The FReeper Foxhole Remembers Utah Beach - The Seaborne Assault (6/6/1944)

The 4th Division Pushes Inland

While combat engineers prepared the beaches for the follow-up of additional men and materiel, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 8th Infantry proceeded on their altered mission. When General Roosevelt and the battalion commanders became aware of the error in the landings, it was decided to reduce the enemy strong points immediately confronting them and proceed inland to their original objective. Directly in front of the 1st Battalion was the fortification in and around Madeleine, and facing the 2d Battalion approximately 1,300 yards to the southeast, was another fortification, just south of the Exit 2 road. These were field fortifications placed to cover the causeway roads; they were not formidable. They were all taken by forces of company size or less against light opposition. Other troops cleaned out houses along the road running parallel with the beach. The enemy coastal garrisons, apparently demoralized by the preparatory bombardment, showed little fight; some did not fire at all.

Two or three hours were consumed in eliminating opposition in the beach area and in reorganizing for the advance inland. The two battalions then diverged, the 1st moving north and then inland through Exit 3, and the 2d moving down the coast to Exit 1. By this time additional waves of infantrymen had landed. At approximately 0745 (H plus 75 minutes) the 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry (initially attached to the 8th Infantry), touched down on Green Beach and moved north along the coast to reduce beach strong points. The 3d Battalion of the 8th Infantry landed in the same waves on Red Beach and moved inland across Exit 2. Four battalions of infantry had thus landed by 0800. Two more came in at about 1000-the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, on the northern beach and the 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, on the southern. According to plan these two battalions were to march inland through Exit 4. Since the eastern end of this exit was still covered by enemy fire and the causeways to the south were already congested, some of the 22d Infantry's units were compelled to wade two miles through the inundations. Elements of the 12th Infantry, which landed shortly after noon, also waded through the flooded area. The water was generally only waist-deep, but the area was full of ditches and holes, and men frequently dropped into water over their heads. Since the 22d Infantry's objective lay to the northwest in the direction of St. Germain-de-Varreville, it had to cross the Exit 3 road and wade through the swamps. In doing so it found itself crossing rear elements of the 8th Infantry moving west on the road.

This was only part of the traffic congestion resulting from the errors in landing. The original traffic plan envisaged the use of Exit 2 and Exit 3 for vehicles. Exit 3 could not be used because of the nearness of enemy positions to the north. Consequently all vehicles tried to use Exit 2. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, supported by tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion and engineers of the 237th Engineer Combat Battalion, had begun to move down the causeway to Exit 2. Halfway down the causeway it found that the culvert over a small stream had been blown, and the road was covered by an antitank gun off to the right. The first tank was stopped by a mine. Another was knocked of the road by an anti- tank gun. It was not until a third tank silenced the enemy gun that the column proceeded to ford the stream. The blown culvert never really obstructed traffic; Major Tabb of the Beach Obstacle Task Force immediately brought up a platoon of engineers and built a small treadway bridge.

The Sea Wall At the Eastern American Beach (Utah Beach)

Meanwhile a great many vehicles accumulated in the areas behind the beach. Enemy shelling of the beach intensified during the morning but fortunately did not hit the parking fields. Beginning about noon Exit 2 became jammed with trucks. Engineer work parties had unloaded bridging equipment on the causeway, an antiaircraft half-track had taken up a position on the road, and a signal truck was slowly laying wire. Exit 2 was narrow and practically without shoulders. At noon, General Barton, concerned over an enemy tank threat, ordered that the road be cleared for antitank guns, even if other vehicles had to be pushed into the swamp. Late in the day there was still considerable congestion east of the bridge because trucks were maneuvering to reclaim partly mired vehicles.

After the capture of the coastal positions the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, moved north and then west on the causeway to Exit 3. Despite enemy artillery fire, it crossed the inundated area and reached the vicinity of Turqueville by evening.

