting and Air Force Academy community relations.
The Band’s high standards can be traced back to its inception in 1942 as a group called the “Flying Yanks,” which was started by two American airmen in England. This band was eventually designated the 739th Army Air Force Band in March 1944 and performed for radio shows, the general public and for Eighth Air Force Victory Bond drives.
The 739th Band, which came to be known as one of the best bands in Europe during WWII, was inactivated on October 20, 1945. It was reactivated on May 10, 1955 and assigned to the new United States Air Force Academy at Lowry Air Force Base, Denver, Colorado. Bandleaders throughout the Air Force were asked to screen their musicians for the best personnel that would fill the positions in what became the Air Force Academy Band.
In 1958 the Band moved to the new campus of the Air Force Academy near Colorado Springs to support the Cadet Wing at wing parades, military ceremonies, and athletic events. From 1958 to 1993 the Air Force Academy Band contributed to the training and development of more than 26,000 cadets.
In 1993 The Air Force Academy Band was renamed The United States Air Force Band of the Rockies and reassigned to Headquarters, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, also located in Colorado Springs. On October 1, 2003, the Band returned to its roots as The United States Air Force Academy Band. The United States Air Force Academy Band is proud to continue its long-standing commitment to musical and military excellence in its service to the nation.
Morning PE, thanks for the article on The United States Air Force Academy Band and the photo.
Good morning Aeronaut.
Mornin' alfa6.
Nice painting of the AFA. The flag and the chapel against the Rockies backdrop, must be neat to see in person.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
