The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Big Week - (20-25 Feb, 1944) - June 3rd, 2004

www.ibiblio.org ^ | W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate

[SAMWolf]

Lord,

Keep our Troops forever in Your care

Give them victory over the enemy...

Grant them a safe and swift return...

Bless those who mourn the lost.
.

FReepers from the Foxhole join in prayer
for all those serving their country at this time.

...................................................................................... ...........................................

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Big Week

At long last, on 19 February 1944, the weather over the German fighter factories began to open up, and during the six succeeding days the concerted bombing attack which had been projected since November 1943 became a reality. The plan, drafted originally and repeatedly modified by the Combined Operational Planning Committee (COPC) under the code name ARGUMENT, pointed toward a series of coordinated precision attacks by the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces against the highest-priority objectives, most of which by February 1944 were situated in central and southern Germany. The RAF agreed to make its night area attacks coincide with the daylight missions both in time and in place.

The projected operation was to be directed principally against the airframe and final assembly phase of single- and twin-engine production. It had been consistently assumed by those responsible for selecting targets for the CBO that bombing of airframe manufacture would be reflected more rapidly in enemy front-line fighter strength than an attack on the aero-engine manufacture. The policy based on this assumption, however, was coupled with one giving a high immediate priority to the antifriction-bearing industry which lay, one might say, at the opposite end of the production line but which was believed to be highly concentrated in so small a number of targets as to make the system highly vulnerable. As finally worked out, the ARGUMENT plan looked to a combination of attacks against final assembly, antifriction bearings, and component parts manufacture. Thus, for example, bombing of the Erla assembly plant at Leipzig-Möckau, engaged in assembling Me-109's, was to be supplemented by bombing the Heiterblick component factory at Leipzig which supplied major parts for assembly at the airfield. Ju-88 twin-engine fighter production at Bernburg was made to share the bombing attack with the fuselage factory at Oschersleben and the wing factory at Halberstadt, on both of which it depended. Likewise, the Messerschmitt assembly plant at Regensburg-Obertraubling was to be bombed simultaneously with the component factory at Regensburg-Prüfening. This technique was, of course, unnecessary at the Messerschmitt factories at Gotha and Augsburg where both final assembly and major component manufacture were carried out in the same factory area.



The primary responsibility for mounting the attack belonged to USSTAF. It had not been anticipated that this headquarters would ordinarily direct daily operations involving either or both of the two AAF heavy bombardment forces, the Eighth and Fifteenth. Its general task was a supervisory and policy-making one, but in the case of coordinated operations undertaken by the two forces the day's activity was to fall under the immediate direction of USSTAF's deputy for operations, Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Anderson. ARGUMENT had been scheduled repeatedly-every time, in fact, that early weather reports seemed to offer any hope; but each time deteriorating weather had forced cancellation. By February the destruction of the German fighter production had become a matter of such urgency that General Spaatz and General Anderson were willing to take more than ordinary risks in order to complete the task, including the risk of exceptional losses that might result from missions staged under conditions of adverse base weather. General Spaatz on 8 February had directed that ARGUMENT must be completed by 1 March 1944.



ARGUMENT

On 19 February the USSTAF weather section, the central agency through which all forecasting was coordinated for the American bomber and fighter forces in the United Kingdom, became aware of two extensive pressure areas, one centered in the Baltic and one just west of Ireland, which were developing in a way that made good weather over central Europe and the home bases seem probable. If the Pressure area over the Baltic moved southeast across Europe as was anticipated, the resulting winds would break out the cloud and leave clear skies or, at worst, scattered clouds. Neither the Eighth Air Force nor Ninth Air Force weather observers shared the confidence of USSTAF on this prospect. As a result, neither General Doolittle of the Eighth nor General Brereton, whose Ninth Air Force medium bombers would be heavily involved as diversionary forces, was enthusiastic about Anderson's proposal to attempt as difficult and dangerous an operation as ARGUMENT the following day.



Nevertheless, General Anderson continued to explore the possibilities and conferred by cable with Eaker to determine whether Maj. Gen. Nathan F. Twining of the Fifteenth Air Force was prepared to cooperate. The request caught Eaker at an embarrassing time. He had been assured by those in command of the ground campaign at Anzio that the following day would be a critical one on the beachhead. Both Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark of the Fifth Army and Maj. Gen. John K. Cannon of the Twelfth Air Force hoped for full assistance from the heavy bombers of the Fifteenth. Weather reports received in Italy indicated, furthermore, that the proposed south German targets would offer little chance for visual bombing; and since the Fifteenth had as yet no H2X equipment, a diversionary attack on area targets as suggested by USSTAF would be impossible. Eaker also feared that if the Fifteenth were withdrawn for POINTBLANK operations at this critical stage of the Italian campaign General Wilson might feel compelled to declare an emergency and employ the heavy bombers by direct command. Eaker wished to avoid such a declaration, lest the control exercised by his own headquarters over the operations of the Fifteenth be robbed of all flexibility. Accordingly he requested that the Fifteenth not be committed by USSTAF on the 20th. Spaatz, to whom the impending air battle promised results so decisive that any diversion of support from the land campaign in Italy would be justified, took the question to Air Chief Marshal Portal, who answered that the Prime Minister wished all available forces to be used in support of the beachhead. Participation by the Fifteenth on the 20th was accordingly left to Eaker's discretion.



The mission remained on the books, at least for the Eighth, and preparations went ahead on the assumption that it would be flown the next morning. During a night that brought little sleep for the responsible commanders, doubts continued to be expressed concerning the weather prospect. Could the fighter escorts get up through the clouds considered likely over the bases? Might not the icing that would result seriously reduce their efficiency? General Kepner, in command of the Eighth Air Force fighters, believed it would cut the efficiency of the P-38's by half but did not foresee too much difficulty for the P-47's and P-51's. General Spaatz felt the mission should be flown if necessary without full fighter support. But what of the bombers themselves? Could they negotiate assembly through 4,000 to 5,000 feet of cloud with the likelihood of even more trouble from icing than the fast-moving fighters would encounter? It was suggested that de-icing fluid could be used and cockpit windows opened after the cloud area was passed, and so the debate continued, but early in the morning of the 20th the wires carried down from headquarters the final decision "Let 'em go."