The aircraft engine nacelle and propeller are top right. Dark patches are cloud shadows. German flooding of the low pasturelands immediately west of the beach was planned to limit American accessibility to the higher ground. Further west along the top of the photo can be seen the flooded Merderet River valley, also a defensive tactic that caused grievous losses to the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. On the beach, landing craft are bringing in General Barton's 4th Infantry Division. Two causeways carry vehicles and men westbound to relieve the paratroopers holding the causeways western exits. Over the following months ships off loaded supplies and men across the beach in volumes comparable to the port of Philadelphia.

The 3d Battalion moved west beyond Exit 2, meeting little opposition until just north of Ste. Marie-du-Mont. There, at Germain, it encountered enemy dugouts, underground shelters, three or four 88-mm. guns, and smaller weapons. After a short fire fight, the battalion closed in. Fifty Germans were cut down as they broke and ran; a hundred were taken prisoner. At night the battalion bivouacked north of les Forges, confronting the high ground south of Ste. Mere-Eglise. Company K took up a position far to the left and sent one platoon to Chef-du-Pont to establish contact with the 82d Airborne Division. The 2d Battalion moved straight south toward Pouppeville. Colonel MacNeely (commanding the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry), scheduled to land at H plus 30 minutes, had decided to go in earlier. When he landed, Company F was already moving in to reduce the fortification confronting it. Company E had found a path through the mine field behind the dunes and followed it under artillery fire without losing a man. Colonel MacNeely shortly had his battalion in hand and, while Company F was still engaged, he moved Company E around behind Company F and led it down the road along the eastern edge of the inundations. Company G moved south also, hugging the sea wall. The battalion encountered continuous small-arms fire all the way down the coast. Company G received artillery fire as it approached the strong point at Beau Guillot, and ran into a mine field, but decided to move through. The battalion was assembled at the road junction northeast of Pouppeville and then advanced on the village, where first contact was made with the 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry.

The battalion thus bypassed some enemy positions at the southern tip of the inundated area, including the lock north of Grand Vey which in part controlled the inundations. The lock, which was originally the mission of Company G, 8th Infantry, was secured later by Company A, 49th Engineer Combat Battalion. In the course of reducing the surrounding enemy defenses, the engineers took 12S prisoners. The 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, relieved the 3d Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry, at Pouppeville. From there it pushed on west and at night it bivouacked just south of the main road intersection at les Forges.

DD-Tanks made it ashore at Utah Beach

The 8th Infantry had reached its D-Day objectives. It had relieved elements of the 101st Airborne Division in the Pouppeville area and was in a position to protect the southwest flank of the 4th Division. Only north of les Forges did it encounter . difficulties. A finger of strong enemy resistance extended through Fauville to Turqueville. Entrenched along a ridge, the enemy cut the les Forges-Ste. Mere-Eglise highway, and prevented contact between the 8th Infantry and the main body of the 82d Airborne Division at Ste. Mere-Eglise. Attacked earlier in the day by the 505th Parachute Infantry troops from Ste. Mere-Eglise, the Germans had apparently given some ground to the north but had consolidated again at Fauville.

Late in the afternoon the advance elements of the seaborne "Howell Force," which was attached to the 82d Airborne Division and commanded by Col. E. D. Raff, followed the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, across Exit 2. They were to join the 82d Airborne Division at Ste. Mere-Eglise. When the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, came up against the enemy positions on the high ground to the north, it requested artillery but did not intend to advance farther that evening. Colonel Raff, on the other hand, considered it necessary to attempt forcing his way through in order to accomplish his mission. He was also concerned over clearing the area to permit the landing of gliderborne artillery units of the division scheduled to come in at 2100.

An 88-millimetre gun points seaward from a casemate at Les-Dunes-de-Varraville, Utah Beach

Twice tanks and infantry struck at the German defenses and were turned back. One tank was disabled in the first attempt; two were destroyed in the second. The enemy had not been budged at 2100 when, on schedule, sixty C-47's appeared over the area with gliders in tow. Despite heavy enemy fire most of the gliders were cast loose over the German positions. Some came down in enemy lines; some drifted farther south; most crash landed with high casualties. Colonel Raff was able to gather only miscellaneous personnel to help set up a defensive line against enemy counterattack. And there in the vicinity of les Forges his force spent the night.

