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Posted on 12/09/2003 12:00:46 AM PST by SAMWolf
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 are acknowledged, affirmed and commemorated.
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| Our Mission: The FReeper Foxhole is dedicated to Veterans of our Nation's military forces and to others who are affected in their relationships with Veterans. In the FReeper Foxhole, Veterans or their family members should feel free to address their specific circumstances or whatever issues concern them in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, brotherhood and support. The FReeper Foxhole hopes to share with it's readers an open forum where we can learn about and discuss military history, military news and other topics of concern or interest to our readers be they Veteran's, Current Duty or anyone interested in what we have to offer. If the Foxhole makes someone appreciate, even a little, what others have sacrificed for us, then it has accomplished one of it's missions. We hope the Foxhole in some small way helps us to remember and honor those who came before us.
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Even as the likelihood of Japanese aggression mounted in the 1930s, Alaska and the Aleutian Island chain remained virtually undefended. Although the Aleutians themselves stretch nearly 900 nautical miles west from the tip of the Alaskan Peninsula to the outermost island of Attu – and reach to within 650 nautical miles of what was then Japan’s northernmost naval base at Paramushiro in the Kurile Islands – they seemed unlikely candidates for Japanese conquest. Cold, inhospitable, virtually unpopulated, totally lacking in any natural resources but fish, and afflicted with some of the worst weather in the world, the Aleutians held little military interest for either the United States or Japan.  The Aleutian Islands stretch 900 nautical miles westward from the Alaskan Peninsula to the outermost island of Attu, only 650 miles from what was then Japan’s northernmost naval base at Paramushiro in the Kurile Islands. The principal U.S. base was at Dutch Harbor on the island of Unalaska. Even so, with the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1937, defense of the northeast Pacific region assumed new importance, and seaplane bases were established first at Sitka, southwest of Juneau – and later on Kodiak Island (south of the Alaskan Peninsula) and at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska in the eastern Aleutians. The last two of these were also provided with the support facilities for basing six submarines each, and by late 1941, they were ready for operation under a newly-formed Alaskan Naval Sector, part of the 13th Naval District headquartered in Seattle. When the war began, the sector commander controlled a small force of hand-me-down gunboats, two World War I destroyers, and a few Coast Guard cutters and improvised patrol craft, plus ten PBY Catalina flying boats. Meanwhile, the Army had established an Alaskan Defense Command and begun the construction of an airfield on Umnak, near Dutch Harbor, from which land-based bombers could be staged.  This 1943 view of the U.S. submarine base at Dutch Harbor, Alaska conveys the icy desolation that characterized the Aleutians campaign. Originally established as a seaplane base in the late 1930s, Dutch Harbor also had provision for six submarines by the opening of the war. As an adjunct to Admiral Yamamoto’s plan for the invasion of Midway in June 1942, the Dutch Harbor facilities were heavily damaged on the 3rd and 4th in bombing raids by carrier aircraft from IJS Ryujo and IJS Junyo. After Pearl Harbor – and in accordance with the Rainbow Five war plan – COMSUBPAC RADM Thomas Withers sent two older submarines, S-18 (SS-123) and S-23 (SS-128) to Alaska from the U.S. West Coast, and they arrived at Dutch Harbor on 27 January 1942. Within two weeks, they had departed on their first war patrols, defensive sweeps south of the Aleutian chain and easterly toward Kodiak Island. Although no contact was made with the enemy, the two S-boats were the first to experience the full rigor of the weather and ocean conditions that characterized Alaskan submarine operations for two miserable years. An entry in S-23’s deck log for 13 February 1942 notes: Shipped heavy sea over bridge. All hands on bridge bruised and battered. Officer of the Deck suffered broken nose. Solid stream of water down hatch for 65 seconds. Put high pressure pump on control room bilges; dry after two hours… Barometer 29.60, thirty knot wind from northwest.  RADM “Fritz” Harlfinger, who served on S-boats in the Aleutians, later described how dreadful it was: The conditions those boats endured up there are simply indescribable. It was God awful. Cold. Dreary. Foggy. Ice glaze. The periscopes froze. The decks and lifelines were caked with ice. Blizzards. You could never get a navigational fix.  Savage arctic storms often swept down on Dutch Harbor, striking buildings with a wind nearing 100 miles an hour. The gales could easily wreck unprotected planes and tossed lumber and machinery about like paper. These storms caused more damage than Japanese air raids and were dreaded by the Navy Moreover, the tides, currents, and weather throughout the region were often unpredictable and frequently treacherous, and the rocks and shoals of the island-studded archipelago posed a constant danger under the usual conditions of poor visibility from driving snow and rain, particularly during the long northern nights. After their relatively brief patrols, S-18 and S-23 returned to San Diego for an overhaul that included superstructure modifications and additional internal heating in accordance with the “lessons-learned” from their first Alaskan experience. Simultaneously, a division of six additional S-boats – originally intended for Brisbane, Australia – was redirected to Dutch Harbor. These submarines – S-30 through S-35 (SS-135 through 140) – arrived in the theater between April and August 1942, to be augmented by S-27 (SS-132) and S-28 (SS-133), which headed north from San Diego in late May. Thus, when S-18 and S-23 completed their overhauls and returned to the theater at that same time, a total of ten S-boats had been assigned to Alaskan waters. In April, on the first Dutch Harbor war patrols into Japanese territory, both S-34 and S-35 penetrated as far as Paramushiro, but despite several attacks on merchant ships, they scored no successes.  