The force assembled for the mission was the largest in the history of the American strategic forces. Sixteen combat wings of heavy bombers, numbering over 1,000 planes, were dispatched, of which total 941 were credited with sorties. All available AAF fighter escort was provided, 17 groups in all--13 P-47, 2 P-38, and 2 P-51--drawn from both VIII Fighter Command and the Ninth Air Force. In addition to these American escort groups, the RAF provided 16 fighter squadrons, consisting of Spitfires and Mustangs.

Twelve specific targets had been selected, representing major assembly and component plants for Me-109's, Me-110's, Ju-88's, Ju-188's and FW-190's. Most of the objectives lay in the Brunswick/Leipzig area; but three lay in the north, two in the Posen area of Poland and one at Tutow. Six combat wings of bombers were sent to the latter targets by a route which led over the North Sea and across the southern part of Denmark. The remaining ten combat wings were to bomb the targets in central Germany. Since these wings would certainly encounter the stiffest resistance from the Luftwaffe (the northern route lay largely beyond the lanes usually defended by the Germans), they were given all the available escort. Several of the American fighter groups were to refuel and make second sorties. The main bombing force was to enter the enemy radar screen in time to prevent large numbers of fighters from concentrating on the unescorted northern force. In order to facilitate fighter support, the combat wings of the main force were to fly at close intervals over the same route until it became necessary to diverge toward their respective targets. Both Parts of the day's mission could easily be interpreted, and probably Were by many German observers, as a threat to the national capital.



Thanks to these precautions, to the generally excellent support of friendly fighters, and doubtless also to the fact that the RAF had bombed the city of Leipzig heavily the night before and had worn out much of the night fighter force, the bombers of the Eighth suffered relatively little from enemy attack. This was good news to those who remembered earlier attempts at penetrations deep into enemy territory-the Schweinfurt mission of 14 October or the most recent of such operations on 11 January when of 651 bombers making sorties 60 failed to return. On 20 February, against many of the same targets, only 21 were lost nut of a force of almost 1,000.



The bombing, wherever it was accomplished visually (at Leipzig, Bernburg, and Brunswick and at several targets of opportunity), was good. Severe damage was, for example, done to four plants of A.T.G. Maschinenbau GmbH, in the Leipzig area. A.T.G. was one of the licensees of Junkers and was engaged in airframe manufacture and assembly, especially of the twin-engine Ju-88. Destruction was especially heavy in terms of structural damage. Machine tools, although not damaged quite so severely as Allied intelligence believed at the time, were badly mauled. The mission of 20 February caused a loss of slightly more than one month's output for the entire concern. The Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH also suffered heavily, especially its main plant at Heiterblick and the assembly plant at Möckau being used for the manufacture of Me-109's, a type of which the Erla complex as a whole produced 32 per cent. An estimated forty completed aircraft and an undetermined amount of component parts were destroyed at these two plants. The bombs also killed some 450 workers in slit trenches and in inadequate air-raid shelters provided at Heiterblick. As at A.T.G., damage to buildings was proportionally greater than to machine tools, a surprising number of which remained undamaged or reparable. It was this raid, however, that decided the plant authorities to begin a serious policy of dispersal, with all its attendant loss of production and dependence on vulnerable lines of rail communication.



This mission of 20 February was the beginning of the dramatic series of strategic operations that has come to be called the Big Week. On the night of 19/20 February it all seemed a hazardous gamble on the doubtful long-range weather forecast. That the first mission was attempted can be attributed to the stubborn refusal of General Anderson to allow an opportunity, even a dubious one, to slip past him. To the intense relief of USSTAF headquarters the gamble paid off. Not only had an apparently good job of bombing been achieved but the cost must have seemed gratifyingly small to men who had been talking in terms of a possible loss of 200 bombers and crews. So, when the weather prospect for the 21st indicated continuing favorable conditions over Germany, an operation was enthusiastically undertaken. The feeling was spreading within USSTAF headquarters, and from there to the operational headquarters, that this was the big chance.



As on the previous day it was the RAF that dealt the initial blow. On the night of 20/21 February, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris' Bomber Command struck at Stuttgart, a city important to the aircraft industry, with over 600 planes. USSTAF planned to bomb the two M.I.A.G. factories at Brunswick, both of which were producing component parts for the twin-engine, rocket-firing Me-110, and also to attack half-a-dozen important airfields and storage parks in western Germany. It was hoped that the medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force and the heavies of the Fifteenth could cooperate. But the former, as on the 20th, found weather over assigned airfield targets in the Low Countries unfavorable, and the Fifteenth found it impossible because of bad weather even to fly missions in support of the ground action. On the part of the Eighth it was another all-out effort, planned and launched on a scale not far short of the previous mission. But the strategic results were not so encouraging. True, the large air park at Diepholz was severely and accurately bombed, as were several of the other airfields attacked, but the principal targets at Brunswick were found covered by cloud. The bombardiers switched from visual to pathfinder tactics and succeeded in dropping a heavy tonnage of bombs on the city, but without damaging the aircraft factories directly.



Weather reports for the next day continued to indicate good prospects for visual bombing over many important targets, and special attention was invited to evidence that the high-pressure area responsible for the clear weather was moving south in such a way as to open up the two top-priority objectives--Regensburg and Schweinfurt. A promise of good weather farther north also encouraged the planners to debate seriously an attack on the next highest on the priority list, the Erkner ball-bearing factory near Berlin. A mission to Erkner undertaken simultaneously with attacks on the southern targets, however, would spread the forces too much and make them too vulnerable to enemy attack. Excellent results had been achieved on the two previous missions by sending the bombers and their fighter escort into enemy territory as a team, only splitting the force when the target areas were neared. Even after Erkner had been ruled out, the remaining targets presented a dangerous spread, and so the news that the Fifteenth would be able to send a force against Regensburg was especially welcome. It was decided that on the 22d the Eighth should attack aircraft factories at Schweinfurt, Gotha, Bernburg, Oschersleben, Aschersleben, and Halberstadt, leaving Regensburg to be bombed from Italy by the Fifteenth. In addition, a small diversionary force, equipped with radar-jamming devices, was to fly to Denmark and bomb the Aalborg airfield. This force, it was hoped, would hold a number of enemy fighters in the north and would make it hard for the enemy to detect the main force of bombers until after it had formed over England.