The other two regiments of the 4th Division did not reach their D-Day objectives. After wading through the inundated area, the 12th Infantry came up on the left of the 502d Parachute Infantry south of Beuzeville- au-Plain, and remained there for the night. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 22d Infantry, which also had to wade inland through the swamps and spend about seven hours in the marsh, reached dry land in the vicinity of St. Martin-de-Varreville and moved on to St. Germain-de-Varreville, where they bivouacked for the night. The 3d Battalion, 22d Infantry, as already noted, was assigned the task of reducing enemy beach strong points. The battalion moved north past les Dunes de Varreville and the Exit 4 road and reached the southern edge of Hamel de Cruttes by nightfall.

1 posted on 11/25/2003 12:00:30 AM PST by SAMWolf

To: snippy_about_it; PhilDragoo; Johnny Gage; Victoria Delsoul; Darksheare; Valin; bentfeather; radu; ..

The Landing in Retrospect

The relative ease with which the assault on Utah Beach was accomplished was surprising even to the attackers, and gave the lie to the touted impregnability of the Atlantic Wall. The 4th Division's losses for D Day were astonishingly low. The 8th and 22d Infantry Regiments, which landed before noon, suffered a total of 118 casualties on D Day, 12 of them fatalities. The division as a whole suffered only 197 casualties during the day, and these included 60 men missing through the loss (at sea) of part of Battery B, 29th Field Artillery Battalion. Not less noteworthy than the small losses was the speed of the landings. With the exception of one field artillery battalion (the 20th) the entire 4th Division had landed in the first fifteen hours. In addition there came ashore one battalion of the 359th Infantry, the 65th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less two companies), the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions, components of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade which had begun organizing the beach for the build-up, seaborne elements of the airborne divisions, and many smaller units. A total of over 20,000 troops and 1,700 vehicles reached Utah Beach by the end of 6 June.

A headquarters area at Uncle Red sector. More and more men, equipment, and supplies are landing from ships and craft such as those shown at low tide in the background.

Corps headquarters had, up to the night of D Day, participated but very little in the initial beachhead operation. Consequently, all activity centered around the divisions and, more particularly, their subordinate units.

VII Corps Headquarters was actually divided on D Day. An advance detachment of the headquarters, under Maj. Gen. Eugene M. Landrum, had crossed Exit 2 late in the afternoon, paused in an orchard in the vicinity of la Houssaye at the west end of the causeway, and proceeded to Audouville-la-Hubert at 1900 to establish a command post only a few hundred yards from that of the 4th Division. But by nightfall higher headquarters still had little contact with most of the units on the Utah beachhead, and direction of the battle remained almost completely decentralized.

The Corps commander, General Collins, was at the close of D Day still aboard the Bayfield with the major portion of his staff. For a number of reasons the Corps commander had decided to maintain his headquarters aboard ship. The Bayfield had been especially fitted with radio communication in order that contact could be kept with V Corps on the left and with General Bradley, whose command ship was nearer the Omaha than the Utah Beach operation. The Bayfield was also prepared to receive radio communications directly from the two airborne divisions and from the 4th Division. Furthermore, General Collins wanted to be near Admiral Moon's headquarters to insure that landing operations would continue uninterrupted in spite of adverse weather. This decision was fortunate, for Admiral Moon became greatly concerned over the loss of some vessels in the Task Force. Late in the day he considered a recommendation of his staff to suspend landing operations during the night, but General Collins convinced him of the necessity of continuing landing operations as uninterruptedly as possible. This was agreed to.

Among the commanders who were on the ground and whose units were in contact with the enemy there were uncertainty and anxiety on the night of D Day. Most disturbing was the lack of information about other units. This uncertainty had already affected the decisions of many commanders on D Day, and was most keenly felt by the airborne units, particularly the 82d Airborne Division, which had little or no knowledge of the course of the battle on other parts of the beachhead.