Capt.(Later Rear Admiral) Robert A. Theobald Even before the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May 1942, cryptologic intelligence had revealed that Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s next major offensive in the central Pacific would be the invasion of Midway Island, some 1,100 miles west of Hawaii early in June. This main attack would be accompanied by a diversionary thrust toward the Aleutian Islands. In response to the latter, CINCPAC Admiral Chester Nimitz assigned two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and ten destroyers to a North Pacific Force under RADM Robert Theobald, who also assumed command of the existing “Alaska Navy,” including the Dutch Harbor submarines, then under CAPT Oswald Colclough. Since RADM Theobald expected the Japanese attack – possibly including amphibious landings – to be directed against military facilities on the Alaskan Peninsula and the eastern Aleutians, he deployed his main surface force south and west of Kodiak Island during the first days of June. Of the six submarines that had already arrived in the theater, four were set to patrolling off the approaches to the expected Japanese objectives in the east and the remaining two as far west as Attu in hopes of intercepting the enemy.  Japanese Bomb Dutch Harbor In fact, RADM Theobald’s surface task force made no contact at all with the Japanese. Except for bombing raids by aircraft from the carriers IJS Ryujo and IJS Junyo on Dutch Harbor on 3 and 4 June, Japan had no designs whatsoever on the eastern Aleutians, and all along had planned only to occupy Attu, Kiska, and Adak well to the west. Several thousand miles to the south, however, the Japanese suffered a major setback in the Battle of Midway on the 4th through the 6th, and Admiral Yamamoto had nearly cancelled the Aleutian invasions. In the event, he was persuaded by his staff to proceed with the seizure of Attu and Kiska, which was accomplished without opposition on the 6th and 7th. The attempt on Adak was abandoned. Only S-34 and S-35 were in any position to oppose the Japanese landings. Both had been patrolling north of Attu since the end of May, but neither had sighted any elements of the invasion force by the time they were ordered back to Dutch Harbor on 11 June.  LCDR Howard Gilmore To consolidate their hold on Attu and Kiska, the Japanese began convoying reinforcements and supplies into the islands from Paramushiro and Ominato (on northern Hokkaido). To protect these supply lines, they formed a powerful task force around the heavy carrier Zuikaku, the light carriers Zuiho, Ryujo, and Junyo, and two battleships, which operated south of the western Aleutians until mid-July. these were discontinued in August 1942 in favor of supporting the Guadalcanal campaign, seven fleet boats had made sorties into the northern theater – in order, Growler (SS-215), Triton (SS-201), Finback (SS-230), Grunion (SS-216), Trigger (SS-237), Tuna (SS-203), and Gato (SS-212).  SS Growler Of these, only Growler, Triton, and Grunion scored sinkings. The most spectacular success was achieved by Growler under LCDR Howard Gilmore – later to be awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. On 5 July, Gilmore came upon three Japanese destroyers anchored off Kiska and in his first attack of the war loosed torpedoes at all three, scoring hits on each. Growler went deep to avoid two torpedoes fired back at her, but when the smoke cleared, one of the destroyers – IJS Arare – had sunk, and the other two were so severely damaged they had to be towed back to Japan for repairs. Similarly, the day before, Triton sank another destroyer off the island of Agattu, and Grunion destroyed two patrol craft near Kiska on the 15th. Unfortunately, that same war patrol ended tragically, because contact was lost with Grunion after 30 July, and she was never heard from again.
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I know the plan was to take Attu and Kiska to provide a diversion for the attack on Midway, but I still shake my head over that strategy. Two islands of no strategic or economic importance whatsoever. I'm half surprised Nimitz didn't tell them, "you want them that bad, keep 'em." And what commander would would ever take the bait and leave Midway and the Hawaiian Islands lightly defended to go rescue Attu and Kiska??? Whoever dreamed that plan up had gotten into the Sake cabinet.
I have to agree with you on that one. I don't know who really got the worst of "Tying up enemy forces" us or the Japanese, both sides needed everything they could get into the main areas of combat. Those carriers might have made a difference in the Battle of Midway, even though they weren't top line fleet carriers.
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Isn't it? It could be puke green and flaming magenta, and it would still symbolize beautiful ideas, but that arrangement of red, white and blue really is one of the most beautiful sights around.
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