A number of things went wrong with these plans. The B-17's of the 3d Bombardment Division, which constituted the Schweinfurt force, found it impossible to assemble because of the unfavorable weather over their bases. Several collisions occurred in the air, and General LeMay finally ordered this part of the mission abandoned. His decision, though apparently justified under the circumstances, left the Fifteenth to face stronger defenses than would have been met had the bombers of the Eighth been able to get as far south as Schweinfurt. The B-24's of the 2nd Bombardment Division on their way to Gotha also ran into trouble. Badly strung out as they crossed the Channel, they found it impossible to organize on the way inland and the decision was made to recall. These defections left only the five combat wings of the 1st Division which had been scheduled to attack Oschersleben, Halberstadt, Bernburg, and Aschersleben. Oschersleben, most important of these objectives, was obscured by cloud and was passed over in favor of targets of opportunity. Many planes of the Halberstadt force found the same difficulty and adopted the same alternative. As a result, only 99 bombers out of a force of 466 dispatched by the Eighth that morning succeeded in bombing their primary targets, and only 255 planes bombed any target at all. Fortunately, the Fifteenth had better luck and was able to get off a force of 183 bombers against Regensburg, where 118 planes bombed the Messerschmitt factory at Obertraubling.



Bombing results at the major targets were very uneven, owing principally to the degree of visibility allowed the bombardiers. The thirty-four bombers that attacked the Aschersleben Motor Works (manufacturing Ju-88's and other products for the Junkers complex) are credited with causing a so per cent production loss for two months. The Bernburg attack, aimed also at Ju-88 production, was one of several effective missions which eventually damaged the assembly buildings to the extent of 70 to 80 per cent. Bombing was poor at Halberstadt. The Fifteenth at Regensburg gave a good start to a second campaign against that segment of the Messerschmitt system, a campaign which was carried on still more effectively three days later by both air forces.



The German fighters made the bombers of both the Eighth and the Fifteenth pay more heavily on the 22d than on the two preceding missions. On those two occasions the bombers, with excellent fighter support and other factors in their favor, had a relatively easy time of it, but on this day the Germans successfully tried a new tactic against the Eighth Air Force. Instead of concentrating their efforts in the target area, where fighter escort was now usually provided, or even on the later stages of the flight toward the target, they attacked early in the penetration at a time when fighter cover was either thin or entirely lacking. In the course of the running battle that ensued the Eighth lost 41 bombers out of a force of 430 credited with making sorties. Part of the trouble arose from a widely spread-out bomber force; when many of the units tuned away to seek targets of opportunity, the invading force lost what compactness it had maintained on the penetration flight and this made it hard for the two groups of long-range P-51's acting as target area support to afford complete cover. The escort in general had a field day, claiming sixty of the enemy destroyed at a cost of eleven of their number. The Fifteenth, also running into stiff enemy opposition, lost fourteen of its bombers, chiefly to twin-engine fighters.



Prospects for a visual attack by the Eighth on the 23d looked so poor that no mission was planned. General Doolittle welcomed the break in operations. For three successive days his bomber crews had been working under high pressure and they were tired. The long-range fighter escort units were even more exhausted, but presumably the German Air Force was tired too, and had weather promised an even chance for visual bombing, a mission would doubtless have been flown. The Fifteenth was able to send a small force of 102 bombers to Steyr, in Austria, where they destroyed 20 per cent of the plant area at the Steyr Walzlagerwerke, then turning out between 10 and 15 per cent of the German ball-bearing production.

[SAMWolf]

The weather over central Germany opened up again in time for another full-scale coordinated mission on the 24th. This time it was decided to strike hard at Schweinfurt's antifriction-bearing plants, most important of their sort in the Axis countries. In addition to the five combat wings of B-17's dispatched to Schweinfurt, three combat wings of B-24's were sent to Gotha to bomb the important Gothaer Waggonfabrik A.G., largest producer of twin-engine Me-z 10's, and a third force, amounting to five combat wings, was to bomb aircraft component factories and assembly plants in northeastern Germany and Poland at Tutow, Kreising, and Posers, all producing FW-190's. Since it was not at all certain that these northern targets would be open to visual bombing, and since the position of the last two in occupied territory made them unsuitable for the relatively inaccurate radar bombing, the third force was directed as an alternative to bomb the city of Rostock. The Fifteenth Air Force agreed to fly in force against the Steyr-Daimler-Puch aircraft component plant at Steyr.



Care had to be taken to prevent heavy enemy fighter reaction to, the northern force dispatched by the Eighth, since the extreme length of its flight prevented the use of even the long-range fighter escort then available. It was hoped that by carefully timing the flight of the main force the enemy controller could be prevented from committing too many units to the task of intercepting the Tutow-Kreising-Posers force. The actions of the Fifteenth against Steyr and of the main force of the Eighth were calculated to be mutually helpful in splitting the German defenses.

These precautions apparently worked well for the northern force, although the overcast weather encountered no doubt helped to discourage enemy fighters. The Schweinfurt-Gotha forces and that of the Fifteenth, however, ran into plenty of trouble. The 87 B-17's of the Fifteenth that flew to Steyr (27 others became separated and attacked the Fiume oil refinery) experienced almost all the German interceptor tricks that had been worked out against the Eighth during the previous year-coordinated attacks by four to six single-engine fighters, rockets fired at long range from twin-engine aircraft, and aerial bombs. The attacks were especially heavy against the rear formation, all 10 bombers of which were shot down. The Steyr force lost a total of 17 bombers in this air battle, despite excellent withdrawal support provided by 146 P-47's and P-3 8's. A similar story was told by the B-24 crews that flew to Gotha. Despite almost continuous fighter cover, the B-24 formations suffered persistent and concentrated attack, especially In the target area, and lost 33 planes out of the 239 patched that morning. The Schweinfurt force fared somewhat better, losing only 11 planes. The supporting fighters lost 10 and claimed the destruction of 37 of the enemy. Bomber claims (108 German fighters destroyed) reflected the intensity of the battle.