The anxiety experienced by some ground commanders on the night of D Day was not as keenly felt at higher headquarters, where a somewhat broader picture of the operation was obtainable. Some assuring reports had reached the Bayfield on the course of the operation. General Collins had heard as early as 0700 or 0800 that the 101st had taken St. Martin-de- Varreville, and by noon he had learned that definite contact had been established between the 4th Division and the 101st and that the beach exits were in their possession. These reports were particularly reassuring, for the greatest causes for concern had been the six 150-mm. guns reported at St. Martin-de-Varreville and the fear that the western ends of the causeways would be mined and held in strength. It was a great relief to learn that the inundated area had been crossed and that the exits were in American hands.

In general, on the Bayfield there was reason to believe that things were going well ashore, except for the lack of information about the 82d Airborne Division. General Collins' headquarters called the division repeatedly on D Day, but could not raise a single response. Early in the evening a report was received at 4th Division headquarters at Audouville-la-Hubert to the effect that elements of the division were being attacked from the northeast and south; but this message was not clearly identified as to its origin. Two-way communication with the 82d Airborne Division was not established on D Day. The first report did not come in until late during the night. However, with favorable reports from both the 4th and 101st Divisions, General Collins saw no need for any changes in the Corps plans. He was confident that the veteran 82d possessed the leadership and fighting ability to take care of itself until contact was made with other units ashore.

2 posted on 11/25/2003 12:01:39 AM PST by SAMWolf (Free the Heinz 57.)

German Reactions to the Landings

Apparently the Allied assault on Normandy had achieved tactical surprise in spite of the enemy's awareness of an impending invasion. This success could be attributed in part to the fact that the enemy defense plan for the Atlantic Wall included basic miscalculations and in addition could never be fully put into effect because of German helplessness in the air and the steady attrition of German forces on two other major fronts. The German effort to build permanent coastal defenses had been handicapped throughout the winter both by the inability of the crowded and bombed railroads to carry sufficient building materials and by the higher priority for men and materials which was assigned to the V-Bomb sites. Those defenses which were completed were concentrated most heavily in the area between the Somme and Seine Rivers which the Commander in Chief West consistently estimated as the most likely spot for an Allied invasion attempt. This region presented the most direct way to the Ruhr and from its excellent port, Le Havre, a fine road net led to the interior. Moreover, some effort had also to be expended to meet Hitler's insistence on maximum defense of the Channel Islands. It was not until May 1944, when the imminence of a landing became obvious to all, that Hitler reportedly foresaw, by "intuition," the likelihood of an assault on the Cotentin Peninsula. At that time it was too late to improve the fixed defenses. But additional antiaircraft and antitank weapons were emplaced in the peninsula, one more division (the 91st) was moved there, and units were supplied with "extra weapons mainly of a type useful in combating airborne troops."

Though the landings in Normandy might have been foreseen. it was not considered likely that they would constitute the main Allied effort. For weeks after the Normandy invasion Hitler and his generals continued to expect a second major effort in the Somme area and kept the Fifteenth Army there to meet it.

The army high command also found it difficult to agree on the best method of dealing with the invasion once it struck. One faction of the high command wanted to retain the bulk of the armored reserves well inland for eventual employment in mass counterattack. Field Marshal Rommel, on the other hand, was adamant in his contention that all reserves should be moved in as close to the coast as possible. He thought that it would be impossible to throw back an invasion once it had gained a foothold and that Allied air power would make impracticable extended troop movements. His view, backed by prior experience in North Africa, prevailed and in May three of the four armored divisions in strategic reserve, the 21st Panzer Division, 12th SS-Panzer Division, and 2d Panzer Division, were moved into Normandy proper-one to the south of Caen and two to the Alencon-Evreux region. Henceforth the Germans were committed to the coastal areas as their main line of resistance with all the dangers inherent in such an extended linear defense.

If there were some doubts on the wisdom of the plan, there were none on what was at stake. The Germans recognized from the beginning that failure to repel the invasion at the outset would rapidly unbalance both their tactical and strategic positions. Given a foothold, the Americans and British could ultimately win the race for the build-up of men and supplies, and so make it impossible to dislodge the enemy forces. But if the landings could be pushed back into the sea at once, it as likely that invasion would not be attempted again in the near future and perhaps not at all. Germany would then have a large part of the sixty western divisions for use as reserves against the Russians.