It is hard to estimate the exact amount of damage done to the Schweinfurt ball-bearing industry by the 54.3 tons of high explosives and incendiaries dropped by the 238 B-17's on 24 February because that night the RAF, guided by the fires left burning from the American attack, dropped a much greater weight of bombs on the entire individual area of Schweinfurt. The combined attack was thus the heaviest yet directed against that city, but it was not the most damaging to the antifriction-bearing industry. The attack of 14 October retained that honor throughout the war. It was not that the bombing of 24 February was inaccurate, for three of the four bearing plants sustained major damage in the daylight raid with direct hits on machine shops, storage buildings, and power stations. It was simply that Schweinfurt, considered as a POINTBLANK objective, was not the target it had been in the fall of 1943. Since the October raid, Vereinigte Kugellager Fabriken A.G. had been busily engaged in dispersing its activities. By February 1944 it had moved 549 machines to the new locations, leaving only 73 per cent of its total stock of machines in the Schweinfurt plants. Thus Schweinfurt was only about 60 per cent as valuable a target in February 1944 as it had been in October 1943. Nevertheless the bearing plants suffered heavy damage in the raids of 24-25 February, especially in the departments processing rings; and the ball department, already half-dispersed, lost another 10 per cent of its machines. Many of the most important processes remained, however, unaffected.



Bombing at Gotha was especially accurate, and probably more important strategically than at Schweinfurt. Over 400 bombs, both high explosive and incendiary, fell in the target area, 93 of which hit buildings; this does not count the large number of fragmentation bombs (180 tons out of a total of 424) dropped also. Almost every building in the very compact factory area was damaged. The eastern half of the plant, where the aircraft manufacture was centered, was generally destroyed, although machine tools, the vital part of the production system, received surprisingly slight damage, considering the amount of damage to buildings. Most of the loss of machine tools resulted from fires. Even falling debris and steel girders did less damage than factory executives had expected. In fact the loss of production following the raid resulted less from actual damage to the machine tools than from their inaccessibility. Much time and labor had to be expended clearing heavy girders from the machines caught under them. Some loss of production also resulted from the policy of dispersal begun on official order after 24 February. In all, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey estimated that as a result of this mission the Gothaer Waggonfabrik A.G. lost about six to seven weeks' production or the equivalent of 140 planes. Recuperation was rapid, however. 1n a little over two months the concern was operating again at full capacity. But it must be remembered that, in order to bring about full production at new dispersed plants, a heavy drain was placed on other factories in the Messerschmitt ring.



As if to add a final touch of celebration to a week of unwonted liberality, the weather on 25 February permitted the daylight bombing forces to choose almost any targets they wished in German territory. The decision was made in USSTAF headquarters to launch another full-scale coordinated attack by both strategic air forces against the remaining high-priority objectives in southern Germany. The Fifteenth was directed to attack the Messerschmitt component plant at Regensburg-Prüfening. The Eighth was given both Messerschmitt factories at Regensburg, the Messerschmitt parent plant at Augsburg, the antifriction-bearing plant of V.K.F. at Stuttgart, and the factory of Bachmann-Von Blumenthal at Fürth, manufacturing components and assembling Me-110's.



The mission promised to be a dangerous and taxing day's work for both forces, involving as it did for each an extremely deep penetration. USSTAF planners hoped that this closely coordinated attack, the first to be attempted on the same day by the Eighth and Fifteenth against the same objective, would split and confuse the German fighter forces. It was also hoped that the Germans would be showing the strain of five days of constant action. An additional advantage lay in the fact that the targets were fairly well concentrated, making it possible for the Eighth to move its huge force along a single line of penetration under a single comprehensive plan of fighter cover. The Fifteenth was not in such a favorable position. It lacked escort of sufficiently long range to provide protection during the most distant phase of the penetration. It suffered also from the handicap of a relatively small force. Only bombers equipped for long-range flying could be sent as far as Regensburg, and, although the Fifteenth dispatched that day almost 40o bombers, only 176 were airborne on the main mission. The remainder hit yards and port installations at Flume, the harbor at Zara, warehouses and sheds at Pola, rail lines at Zell-am-See, and the airfield at Graz-Thalerhof.



As it happened, the German fighters concentrated relatively larger forces on the Fifteenth than on the Eighth, with the result that the Foggia-based bombers lost 33 of their number on the Regensburg mission, or nearly one-fifth of the attacking force. The fighting was intense, and the bomber crews claimed large numbers of the enemy shot down. The Eighth, on the other hand, lost only 31 of its total force of 738 credited with sorties. It was another proof of the fact, long since conceded by American strategic bombing experts, that a daylight bomber force without full fighter cover could not hope to get through an aggressive enemy without excessive losses, especially when, as in this instance, the enemy chose to concentrate on the weaker and more poorly protected force.



All forces were able to bomb their primary targets on the 25th and to do so with generally good accuracy. Results were especially important at Regensburg and Augsburg, although a great deal of destruction was done also to plant and finished aircraft at Forth. Regensburg was the heart of the Me-109 production and it was considered worth any reasonable risk, including a slight reduction in bombing altitude, to do an effective job on the two plants there. In the raids by the Fifteenth on 22 February and 25 February on the Obertraubling factory and by the Eighth against both factories on the 25th, scarcely a building escaped damage, many being utterly destroyed. The effect on aircraft production was great. Plant records indicate that production fell from 435 planes per month in January 1944 to 135 per month in March 1944, the decline resulting entirely from bomb destruction. The Regensburg system did not again reach scheduled production levels for four months. The main Messerschmitt plant at Augsburg underwent similarly drastic treatment. Blast and fire from over 500 tons of bombs destroyed approximately thirty buildings. Production capacity was reduced by about 35 per cent. Almost one-third of all machine tools were damaged, and 70 per cent of stored material destroyed. The plant was, however, back in full production in little over one month.



Allied intelligence, working on the basis of extremely accurate reports of damage to factory buildings, quite understandably expected more loss of production than actually occurred. The error arose partly because these reports contained no detailed information regarding dispersal of plant functions. Since the summer of 1943, when the first heavy raid was made by the AAF against the Regensburg factories (17 August), the Messerschmitt company had been energetically engaged in dispersing the activity of all major plants in a closely integrated system of small factories, many of them cleverly concealed in forest areas adjoining the original manufacturing centers. The effect of bombing attacks was thus greatly reduced. The 17 August 1943, raid, for example, had prevented the Regensburg complex from returning to scheduled production for five months. Although much heavier and more devastating, the attach of 25 February retarded manufacture for only four months. Another source of miscalculation lay in the fact that here, as elsewhere, the machine tools, which were the least replaceable part of the production process and of vital importance, suffered astonishingly slight damage considering the general devastation. Underestimating the recuperability of such plants, USSTAF failed in many instances to schedule return raids which, undertaken fairly soon after the completion of an apparently very effective one, might have finished work only partly accomplished.



After these attacks of 25 February the weather turned bad (indeed, it would be generally so for another month) and ended the Big Week.

[SAMWolf]

How Big Was the Big Week?

The question naturally arises, how big was the Big Week? To those who participated in it and who directed its operations it looked very big indeed. Perhaps it looked even larger to the public relations men and the press writers who were responsible for giving it the tag that has clung to it ever since. If under the unromantic eye of the historian it loses some of its legendary proportions, it remains nevertheless a truly big and important campaign.



Here are some of the facts, many of them gathered since the end of the war and reconciled where possible with German records. Over 3,300 bombers from the Eighth Air Force and more than 5oo from the Fifteenth attacked the main POINTBLANK targets. These forces dropped a total of almost 10,000 tons of bombs--a scale of attack roughly equal to that of the Eighth Air Force during its entire first year of operations. Losses, though heavy, were less than had generally been anticipated. USSTAF planners were prepared to accept losses of as many as 200 heavy bombers on a single day's operation. The Eighth actually lost some 137 heavy bombers in the entire six days' campaign, the Fifteenth 89--an over-all average of about 6 per cent. Fighter sorties in support of the heavy bomber missions amounted to approximately 2,548 for the Eighth Air Force, 712 for the Ninth, and 413 for the Fifteenth. Total fighter losses were 28. A rough estimate of crewmen lost, including those killed in action, missing, and seriously wounded, would be 2,600.



In addition to the weight of attack delivered by the American Forces, mainly in connection with visual bombing of specific industrial targets, the RAF made five heavy raids against cities containing priority POINTBLANK targets: Leipzig, Stuttgart, Schweinfurt, Steyr, and Augsburg. Some 2,351 of its aircraft dropped 9,198 (U.S.) tons of bombs for a loss of 157 heavy bombers, about 6.6 per cent. This figure, slightly higher than that of American losses, is most interesting in the light of earlier estimates of the relative costs of day and night bombing.



The scale of these coordinated operations was thus big enough in all reason. It is more difficult to estimate their effect on the enemy with equal exactness because it cannot be done entirely on a quantitative basis. Certain general conclusions seem warranted, however. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, after ransacking German sources, estimated that the 4,000-odd tons of bombs dropped on targets in the aircraft industrial system alone damaged or destroyed 75 per cent of the buildings in plants that at the time accounted for 90 per cent of the total German production of aircraft. The immediate reaction in the industry was one of consternation, we are told. The German authorities, whose plans had hitherto rested on unduly optimistic foundations, now apparently for the first time showed signs of desperation.



As a result of the bombing, the aircraft industry received in late February a formal order to disperse its plants. That order, of course, merely intensified a policy begun locally and unsystematically after that industry first came under daylight bombing attacks in the second half of 1943. Also the bombings helped to precipitate a crisis in the over-all organization of aircraft production which culminated in the shifting of responsibility from Goering's Air Ministry to a special agency operating within the Albert Speer Ministry of Armaments and Munitions. In short, the February bombings had the effect of galvanizing the aircraft industry into feverish action.



Thanks in part to that activity, directed as it was with considerable resourcefulness, the effects of the February bombings were substantially mitigated. Damage, moreover, proved on more careful investigation to have been proportionately less severe in the vital category of machine tools than to buildings; in fact a very high percentage of the former was salvaged. Dispersal was especially successful in the airframe and final-assembly branch of the industry (the one singled out for priority attack) since it was possible to carry on most of the necessary operations in roughly constructed frame shelters, many of them we concealed in wooded areas. As a result of these several factors, aircraft production recuperated very rapidly. Interestingly enough, the February bombings, heavy and accurate as they were, caused less total delay in aircraft production than did the relatively lighter and more isolated attacks conducted by the Eighth Air Force in August anti October 1943. The latter are credited with causing a three-month delay in production-the former with only about two months' loss.



Failure to take into account the phenomenal recuperability of the aircraft industry, especially in its airframe branch, led Allied intelligence agencies to overestimate the effects of the February bombing campaign. Reasonably accurate during 1943, Allied estimates of German fighter production became after February 1944 grossly optimistic. The average monthly production of German single-engine fighters during the last half of 1943 was 851, as against Allied estimates of 645. For the first half of 1944, on the other hand, actual production reached a monthly average of 1,581, whereas Allied intelligence estimated only 655.



Allied estimates were even further off in dealing with the antifriction-bearing industry. In this instance the original estimates, on the basis of which that industry had been selected for top-priority bombing, had been too optimistic. Ball bearings were vital enough to the aircraft industry. But they were too well cushioned in the production process: basic stocks were too large, the pipelines in the aircraft industry too well filled, and the possibility of economy too great for even the most successful bombing of the bearing plants to affect final aircraft production appreciably. Furthermore, owing to the vigorous policy of dispersal which has been mentioned before, the Schweinfurt plant had nowhere near the importance it had possessed in 1943.



Unquestionably the Big Week derived much of its importance from these errors in intelligence. Yet it must be remembered that the February bombings did deny many hundreds of aircraft to the enemy at a time when they were badly needed and could probably have been brought into effective use against the Allied invasion of Europe. The fact that the Germans suffered only a temporary setback in their overall program of aircraft production is less important than that they lost a significant number of planes at a critical point in the air war and that, at the same critical juncture, they were forced to reorganize and disperse the entire industry. According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, the February campaign would have paid off even if its only effect had been to force the enemy into an intensive program of dispersal.



For that program not only accounted indirectly for much wasted effort and production loss; it also left the industry vulnerable to any serious disruption in transportation. The dispersal policy did, in fact, defeat itself when Allied bombers subsequently turned to an intensive strategic attack on transportation.

Moreover, the effect of the Big Week on German air power was not restricted to bomb damage. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the large and fiercely fought air battles of those six February days had more effect in establishing the air superiority on which Allied plans so largely depended than did the bombing of industrial plants.

Additional Sources:

www.wpafb.af.mil
www.klammi.de
hsgm.free.fr
www.100thbg.com
www.brooksart.com

[SAMWolf]

During "The Big Week", 3,300 bombers were dispatched from England and 500 from Italy, with 137 of the former and 89 of the latter being lost. Also, 28 AAF fighters were shot down by the enemy (by both flak and interceptors) in desperate defense of the hinterland.



The number of U.S. personnel killed, missing, and seriously wounded totaled 2,600, but 75% of the buildings attacked in the German aircraft industrial system were destroyed. In addition, 600 Luftwaffe airplanes were claimed as destroyed in vicious air battles over Germany.