Considering the importance attached to fast and total reaction to any attempt to crack the Atlantic Wall, it is notable that so little German air power was used against the beachheads. Apparently Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, considered at one time the possibility of committing the whole of his fighter force against the expected invasion, but was forced to abandon the idea. Allied bombings had hit hard at Luftwaffe ground installations in France, and by moving large numbers of fighters to France, months ahead of time, the Luftwaffe would have been inviting destructive fights with Allied planes which it could not afford. Moreover, Goering was reluctant for obvious political as well as military reasons to strip Germany of fighter protection.

Two 386th Bomb Group's planes over Utah Beach heading back to base after mission. Great aerial view of Utah Beach after invasion forces moved inland. Extremely accurate low level bombing just 5 minutes before first forces landed enabled an unheard of low total of casualties. Beach is littered with landing craft and bomb craters which created instant fox holes for our troops. The enemy was killed, wounded or so stunned they offered little or no resistance.

Even though Allied control of the air and sea, together with bad weather, had curtailed German reconnaissance, enemy intelligence had secured a fairly accurate picture of Allied strength and estimated that the invasion would come as soon after 1 April as weather permitted. Yet the Germans had no knowledge of Allied plans for artificial ports and they under estimated the speed with which the build-up could take place across the beaches. Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl figured that the landing of about six American divisions across open beaches would require from five to six days and thought that within that time the German tactical reserves could be committed in a main counterattack. Actually the early build-up was much more rapid-within four days six and one-half divisions were ashore-and the movement of German troops took three or four times longer than expected. Despite the German command's estimate in May that an Allied invasion attempt was imminent, the actual landfall on 6 June took the enemy by surprise. Field Marshal Rommel was not present at the front, and the troops in the sector attacked had been taken out of their defense positions to construct additional fortifications.

Word of the Allied landings reached Hitler's headquarters about four hours after the first airborne troops came down in the peninsula, but it was not until several hours later that the landings were reported as part of a full-scale invasion and not until late in the day that even the Seventh Army realized that seaborne landings had taken place at Utah. The German high command released two of the four armored divisions in Seventh Army reserve for employment in Normandy; the expectation was that these reserves would arrive in the battle area by the end of D Day. The Sturm Battalion AOK 7 (Assault Battalion, Seventh Army) was ordered from Cherbourg into the beachhead sector. But generally the Seventh Army command was sure that the coastal forces could cope with the invaders. No other major troop shifts were ordered at the time. The German command still feared further landings elsewhere on the French coast, especially in the area between the Somme and Seine Rivers.

4th Division troops shelter behind a concrete wall while others advance off the beach

The disposition of the enemy forces in the Cotentin largely confirmed Allied estimates of the enemy Order of Battle prior to D Day. Manning the coastal defenses at Utah Beach was the 919th Regiment of the 709th Division. Other units of this division (729th and 739th Regiments) were identified as they reached the battle area from positions farther up the coast. It developed that there was no Georgian regiment in the 709th Division as believed in G-2 estimates prior to D Day, but the 729th Regiment had an 0st Battalion (the 649th), and the 739th Regiment a Georgian battalion (the 795th), the latter of which was encountered in the Ste. Mere-Eglise area. Both the 795th Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 919th Regiment (which was at Utah Beach), lost communications with higher headquarters early on D Day. Elements of the latter escaped over the Carentan Canal and joined other German units southeast of the Douve River.

Pre-D-Day intelligence had placed only the 716th Division southeast of Carentan, but elements of the 352d Division had also moved into this area. The 6th Parachute Regiment, located near Carentan, had not been listed separately in VII Corps' enemy Order of Battle, but had been mentioned in intelligence reports of higher headquarters as part of the 91st Division. The 1057th and 1058th Regiments, also part of this division, were identified along the Merderet as expected.