[SAMWolf]

Veterans for Constitution Restoration is a non-profit, non-partisan educational and grassroots activist organization. The primary area of concern to all VetsCoR members is that our national and local educational systems fall short in teaching students and all American citizens the history and underlying principles on which our Constitutional republic-based system of self-government was founded. VetsCoR members are also very concerned that the Federal government long ago over-stepped its limited authority as clearly specified in the United States Constitution, as well as the Founding Fathers' supporting letters, essays, and other public documents.

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Actively seeking volunteers to provide this valuable service to Veterans and their families.

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Iraq Homecoming Tips

~ Thanks to our Veterans still serving, at home and abroad. ~ Freepmail to Ragtime Cowgirl | 2/09/04 | FRiend in the USAF

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PDN members and fans. We hope you will consider this simple act of patriotism worth passing on or taking up as a project in your own back yard. In summary:

Who They Are: Operation: Stitches Of Love was started by the Mothers of two United States Marines stationed in Iraq.

What They Are Doing: We are gathering 12.5"x12.5" quilt squares from across the country and assembling the largest quilt ever produced. When completed we will take the quilt from state to state and gather even more squares.

Why They Are Doing This: We are building this quilt to rally support for the Coalition Forces in Iraq and to show the service members that they are not forgotten. We want the world to know Nothing will ever break the stitches that bind us together as a country.

Ideas to start a local project:

Obtain enough Red, White and Blue material (cloth) for a 12.5 x 12.5 quilt square.
If you have someone in your family that sews, make it a weekend project and invite neighbors to join you.

Consider this tribute as a project for your civic group, scouts, church or townhall group.

Locate an elementary school with an after school program in your neighborhood or locate an after school program in your neighborhood not attached to a school and ask if you could volunteer one or two afternoons and create some squares with the kids.

Invite some VFW posts to share your project in honor of their post.

Send us webmaster@patriotwatch.com for digital photos of in progress and finished project for various websites, OIFII.com and the media.

PDN is making this appeal in support of Operation: Stitches Of Love
Media Contact: Deborah Johns (916) 716-2749
Volunteers & Alternate Media: PDN (916) 448-1636

Your friends at PDN

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UPDATED THROUGH APRIL 2004



The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul

Click on Hagar for
"The FReeper Foxhole Compiled List of Daily Threads"

[snippy_about_it]

FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole!



Good Thursday Morning Everyone.


If you would like to be added to our ping list, let us know.

[GATOR NAVY]

Just saying hi

[snippy_about_it]

How sweet of you. Hi Sailor!

[SAMWolf]

Morning Gator Navy.

Good Night Snippy.

[snippy_about_it]

Time for me to turn in, too. Good night.

[Aeronaut]

Good morning Snippy.

[radu]

Good evening to all at the Foxhole!

To all our military men and women, past and present, and to our allies who stand with us,
THANK YOU!

I hope y'all are doing well. I sure do miss everyone but things are a bit crazy around here these days. Once our car club's car show is behind us, the pace should slow down a bit. *finger crossed*
*HUGZ* all 'round and y'all have a great day!

[radu]

Guess that should have been "Good MORNing", not evening. duuuuuuh! It's been a looooong week today and my brain is numb. Off to bed while I can still get there. LOL!

[E.G.C.]

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole.

We had a line of storms move through. 80+ MPH winds. Some power outages. It's calm now.

[The Mayor]

The end of all things is at hand; therefore be serious and watchful in your prayers. —1 Peter 4:7

Be ready for your last moment by being ready every moment.

[Tax-chick]

Good morning everyone! Great airplane pictures! (Still looking for a home for the bird ...)

[Soaring Feather]

Good morning everyone.

[CholeraJoe]

Morning SAM and snippy. Nothing like a good airpower thread to get this bluesuiter's pulse rate up.

[WaterDragon]

This is just an awesome account of bravery and determination by our pilots!

[Valin]

On This Day In History


Birthdates which occurred on June 03:
1761 Henry Scrapnel English inventor (shrapnel shell)
1804 Richard Cobden founder Anti-Corn-Law League
1808 Jefferson Davis Ky, Pres of Confederate States of America (1861-5)
1844 Garret Augustus Hobart (R) 24th US VP (1897-99)
1864 Ransom Eli Olds auto (Oldsmobile) & truck (REO) manufacturer
1865 George V king of England (1910-36)
1895 Kavalam Madhava Panikkar India, statesman/diplomat/writer
1904 Dr Charles Drew Washington DC, pioneer of blood plasma preservation/first director of the Red Cross blood bank
1906 Josephine Baker dancer/singer/Parisian night club owner
1911 Paulette Goddard [Marion Levy], Switz, actress (The Great Dictator)
1913 Ellen Corby Racine Wisc, actress (Grandma Walton-The Waltons)
1925 Tony Curtis [Bernard Schwartz], actor (Some Like It Hot, Trapeze)
1926 Allen Ginsberg beat poet (Howl)
1926 Colleen Dewhurst Montreal Canada, actress (Maggie-Blue & Grey)
1929 Chuck Barris Phila, TV game show producer/host/CIA spy(?) (Gong Show)
1942 Curtis Mayfield singer (Freddie's Dead, Superfly)
1946 Ian Hunter England, rocker (Mott the Hoople-All the Young Dudes)
1951 Christopher Cross Texas, singer(?) (Sailing)

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Deaths which occurred on June 03:
1875 Georges Bizet France, composer
1881 Japanese giant salamander dies in Dutch zoo at 55; oldest amphibian
1949 Amedos Peter Giannine founder of Bank of America dies at 79
1963 Paul Maxey actor (Matt-Lassie, Mayor-People's Choice), dies at 57
1963 Pope John XXIII dies at 81
1975 Ozzie Nelson actor (Adventures of Ozzie & Harriet), dies at 69
1987 Will Sampson actor (From Here to Eternity, Yellow Rose), dies at 54
1991 Harry Glicken volcanologist, killed by Mt Unzen Volcano in Japan