Covering the west coast of the Cotentin was the 243 Division, with about half its personnel manning beach fortifications and the remainder occupying higher ground a few kilometers inland, with the mission of breaking up any attempted airborne attack. This division was in the process of reorganization which would have upgraded it from its limited employment category and given it greater mobility. Its retraining and reequipment, however, had not been completed. Units of the division were ordered to regroup eastward early on D Day and were identified in the invasion area a few days later.

Unpreparedness of the enemy in ground and air defense, his indecision which tied up reserves, and his miscalculation of both his own and Allied capabilities played perhaps as important a part in allowing Allied forces to establish a foothold on the Continent on D Day as the efforts of the assaulting troops themselves. In the week that followed, the same enemy weaknesses, exploited in particular by overwhelming Allied air power which provided time for powerful build-up over the beaches, was to insure that Allied invasion forces had come to stay.

Additional Sources:

www.history.navy.mil
users.skynet.be
www.normandybattlefields.com
www.tuxjunction.net
www.bbc.co.uk
www.planetrainbowsix.com
www.jack-travel.com
search.eb.com
www.skylighters.org
pages.zdnet.com

3 posted on 11/25/2003 12:02:06 AM PST by SAMWolf (Free the Heinz 57.)

"Utah" was the code name for the farthest beach on the right of the five landing areas of the Normandy Invasion. Located on the eastern shore of the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, it was a late addition to the areas scheduled for invasion. The original Overlord plan did not call for a landing on the Cotentin, but General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, added it to ensure an early capture of the port of Cherbourg at the northern tip of the peninsula.

The Utah landing area was approximately three miles (5 kilometres) wide and was located northwest of the Carentan estuary on sandy, duned beaches. Compared to German fortifications at Omaha Beach, the defenses at Utah, based on fixed infantry positions, were sparse because the low-lying areas immediately behind the landing area were flooded and the Germans could control the flooding with locks. Four causeways exited the beach through the flooded lowlands and severely restricted movement inland. Indeed, all land traffic was restricted to established routes, especially through the important crossroads towns of Carentan and Sainte-Mère-Église. Defenses along the causeways consisted mostly of strong points equipped with automatic weapons. Two miles inland were some coastal and field artillery batteries. The defending forces consisted of elements of the German 709th, 243rd, and 91st Infantry Divisions.

The assault sectors at Utah Beach were designated (from west to east) Tare Green, Uncle Red, and Victor. The invasion was planned for Tare Green and Uncle Red, with the number 3 causeway almost in the middle of the landing area. H-Hour was scheduled for 0630 hours. The beach was to be assaulted by the U.S. 4th Infantry Division. The plan was to cross the beach and seize control of the coast roads, link up with airborne troops who were to have been dropped inland five hours earlier, and then be prepared to attack toward Cherbourg. The 8th Infantry Regiment was to attack first; supported by 32 special amphibious tanks in the first wave, it was to land opposite Les-Dunes-de-Varraville, a well-fortified area.

4 posted on 11/25/2003 12:02:29 AM PST by SAMWolf (Free the Heinz 57.)

Veterans for Constitution Restoration is a non-profit, non-partisan educational and grassroots activist organization. The primary area of concern to all VetsCoR members is that our national and local educational systems fall short in teaching students and all American citizens the history and underlying principles on which our Constitutional republic-based system of self-government was founded. VetsCoR members are also very concerned that the Federal government long ago over-stepped its limited authority as clearly specified in the United States Constitution, as well as the Founding Fathers' supporting letters, essays, and other public documents.

Tribute to a Generation - The memorial will be dedicated on Saturday, May 29, 2004.

Actively seeking volunteers to provide this valuable service to Veterans and their families.

5 posted on 11/25/2003 12:02:50 AM PST by SAMWolf (Free the Heinz 57.)

To: carton253; Matthew Paul; mark502inf; Skylight; The Mayor; Prof Engineer; PsyOp; Samwise; ...

FALL IN to the FReeper Foxhole!

Good Tuesday Morning Everyone

If you would like added to our ping list let us know.

6 posted on 11/25/2003 3:23:58 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

To: snippy_about_it

Good morning, Snippy and everyone at the Freeper Foxhole.

7 posted on 11/25/2003 3:28:19 AM PST by E.G.C.