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Reported: MISSING in ACTION


1966 KRYSZAK THEODORE E. BUFFALO NY.
[WRECKAGE SITED NO TRACE OF CREW]
1966 MARTIN RUSSELL D. BLOOMFIELD IA.
[WRECKAGE SITED NO TRACE OF CREW]
1966 MULLINS HAROLD E. DENVER CO.
[WRECKAGE SITED NO TRACE OF CREW]
1966 ROSE LUTHER L. HOWE TX.
[WRECKAGE SITED NO TRACE OF CREW]
1966 SMITH HARDING E. LOS GATOS CA.
[WRECKAGE SITED NO TRACE OF CREW]
1966 WARREN ERVIN PHILADELPHIA PA.
[WRECKAGE SITED NO TRACE OF CREW]
1967 BODDEN TIMOTHY R. DOWNERS GROVE IL.
[LAST SEEN IN CRASHED ACFT]
1967 CIUS FRANK E.
[03/05/73 RELEASED BY PRG,ALIVE IN 98]
1967 DEXTER RONALD J. ABILENE TX
[07/67 DIC PER FRANK E. CIUS]
1967 GARDNER JOHN G. HOT SPRINGS NC.
[LAST SEEN IN CRASHED ACFT]
1967 HANSON STEPHEN PAUL BURBANK CA.
[LAST SEEN IN CRASHED ACFT]
1967 KEARNS JOSEPH THOMAS JR. SEA CLIFF NY.
[REMAINS RETURNED 8/88 CACCF/CHNGE 6/89 SEA GIRT NJ]
1967 LANEY BILLY R. GREEN ACRES CITY FL.
[LAST SEEN IN CRASHED ACFT]
1967 SPRINGSTON THEODORE JR. SAN FRANCISCO CA.

POW / MIA Data & Bios supplied by
the P.O.W. NETWORK. Skidmore, MO. USA.

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On this day...
1098 Christian Crusaders seize Antioch, Turkey
1539 Hernando De Soto claims Florida for Spain
1770 Mission San Carlos Borromeo de Carmelo founded in Calif
1781 Jack Jouett rides to warn Jefferson of British attack
1789 Alex Mackenzie explores Mackenzie River (Canada)
1851 1st baseball uniforms worn. Knickerbockers wear straw hat, white shirt & blue long trousers
1860 Comanche, Iowa completely destroyed by 1 of a series of tornadoes
1861 1st Civil War land battle-Union defeats Confederacy at Philippi, WV
1864 Battle of Cold Harbour continues
1875 C H F Peters discovers asteroid #144 Vibilia & #145 Adeona
1884 John Lynch (R-MS) chosen 1st black major-party natl convention chair
1888 "Casey at the Bat" published (SF Examiner)
1916 ROTC established by Act of Congress
1918 Supreme Court rules child labor laws unconstitutional
1919 Liberty Life Insurance Co (Chicago) organized by blacks
1921 A sudden cloudburst kills 120 near Pikes Peak, Colorado
1924 Gila Wilderness Area established by Forest Service
1925 Goodyear airship "Pilgrim" makes 1st flight (1st with enclosed cabin)
1929 1st trade show at Atlantic City Convention Center (electric light)
1933 A's score 11 runs in 2nd, Yanks score 10 in 5th & win 17-11 (Great pitchin)
1933 Pope Pius XI encyclical "On oppression of the Church in Spain"
1937 Duke of Windsor (Edward 8) weds Mrs Wallis Warfield Simpson in France
1948 200" (5.08 m) Hale telescope dedicated at Palomar Observatory
1948 Korczak Ziolkowski begins sculpture of Crazy Horse near Mt Rushmore
1949 1st negro to graduate from US Naval Academy (Wesley Anthony Brown)
1949 Dragnet is 1st broadcast on radio (KFI in Los Angeles)
1957 Howard Cosell's 1st TV show
1959 1st US Air Force Academy graduation
1964 Rolling Stones begin 1st US tour (with Bobby Goldsboro & Bobby Vee)
1965 Gemini 4 launched; 2nd US 2-man flight (McDivitt & White)
1966 European DX Council formed in Copenhagen (shortwave listeners)
1966 Gemini 9 launched; 7th US 2-man flight (Stafford & Cernan)
1968 Yanks turn 21st triple-play in their history lose 4-3 to Twins
1971 Chic Cub Ken Holtzman 2nd no-hitter beats Cin Reds, 1-0
1976 US presented with oldest known copy of Magna Carta
1977 Balt Orioles pull their 6th triple play (9-6-4-6-6 vs KC Royals)
1979 Ex-president Idi Amin of Uganda flees to Libya
1980 Crew of Soyuz 36 returns to Earth aboard Soyuz 35
1980 ESPN begins televising college world series games
1980 Jimmy Carter wins enough delegates for renomination
1981 Pope John Paul II released from hospital after attempt on life
1986 E F Helin discovers asteroid #3767
1987 Cubs & Astro tie Oriole & Ranger record of 3 grand slams in a game
1989 Troops in China shoot & kill 100s of students demonstrating for democracy in Tiananmen Square, Beijing
1991 Mount Unzen erupts in Japan. Worst eruption in Japanese history
1991 France signed the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which prohibits signatories from helping other countries to acquire nuclear weapons.
1993 President Clinton announces he was withdrawing the nomination of University of Pennsylvania law professor Lani Guinier to head the civil rights division of the Justice Department.

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Holidays
Note: Some Holidays are only applicable on a given "day of the week"

Kentucky, Louisana : Confederate Memorial Day (1868)
Massachusetts : Teachers' Day (Sunday)
Ireland : Bank Day (Monday)
Bahamas : Labour Day (Friday)
New Zealand : Queen's Birthday (Monday)
Western Australia : Foundation Day (1838)(Monday)
Japan : Broken Dolls Day
National Frozen Yogurt Week (Day 4)
National Adopt-a-Cat Month

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Religious Observances
Buddhist : Memorial of Broken Dolls
RC : Feast of St Clotilda, queen of the Franks
RC, Ang : Mem of SS Charles Lwanga & 21 companions, Ugandan martyrs
Luth : Commemoration of John XXIII, Bishop of Rome
RC : Solemnity of Corpus Christi (Body & Blood of Christ)

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Religious History
1098 Armies of the First Crusade (1096-99) captured the city of Antioch (in modern Syria).
1726 Birth of Philip William Otterbein, German Reformed pastor who in 1800 helped found the Church of the United Brethren in Christ (an early branch of the modern United Methodist Church).
1853 Central College was chartered in Pella, Iowa under Baptist auspices. (In 1916 the university passed to Dutch Reformed leadership.)
1930 Missionary linguist Frank C. Laubach wrote in a letter: 'As we grow older all our paths diverge, and in all the world I suppose I could find nobodym who could wholly understand me excepting God.'
1972 In Cincinnati, Ohio, Sally J. Priesand, 25, became the first woman in Reform Judaism to be ordained as a rabbi.