Good morning EGC. Only 24 degrees and frost this morning. Brrr.

8 posted on 11/25/2003 3:46:49 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

To: snippy_about_it

9 posted on 11/25/2003 3:49:02 AM PST by manna

10 posted on 11/25/2003 3:51:21 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

To: snippy_about_it

Whose will those things be which you have provided? —Luke 12:20

If we pursue mere earthly gain,
We choose a path that ends in pain;
But joy will stay within the soul
When we pursue a heavenly goal

Life is more than the things we store.

11 posted on 11/25/2003 5:01:53 AM PST by The Mayor (Through prayer, finite man draws upon the power of the infinite God.)

To: snippy_about_it

Brrrrrrrr! 29 and frosty in UpState South Carolina this mornin'.

Mornin' Snippy,,,Mornin' Sam!

12 posted on 11/25/2003 5:38:24 AM PST by SCDogPapa (In Dixie Land I'll take my stand to live and die in Dixie)

Good read today SAM, thanks. Our troops at this beach landing were much more fortunate than troops at other beaches.

It's too bad about the number of casualties caused by the glider crashes landing at night mentioned.

However, as we learned from your previous coverage of the Airborne assault at Utah, nighttime landing of gliders was not a good idea.

It was interesting to read about the Navy and Army teams clearing the mines and other obstacles on the beach and now I need to research what a Belgian gate is. I'll be back later with my results. :)

13 posted on 11/25/2003 5:56:26 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

To: SAMWolf; All

For those who may have missed it, in addition to today's coverage of the Seaborne Assault behind Utah, we also covered the Airborne Assault Assault here.

The FReeper Foxhole Remembers The Airborne Assault Behind Utah Beach (6/5-6/1944) - Nov. 18th, 2003

14 posted on 11/25/2003 6:09:10 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

15 posted on 11/25/2003 6:09:35 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

Brrr is right. Looks like the cold front has moved way down south this morning, at least you can look forward to warming up. :)

Good morning.

16 posted on 11/25/2003 6:10:40 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

To: snippy_about_it; SAMWolf; radu; Darksheare

Good morning everyone!

17 posted on 11/25/2003 6:22:51 AM PST by Soaring Feather (I wrote this poem this morning.)

To: snippy_about_it; SAMWolf

18 posted on 11/25/2003 6:27:45 AM PST by The Mayor (Through prayer, finite man draws upon the power of the infinite God.)

Good morning feather.

19 posted on 11/25/2003 6:38:27 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

To: SAMWolf; All

Belgian Gates

The Cointet devices, known as “Belgian gates”, were heavy metal barriers mounted on wheels. They had been used in Belgium in 1939-40, as part of the country’s antitank defences. Recovered by the Germans, large numbers of them were erected as obstacles on the beaches of the Channel and the North Sea, as well as on roads, to serve as barricades.

Navy sailor leaning against 'Belgian Gate' obstacle, Omaha Beach, June 1944

abandoned 'Belgian Gates' elements at one of the former Belgian Forts
(Antwerp province, Belgium)

The beaches were also heavily fortified with hedgehogs, Belgian gates, log ramps, wooden posts, and Rommel's asparagus.

Hedgehogs are star-shaped, six-foot high obstacles that were constructed of solid steel. They were topped with mines and were designed to rip out the hull of any boat that passed over them.

Belgian gates are large pieces of steel perpendicular to the beach and facing the water. They were ten feet high and topped with antitank mines.

The log ramps and wooden posts are bits of wood angled toward the sea and topped with mines intended to destroy any passing boats.

The beaches were also covered with barb wire and minefields intended to stop any invading army from exiting the beach. By the time D-Day finally occurred, Rommel had laid 6.5 million mines and was working towards his goal of 11 million.

Rommel's asparagus is the nickname for the poles the he had driven into the ground in any field that was suitable for landing a glider, these stakes would rip the glider up when it tried to land.

20 posted on 11/25/2003 6:51:10 AM PST by snippy_about_it (Fall in --> The FReeper Foxhole. America's History. America's Soul.)

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