Source: William D. Blake. ALMANAC OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1987.

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Thought for the day :
"They know enough who know how to learn."

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Actual Newspaper Headlines...
Air Head Fired

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Why did the Chicken cross the Road...
Locke:
Because he was exercising his natural right to liberty

---

Dumb Laws...
Ohio:
Citation: Section 2331.12
General Assembly: 100.
Bill Number: House Bill 1
Effective Date: 10-1-53

No person shall be arrested during a sitting of the senate or house of representatives, within the hall where such session is being held, or in any court of justice, during the sitting of such court, or on Sunday, or on the fourth day of July.

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A Cowboy's Guide to Life...
If you get to thinkin' you're a person of some influence, try orderin' somebody else's dog around.

[Valin]

Hot Flash
By Alan W. Dowd

Warriors from a New World
http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18058/article_detail.asp

On June 6, it will have been 60 years since the D-Day landings at Normandy. In the greatest air-sea invasion in history, the allies hurled 160,000 men, 5,000 ships, 2,300 planes and 840 gliders across the English Channel. They lost 2,400 dead in the first 24 hours--three times the number killed in a year of fighting in Iraq.



An invasion of a different kind will take place this weekend, as presidents and prime ministers descend on the Channel coast to commemorate Operation Overlord. They will solemnly intone about the lessons of history; the importance of transatlantic partnership; the need for sacrifice and bravery in the face of a new form of terror and tyranny. And they cannot be faulted for wanting to use this occasion to draw those parallels: The allied invasion of Normandy and the allied invasion and reconstruction of Iraq are indeed pivotal moments in history. Now as then, the ultimate trajectory of history will be determined by a small and bloodied band of democracies--and the warriors who defend them.



Which is why the politicians who will descend on Normandy beach on June 6 would do well to step out of the spotlight and let the troops take this curtain call. Their story says more about the measure of a nation, the value of an alliance, the high stakes of failure, and the true cost of freedom than anything a speechwriter could pen. So I'll take my own advice, and let the story speak for itself.



Somewhere in the mass of humanity that stormed the beaches, rode the seas, and screamed through the heavens on June 6, 1944, were two individual soldiers who embodied the American fighting man of World War II. They gave flesh and bone to Churchill's desperate dream after Dunkirk--"the New World, with all its power and might, step[ping] forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old." Here are some small parts of their stories:



*****



The first soldier was the son of a physician, a city boy who grew up in the middle class of Middle America. In keeping with his family's Irish roots, he was a devout Catholic. (And staying true to form, he would be a lifelong Democrat.) He went to Notre Dame during the Depression but had to leave school (and a promising golf career) to take care of his family after his father passed away. There was no time for "finding yourself."



When war came, he enlisted as an officer in the Army Air Force. On D-Day, he found himself as a second-seater in a C-47, towing gliders over Hitler's Atlantic Wall.



He never cussed. When someone said something off-color or risque, he would leave the room. Indeed, even though he had to grow up fast, he had a childlike innocence about him always. He used to quip that he didn't find out the big secret about Santa Clause until December of 1943, when he was deployed to England.



Like so many of his generation, this first soldier was also optimistic and patriotic, stoic and humble. I guess if there was a trace of pride in him, it was the kind that he showed for his family. In fact, when his sons or grandchildren would ask what he did to earn the Silver Star his wife kept on display in the living room, he would always say, "The Army gave me that for being first in the chow line 30 days in a row." Then he'd grin, take a sip of beer, and change the subject. As far as I know, no one ever pried that secret from his humble heart.



Likewise, modesty and patriotism and optimism seemed hard-wired into our second D-Day soldier. But the similarities would end there. Rather than coming from a patrician family, this second soldier was a dirt-poor farm boy from rural Texas. The Dustbowl and Depression had humbled his father and dashed his own dreams of independence.



He could cuss like a sailor. He was anything but stoic. And he was a lifelong Republican. Although raised a Southern Baptist, he wasn't much for religion. He was bothered by the hypocrisy. "Anyone who tells me 'Do as I say, not as I do,' isn't worth my time," he used to say. Yet he was always deferent to the beliefs of others; he especially admired it when someone's words matched their actions.



The second soldier entered the Army Air Force just out of high school and quickly became a radio operator for a signals intelligence unit detached to larger units throughout the war. He was a radioman on 13 B-26 missions before D-Day. On one of those missions, he was shot down over the Channel. After D-Day, he found himself trapped, along with the 101st Airborne, in Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. He brought back more nightmares than medals--images of Dachau and dead buddies, starving civilians and crash landings. But the nightmares didn't poison him. He somehow rose above them.



On D-Day itself, he punched through Fortress Europe in a glider, courtesy of a C-47. No one knows if it was Alfred Dowd's plane towing Willard Eason's glider in the predawn darkness of June 6. But I like to think these men were tethered together, if only for a moment, as they streaked into the unknown. I think about that moment often, especially around June 6. That's because these "D-Day everymen" were my grandfathers. I get my first name from Grandpa Dowd and my middle name from Grandpa Eason.



*****



Their story has some resonance beyond the Dowd and Eason families because of what they were and what they became. I disagree with the notion that men like this are ordinary men who did extraordinary things. They did extraordinary things because they were extraordinary men, because, like silver-haired Clark Kents, they walked among us without pretense. They were extraordinary, simply and sadly, because there weren't--and aren't--many like them. As historian John Keegan writes in his History of Warfare, "Soldiers are not as other men." And Normandy's soldiers are not as other soldiers.



They are better than the rest of us, not because they wore a uniform, but because of what they did in that uniform. Ordinary men don't topple dictators, liberate continents, rescue civilization, and then return home as if they had been on a long vacation. Some say it's wrong to put men like this on a pedestal, but I say it's wrong not to. We need them there to remind us of the price of our freedom.

The Greatest Generation doesn't have a monopoly on this greatness. The spirit of Utah Beach and Omaha Beach--and, yes, Sword, Juno and Gold--lives on in the liberators of Iraq and Afghanistan, in the hundreds of thousands who hunt our enemies and protect us from an evil just as real and insidious as Hitler. Like the boys of Normandy, they are not only liberating an Old World--they are building a new one as well.